JUDGMENT:- Petitioner has tendered an application seeking amendment to the petition being Civil Application No.3115/09. The petitioner by this application wants to bring on record certain developments those have occurred after presentation of the petition. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and respective respondents. Application seeking amendment is allowed. Petitioner shall carry out amendment forthwith. 2. This court on 17-3-2009 while issuing notice made it clear that the petition is likely to be disposed of finally at the stage of admission. The matter as such was adjourned to 24-3-2009. 3. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the parties, the matter is taken up for final disposal at admission stage. 4. Petitioner herein is challenging the order passed by the State Government under section 55-A of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township Act, 1965 in respect of his removal from the post of the President from the date of passing of the order. It has also been directed in the order passed by the State Government that the petitioner shall be disqualified to contest election for further period of six years from the date of passing of the order. 5. Some of the uncontroverted facts are thus:- Petitioner has been allotted plot admeasuring 15 ft. X 40 ft. on lease basis by the Municipal Council, Osmanabad for a period of II months since 19-7-1976. Further lease was created in respect of an area admeasuring 15 ft. X 15 ft. adjoining the area which was already allotted for a period of 11 months by virtue of lease deed executed between the petitioner and the Municipal Council on 10-12-1987. The duration of the lease for additional area was also for the period of 11 months. On the date of passing of the order, the petitioner was possessed of the area allotted to him in pursuant to the lease agreement executed by the Municipal Council. It is also undisputed that Regular Civil Suit No.131181 was presented by the Municipal Council seeking eviction of the petitioner. Said suit came to be decreed by the Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Osmanabad on 23-3-1984. Petitioner presented an appeal raising exception to the decree passed by the trial court being Regular Civil Appeal No.89/84 which was admitted before the District Court and the interim order of stay of execution of decree was also passed. Said suit came to be decreed by the Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Osmanabad on 23-3-1984. Petitioner presented an appeal raising exception to the decree passed by the trial court being Regular Civil Appeal No.89/84 which was admitted before the District Court and the interim order of stay of execution of decree was also passed. Stay order granted in favour of petitioner in appeal was operative till withdrawal of the appeal by the petitioner herein on 29-3-1994. It also transpires from record that in pending appeal, an application was tendered by the petitioner herein seeking leave to withdraw the appeal on the ground that there is settlement arrived at between the Municipal Council and him out of court. The first appellate court before passing the order called the Municipal Council to submit say. On behalf of the Municipal Council it was endorsed on the application that the Council has no objection for withdrawal. Accordingly, appeal was permitted to be withdrawn. It is also a matter of record that the Municipal Council had presented Darkhast for seeking execution of the decree which came to be dismissed for non-prosecution on 6-12-1999. The petitioner sought permission for erection of temporary construction and the Municipal Council in view of order passed on 15-12-1987 permitted the petitioner to raise temporary construction on a plot admeasuring 15 ft. X 15 ft. In the General Body Meeting convened on 17 -101987 the Municipal Council adopted a resolution bearing No. 124 wherein it has been resolved by the Municipal Council to withdraw the pending cases presented against five tenants. The name of the petitioner is also mentioned in the resolution, which is evident from the extract placed on record at Exh.37. It is also not a matter of dispute that the petitioner for the first time contested election from ward no.3 and got elected as a Council for of Municipal Council, Osmanabad in the year 2001. After completion of term of office as a Council for, the petitioner again contested the elections in the year 2006 and was elected as the Council for the second turn. Petitioner thereafter was elected as a President of the Municipal Council and as such, he was occupying the office till the date of passing of the impugned order. Respondent No.5 was the Council for of the Municipal Council, Osmanabad. Petitioner thereafter was elected as a President of the Municipal Council and as such, he was occupying the office till the date of passing of the impugned order. Respondent No.5 was the Council for of the Municipal Council, Osmanabad. However, by virtue of action initiated against him in respect of holding him disqualified, he was unseated. Challenge raised by him to the order in respect of his disqualification has attained finality by virtue of dismissal of Writ Petition No.3193/07 by the Division Bench of this Court. Respondent No.5 tendered complaint to the Collector on 01-02-2007 requesting therein to initiate action against the petitioner herein for holding him disqualified to occupy elected office under the provisions of sections 44, 55-A and 55-B of the Act. It is recorded in the complaint by respondent No.5 that the petitioner herein was allotted plot on lease basis for a period of II months in the year 1976 and he has failed to vacate his possession inspite of issuance of notice by the Municipal Council on 10-3-1978. It is further stated that the land in possession of the petitioner is earmarked for shopping center and as the petitioner has failed to vacate the possession, the property could not be developed. It is also contended that at the end of the period of II months mentioned in the lease agreement, there is no extension of lese granted as contemplated by section 92 of the Act, it is also further stated that the act of the petitioner in continuing with the possession of the land leased out to him after expiry of the period of lease amounts to an act of commission of encroachment. Petitioner has also not secured permission in respect of raising construction on the property and as such, has committed an offence within meaning of provisions of Municipal Law. The act of the petitioner amounts to abuse of the powers vested in him which calls for action under sections 44, 55-A and 55-B of the Act. The Chief Officer, Municipal Council, Osmanabad tendered his explanation to the Collector, Osmanabad on 30-4-2007 wherein it has been recorded that the Municipal Council has allotted the plots on lease basis since 1976 and a temporary wooden and tin shed is erected after the allotment of land on lease basis. The Chief Officer, Municipal Council, Osmanabad tendered his explanation to the Collector, Osmanabad on 30-4-2007 wherein it has been recorded that the Municipal Council has allotted the plots on lease basis since 1976 and a temporary wooden and tin shed is erected after the allotment of land on lease basis. It is specifically made clear that the petitioner has not done any act contrary to the provisions of law during his tenure as a Council for or the President. It has also been informed that there is no record to indicate that the president has at any point of time opposed the construction of shopping center on the disputed site. Report from the Town Planner, Osmanabad was called which was tendered by the concerned officer on 18-6-2007. The Town Planner is of the opinion that the continued occupation of premises by the petitioner/President of the Municipal Council is contrary to the provisions of law. It is also recorded in the report that inspite of there being a decree, possession has not been vacated by the Petitioner/President. It has also been reported that it is for the concerned office bearer to demonstrate as to how he has not violated the provisions of section 44(1)(e) of the Act. It has been reported that the burden rests on the shoulders of the concerned office bearer to demonstrate as to how he has not breached the provisions of sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act. The Collector, however, in the meantime by communication dt.25-7-2007 reported the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai to the effect that the petitioner has not committed any illegality in respect of raising illegal construction or has not encroached upon municipal property during his continuance of his tenure as a Council for or the President. However, as the complainant has requested for initiating action under sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act and that the powers to take action vests with the State Government, the application along with concerned record came to be transmitted to the State Government. The State Government issued notice on 16-5-2008 calling upon the petitioner to show cause s to why action contemplated under sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act shall not be taken against him. It is noted in the notice that an area to the extent of 40 ft X 15 ft. The State Government issued notice on 16-5-2008 calling upon the petitioner to show cause s to why action contemplated under sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act shall not be taken against him. It is noted in the notice that an area to the extent of 40 ft X 15 ft. has been allotted on lease basis for a period of II months after executing an agreement on 15-7-1976 by the Municipal Council in favour of the petitioner whereas further space adjoining the area already allotted to the extent of 15 ft. X 15 ft. has also been let out on lease basis. As such, the petitioner is allotted an area tot he extent of 55 ft. X 15 ft. There was notice issued on 10-3-1978 for vacating his occupation over the premises. However, the petitioner has not acted in consonance to the notice and is in possession of an area to the extent of 16.5 ft. X 57 ft. even after expiry of period of lease. It is also noted in the notice that the protective tin shed that has been raised over the plot is without seeking appropriate permission from the Municipal Council and as such in the absence of proper permission the construction shall be deemed to be unlawful. Suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 131/ 81 was decreed against the petitioner wherein the trial court directed imposition of cost of Rs.1,022.55/- and notice charges of Rs.30/-. However, the petitioner has failed to pay the costs and charges. The notice further recites that the aforesaid act committed by petitioner while holding the office of the President of the Municipal Council, amounts to mis-conduct. Considering the relevant aspects, the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why he shall not be declared as disqualified under the provisions of sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act from continuing as President as well as for holding him disqualified for contesting the Municipal elections for further period of six months. The petitioner was called upon to answer the notice within 10 days. Petitioner tendered his explanation to the notice on 26-6-2008. He has reiterated in reply that an area to the extent of 40 ft. X 15 ft. has been allotted to him on 15-6-1976 on lease basis under the scheme framed for the benefit of educated unemployed persons. The petitioner was called upon to answer the notice within 10 days. Petitioner tendered his explanation to the notice on 26-6-2008. He has reiterated in reply that an area to the extent of 40 ft. X 15 ft. has been allotted to him on 15-6-1976 on lease basis under the scheme framed for the benefit of educated unemployed persons. It has been brought to notice that in the year 1976 he was neither the Council for nor was holding any elected office of the Municipal Council. It is further contended that an area to the extent of 15 ft. X 15 ft. was allotted on recommendations of the Chief Manager, District Industrial Center on 24-10-1987 and said area was allotted on lease basis. It has also been brought to my notice that an amount of Rs.l,245/- has been deposited in the court of Civil Judge, Jr. Dn. Osmanabad towards cost in Regular Civil Suit No.1311l988. It has also been further contended that there was settlement reached between the Municipal Council and the tenants and in view of settlement, rent payable by tenants was enhanced three times by adopting resolution on 19-9-1991 bearing No.8!. In this view of the matter, Municipal council did not prosecute the pending execution application and the same was allowed to be dismissed for want of prosecution and necessary order to that effect was passed on 6-12-1999 in Darkhast No.47/99. It is further reiterated that in the year 1993 he was neither the Council for of the Municipal Council nor was holding any elective office. It has been brought to notice that the tin shed erected over the plot is in pursuance to the permission granted by the Chief Officer. It has been denied by the petitioner that he has raised any illegal construction. The petitioner has also denied that he has committed any encroachment as alleged. It has also been specifically contended that in his capacity as office bearer of the Municipal Council he has not done any act or omission which calls for action under sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act. The petitioner also tendered notes of his arguments with the deciding authority. Decision was rendered after hearing the concerned parties by the Chief Minister on 2-3-2009 thereby holding the petitioner responsible for the acts which according to the deciding authority amount to disgraceful conduct. 6. The petitioner also tendered notes of his arguments with the deciding authority. Decision was rendered after hearing the concerned parties by the Chief Minister on 2-3-2009 thereby holding the petitioner responsible for the acts which according to the deciding authority amount to disgraceful conduct. 6. While assailing the order, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the alleged act for which the petitioner is held responsible does not call for any action under section 55-A or 55-B of the Act. It is contended that induction of petitioner in possession of disputed premises was by adopting due process of law. It is undisputed that it is in furtherance of lease agreement executed in favour of the petitioner he was inducted in possession. When the petitioner was inducted in possession in the year 1976 or while additional area was allotted in the year 1988, he was neither the Council for of the Municipal Council nor was holding any post with the Municipal Council. The area has been allotted considering the fact that the petitioner was an educated unemployed and the additional area of 15 ft. X 15 ft. was allotted on the recommendation of the Chief Manager, District Industrial Center. Thus, induction of the petitioner over the disputed plot was by taking recourse of the provisions of law. Although, the Municipal Council took steps for evicting the petitioner by filing Regular Civil Suit No.131181, however, it has later on adopted resolution to permit the tenants including petitioner to remain in occupation of the premises. My attention was drawn to the resolution dt.l7-12-1987 adopted in the General Body Meeting of the Municipal Council, Osmanabad. Even after passing of decree in the matter, in view of change in policy, no steps were taken and the execution application was allowed to be dismissed for non-prosecution. It has also been pointed that an application was presented by petitioner in pending appeal contending therein that there is out of court settlement between the Municipal Council and the petitioner, the Municipal Council raised no objection to the application for withdrawal of appeal and specifically accorded consent. It has also been pointed that an application was presented by petitioner in pending appeal contending therein that there is out of court settlement between the Municipal Council and the petitioner, the Municipal Council raised no objection to the application for withdrawal of appeal and specifically accorded consent. The act of permitting the petitioner to withdraw the appeal without raising objection to contents of application and the act of allowing the pending execution application to be dismissed for non-prosecution and further adoption of resolution in the year 1987 thereby permitting the petitioner to continue to occupy the premises leads to irresistible conclusion that the petitioner continued in possession with the consent of the Municipal Council and in view of the settlement reached between them. It was also pointed out that the rent payable by the tenants in occupation including petitioner was enhanced three times since 1987. It has also been contended that for all these years right from 1976 till 2008, the petitioner continued to pay the rent and the same has been accepted by the Municipal Council. It has also been brought to the notice that in respect of raising temporary construction over the premises, permission from the Chief Officer was secured and copy of the permission letter dt.15-12-1987 is placed on record. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the continued occupation of the petitioner of the premises since 1976 cannot be branded as encroachment. The fact that the petitioner continued to pay rent and the same was accepted by the Municipal Council from 1976 till 2008 is to be taken into account. It has also been brought to the notice that since the date of his assumption of office has elected Council for in 2001, till 2008, it has not been alleged that the petitioner has committed any positive act which can be construed as disgraceful act or mis-conduct as contemplated under provisions of sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act. There is absolutely no adverse action initiated since his election as a Council for i.e. since 2001 till 2008 in respect of eviction out of premises in question. Whatever allegations are made those are in respect of alleged acts prior to assumption of his office as a Council for. There is absolutely no adverse action initiated since his election as a Council for i.e. since 2001 till 2008 in respect of eviction out of premises in question. Whatever allegations are made those are in respect of alleged acts prior to assumption of his office as a Council for. It therefore cannot be said that the petitioner has committed any act which can be termed as "mis-conduct in discharge of his duty or neglect of or incapacity to perform his duty or disgraceful conduct committed during his continuance of office". Learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited my attention to the impugned order passed by the State Government and has contended that the order does not set out any reasons for reaching conclusion to support final order. It is contended that quasi judicial authority dealing with the matter is duty bound to record reasons and recording of reasons is a fundamental requirement governing the principles of natural justice. Recording of reasons excludes chances of arbitrariness and assures degree of fairness in the process of decision making. Impugned order passed by the deciding authority does not satisfy the requirements of observance of principles of natural justice as there are absolutely no reasons recorded in support of the conclusion drawn. 7. Respondents have supported the impugned order contending that the very continuance of the petitioner over the disputed premises knowing fully well that there is no extension of lease granted, itself amounts to mis-conduct on the part of the office bearer and the same also amounts to disgraceful conduct. It is contended that the continued occupation of the petitioner over the disputed property is in violation of section 92 of the Act. It has also been contended that it is immaterial as to when the construction is raised. Even if the construction is raised prior to assumption of office it attracts the penal provisions and calls for action as contemplated by sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act. It is contended by respondents that by virtue of continued occupation of the petitioner over the disputed premises it was not possible for the Municipal Council to developed the reserved site and the act of keeping the premises in possession unauthorisedly itself amounts to causing hindrance in the development activities and as such, the very act of the office bearer i.e. the petitioner herein shall have to be construed as an disgraceful act. It is contended that conclusions drawn by the deciding authority i.e. the State Government are in conformity with the notice issued earlier. It is contended that there are reasons recorded in support of the order and sufficiency of reason or reasonableness of reasons may not be a matter of scrutiny in exercise of writ jurisdiction by this court. It is contended that there is no violation of principles of natural justice as the parties concerned were extended fullest opportunity to place their contentions before the deciding authority. 8. I have perused the relevant documents annexed with the petition and heard arguments advanced by respective counsel. While dealing with the challenge raised in the petition, one has to take into account bundle of facts and an isolated instance may not be a determinative criteria to reach the conclusion. From the facts set out before me, it does appear that the petitioner was inducted in the suit premises lawfully in the year 1976. Although, initial lease period was for II months, the fact remains that the petitioner was allowed to continue in possession and the Municipal Council has also continued to accept rent for the premises right from 1976 till this date uninterruptedly. One thing is clear that induction of petitioner over the disputed premises is by lawful means as well as the act of the Municipal Council in accepting rent of the premises for all these years has given support to the contention of the petitioner that his continuation of occupation of the premises can in no case be branded as that of an encroacher. It has also to be taken note of that although the proceedings were initiated by the Municipal Council for eviction in the year 1981 and although those proceedings were terminated in favour of the Municipal Council by virtue of decree passed on 23-3-1984, no steps were taken for getting the decree executed. However, the petitioner was allowed to continue to occupy the premises and the rent was also accepted by the Municipal Council for the intervening duration. When the petitioner raised challenge to the decree passed by the trial court, it does appear that during the intervening period there was some understanding reached between the Municipal Council and the tenants in respect of continuation of the lease. When the petitioner raised challenge to the decree passed by the trial court, it does appear that during the intervening period there was some understanding reached between the Municipal Council and the tenants in respect of continuation of the lease. Resolution passed on 17-10-1987 in the General Body Meeting of the Municipal Council specifically makes mention that the tenants in occupation of the premises be continued to remain in occupation and enhanced rent shall be charged at three times the original rent. It does appear that in view of the resolution adopted by the Municipal Council, no steps were taken for securing execution of the decree. However, rent was charged in accordance with the resolution at enhanced rate. Therefore, the petitioner is justified in contending that in view of the settlement reached he was allowed to continue in occupation of the premises. This fact also is supported by another circumstance, that while withdrawing the pending appeal presented by the petitioner before the District Court raising challenge to the decree in respect of his eviction, an application was tendered wherein it has been specifically contended that there is settlement reached between the contesting parties and as such, the petitioner does not want to continue with the appeal. While recording say on the application, the Municipal Council has specifically recorded that it has no objection in respect of withdrawal. Even though it is tried to canvass that the objection was not raised for withdrawal of the appeal and cannot be construed as consent in respect of contents of the application. However, there was no endorsement to the effect made on the application that the contentions raised in respect of settlement out of court are wrong or that are not admitted. There was no reason for the petitioner to withdraw the appeal when there was an interlocutory order operating in his favour. The fact that there was understanding reached is supported by the various resolutions placed on record and one of such resolution is dt.17-10-1987. Contention raised by petitioner in respect of settlement is also supported by the circumstance that the Municipal Council without raising any objection continued to accept rent in respect of tenanted premises and since the year 1987, accepted enhanced rent. Contention raised by petitioner in respect of settlement is also supported by the circumstance that the Municipal Council without raising any objection continued to accept rent in respect of tenanted premises and since the year 1987, accepted enhanced rent. In view of these facts, it cannot be inferred that induction of the tenant over the suit premises was unlawful or that his continued occupation of the suit premises can be branded as encroachment. It is also to be taken note of that during the intervening period, even after securing decree from competent court, there was no move by the Municipal Council to secure possession. Another most glaring fact that is brought to notice is that since the date of assumption of office of the Council for by the petitioner in the year 2001 till the year 2008, there is absolutely no action initiated by the Municipal Council to evict the petitioner. Not even single notice was served calling upon petitioner to vacate the premises. However, Municipal Council continued to accept rent in respect of tenanted premises. There is also no allegation that the petitioner has committed any act of raising illegal construction which calls for action as contemplated by provisions of the Municipalities Act during his continuance of office either as a Council for or as a President of the Municipal Council. Induction of the petitioner is stated to be in the year 1976. The alleged temporary construction that has been raised is also in pursuance to the permission secured in 1987. Action initiated for eviction in civil court against the petitioner is of the year 1981. Decree that has been passed is of the year 1984, dismissal of the execution application for want of prosecution is of the year 1999 whereas presentation of appeal by the petitioner raising exception to the decree is in the year 1985 and withdrawal of the same with the consent of the Municipal Council is of the year 1994. All these developments/acts are prior to assumption of office by the petitioner as a Council for. There is absolutely no allegation in respect of act of mis-conduct or of any disgraceful conduct during continuation of the petitioner either as Council for or as a President of the Municipal Council. All these developments/acts are prior to assumption of office by the petitioner as a Council for. There is absolutely no allegation in respect of act of mis-conduct or of any disgraceful conduct during continuation of the petitioner either as Council for or as a President of the Municipal Council. Therefore, argument that has been advanced that mere continuation of possession by the petitioner after his getting elected itself shall be construed as an act of encroachment and amounting to disgraceful conduct on the part of the elected office bearer does not hold any substance. 9. It is necessary to consider certain provisions of the Act. The relevant provisions are quoted as below:- "44. Disqualification of Council for during his term of office: (1) A Council for shall be disqualified to hold office as such. if at any time during his term of office, he- (e) has constructed or constructs by himself, his spouse or his dependent, any illegal or unauthorised structure violating the provisions of this Act, or the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 or the rules or bye laws framed under the said Acts; or has directly or indirectly been responsible for, or helped in his capacity as such Council for in, carrying out such illegal or unauthorised construction or has by written communication or physically obstructed or tried to obstruct any Competent Authority from discharging its official duty in demolishing any illegal or unauthorised structure. 55-A. Removal of President and Vice President by Government: Without prejudice to the provisions of sections [55-lA] and 55, a President or a Vice President may be removed from office by the State Government for misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or for neglect of, or incapacity to perform, his duties or for being guilty of any disgraceful conduct, and the President or Vice president is removed shall not be eligible for re-election or re-appointment as President or Vice President, as the case may be, during the reminder of the term of office of the Councilors: Provided that, no such President or Vice President shall be removed from office, unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity to furnish an explanation. 55-B. Disqualification for continuing as Council for of becoming Council for on removal as President or Vice President: Notwithstanding anything contained in section 55-A. if a Council for or a person is found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his official duties or being guilty of any disgraceful conduct while holding or while he was holding the office of the President or Vice President, as the case may be, the State Government may (a) disqualify such Council for to continue as a Council for the remainder of his term of office as a Council for and also for being elected as a Council for, till the period of six years has elapsed from the order of such disqualification: (b) disqualify such person for being elected as a council for till the period of six years has elapsed from the order of such disqualification. 92.Provisions regarding transfer of municipal property: (1) No Council shall transfer any of its immovable property without the sanction of the State Government. (2) A proposal of such transfer shall be accompanied by resolution of the council passed at a meeting by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Council for and shall in no way be inconsistent with the rules made in this behalf by the state Government. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a Council may lease its immovable property for a period not exceeding three years, and the leassee shall not be allowed to make any permanent constructions on such immovable property, Such lease may be renewed by the council beyond the period of three years so, however, that the total period of any lease shall not exceed nine years. No such lease or any renewal shall be granted unless supported by a resolution passed at a meeting of the Council." To, It is contended by learned counsel for the respondents that sections 55A and 55-B occupy a larger area and are not restricted to either section 44 or section 16 of the Act. The provisions of sections 16 and 44 of the Act are required to be read in section 55-A. However, the provisions of section 55A in itself holds a person liable to be removed if he commits misconduct in discharge of duty or he is responsible for neglect or incapacity to perform his duty or for being guilty of any disgraceful conduct. In the instant matter, allegations against the petitioner are falling within preview of section 44(e) of the Act. Subsection I to section 44 of the Act provides that a Council for shall be disqualified to hold the office as such if at any time during the term of his office he has constructed or constructs by himself, his spouse or his dependent, any illegal or unauthorised structure violating the provisions of this Act. In the instant matter, firstly there is no act alleged against the petitioner of raising any illegal construction during the tenure of his office either as a council for or the President nor from the facts enumerated above, it can be said that any construction that has been raised is unauthorised one. It is contended that although permission was secured for raising construction from the Chief Officer, considering the period of lease under the agreement to be of 11 months, it shall be construed that such permission is valid during the period which is co-terminus with the lease. It cannot be construed that raising of construction itself was unauthorised or illegal. As stated above in the forgoing paragraphs, even continuation of the petitioner over the disputed premises cannot be construed as encroachment. Act of raising construction itself also cannot be construed as unauthorised one in view of letter of permission placed on record. Apart from this aspect, as stated above, there is absolutely no allegation that during his continuance of the term as Council for or President of the Municipal Council, the petitioner has done any act which is in violation of section 44(1)(e) of the Act. So far as payment of cost is concerned, the same does not attract the provisions of section 16(l)(h) of the Act. However, it has been demonstrated by the petitioner that the amount of cost has been deposited by him in the civil court. Even factually, contentions raised in that regard are not correct. Much less, those acts in itself do not call for any action or that any inference is impermissible which would warrant action within meaning of sections 55-A and 55-B of the act. 11. It is true that provisions of sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act are not controlled by sections 16 and 44 of the Act. Much less, those acts in itself do not call for any action or that any inference is impermissible which would warrant action within meaning of sections 55-A and 55-B of the act. 11. It is true that provisions of sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act are not controlled by sections 16 and 44 of the Act. If it can be demonstrated that requirements of section 55-A are satisfied, order in respect of disqualification of the office bearer can be issued. It has to be examined whether the allegations raised against the petitioner would amount to misconduct in discharge of his duties or amounts to neglect of or an act which amounts of disgraceful conduct. It has been laid down by the Division Bench of this court court in the matter of Baburao Vishwvanath Mathpati Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1996(1) Mh.L.J. 366 thus: "The word "neglect" has a connotation as 'gross', 'wilful', 'intentional' or 'culpable' neglect. The word 'neglect' has therefore a different connotation than the word 'negligence'. This provision sufficiently entails civil consequences and attaches stigma to the President and therefore. in order to remove a President On these grounds the order must be founded on strong grounds." 12. The expression 'misconduct' has not been defined in the Act nor the expression 'disgraceful conduct'. In the New International Websters Comprehensive Dictionary, 'misconduct' is defined as to behave improperly, to mismanage, improper conduct, bad behaviour. In Black's Law Dictionary, official misconduct means a public officer's corrupt violation of assigned duties by malfeasance, mis-feasance, or non-feasance. So far as expression 'disgraceful' is concerned, the same is defined in the New Oxford American Dictionary as shockingly unacceptable. In the New International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary meaning attached to the phrase is causing disgrace, shameful. In the instant matter, considering the act alleged and the bundle of facts stated above, it cannot be said that the said act alleged against petitioner comes within the definition of either misconduct or disgraceful conduct. 13. Reference may be conveniently made to a Division Bench judgment in the matter of Keshav Shankar Ekbote Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2006(1) ALL MR 624. 13. Reference may be conveniently made to a Division Bench judgment in the matter of Keshav Shankar Ekbote Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2006(1) ALL MR 624. In the reported matter, proceedings were in respect of disqualification of the President of the Municipal Council Buldhana under section 55-A of the Act on the ground that the President allotted plot belonging the Municipal Council in favour of a trust of which the husband of the President was Chairman. In paragraph no.24 of the judgment cited supra it has been laid down thus:- "24. We, therefore, find that allotment of said land in favour of the said Trust is much prior to the date on which the petitioner was elected and assumed charge as a President of the Municipal Council. In any case, stretching the case of the petitioner to the extremity, even if the husband of the petitioner has any share or interest in the said lease, then merely by having such share or interest, a case is not made out for disqualification u/s.16(1)(i), unless it is proved that such Council for, as a council for or a member of Committee has voted in favour of a resolution of any matter in which he has share or interest as contemplated in any of the clauses in subsection (3) of Section 16. This is not the case of the petitioner. Even factually also it cannot be; since the resolution to award the land to the said trust was passed in the year 1997 i.e. much prior to the date on which respondent no.2 was elected as a President." Similar analogy can be drawn in the instant matter also. All the acts alleged in respect of allotment of the property are of the year 1976. The alleged construction raised that to with permission was also prior to his getting elected. There is absolutely no allegation in respect of commission of any positive act which would be violative either under sections 16, 44 or section 55-A of the Act during his continuance as a Council for or the President of the Municipal Council. Considering the facts of the case, the Division Bench in the similar circumstances as in the instant matter, has drawn following conclusion: "Even factually, from the perusal of the record, it is difficult to accept that so-called construction is in any way illegal or unauthorised. Considering the facts of the case, the Division Bench in the similar circumstances as in the instant matter, has drawn following conclusion: "Even factually, from the perusal of the record, it is difficult to accept that so-called construction is in any way illegal or unauthorised. Perusal of the record would show that vide order dU8-07 - 200 I the Chief Officer of respondent no.5 Municipal Council has granted permission to the President of the said trust to make, construction of the tin shed on a temporary basis. It can thus be seen that the construction made by the said Trust has been made with prior approval of respondent no.5 - Municipal Council. It has also to be e noted that on the date on which said permission was granted i.e. 18-072001, respondent no.2 was not President of the Municipal Council, but she assumed the charge of the said office only on 18-12-2001…………… It is not in dispute that the construction which is made is prior to the date on which respondent no.2 has assume the charge and therefore, the case of the petitioner would also not fit in this ground." 14. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to a case reported in 2006 BCR 92 in the matter of Edwin Francis Britto Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and others. It has been recorded in paragraph no.10 of the judgment thus: "The person who has erected unauthorised structure before his election as Council for would not be interested in removal of unauthorised structures and, therefore, the view of the legislature appears to be to discourage election of persons who are responsible for raising unauthorised structures. Perusal of the provisions of section 16(l-D) further shows that hen the legislature wanted the capacity as a Council for to be relevant the legislative provision has clearly indicated that. Insofar as the structure which is not erected by the person himself, but in relation to which he has merely helped, that help should be in his capacity as a Council for. So far as raising of structure is concerned, the raising of unauthorised structure by him or his family need not be after his election. Insofar as the structure which is not erected by the person himself, but in relation to which he has merely helped, that help should be in his capacity as a Council for. So far as raising of structure is concerned, the raising of unauthorised structure by him or his family need not be after his election. Even if an illegal structure is raised by the person before his election, on being found that he was responsible for raising the unauthorised structure, he can be disqualified from being a Council for." In the reported matter from the facts it is evident that during his continuance as Council for there were notices issued to the petitioner in respect of raising of unauthorised structure and on his failure to act in accordance with the notice, action for demolition of the structure was also initiated. Observations made in the peculiar facts of that case would obviously not apply to the instant matter firstly for the reason that there is no clear evidence in respect of raising of an unauthorised construction in matter at hand. The construction which is alleged to have been raised is with the permission of the Municipal Council and the copy of the letter dt.l5-12-1987 in that regard is placed on record. Apart from this aspect, there is absolutely no allegation that petitioner has committed any act of raising construction during his continuance of office or that any attempt was made in respect of removal of such construction by issuing any notice during his continuance of office since 2001 onwards. In fact, all the acts those are alleged are prior to election of the petitioner as Council for. 15. In order to attract the provisions of section 55-A of the Act, there shall be some positive or wilful act which calls for an action. In the instant matter, there is absolutely no act alleged to have been committed by the petitioner during his continuance as a Council for or President of the Municipal Council which calls for action under section 55-A & B of the Act. Reference is required to be made to a judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (2001)6 Supreme Court Cases 260. The Apex court has observed in paragraph no.7 of the judgment thus: "7. Reference is required to be made to a judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (2001)6 Supreme Court Cases 260. The Apex court has observed in paragraph no.7 of the judgment thus: "7. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of the returned candidate but also of a constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within section 22 of the Act must be clearly made out. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of section 22, on the ground of 'abuse of his powers' (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case," Taking into consideration the ratio laid down by the Apex court, necessary inference has to be drawn in the instant matter that there are no allegations which call for action under section 55-A or 55-B of the Act which are alleged to have been committed by the petitioner during continuance of his term of office. 16. Now coming to the last argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of non-observance of principles of natural justice, a reference is required to be made to few judgments which emphasize the need of recording reasons by the quasi judicial or administrative authorities and such recording of reasons is held to be one of the facet of principles of natural justice. Reference can be made to the judgment in the matter of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1984. Reference can be made to the judgment in the matter of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1984. It has been observed thus: "In view of the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework where under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement, it may do so by making an express provision to that effect. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. Therefore except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision. aThe recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutory purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and assures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. Therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It is however not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. It is however not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge." Similar view is reiterated in an earlier judgment of the Apex court in the matter of S.L. Kapoor reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 . It is contended by the petitioner that there are absolutely no reasons recorded by the Minister while deciding the appeal which supports the final conclusion reached in the matter. In the operative portion, it has been recorded that the act of petitioner amounts to disgraceful conduct. However, it has not been recorded in the judgment as to how the alleged act amounts to disgraceful conduct. Petitioner has been directed to show cause in view of notice dt.165-2005 in respect of the allegations that while continuing to hold the office of the President of the Municipal Council, he is responsible in respect of acts committed by him which amount to disgraceful conduct. However, details or particulars in respect of such acts have not been noted. The deciding authority without recording any reason has held the petitioner responsible for disgraceful conduct. It has not been demonstrated in the order as to what are those acts which the petitioner committed during his continuance of office as the President of the Municipal Council for which action is called for under sections 55-A and 55-B of the Act. Although the deciding authority is bound to record reasons in support of the order. failure to record such reasons amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. The impugned order therefore does not satisfy the requirements laid down by the judgment cited supra. 17. For the reasons set out above, therefore, the petition deserves to be allowed and the same is accordingly allowed. failure to record such reasons amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. The impugned order therefore does not satisfy the requirements laid down by the judgment cited supra. 17. For the reasons set out above, therefore, the petition deserves to be allowed and the same is accordingly allowed. The impugned order passed by the Chief Minister on 2-3-2009 under sections 55-A and 55-B of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 is quashed and set aside. Respondents are directed to restore the charge of elective office of the President in favour of the petitioner forthwith. Rule is accordingly made absolute. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 18. Pending civil application, if any, stands. Petition allowed.