JUDGMENT:- This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 13-3-2002 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. Raipur in Sessions Trial No. 470/2001 convicting the accused/appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 452 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and pay fine of Rs.1000, and rigorous imprisonment for seven years and pay fine of Rs.3000 respectively, with default stipulations. 2. The judgment is challenged on the ground that the trial Court has committed an illegality in convicting and sentencing the accused/appellant as mentioned above without there being any cogent and reliable evidence available on record. 3. Case of the prosecution in brief is that on 14-10-2001 between 9 and 10 p.m. when injured Jaswant Yadav (PW-4) went for having tea, on the way accused/appellant met him and asked for chillum. On refusal by the injured, the accused/appellant started abusing him and then injured went home. Thereafter, accused/appellant went to the house of injured along with co-accused Kirti and asked him to come out of the house. When he did not come, accused/appellant went inside the house of the injured and assaulted him with knife over his abdomen and other parts of the body. Vimla Bai (PW5) who is the wife of injured, took him to the police station and lodged Dehati Nalisi Ex.P-8 and from there he was sent to Medical College Hospital, Raipur for medical examination. He was examined by Dr. Santosh Kumar Bhandari (PW-1) on the same day who found 12 incised wounds over different parts of his body out of which injury No.3 was dangerous in nature. Accused/appellant was taken into custody and he made disclosure statement relating to knife Ex. P-3 which was later recovered at his instance from under a stone near his house vide Ex. P-4. The knife was examined by the doctor vide Ex. P2 and according to him the injuries sustained by the injured could be caused by the said knife. Blood stained vest (Baniyan) was seized vide Ex. P-5. Blood stained soil and plain soil was seized vide Ex. P-6. One Bajaj Super scooter was seized vide Ex. P-7. Injured was admitted to the hospital where the perforated stab wound was repaired. Based on Dehati Nalisi FIR was registered vide Ex. P-13. Accused/appellant was arrested on 15-10-2001 Vide Ex.P-15. 4. Blood stained vest (Baniyan) was seized vide Ex. P-5. Blood stained soil and plain soil was seized vide Ex. P-6. One Bajaj Super scooter was seized vide Ex. P-7. Injured was admitted to the hospital where the perforated stab wound was repaired. Based on Dehati Nalisi FIR was registered vide Ex. P-13. Accused/appellant was arrested on 15-10-2001 Vide Ex.P-15. 4. After recording the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and completing the investigation charge sheet was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class. Raipur, who in turn committed the case to the Court of Sessions from where learned Additional Sessions Judge received the case on transfer for trial. 5. In order to establish the guilt of the accused/appellant the prosecution has examined seven witnesses. Statements of the accused/appellant and the co-accused were also recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which they denied the material appearing against them in the case of the prosecution and pleaded their innocence and false implication in the case. Present appellant has taken a specific defence that at the time of incident he was not present on the spot. He has also examined Narsing Prasad Verma (DW-l) and Chhotu Kumar Tembulkar (DW-2) in defence who have also stated that the accused/appellant was not present on the place of incident. 6. After giving opportunity of hearing to the parties the Court below has acquitted the co-accused Kirti of the charge levelled against him but convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as mentioned above. 7. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record including the judgment impugned. 8. At the outset counsel for the accused/ appellant submits that as the accused/appellant has already completed the sentence imposed on him, he would confine his argument to the legality and propriety of conviction part of the judgment only. He submits that the case of prosecution against both the accused persons rests on the same set of evidence on the basis of which co-accused Kirti has been acquitted of the charge levelled against him whereas the present appellant has been convicted without there being any additional evidence against him. He further submits that even the injured has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution: therefore, his statement being untrustworthy does not inspire confidence and cannot be safely relied upon. He further submits that even the injured has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution: therefore, his statement being untrustworthy does not inspire confidence and cannot be safely relied upon. According to the counsel for the accused/ appellant doctor has also not specifically stated that the injuries sustained by the injured were fatal in nature. In this case the injuries are said to have been caused with knife but even after the seizure the same has not been produced in the Court which has caused a serious prejudice to the accused/appellant. It is submitted that due to non production of the knife in the Court, the accused/appellant has been acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 25 of the Arms Act. The knife was sent for analysis with a view to confirm on it but the prosecution has deliberately not produced the analysis report which shows that no blood was found over the knife. Non-production of analysis report is suggestive of the innocence of the accused/appellant. Reliance is placed on the decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Ram Dayal v. State of M. P., 1986 II MPWN 103 in which it has been held that failure to recover the gun and empty cartridges is also a ground for acquittal of the accused. Further reliance is placed on the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Ghisilal v. State of M. P., 1993 (1) MPWN 161 in which it has been held that if the prosecution fails to establish the firing of Katta beyond reasonable doubt, then the accused is entitled for acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt. 9. On the other hand counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all shadow of doubt. He argued that as the injured has not stated anything against the co-accused, he was acquitted of the charges levelled against him. 10. In this case the injuries sustained by the injured have not been disputed by the defence and only the complicity of the accused/appellant in the crime in question is disputed. Injuries caused to the injured are even otherwise established from the• statement of the injured himself, Dr. Santosh Kumar Bhandari (P.W. 1), Vimla Bai (P.W. 5) and Dr. Ram Sewak Verma (P.W. 7). Injuries caused to the injured are even otherwise established from the• statement of the injured himself, Dr. Santosh Kumar Bhandari (P.W. 1), Vimla Bai (P.W. 5) and Dr. Ram Sewak Verma (P.W. 7). Injured has deposed in his evidence that he was assaulted over his abdomen and other parts of his body with knife, he became unconscious and was shifted to the hospital for treatment. Vimla Bai (P.W. 5) has categorically stated that her husband was assaulted with knife and took him to the police station and then to the hospital. Dr. Santosh Kumar Bhandari (P.W. 1) examined the injured and noticed 12 injuries over his body vide Ex. P-1. Injured was also admitted to the hospital for treatment. Dr. Ram Sewak Verma (P.W. 7) examined the injured and found stab wound over the ribs, chest, stomach and small intestine. According to him the injury over the stomach was dangerous in nature. Injured sustained 12 injuries including the injury over his abdomen which was dangerous in nature. 11. As regards complicity of the accused/ appellant in the crime in question, injured has categorically stated that at the time of incident some dispute took place between him and the accused/appellant and thereafter he came back to his house. Thereafter, accused/appellant went to his house and assaulted him with knife over his abdomen and other parts of the body as a result of which he became unconscious and was shifted to the hospital. Vimal Bai (P.W. 5) is the wife of the injured who has corroborated the evidence of her husband and stated that she took him to the police station and then to hospital where he was admitted for treatment. Dehati Nalishi Ex. P.8 has been recorded at the hospital in which the injured has specifically stated that he was assaulted by the accused/appellant. Injured has not stated anything against the co-accused and he was declared hostile by the prosecution. In his detailed cross-examination, the injured has categorically supported the case of the prosecution and deposed that the appellant is the person who entered his house and assaulted him with knife. Vimla Bai (P.W. 5), the wife of the injured has also supported the statement of her husband in her cross-examination. In his detailed cross-examination, the injured has categorically supported the case of the prosecution and deposed that the appellant is the person who entered his house and assaulted him with knife. Vimla Bai (P.W. 5), the wife of the injured has also supported the statement of her husband in her cross-examination. Appellant has examined Narsing Prasad Verma (D.W. 1) in his defence who has deposed that on the date of incident accused/appellant along Chhotu came to his house for participating in some religious function and after taking dinner they left his house at 11 p.m. Chhotu Kumar Tembulkar (D.W. 2) has also stated the same thing. However. in his cross-examination Narsing Prasad Verma (D.W. 1). the maternal uncle of the accused/appellant has stated that even on the date of evidence he was not having the knowledge that the accused/appellant assaulted the injured and police has arrested him. Chhotu Kumar Tembulkar (D.W. 2) has admitted in his cross-examination that on 15-10-2001 police arrested the accused/appellant. Thus both the defence witnesses have stated that the accused/appellant had gone to the house of the Narsing Prasad Verma (D.W. 1) at about 2 p.m. for participating in some religious function and stayed there till 11 p.m. However, neither of them has stated that the accused/appellant was invited by Narsingh to participate in the religious function. Even Narsingh Prasad Verma (D.W. 1) was not aware of the incident or arrest of the accused/appellant. This shows that both the witnesses have not seen anything and only with a view to save the accused/appellant, they have deposed before the Court. In the matter of Ram Dayal (supra) the accused was acquitted on various grounds including that of non-recovery of the weapon used in the incident. Thus the facts of that case are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the matter of Ghisilal (supra) the prosecution has failed to establish firing of Katta which is also distinguishable in this case on facts. In the present case, according to the case of the prosecution accused/appellant assaulted the injured with knife which was recovered though the same has not been produced before the Court and only because of non-production of the weapon in the Court the accused/appellant has been acquitted of the offence under Section 25/27 of the Arms Act. 12. In the present case, according to the case of the prosecution accused/appellant assaulted the injured with knife which was recovered though the same has not been produced before the Court and only because of non-production of the weapon in the Court the accused/appellant has been acquitted of the offence under Section 25/27 of the Arms Act. 12. Admittedly, the injured in the present case has lodged Dehati Nalisi in which he has categorically stated against the accused/appellant and his friend but in his statement before the Court he has not stated anything regarding the co-accused. Maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus cannot be applied mechanically as it is not applicable in India. Statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded on the ground of exaggerations, omissions and contradictions. The Court is required to separate the grains of acceptable truth from the chaff of exaggerations and improbabilities which cannot be safely or prudently accepted and acted upon. While dealing with the same question in the matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra it has been held by the Supreme Court that witnesses cannot be branded as liars in toto and their testimony rejected outright even if parts of their statements are demonstrably incorrect or doubtful. Relevant portion reads as under : "Before we discuss the evidence further, we may observe that Professor Munsterberg in a book called "On the Witness Stand" (P. 51), "Law and the Modern Mind" (see: 1949 ed. P. 106) gives instances of experiments conducted by enacting sudden unexpected the hospital for treatment. Dr. Ram Sewak Verma (P.W. 7) examined the injured and found stab wound over the ribs, Chest, stomach and small intestine. According to him the injury over the stomach was dangerous in nature. Injured sustained 12 injuries including the injury over his abdomen which was dangerous in nature. 11. As regards complicity of the accused/ appellant in the crime in question, injured has categorically stated that at the time of incident some dispute took place between him and the accused/appellant and thereafter he came back to his house. Thereafter, accused/appellant went to his house and assaulted him with knife over his abdomen and other parts of the body as a result of which he became unconscious and was shifted to the hospital. Thereafter, accused/appellant went to his house and assaulted him with knife over his abdomen and other parts of the body as a result of which he became unconscious and was shifted to the hospital. Vimal Bai (P.W. 5) is the wife of the injured who has corroborated the evidence of her husband and stated that she took him to the police station and then to hospital where he was admitted for treatment. Dehati Nalishi Ex. P.8 has been recorded at the hospital in which the injured has specifically stated that he was assaulted by the accused/appellant. Injured bas not stated anything against the co-accused and he was declared hostile by the prosecution. In his detailed cross-examination, the injured has categorically supported the case of the prosecution and deposed that the appellant is the person who entered his house and assaulted him with knife. Vimla Bai (P.W. 5), the wife of the injured has also supported the statement of her husband in her cross-examination. Appellant has examined Narsing Prasad Verma (D.W. 1) in his defence who has deposed that on the date of incident accused/appellant along Chhotu came to his house for participating in some religious function and after taking dinner they left his house at 11 p.m. Chhotu Kumar Tembulkar (D.W. 2) has also stated the same thing. However. in his cross-examination Narsing Prasad Verma (D.W. 1), the maternal uncle of the accused/appellant has stated that even on the date of evidence he was not having the knowledge that the accused/appellant assaulted the injured and police has arrested him. Chhotu Kumar Tembulkar (D.W. 2) has admitted in his cross-examination that on 15-10-2001 police arrested the accused/appellant. Thus both the defence witnesses have stated that the accused/appellant had gone to the house of the Narsing Prasad Verma (D.W. 1) at about 2 p.m. for participating in some religious function and stayed there till 11 p.m. However, neither of them has stated that the accused/appellant was invited by Narsingh to participate in the religious function. Even Narsingh Prasad Verma (D.W. 1) was not aware of the incident or arrest of the accused/appellant. This shows that both the witnesses have not seen anything and only with a view to save the accused/appellant, they have deposed before the Court. In the matter of Ram Dayal (supra) the accused was acquitted on various grounds including that of non-recovery of the weapon used in the incident. This shows that both the witnesses have not seen anything and only with a view to save the accused/appellant, they have deposed before the Court. In the matter of Ram Dayal (supra) the accused was acquitted on various grounds including that of non-recovery of the weapon used in the incident. Thus the facts of that case are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the matter of Ghisilal (supra) the prosecution has failed to establish firing of Katta which is also distinguishable in this case on facts. In the present case, according to the case of the prosecution accused/appellant assaulted the injured with knife which was recovered though the same has not been produced before the Court and only because of non-production of the weapon in the Court the accused/appellant has been acquitted of the offence under Section 25/27 of the Arms Act. 12. Admittedly, the injured in the present case has lodged Dehati Nalisi in which he has categorically stated against the accused/appellant and his friend but in his statement before the Court he has not stated anything regarding the co-accused. Maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus cannot be applied mechanically as it is not applicable in India. Statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded on the ground of exaggerations, omissions and contradictions. The Court is required to separate the grains of acceptable truth from the chaff of exaggerations and improbabilities which cannot be safely or prudently accepted and acted upon. While dealing with the same question in the matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra it has been held by the Supreme Court that witnesses cannot be branded as liars in toto and their testimony rejected outright even if parts of their statements are demonstrably incorrect or doubtful. Relevant portion reads as under: "Before we discuss the evidence further, we may observe that Professor Munsterberg in a book called "On the Witness Stand" (P. 51), "Law and the Modern Mind" (see: 1949 ed. P. 106) gives instances of experiments conducted by enacting sudden unexpected preplanned episodes before persons who were then asked to write down, soon afterwards, what they had seen and heard. P. 106) gives instances of experiments conducted by enacting sudden unexpected preplanned episodes before persons who were then asked to write down, soon afterwards, what they had seen and heard. The astounding result was : "Words were put into the mouths of men who had been silent spectators during the whole short episode; actions were attributed to the chief participants of which not the slightest trace existed; and essential parts of the tragic-comedy were completely eliminated from the memory of number of witnesses. " Hence, the Professor concluded : "We never know, or imagine". Witnesses cannot, therefore, be branded as liars in toto and their testimony rejected outright even if parts of their statements are demonstrably incorrect or doubtful. The astute Judge can separate the grains of acceptable truth from the chaff of exaggeration and improbabilities which cannot be safely prudently accepted or acted upon. It is sound commonsense to refuse to apply mechanically, in assessing the worth of necessarily imperfect human testimony, the maxim: "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus". 13. In the matter of Gorle S. Naidu v. State of A. P., AIR 2004 SC 1169 : (2004 Cri LJ 924) it has been held by the Apex Court that mere acquittal of large number of coaccused does not per se entitle others to acquittal and the Court is required to separate the grain from the chaff. Likewise, in the matter of Isar v. State of U. P., AIR 2005 SC 249 it has been held by the Apex Court that maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. While dealing with the same question in the matter of Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2008 AIR SCW 3957 : (2008 Cri LJ 3061) it has been held by the Apex Court that Maxim - Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus i.e. false in one thing, false in every thing has not received general acceptance in different jurisdiction in India Nor has this maxim come to occupy status of rule of law. Relevant portion reads thus: "9. Coming to applicability of the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of large number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. Relevant portion reads thus: "9. Coming to applicability of the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of large number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. However, where large number of other persons are accused, the Court has to carefully screen the evidence. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. 10. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing. false in everything) has not received general acceptance in different jurisdiction in India, nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded. and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called "a mandatory rule of evidence". (See Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR 1957 SC 366). Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them. so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted (See Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab. AIR 1956 SC 460). The doctrine is dangerous one specially in Indian for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. The witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story. However, true in the main. The witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story. However, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a mater of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroiders or embellishment. (See Sahrab s/s Belli Nayata v. The State of Madhya Pradesh. (1972) 3 SCC 751 : (1972 Cri LJ 1302) and Umar Ahir v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277). An attempt has to be made to in terms of Fellictous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made in discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwieolae Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 15 and Balka Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1962). As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki, AIR 1981 SC 1390, normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observations, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and these are always there however honest and truthful a witness may be material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so." 14. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so." 14. In the present case, admittedly one part of the statement of the injured Jaswant Yadav (P.W. 4) is 'demonstrably false but the other part relating to the assault made by the accused/appellant is true and the same is corroborated by the statement of Vimla Bai (P.W. 5) as well as the medical evidence and being trustworthy it inspires confidence of the Court. 15. For the foregoing reasons I am of the considered opinion that the judgment of the trial does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity warranting interference in appeal. The Court -below has rightly placed reliance on the statements of the witnesses while convicting and sentencing the accused/appellant as mentioned above. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of sub-stance is liable to be dismissed. It is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.