JUDGMENT DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, C.J. — This writ petition has been filed to set aside the notification dated 10.12.2003 (Annex.-10) by which the petitioner has been dismissed from service after hold¬ing the departmental proceedings and further to reinstate him in service with back wages. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the petitioner, while working as a Munsif in 1993 in the judgeship of Cuttack, decided three suits on priority basis in which it was alleged that one of his relatives had been the plaintiff. On receiving the complaint this Court on administra¬tive side called for the record and issued a show cause to the petitioner initiating a preliminary inquiry. The petitioner filed a show cause dated 18.12.1993 (Annex.-2) explaining that the allegations were false and none of the parties in the suit was his relative. After considering petitioner’s reply this Court decided to initiate the departmental proceedings against him. The petitioner was put under suspension in the year 1995 while he was working at Malkangiri in the judge ship of Koraput. Charge sheet dated 8.2.1996 (Annex.-3) was served upon the petitioner. Peti¬tioner filed written statement dated 24.4.1996 (Annex.4) in defence denying all the charges levelled against him. However, after considering the same this Court appointed Shri G. Narasim¬ham, the then District and Sessions Judge, Cuttack as the Inquiry Officer, who conducted the inquiry and submitted the inquiry re¬port. This Court considered the report of the Inquiry Officer, but it did not accept the same. Rather it had taken a decision to hold de novo inquiry and the said decision was communicated to the petitioner by the Joint Registrar of this Court vide letter dated 18.12.1998. By the said order suspension of the petitioner was revoked as the de novo inquiry was likely to take some time. Shri N.P. Rout, the then Registrar (I & E) of this Court was appointed as the Inquiry Officer, who conducted the inquiry and submitted the report on 3.5.2000 (Annex-7) by which the charges were found proved against the petitioner. Second show cause dated 29.11.2000 (Annex.-8) was issued to the petitioner and petitioner submitted his reply dated 8.1.2001 (Annex.9). Same was considered and this Court resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service. Recommendation so made was accepted by the Government and accord¬ingly, notification dated 10.12.2003 (Annex.-10) dismissing him from service was issued. Hence this petition. 3. Second show cause dated 29.11.2000 (Annex.-8) was issued to the petitioner and petitioner submitted his reply dated 8.1.2001 (Annex.9). Same was considered and this Court resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service. Recommendation so made was accepted by the Government and accord¬ingly, notification dated 10.12.2003 (Annex.-10) dismissing him from service was issued. Hence this petition. 3. Shri Jagannath Patnaik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that in the absence of any statutory provision enabling the High Court to hold second/de novo inquiry, the order to hold de novo inquiry was illegal and there was nothing on record on the basis of which de novo inquiry was warranted as the first inquiry had been conducted strictly in accordance with law and it ought to have been accepted by the Court. More so, the second inquiry report is perverse being based on no evidence. Rather the second inquiry report has been submit¬ted without taking into consideration the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.8. Therefore, the petition deserves to be allowed. 4. On the other hand, Mr. P.K. Khuntia, learned Additional Government Advocate has vehemently opposed the petition contend¬ing that even in the absence of statutory rules there cannot be any bar on the disciplinary authority to initiate a second/de novo inquiry if it is satisfied that there has been some lacuna in holding the earlier inquiry. In case the principles of natural justice or the procedure prescribed in the statute has not been followed, there may be miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the disciplinary authority always has the right to order de novo inquiry. More so, the earlier inquiry report has not been accept¬ed nor acted upon. Proceedings stand concluded only when the final order of punishment or exoneration is passed by the disci¬plinary authority. In the instant case, the earlier inquiry has not been conducted properly. Therefore, the High Court took the decision to hold a fresh inquiry. No fault can be found in the direction for holding second/de novo inquiry. The earlier prelim¬inary enquiry was abandoned by the Court in 1998 and de novo enquiry was directed to be held. Petitioner participated in the enquiry without raising any objection. The same stood concluded vide impugned order of punishment dated 10.12.2003. No fault can be found in the direction for holding second/de novo inquiry. The earlier prelim¬inary enquiry was abandoned by the Court in 1998 and de novo enquiry was directed to be held. Petitioner participated in the enquiry without raising any objection. The same stood concluded vide impugned order of punishment dated 10.12.2003. Petitioner is estopped by his conduct to raise the issue of holding the de novo enquiry because of his participation without protest for a period of six years and he cannot be permitted to take the issue at such a belated stage. Thus, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. We have heard the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The issue of competence to direct de novo inquiry is no more res integra. 7. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.R. Dev v. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC 1447 considered the statutory provisions of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 in this respect and held as under : “It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particu¬lar case there has been no proper inquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not exam¬ined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in rule 15 for completely setting aside previous in¬quiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evi¬dence itself and come to its own conclusion under rule 9.” (emphasis added) 8. The matter was reconsidered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in The State of Assam & Anr. v. J.N. Roy Biswas, AIR 1975 SC 2277 and after considering the application of doctrine of double jeopardy, the Court held as under : “We may however make it clear that no government servant can urge that if for some technical or other good ground, procedural or other, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law that a second enquiry cannot be launched. It can be; but once a disciplinary case has closed and the official rein¬stated, presumably on full exoneration, a chagrined Government cannot re-start the exercise in absence of specific power to review or revise, vested by the rules in some authority. The basis of the rule of law cannot be breached without legal provi¬sion or other vitiating factor invalidating the earlier enquiry.....’ (emphasis added) 9. In State of Punjab & Anr. v. Kashmir Singh, (1996) 10 SCC 356 , a similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court observing that there must be sufficient reasons and compelling circumstances to hold a fresh inquiry. However, the question of holding second inquiry does not arise, in case the earlier in¬quiry report has been accepted and acted upon and the proceedings stood concluded. 10. In Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra, AIR 1998 SC 2713 it was held that the departmental proceedings stand concluded with the final decision of the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the proceedings attain finality. When after acceptance of the inquiry report and considering the reply of the delinquent, the disciplinary authority passes an order imposing punishment or exonerating him. 11. In Union of India & Ors. v. P. Thayagarajan, AIR 1999 SC 499, the Apex Court reconsidered its earlier judgment in K.R. Deb (supra) and explained the same observing as under : “A careful reading of this passage will make it clear that this Court notices that if in a particular case where there has been no proper enquiry because of some serious defect having crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence but that provision would not enable the Disci¬plinary Authority to set aside the previous enquiries on the ground that the report of the Enquiry Officer does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. In the present case the basis upon which the Disciplinary Authority set aside the enquiry is that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer was contrary to the relevant rules and affects the rights of the parties and not that the report does not appeal to him. In the present case the basis upon which the Disciplinary Authority set aside the enquiry is that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer was contrary to the relevant rules and affects the rights of the parties and not that the report does not appeal to him. When important evidence, either to be relied upon by the department or by the delinquent official, is shut out, this would not result in any advancement of any justice but on the other hand results in a miscarriage thereof. Therefore, we are of the view that Rule 27(c) enables the Disciplinary Authority to record his findings on the report and to pass an appropriate order including ordering a de novo enquiry in a case of present nature. ....... the Disciplinary Authority will have to be satisfied with the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer before passing an order. It does not stand the logic that in a given case the appellate authority could order a fresh enquiry and not the Disciplinary Authority at whose instance the enquiry began and which is not satisfied with the enquiry held for some vital defects in the procedure adopted. .......” (emphasis added) 12. In Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906, the Apex Court considered the issue of double jeopardy, initiation of second enquiry on the same charges and considered its earlier judgment in Lt. Governor, Delhi v. HC Narinder Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 342 ; wherein it had been held that once after holding the enquiry punishment had been imposed, the enquiry comes to an end and it is not permissible for the disci¬plinary authority to issue show cause again on the same mis-conduct as it would amount to double jeopardy. The Court came to the conclusion that in a case where enquiry stood concluded and final order of exoneration has been passed, the question of initiation of second enquiry/de novo enquiry does not arise. But where in the earlier proceedings, no finding had been recorded and it did not attain finality, there could be no bar in initiating the second/de novo enquiry. 13. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarized that generally de novo or fresh inquiry is permissible only if the statute so provides. But where in the earlier proceedings, no finding had been recorded and it did not attain finality, there could be no bar in initiating the second/de novo enquiry. 13. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarized that generally de novo or fresh inquiry is permissible only if the statute so provides. But in case a departmental proceedings suffered from some fundamental procedural error, i.e., evidence has not been properly recorded or material witnesses were not available or they were not in a position to depose or the delin¬quent or the department had not been permitted to cross-examine any of the witnesses in such a situation de novo inquiry is permissible. However, de novo inquiry is not permissible merely on the ground that the inquiry report which is in favour of the delinquent does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. More so the decision to hold de novo inquiry must be taken prior to acting upon the report of the earlier Inquiry Officer and conclu¬sion of the departmental proceedings. In the instant case, the earlier enquiry report had not been accepted nor acted upon. The Court on administrative side was of the opinion that the enquiry had not been conducted properly. Therefore, it cannot be held that in such a fact situation the second enquiry could not have been held. 14. Admittedly, in the instant case, the earlier enquiry report was submitted in 1998. The Court did not accept it and acted upon, rather took a decision to have the de novo proceeding. The petitioner participated in the enquiry by all means without raising any protest. Even in the second show cause, no such issue was raised. In the writ petition, it has not been mentioned as to under what circumstances and under what manner, initiation of de novo enquiry had prejudiced his cause in case the earlier enquiry had not been conducted properly. No explana¬tion could be furnished by Sri Patnaik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner as to under what circumstances the issue had not been agitated by the petitioner during the enquiry. 15. In P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 2064 ; the Apex Court examined an issue agitated on behalf of the delinquent employee as to whether initiation of enquiry at a belated stage stood vitiated because of delay on the part of the Disciplinary Authority. 15. In P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 2064 ; the Apex Court examined an issue agitated on behalf of the delinquent employee as to whether initiation of enquiry at a belated stage stood vitiated because of delay on the part of the Disciplinary Authority. The Apex Court applying the doctrine of acquiescence repelled the contention observing as under :- “The validity of the disciplinary proceeding and/or justi¬fiability thereof on the ground of delay or otherwise had never been raised by the appellant before any forum. It was not his case either before the appellate authority or before the High Court by reason of any delay in holding the disciplinary proceed¬ing, he has been prejudiced in any manner. It is true that delay itself may be a ground for arriving at a finding that enquiry proceeding was vitiated in the event it is shown that by reason thereof the delinquent officer has been prejudiced,.........the appellant did not raise the question of delay before any forum whatsoever. He did not raise such a question even before the disciplinary authority. He not only took part therein without any demur whatsoever, but, as noticed hereinbefore, cross-examined the witnesses and entered into the defence.” 16. Acquiescence, being the principle of equity, must be made applicable in a case where the order has been passed and complied with without raising any objection. 17. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in M/s. Pannalal Binjraj & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1957 SC 397 , had explained the scope of estoppel observing that once an order is passed against a person and without raising any objec¬tion he submits to the jurisdiction or complies with such order, he cannot be permitted to challenge the said order merely because he could not succeed there, for the reason that such conduct of that person would disentitle him for any relief before the Court. A similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Manak Lal Advocate v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi & Ors., AIR 1957 SC 425 ; and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 329 . 18. A similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Manak Lal Advocate v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi & Ors., AIR 1957 SC 425 ; and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 329 . 18. When a candidate appears at the examination without protest and is subsequently found to be not successful in the examination, question of entertaining a petition at his behest challenging the procedure adopted in the said examination would not arise. (Vide Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 2428 ; Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan & Ors. AIR 1978 SC 1814 ; Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1043 ; Madan Lal & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1088 ; Union of India & Anr. v. N. Chandrasekharan & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 795 ; Utkal University & Ors. v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 943 ; State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Anil Kumar Sunil Kumar & Party & Anr., AIR 2000 SC 1441 ; and Vijay Syal & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 4023 ). 19. In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Krishan Niwas, AIR 1997 SC 2349 , the Apex Court examined a case where the services of the employee were terminated in exercise of the powers under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution. The Appellate Court reduced the punishment imposed by the trial Court. In the Departmental Ap¬peal, the order of dismissed was also converted into that of a lesser punishment. The employee had acted upon it and joined the post. He was held not entitled to challenge the reduced punish¬ment as principle of estoppel/acquiescence was attracted. 20. In M/s. Power Control Appliances & Ors. v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 448 the Apex Court held as under :- “Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the rights..... It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim... It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as involved in laches.... The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the inference of a licence sufficient to create a new right in the defendant....” 21. It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim... It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as involved in laches.... The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the inference of a licence sufficient to create a new right in the defendant....” 21. In action in every case does not lead to an inference of implied consent or acquiescence as has been held by the Apex Court in P. John Chandy & Co. (P) Ltd. v. John P. Thomas, AIR 2002 SC 2057 . Thus, the Court has to examine the facts and circum¬stances in an individual case. 22. In the instant case petitioner for the reasons best known to him did not raise the issue of initiation of de novo enquiry at all, rather participated in the enquiry without pro¬test. We fail to understand as to how he can be permitted to urge this ground at such a belated stage. 23. We may now proceed to consider the enquiry report dated 3.5.2000 submitted by the Registrar (I & E)-cum-Enquiring Offi¬cer, Orissa High Court, Cuttack. The charges framed against the petitioner-delinquent are noted hereunder : Charge No.1 :- Knowing fully well that the plaintiffs name¬ly, (a) Shri Panchanan Behera alias Pradhan, the father-in-law of your younger brother, Shri Dinabandhu Behera. (b) Shri Guru Charan Mohanty, the father of your Bench Clerk and (c) Premalata Das, the wife of the Sheristadar of your Court, you disposed of T.S. No.25/93 filed on 8.1.93 in their favour on 10.5.93, i.e., within 4 months of the institution of the suit and thus there are reasons to believe prima facie that you took such special interest and gave the aforementioned case preference over other year-old cases and disposed of the same in favour of the plaintiffs with undue haste upon extraneous consideration in order to serve the interest of your said relative and other personal acquaintance and thus acted in a manner unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and committed misconduct while discharging your judicial function. Charge No.2 :- It further appears that you took special interest in T.S. No.211/93 in which Shri Panchanan Behera alias Pradhan, the father-in-law of your younger brother, Dinabandhu Behera was one of the plaintiffs. Charge No.2 :- It further appears that you took special interest in T.S. No.211/93 in which Shri Panchanan Behera alias Pradhan, the father-in-law of your younger brother, Dinabandhu Behera was one of the plaintiffs. It also further appears that you took special interest in the aid case for extraneous consideration in order to benefit your such relation and thus it prima facie appears that you acted in a manner unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and com¬mitted misconduct while discharging your judicial function. Charge No.3 :- It appears from the record that you dealt with T.S. 25/93 and T.S. 211/93 and T.S. 338/93 in which the father-in-law of your younger brother was one the plaintiffs and thereby you acted contrary to the established practice and judicial propriety and your such conduct appears to be motivated and unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. Charge No.4 :- It appears that in reply to enquiry made by the High Court, you denied any relationship with said Panchanan Behera alias Pradhan although it prima facie appears that Shri Panchanan Behera is the father-in-law of your younger brother which indi¬cates that you deliberately furnished incorrect information in order to conceal your relationship with Sri Panchanan Behera alias Pradhan and misled the High Court and thus prima facie it appears that you have acted upon in a manner unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and committed misconduct in the general sense and also within the meaning of Rule-3 of the Orissa Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1959. 24. The Marshalling Officer has stated to have examined as many fourteen witnesses and the petitioner-delinquent while denying the charges did not examine any witnesses on his behalf, stating that his written statement may be accepted as evidence from his side. The Enquiring Officer in order to determine the charges framed against the petitioner-delinquent framed the fol¬lowing issues for determination:- (a) Whether Panchanan Behera alias Pradhan is the father-in-law of the younger brother of the delinquent ? (b) Whether the relations of the staff of the delinquent, the father-in-law of the younger brother of the delinquent and other parties are well acquainted with the delinquent ? (c) Whether deliberately the delinquent has taken special interest for extraneous consideration in order to show favour to them ? 25. (b) Whether the relations of the staff of the delinquent, the father-in-law of the younger brother of the delinquent and other parties are well acquainted with the delinquent ? (c) Whether deliberately the delinquent has taken special interest for extraneous consideration in order to show favour to them ? 25. After perusing the entire evidence on record he came to answer the aforesaid issues framed against the petitioner-delinquent in the following manner :- (a) The delinquent, being aware of the fact that plaintiff No.9 and plaintiff No.2 in T.S. 25/93 and T.S. 211/93 respectively is the father-in-law of his younger brother, has deposed of T.S. 25/93 hastily and was dealing with T.S. 211/93. (b) The manner in which the T.S. 25/93 has been disposed of indicates that the delinquent, staff, concerned lawyers, con¬cerned Advocate’s Clerk, and the brother of the shop-keeper having Electronic shop close to the Court have joined hands to grab the land of the Government. (c) The delinquent in order to escape from the proceeding has lied in saying that he was not aware of the fact that the father-in-law of his younger brother was plaintiff No.2 and plaintiff No.9, in T.S. 211/93 and T.S.25/93. After having come to the aforesaid findings, the Enquiring Officer found the petitioner-delinquent guilty of all the charges. 26. Mr. Jagannath Patnaik, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, advanced a contention that, Panchanan Pradhan, alias Behera who is one of the plaintiffs in T.S. 25/93 was not the father-in-law of the petitioner-delinquent’s younger brother. It is submitted that the petitioner was a permanent resident of Brajarajnagar in the district of Sambalpur and that the marriage of the petitioner’s younger brother was solemnized at Brajarajnagar and all pre and post marriage correspondences were made at the address of Panchanan Pradhan @ Behera at Braja¬rajnagar. It is further averred that the only occasion for the petitioner to see the father-in-law of his younger brother was during the marriage. After one year of such marriage due to family dispute the petitioner-delinquent and his younger brother they are no more in visiting terms. It is further averred that the only occasion for the petitioner to see the father-in-law of his younger brother was during the marriage. After one year of such marriage due to family dispute the petitioner-delinquent and his younger brother they are no more in visiting terms. It is further submitted that the petitioner being a judicial officer and not being a native of Kendrapara District had no occasion to know the relation of his staff and he contends none of his staff brought to his notice that the father of the Bench Clerk and the wife of his Sheristadar were also co-plaintiffs along with other plaintiffs in TS 25/93. It is further submitted that T.S. 25/93 was disposed of early since the parties to the proceeding including the defendant took prompt steps in the matter and no pressurize was given out of turn hearing of the suit and there could not have been established that the petition¬er took any special interest in disposal of the suit. It is further contended that in T.S. 211/93 the plaintiff namely, Panchanan Pradhan was not the father-in-law of the peti¬tioner’s younger brother and that Panchanan Pradhan, plaintiff in T.S. 25/93 was not the same plaintiff Panchanan Pradhan in T.S.211/93 since the signatures of two Panchanan Pradhan, do not tally. It is further averred that Panchanan Pradhan plaintiff in T.S. No.25/93 had not adduced any evidence in the said suit and during the hearing of the said suit no party informed the peti¬tioner that the said Panchanan Pradhan was the father-in-law- of his younger brother and therefore it is not possible on his part to know that the plaintiff in T.S. No.25/93, resident of Kendra¬para was in fact the father-in-law of his younger brother and therefore, he denied having furnished any incorrect information deliberately to the Hon’ble Court. It is alleged by the petition¬er that the evidence of the prosecution witness Nos.1 to 8 has not been taken into consideration by the Enquiring Officer, therefore, it become necessary on our part to peruse the said evidence. 27. P.W.-1 Umakanta Mohanty, was the Bench Clerk of Munsif, Kendrapara, i.e., the present petitioner and in his evidence he states that during his tenure as Bench Clerk of the petitioner, T.S. No.25/93 was filed on 15.1.1993 originally by five plain¬tiffs including plaintiff No.3 the Bench Clerk’s father. 27. P.W.-1 Umakanta Mohanty, was the Bench Clerk of Munsif, Kendrapara, i.e., the present petitioner and in his evidence he states that during his tenure as Bench Clerk of the petitioner, T.S. No.25/93 was filed on 15.1.1993 originally by five plain¬tiffs including plaintiff No.3 the Bench Clerk’s father. He further states that the written statement was filed on 25.2.1993, i.e., on the date fixed for appearance of the defendant and the case was adjourned to 4.3.1993. On 4.3.1993 issues were settled and the case was adjourned to 17.3.1993 for filing of documents as well as the list of witnesses. On 17.3.1993 list of witnesses and documents were filed and the case was adjourned to 7.4.1993 for hearing of the suit. It is further stated that no document was filed along with the plaint and suit documents were actually filed on 17.3.1993 when the matter stood adjourned to 7.4.1993 for hearing. On 29.3.1993, i.e., before 7.4.1993 (date for hear¬ing) a petition under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. was filed to im¬plead some other plaintiffs and it was directed that the matter may be considered on 7.4.1993. On the said date, i.e., 7.4.1993 since no objection was filed, although specific order had been passed to file objection by the said date, the matter was ad¬journed to 16.4.1993 for orders. It is at this stage that the petition under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. was allowed and the plain¬tiff Nos.6 to 10 was allowed to be impleaded as co-plaintiffs. It is important to take note of the fact that amongst these plain¬tiffs who were impleaded by way of amendment is the name of Panchanan Pradhan, allegedly the father-in-law of the petition¬er’s younger brother. So after the impletion of Panchanan Pradhan as co-plaintiff on 16.4.1993 arguments were heard and judgment was delivered on 10.5.1993 decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs by declaring their right, title and interest over Ac.51.29 decimals of land. This witness (Bench Clerk of the petitioner) claimed that while plaintiff No.3 was indeed his father, yet, he had no knowledge about the filing of such a suit since allegedly he was not in talking terms with his father. This witness (Bench Clerk of the petitioner) claimed that while plaintiff No.3 was indeed his father, yet, he had no knowledge about the filing of such a suit since allegedly he was not in talking terms with his father. In cross-examination he has stated that Sri Goura Prashad Mohapatra, Advocate (Additional Government Pleader) had not raised any question regarding non-filing of suit documents at the time of presenting the written statement and nor the said advo¬cate ever sought any time to file the written statement. 28. Prosecution witness No.2 one Sri Prasanna Kumar Sahoo, stenographer to Munsif, Kendrapara (Petitioner) in his examination in chief admits that plaintiff No.8 in T.S. No.25/93 was his father, but he claims that he had no knowledge that his father was involved in the said suit. The said witness further admits that at the relevant time Sri Sarat Chandra Das was the Sherista¬dar in the Court of Munsif, Kendrapara but he could not say if plaintiff No.4 in T.S. No.25/93 Smt. Premalata Dash was or was not the wife of Sri Sarath Chandra Dash. 29. Prosecution witness No.3 one Sri Gangadhar Palei, learned advocate of Kendrapara Bar Association who along with one Bibhutibhusan Bhuyan had appeared for original plaintiffs No.1 to 5. He states that these plaintiffs had come along with plaintiff No.1 Gunadhar Bera and the plaint was drafted in accordance with the instruction of his client. He asserts that plaintiff No.1 did not disclose before him that plaintiff No.4 Smt. Premalata Das was the wife of Sheristadar (Sarat Chandra Das) of the Munsif Court, Kendrapara. 30. Prosecution witness No.4 one Sri Niranjan Samal was the plaintiff No.6 in T.S. No.25/93. This plaintiff along with the plaintiffs 7 to 10 sought for implication as plaintiffs in T.S. No.25/93 and the same was allowed by an order dated 16.4.2003 and the judgment was passed on 10.5.2003. Although he claims that his father had been cultivating a part of the suit schedule land since last fifty years, he admits that he had never seen the land and does not possess any document pertaining to the said land. 31. Prosecution witness No.5 one Sri Balakrushna Behera, who was plaintiff in a civil suit bearing number T.S. 211/93, states that Panchanan Behera plaintiff No.2 therein was his brother being the son of his father’s elder brother and was “Keuta” by caste. 31. Prosecution witness No.5 one Sri Balakrushna Behera, who was plaintiff in a civil suit bearing number T.S. 211/93, states that Panchanan Behera plaintiff No.2 therein was his brother being the son of his father’s elder brother and was “Keuta” by caste. He further states that Ananda Behera was the father of Panchanan Behera and that there was no other Panchanan Behera except his cousin in his village Jadupur under Police Station Patkura in the district of Kendrapara. The said witness further states that since fifty years “Panchanan Behera is resid¬ing outside his village at Brajarajnagar.” 32. Prosecution witness No.6 one Sri Niranjan Patnaik denied to have signed on any Vakalatnama in T.S. No.211/93. Prosecution witness No.7 one Sri Susanta Behera has stated that Panchanan Behera son of Ananda Behera of his village is my uncle and states that he was plaintiff in T.S. No.338/93. In his cross-examination he states that all the children of Panchanan Behera have been born at Brajarajnagar. 33. Prosecution witness No.8 one Sri Gunadhar Bera was plaintiff No. 1 in T.S. No.25/93. He claims to know plaintiff Nos.2 to 5 but claims ignorance of the fact as to whether plaintiff No.3 was the father of the-then Peskar Umakanta Mohanty as well as whether Smt. Premlata Das plaintiff No.4 was the wife of Sri Sarat Ch. Das, Sheristadar of Munsif Court, Kendrapara. He also denied the knowledge as to whether plaintiff No.2 was the father of Nityananda Swain, the registered clerk of their Advocate Sri B.B. Bhuyan. He also could not say as to whether plaintiff No.5 was the brother of Guru Charana Mohanty who was the Government pleader’s clerk then. But he claims that he did not know who was Panchanan Behera, who had implicated him-self in the suit. 34. Prosecution witness No.9 one Sri Goura Prasad Mohapa¬tra, who was Government Advocate in the year 1993 appeared on behalf of the State Government in T.S. No.25/93. He admits that Guru Charana Mohanty who was his clerk, could not state as to whether plaintiff No.5 was the elder brother of said Guru Charana Mohanty. 35. Prosecution witness No.10 one Sri Pradipta Kumar Das states that he was the Advocate for the plaintiffs in T.S. No.211/93. He claims that plaintiff No.2 therein alias Pradhan had signed the plaint in his presence and the said plaintiff was an Oriya person belongs to village Jadupur. 35. Prosecution witness No.10 one Sri Pradipta Kumar Das states that he was the Advocate for the plaintiffs in T.S. No.211/93. He claims that plaintiff No.2 therein alias Pradhan had signed the plaint in his presence and the said plaintiff was an Oriya person belongs to village Jadupur. He further admits that plaintiff No.1 to 3 were related as brothers and sons of Ananda Behera. In his cross-examination he has stated that plain¬tiff No.2 claimed that although his name was Panchanan Pradhan though he was Panchanan Behera, he signed in the Vakalatnama as Panchanan Pradhan. He further states that the signature of Pan¬chanan Pradhan in T.S. No.211/93 does not tally with the signa¬ture of Panchanan Behera in T.S. No.25/93. 36. Prosecution witness No.11 one Sri Adhikari Pravat Kumar Das states that he knows Panchanan Behera of village Jadu¬pur who states that the said Panchanan Behera had changed his surname as “Pradhan”. He further states that the wife of Panchan¬an Behera had filed a suit and the said witness was an advocate for the defendant in that suit bearing T.S. No.213/85 in the Court of Munsif, Kendrapara. He states that he knows that Pan¬chanan has got a daughter namely, Manorama and that she had married the younger brother of the delinquent. He further states that in T.S. No.211/93 Panchanan Pradhan alias Behera was one of the plaintiff in which the witness had appeared on behalf of the defendant Natabara alias Batakrushna Biswal. He further claims to have seen Panchanan Behera was coming to the Court. The said witness also states that Guru Charana Mohanty, who was Government Pleader’s clerk in T.S. No.25/93 and his younger brother namely Harekrushna Mohanty was the plaintiff No.5 in T.S. No.25/93. He further states that Smt. Premlata Das plaintiff No.4 in T.S. No.25/93 was the wife of the-then Sheristadar Sarat Chandra Das and plaintiff No.3 was the father of the then Bench Clerk Umakan¬ta Mohanty, Plaintiff No.8 Bhramananda Sahoo was the father Pra¬sanna Kumar Sahoo, Stenographer to Munsif, Kendrapara and Plain¬tiff No.2 Sindhu Swain was the father of Nityananda Swain who was the plaintiffs advocate’s clerk. He further states that in T.S. No.211/93 Panchanan and his two brothers all are sons of Ananda Behera has been arrayed as plaintiff Nos.1 to 3 and that Panchanan plaintiff No.2 in T.S. No.211/93 and Panchanan plaintiff No.9 in T.S. No.25/93 is one and same person belonging to village Jadupur and the said Pan¬chanan is the father-in-law of the Presiding Officer. 37. Prosecution witness No.12 one Sri Hadibandhu Behera, Advocate states that he knows Panchan Behera @ Pradhan and that his Clerk had identified Panchanan Behera prior to 1993. He further states that his Clerk Kailash Chan Jena had informed him that Panchanan Behera @ Pradhan is the father-in-law of the younger brother of the delinquent, whereafter he claims to have discussed with Panchanan Behera @ Pradhan who confirmed the aforesaid fact. 38. Prosecution witness No.13 one Sri Kulamani Das who is permanent resident of village Jadupur. He states that he knows Panchanan Pradhan @ Behera of village Jadupur and that his elder daughter had married to Dinabandhu, the younger brother of the delinquent Gokha Behera. He further states that when a newspaper article regarding grabbing of Government lands by the relations of the Munsif was published, there was a meeting held in the Bar from which they came to now from the certified copy that the said connected suit, then the father-in-law of the younger brother of the delinquent has got favourable order in T.S. No.25/93. He also states about all other co-plaintiffs in the suit such as the-then Peskar, wife of the-then Sheristadar, father of the Stenographer and brother of the Government Advocate’s Clerks apart from the father-in-law of the delinquent younger brother. In cross-examination he also states that said Panchanan Behera was resid¬ing at Brajarajnagar since last thirty years. The said witness further states that after delinquent joined as Munsif at Kendra¬para, the said Panchanan Behera met with him in two occasions while he was coming from the house of the Munsif and told him that the younger brother of the Munsif (delinquent) was his son-in-law. 39. Prosecution witness No.14 one Sri Rudra Prasanna Sahoo who was Tahasildar of Marshaghai had submitted a inquiry report regarding the identity of said Panchanan Behera @ Pradhan and proved his own report which was marked Exhibit-1 as well as the report of the Collector on the self-same issue marked Exhibit-2. 39. Prosecution witness No.14 one Sri Rudra Prasanna Sahoo who was Tahasildar of Marshaghai had submitted a inquiry report regarding the identity of said Panchanan Behera @ Pradhan and proved his own report which was marked Exhibit-1 as well as the report of the Collector on the self-same issue marked Exhibit-2. The said witness further states that the report marked Exhibit-1 reveals that Dinabandhu Behera, son-in-law of Panchanan Pradhan was staying at Banki. 40. On consideration of oral evidence recorded in the course of disciplinary proceeding the following facts are emanat¬ed. (1) That Panchanan Behera @ Pradhan, resident of village Jadupur, P.S. Patkura, District-Kendrapara is the father-in-law of Sri Dinabandhu Behera. (2) Sri Dinabandhu Behera resident of village Bedapur, P.S. Banki, District-Cuttack is the brother of the delinquent Gokha Behera. (3) Sri Guru Charana Mohanty of village Nilakanthapur, P.S. Pattamundei, District-Kendrapara is the father of Sri Uma Mohanty (delinquent’s Bench Clerk). (4) Smt. Pramila Das of village Bharatpur, P.S./District-Kendrapara is the wife of Sarat Ch. Das (Delinquent’s Sireshta¬dar). (5) Sri Brahmananda Sahoo of At/PO/District- Kendrapara (since dead) was the father of Sri Prasanna Kumar Sahoo (Delin¬quent’s Stenographer). 31. From the aforesaid facts it is clearly and conclusively established that the delinquent as well as the office staff of the delinquent have actively participated in attempting to de¬fraud the State Government a very valuable land belonging to the State. The petitioner-delinquent and his various office staff have clearly colluded in order to bring unlawful gain to them¬selves through their near and dear relatives. These facts by themselves are so shocking to one’s judicial conscience that, we cannot, but while deprecating such gross misuse of judicial authority by the delinquent-petitioner we have no other option than to dismiss the writ application with a note of caution that disciplinary proceeding especially in cases where lack of integ¬rity of the delinquent is involved, steps should be taken to complete such proceedings at an early date preferably within a period of six months of framing of the charge sheet. While the allegation, on the basis of which the petitioner was departmen¬tally proceeded with, relates to the year 1993 yet, the proceed¬ings ultimately concluded only on 16th December, 2003 by the issue of the notification dismissing the petitioner-delinquent from service, we are of the considered view that an officer like the petitioner-delinquent, ought not to have been permitted to continue to discharge judicial duty for a period of more than ten years, after initiation of the disciplinary proceeding. Such matter ought to be taken-up with utmost haste in order to ensure that the faith of the common man is retained in the institution of the judiciary. I. MAHANTY, J. I agree. Application dismissed.