JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. This appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 3-10-2000 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Belonia, South Tripura, in Money Suit No. 1 of 1999, partly decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondent inasmuch as the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to get compensation of Rs. 2,90,000/- from the defendant-appellants and the defendant-appellants are jointly and severally liable to make payment of the same to the plaintiff-respondent within thirty days from the date of passing the judgment and decree i.e. 3-1-2000. 2. Heard Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. G. S. Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate appearing for the defendant appellants as well as Mr. K. N. Bhattacharjee, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. R. Debnath, learned Advocate for the plaintiff respondent. 3. For deciding the present appeal, a short fact leading to the filing of RFA No. 11 of 2000 (Re. RFA No. 8 of 2008), is recapitulated below: The plaintiff respondent filed the suit being Money Suit No. 40 of 1996 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Udaipur, South Tripura for recovery of damages for malicious prosecution, for defamation, for closing the business and shop of the plaintiff-respondent maliciously, for destruction of stock and goods of business as well as damages for mental agonies valued at Rs. 5,00,000/- against the defendant-appellants. Later on, the Money Suit No. 40 of 1996 was transferred to the Additional District Judge, Belonia, South Tripura by an order of the District Judge, Udaipur dated 28-1-1999 and re-registered as Money Suit No. 1 of 1999. 4. The plaintiff respondent pleaded in the plaint that in the year 1990 he started a clothes shop at No. 1 Tilla, Belonia, South Tripura after obtaining the valid licence from the competent authority i.e. the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura and he had spent huge sum of money for getting his shop established and within a short span of time he gained dominance in Belonia Town which made him eye-sore of some political and business tycoons. From the year 1993 the plaintiff-respondent had to suffer much in the hand of the State Officials. From the year 1993 the plaintiff-respondent had to suffer much in the hand of the State Officials. Admittedly, the licence of the plaintiff respondent for running his shop was valid up to 31-3-1993 and during the validity period of his licence, he submitted his licence for renewing or/revalidating to the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura and also that the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura was admittedly the concerned authority for renewing or/revalidating the licence of the plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff-respondent had also deposited necessary fees in the form of challan for renewing his licence to the concerned authority i.e. the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura. In spite of fulfilling all the requirements for renewing the said licence of the plaintiff-respondent, the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura for the reasons best known to him did not revalidate the plaintiff-respondent's licence and simply kept it pending by writing note "wait for obvious reason" on the said licence of the plaintiff-respondent. It is the clear pleaded case of the plaintiff-respondent in the plaint of the Money Suit No. 1 of 1999 that the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura, had the clear and definite knowledge that the plaintiff-respondent's licence had been made pending for revalidation by him by making the said note "wait for obvious reason" and also that he did not cancel the said licence of the plaintiff-respondent at the time he ordered his sub-ordinate officer to enquire the shop of the plaintiff-respondent for the reasons known to him. 5. As ordered by the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura the defendant-appellant No. 5 Pradip Bhowmik, Inspector of Food & Civil Supplies, attached to the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura along with one Shri Amal Sengupta, Executive Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura, Shri Kailash Choudhury, Assistant Director of Food & Civil Supplies Department and Shri Narayan Majumder, Peon of the said Office, went to the shop of the plaintiff-respondent on 21-5-1993. When they reached the shop of the plaintiff-respondent, he was not available at his shop. The defendant appellant No. 5 Shri Pradip Bhowmik and his party had demanded to the employees of the plaintiff-respondents shop for producing all the documents for running the shop. When they reached the shop of the plaintiff-respondent, he was not available at his shop. The defendant appellant No. 5 Shri Pradip Bhowmik and his party had demanded to the employees of the plaintiff-respondents shop for producing all the documents for running the shop. In response to their demand, the employees of the plaintiff-respondents shop replied that all the documents and credentials for running the shop had been lying with the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura for renewal. At that juncture, the plaintiff-respondent came to his shop and expressed that if there had been no licence, the plaintiff-respondent would not have run his shop and pledged to submit the licence as and when it would be renewed by the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura. 6. The defendant appellant No. 5 who had the clear knowledge that the plaintiff-respondent had submitted his licence to the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura for revaluation within time and the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura for the reason best known to him had made the process for revalidation of the licence pending by noting on the licence of the plaintiff-respondent "wait for obvious reason", had seized all the documents and sealed the shop of the plaintiff-respondent. 7. The defendant appellant No. 5 also lodged a complaint to the O/C Belonia police station who registered a criminal case against the plaintiff-respondent being Belonia P. S. Case No. 21 (5) 93 under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. The defendant-appellants who had already seized all the documents from the shop of the plaintiff-respondent and also sealed the plaintiff-respondent's shop, had gone to the extent, with the help of the police, of breaking the seal of the plaintiff-respondent's shop and seized all the stock of the plaintiff-respondent's shop and dump in the police station and all the seized stock of the plaintiff-respondent's shop had been put to auction sale. 8. The O/C Belonia police station had transmitted the said case i.e. Belonia P. S. Case No. 21 (5)93 registered under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act to the Court of the Special Judge, South Tripura at Udaipur for taking cognizance of the offence and the learned Special Judge registered the same as Special 6(SC/B) of 1993. 8. The O/C Belonia police station had transmitted the said case i.e. Belonia P. S. Case No. 21 (5)93 registered under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act to the Court of the Special Judge, South Tripura at Udaipur for taking cognizance of the offence and the learned Special Judge registered the same as Special 6(SC/B) of 1993. After full-length trial, the learned Special Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur passed the judgment and order dated 7-8-1995 in Case No. Special 6(SC/B) of 1993 for acquitting the plaintiff-respondent, relevant portion of the said judgment and order dated 7-8-1995 are quoted hereunder: .... (7) I have seen the credit memo No. 10 dated 15-5-1993 issued by Dipak Chandra Das which has been marked Exhibit P. 8 in this case. I have also seen the licence of the accused which was first issued on 19-5-1990 and thereafter renewed twice and deposited for renewal for the year 1993-94 i.e., till 31.3.1994. This document has been marked Exhibit-A by my predecessor. From this document it appears that the S. D. O., Belonia who is the licencing authority under the Tripura Cotton. Cloth & Yarn Control Order. 1971 has written under his hand "wait for obvious reasons" and put his dated signature on 18-5-1994 as admitted by the witnesses and seen from the record that the licence fee was also deposited within time for renewal of the licence but this licence was not renewed and it has also not refused to be renewed instead of it has been kept pending with an endorsement "wait for obvious reason." (8) I, therefore, find no fault by this accused in running this business without the licence. It was the licencing authority as well as the Food Inspector and the informant who were responsible for non-renewal of the licence of the licensee, the accused in time and there is no explanation for keeping it pending. It has been intimated that there were some irregularities in maintaining records and submission of statements but nothing has been proved against the accused. The licencing authority of the officers of the Food & Civil Supplies Department who are the informant, the Assistant Director and the Food Inspector are responsible for negligence in their duties. They have never thought to ask for any explanation of the accused if he has violated any order/instructions/directions of the licencing authority. The licencing authority of the officers of the Food & Civil Supplies Department who are the informant, the Assistant Director and the Food Inspector are responsible for negligence in their duties. They have never thought to ask for any explanation of the accused if he has violated any order/instructions/directions of the licencing authority. They were so callous that they did not bother to look into the fact that the licensee was not submitting any monthly return (is it required?) and has submitted annual statement. (9) In my opinion the accused has no fault and he has committed no wrong. It is the licencing authority and the officials of the Food & Civil Supplies Directorate who are responsible for harassing this accused-It is they who has raided the shop of the accused and fabricated this case against this accused knowing fully well that his licence is pending in their custody. I do not know what is the reasons of harassing this accused by this authority but fact remains that they have harassed this accused with the greatest possible extent disregarding any administrative norms and legal procedures. (10) For the aforesaid reasons I hold the accused to be not guilty and I acquit Shri Babul Majumder from this case under Section 255, Cr. P.C. from the accusation under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for violation of any terms and conditions of Triupra Cotton, Cloth & Yarn Control Order, 1971. (11) The seized articles be returned to the accused forthwith. 9. The plaintiff-respondent pleaded in the plaint that the said criminal case i.e. Belonia P. S. Case No. 21(5) 93 under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act was initiated by the defendant-appellants without reasonable and probable cause and in abuse of their power and proceeded maliciously with malice against the plaintiff-respondent. The said malicious prosecution of the said criminal case against the plaintiff-respondent had undermined the prestige and dignity of the plaintiff-respondent in the eyes of the public estimation. The said action of the defendant appellants had damaged the fame, properties and had also caused the mental agony by gross humiliation and harassment. 10. The plaintiff-respondent further pleaded in the plaint that he had to spend Rs. 50,000/- for defending his case in the said malicious prosecution. The goods which were the stock in trade of the plaintiff-respondent would be of the value of Rs. 10. The plaintiff-respondent further pleaded in the plaint that he had to spend Rs. 50,000/- for defending his case in the said malicious prosecution. The goods which were the stock in trade of the plaintiff-respondent would be of the value of Rs. 1,00,000/- and the goods which were seized by the defendant-appellant would be of the value of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The plaintiff-respondent also pleaded that his condition was reduced financially to such an extent that he could not get his son to be treated and consequently his son became blind and all these catastrophic calamities came to the plaintiff-respondent only after the launching of the said malicious proceeding by the defendant appellants. The treatment of eyes of the plaintiff-respondent's son would cost more than Rs. 1,00,000/-. The plaintiff-respondent also claimed Rs. 1,50,000/- for imputation of his reputation, and in aggregate the plaintiff-respondent claimed Rs. 5,00,000/- as damages against the defendant appellants. 11. The defendant-appellants also filed their written statements. In their written statements, the defendant-appellants were not denying that the said licence of the plaintiff-respondent had been submitted well in time to the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura for revalidation by depositing all the necessary fees and also that the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura had made the renewal-re-validation process of the plaintiff-respondent's licence pending in his Office by noting on the licence that "wait for obvious reason" and also that the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura with whom the said licence of the plaintiff-respondent was pending for revalidation, had directed the defendant-appellant No. 5 and others to visit the shop of the plaintiff-respondent for the purpose of sealing his shop and also for seizing all the documents of the plaintiff-respondent. In their written statements, the defendant appellants pleaded that the defendant appellant No. 5, Shri P. K. Bhowmik, Inspector of Food & Civil Supplies Department submitted a report dated 19-5-1993, on the body of which an inquiry was ordered by the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura. Thereafter, Shri P. K. Bhowmik along with Shri Kailash Choudhary, Assistant Director of Food & Civil Supplies Department (defendant appellant No. 4) and one Narayan Majumder, Peon of the SDO's Office, visited the shop of the plaintiff-respondent on 21-5-1993 and seized all the documents of the plaintiff-respondent and also sealed his shop. Thereafter, Shri P. K. Bhowmik along with Shri Kailash Choudhary, Assistant Director of Food & Civil Supplies Department (defendant appellant No. 4) and one Narayan Majumder, Peon of the SDO's Office, visited the shop of the plaintiff-respondent on 21-5-1993 and seized all the documents of the plaintiff-respondent and also sealed his shop. The said Shri P. K. Bhowmik, Inspector of Food & Civil Supplies also had lodged a complaint with the O/C Belonia police station which was registered as Belonia P. S. Case No. 21(5)93 under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. The defendant-appellants even proceeded to the extent of breaking the seal of the plaintiff-respondent's shop along with the said Executive Magistrate and police personnel and broken the locks of the plaintiff-respondent's shop and seized all the clothes and put up those seized clothes on auction sale. 12. The defendant-appellants also pleaded in the written statement that, show cause notice was issued to the plaintiff-respondent by the SDO (Food & Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura on 1-6-1993 for cancellation of the licence. Thereafter, the plaintiff-respondent's licence was cancelled only on 26-4-1994, long after 21-5-1993 on which date the defendant appellants had seized all the documents of the plaintiff-respondent and sealed his shop. The defendant appellants further pleaded in their written statements that the plaintiff-respondent had also transported eight bags of clothes belonging to the plaintiff-respondent through a route known to be used by the smugglers for smuggling goods to the Bangladesh and for those goods the plaintiff-respondent could produce only a credit memo No. 10 dated 15-5-1993 but the other documents like photocopy of the valid licence and challan were not produced. The plaintiff-respondent was also found to be failure in submitting the monthly statutory return by the 5th of every month as prescribed vide Notification No. F. V.(1)-TES/71-(B) dated 23rd September, 1972. In this regard, an FIR was lodged by the Assistant Director, Food & Civil Supplies Department, Belonia, South Tripura, to the O/C Belonia P. S. on 28-5-1993. Subsequently, the learned Special Judge passed an order dated 16-9-1995 in case No. Special 7(SC/B)93 that the plaintiff-respondent was not found to be guilty. 13. In this regard, an FIR was lodged by the Assistant Director, Food & Civil Supplies Department, Belonia, South Tripura, to the O/C Belonia P. S. on 28-5-1993. Subsequently, the learned Special Judge passed an order dated 16-9-1995 in case No. Special 7(SC/B)93 that the plaintiff-respondent was not found to be guilty. 13. The defendant-appellants also pleaded in their written statements that the criminal cases were filed by the Inspector, Food & Civil Supplies, Belonia, South Tripura and by the Assistant Director, Food & Civil Supplies, Belonia, South Tripura on the basis of the prima facie satisfaction that the provision of the Essential Commodities Act were violated by the plaintiff-respondent. The defendant-appellants further pleaded that the registration of the FIR, investigation and filing of charge-sheet were the matter of police to look into it. In case no criminal case was made out, the case may not have been registered or charge-sheet may not have been filed. The complaints were lodged by the Inspector, Food & Civil Supplies, Belonia, South Tripura and the Assistant Director, Food & Civil Supplies, Belonia, South Tripura in good faith in due discharge of Government duties. Under Section15 of the Essential Commodities Act, protection has been given against action taken under the Essential Commodities Act. No suit, prosecution or other legal remedies lies against any person for anything which he does in good faith or intended to be done in pursuance of any order made under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. 14. The learned trial Court, after considering the rival contentions of the parties in their pleadings i.e. plaint and written statements, had framed as many as following six issues: (i) Is the suit maintainable in its present form and nature? (ii) Whether the plaintiff has any cause of action to file the suit? (iii) Whether the plaintiff was maliciously implicated in the Special Case No. 6(ST/B) of 1993 in the Court of Learned Special Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur? (iv) Is the plaintiff entitled to damage for such malicious prosecution, damage of his stock, seized goods and for mental agonies? (v) Is the plaintiff entitled to compensation for such defamation and loss of reputation in the eye of public for such malicious prosecution? (vi) What other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to? 15. (iv) Is the plaintiff entitled to damage for such malicious prosecution, damage of his stock, seized goods and for mental agonies? (v) Is the plaintiff entitled to compensation for such defamation and loss of reputation in the eye of public for such malicious prosecution? (vi) What other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to? 15. The plaintiff-respondent had adduced three witnesses i.e. P. W. No. 1 (plaintiff-respondent himself), P. W. No. 2 (Shri Kanai Lal Das) and P. W. No. 3 (Shri Kanu Shil) in support of his case and also exhibited as many as eleven documents. The defendant-appellants examined only one witness as D. W. No. 1 (Shri Kailash Chandra Choudhury, Assistant Director, Food & Civil Supplies, Belonia, South Tripura) i.e. the defendant-appellant No. 4. The D. W. No. 1, in his statement before the learned trial Court, stated clearly that "I cannot recollect whether during my service life I instituted any other case excepting the case of Babul Majumder for not having licence whereas licence was presented to the office for renewal. In the terms and conditions of licence there was no such stipulation that one was supposed to submit the return of his business of a month within the 5th of the following month. We did not give any notice to him (plaintiff-respondent) to submit such return as stated by me." The learned trial Court, in para Nos. 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment and order dated 3-1-2000, had discussed what is malicious prosecution. Para Nos. 10 and 11 are quoted hereunder: 10. Let us first see what is a malicious prosecution. Generally a malicious prosecution is a tort, the liability of which consists in improperly instituting unsuccessful criminal proceedings for an improper purpose and without reasonable and probable cause. An action for damages can be maintained for the abuse of such legal process. In Black's Law Dictionary, malicious prosecution is stated to be a judicial proceeding instituted against a person out of the prosecutors malice and ill-will, with the intention of injuring him, without probable cause to sustain it. The process and proceeding being regular and formal, but not justified by the facts. For this injury an action on the case lies, and called as action of malicious prosecution. 11. Let us now see what constitute malice. The process and proceeding being regular and formal, but not justified by the facts. For this injury an action on the case lies, and called as action of malicious prosecution. 11. Let us now see what constitute malice. In an action, for malicious prosecution the last ingredient which the plaintiff had to prove is that the prosecution was instituted by the defendant due to a malicious intention and not with a mere intention of carrying the law into effect or in other words the plaintiff was actuated by malice in prosecution. Malice here, does not imply hatred, spite or ill-will, but malus animus meaning improper and indirect motive and not the proper motive, which is a desire to secure ends of justice, and vindicate the law. In the past, malice was identified with lack of reasonable and probable cause and vice versa. But the present state of law seems to be that the concept of malice is to be kept distinct from the concept of lack of the reasonable and probable cause, ordinarily, malice denotes, spite or hatred against an individual but it is often difficult to infer spite or hatred from the conduct of a person. It is said that the devil does not know the mind of man. Therefore, the ordinary meaning of malice cannot be terminated by any subjective standard. In order to give an objective meaning to the term "malice", it should be found out whether the accused has commenced prosecution for vindication of justice. A reasonable and probable cause should also be understood objectively. It can only mean that the grounds for the plaintiffs' guilt are reasonable according to a reasonable and prudent man and that there are materials, which might result in the conviction of accused. The defendant can rebut the evidence of malice, by showing good faith. He can show this by placing all facts and circumstance, which were present at the time of instituting the prosecution. It is no doubt, true that everyone has a right to set in motion the judicial machinery for the protection of his own rights or public interest, but such person should not infringe the corresponding rights of others by instituting improper legal proceedings in order to harass by unjustifiable litigation. It is no doubt, true that everyone has a right to set in motion the judicial machinery for the protection of his own rights or public interest, but such person should not infringe the corresponding rights of others by instituting improper legal proceedings in order to harass by unjustifiable litigation. The policy of encouraging the citizens to add in the enforcement of the law cannot be extended to such an extent as to justify false and scandalous charges. 16. The learned trial Court, for the reasons mentioned in the impugned judgment dated 3-1-2000, more particularly in para No. 19, had come to the finding that there were not only absence of reasonable and probable cause but also malicious mind to prosecute the plaintiff-respondent. Hence, the Issue Nos. 2 and 3 are decided in favour of the plaintiff respondent. Para No. 19 of the impugned judgment and order dated 3-1-2000 is reproduced below: 19. On a bare reading of the evidence on record and that of the plaint and the written statements etc. I find that the criminal prosecution Special Case No. 6(SC/B) 93 was initiated substantially with the allegation that the plaintiff was running business without valid document/licence whereas those licences were presented before the defendants in time for renewal and renewal fees were also paid. The plaintiff was running the business since 1990 and there was no allegation against him before the date of inspection and the lodging of F. I. R., dated 21-5-1993. It was within the knowledge of the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 that the licences were within their custody for renewal on the date of making allegation. Exhibit-2 series shows that on 18-5-1993 the licences were placed before the defendant No. 3 and the defendant did not renew it within the period. i.e., 31-3-1993, rather made an entry "wait for obvious reason". The defendants adduced no iota of evidence to justify what was that obvious reason for which the licences were not renewed and thereafter on 21-5-1993 defendant Nos. 4 & 5 along with others raided the shop, seized all documents and sealed the shop under lock and key and restrained the plaintiff from running his business. Such action refers to the malicious mind of the defendants. All the books of accounts were seized and the stocks in the shop were also seized. 4 & 5 along with others raided the shop, seized all documents and sealed the shop under lock and key and restrained the plaintiff from running his business. Such action refers to the malicious mind of the defendants. All the books of accounts were seized and the stocks in the shop were also seized. The defendant No. 6 seized the stocks of the shop even after seizure of the licences (Exhibit-2 series) from the custody of the defendants Nos. 3 to 5 and that shows that defendant No. 6 along with defendant Nos. 3 to 5 collectively proceeded with a malicious mind to ruin the business of the plaintiff. The defendant No. 3 was supposed to renew the licence on or before 31-3-1993 but the same were kept pending stating "wait for obvious reason" and ultimately cancelled the licences on 26-4-1994 by order marked as Exhibit-11 series and that was done after more than a year of the due date and it was after about 11 months of the date of initiation of criminal proceeding (21-5-1993). The acts and circumstances further shows malicious mind of the defendant Nos. 3 to 5 towards the plaintiff. D. W. 1 in his cross-examination stated that he can not recoiled whether during his service life he instituted any other case excepting the case of the plaintiff for not having licence whereas licences were presented to the office for renewal. Such admission of D. W. 1 shows that with an ulterior motive the defendants proceeded against the plaintiff. The defendants adduced no evidence to show that they acted bona fide and the actions were taken for enforcement of law on good faith and to ensure compliance of control order. As per the statements of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 made in paras 16, 17 and 18 of the written statement it is found that the defendant No. 5 on 21-5-1995 instituted criminal case which was registered as Special Court Case No. 6(SC/B) 93 and the substantial allegation was that the plaintiff was running business without valid licence which is reflected in Exhibit-1, the judgment passed by the learned Special Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur. The defendant No. 4 instituted another criminal case on 28-5-1993 alleging that the plaintiff did not submit certain statement as per the notification of the Textile Commissioner dated 23-9-1972 whereas the defendant No. 4 in his deposition (cross-examination) as D. W. 1 admitted that there was no such stipulation/condition in the licence that any such statement/return was supposed to be submitted by the plaintiff monthly within 5th of the following month and that they (defendants) did not give notice to submit any such return. That subsequent case was registered as 7(SC/B)93 before the same Special Judge and that was also ended in acquittal of the plaintiff accused. It is evident that successive criminal prosecution were initiated (one on 21-5-1993 and the other on 28-5-19931 and both cases went in favour of plaintiff and abruptly against the defendants. The defendants though stated that they would prefer appeal/revision etc. but no such appeal/revision was preferred at least no such evidence adduced. Such consecutive unsuccessful criminal prosecution would definitely infer malicious intention of the defendants towards the plaintiff. Excepting the above two items of allegations for which the criminal prosecution was initiated no other allegation are proved by the defendants. Though the defendants stated above some other facts in the written statement but to substantiate all those no iota of evidence adduced and that further proved the malicious attitude of the defendants. The defendant No. 6 in the colour of investigation of the case for no reason seized the entire stock of goods and purposely arranged the ruin of business of the plaintiff even after seizure of licences from the custody of the defendant Nos. 3 to 5. The defendant No. 6 also similarly responsible with defendant Nos. 1 to 5 for the malicious prosecution. The defendant No. 6 adduced no evidence to prove his bona fide or good faith. The mere statement is not sufficient to prove innocence or bonafideness. Accordingly, hold that there were not only absence of reasonable and probable cause but also malicious mind to prosecute the plaintiff and hence the issues are decided in favour of the plaintiff. 17. The Apex Court in Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam and Ors. The mere statement is not sufficient to prove innocence or bonafideness. Accordingly, hold that there were not only absence of reasonable and probable cause but also malicious mind to prosecute the plaintiff and hence the issues are decided in favour of the plaintiff. 17. The Apex Court in Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam and Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 435 , held that the remedy of suit for damages for malicious prosecution is a part of law of torts in India; and in such suit the question is not whether the plaintiff was ultimately found guilty but the question is whether the prosecutor acted honestly and believed that the plaintiff was guilty. Under the law of torts, the defendant can claim to be Judged not of the real facts but of those which he honestly, and however, erroneously, believes. The point to be decided in a suit for remedy for damages for malicious prosecution is that the plaintiff was subjected to prosecution without being reasonable and probable cause or that it was malicious. The Apex Court in Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors. (2007) 8 SCC 418 : 2007 AIR SCW 6169, held that if the powers are exercised with oblique motive, bad faith or for extraneous or irrelevant considerations, there is no exercise of power known to law and the action cannot be termed as action in accordance with law. Para 80 and 81 of SCC in Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. (supra) read as follows: Mala fide exercise of power. 80. The appellant also contended that the impugned action of granting licence to Respondent No. 4 by Respondents 1 to 3 is mala fide. It was submitted that in spite of acute shortage of sugarcane in the State of Uttaranchal, the policy was changed by the Government in order to grant benefit to Respondent 4, not only at the cost of interest of the appellant but also by ignoring larger public interest and industrial growth and development. In this connection, the attention of the Court was also invited to a letter dated 4-8-2003 written by the Cane and Sugar Commissioner to the Secretary, Cane Development and Sugar Industry, Uttaranchal wherein he had stated that there was no necessity to make any change in the licensing policy for 2003-2004. In this connection, the attention of the Court was also invited to a letter dated 4-8-2003 written by the Cane and Sugar Commissioner to the Secretary, Cane Development and Sugar Industry, Uttaranchal wherein he had stated that there was no necessity to make any change in the licensing policy for 2003-2004. The counsel submitted that surprisingly, within a short span of about two months, the same Commissioner agreed to change in policy by inserting a proviso to para (ka) with the sole objective to favour Respondent No. 4. It was pursuant to modified policy that Respondent 4 got the licence. Therefore, the action deserves to be set aside on the ground of mala fide exercise of power. 81. Now, it is well settled and needs no authority for holding that every power must be exercised bona fide and in good faith. Before more than hundred years, Lord Lindley said in General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun 1904 AC 515 : 20 TLR 370 : (1904-1907) All ER Rep Ext 1448 (HL): I take it to be clear that there is a condition implied in this as well as in other instruments which create power, namely, that the powers shall be used bona fide for the purpose for which they are conferred. In other words, every action of a public authority must be based on utmost good faith, genuine satisfaction and ought to be supported by reason and rationale. It is, therefore, not only the power but the duty of the Court to ensure that all authorities exercise their powers properly, lawfully and in good faith. If powers are exercised with oblique motive, bad faith or of extraneous or irrelevant considerations, there is no exercise of power known to law and the action cannot be termed as action in accordance with law. 18. Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant appellants had made a very enumerating submission as to what is malicious prosecution and the malice, and also the essential points or requirements to be proved by the plaintiff respondent in the suit for remedy for damages for malicious prosecution and also the points to be proved by the defendant appellants in support of their case in such suit by referring to the different decisions in the cases of United Kingdom as well as to the different decisions of the Apex Court. 19. 19. Lord Upjohn in Abbott v. Rejuge Assurance Co. Ltd. (1961) 3 All ER 1086, observed that- It is well settled that for the plaintiff to succeed in a malicious prosecution action, he must establish each of the following propositions : (i) that he is innocent of the crime charged against him: (ii) that there was an absence of reasonable and probable cause: (ii) that the defendant was actuated by malice: meaning by the use of that word the presence in the mind of the defendant of some indirect or improper or unlawful motive in instituting the criminal proceedings. Lord Ormedod in Abbott v. Rejuge Assurance Co. Ltd. (1961) 3 All ER 1081 also observed that- I will deal first with the question whether there was reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. The learned Judge in dealing with this matter on P. 6 of the transcript of his judgment says this: Reasonable and probable cause has been defined by LORD ATKIN in his speech in the well-known case of Herniman v. Smith(1938) 1 All ER 1. It is to be observed that the other Lords of Appeal agreed with the speech delivered by LORD ATKIN. He adopted part of the definition given by HAWKINS, J., IN Hicks v. Faulkner (1981) 8 Q.B.D. 167 when he said this (1938) 1 All ERat p. 8 : 'I known of no better statement of the issue than that in the words of HAWKINS, J...." "...I should define reasonable and probable cause to be an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accused, to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed. 20. House of Lords in Glinski v. Mclver (1962) 1 All ER 696, observed that- Malicious prosecution - Honest belief in guilt of plaintiff - Questions not to be put to jury in absence of evidence on which to base a finding of want of such belief. - Legal advice as defence. 20. House of Lords in Glinski v. Mclver (1962) 1 All ER 696, observed that- Malicious prosecution - Honest belief in guilt of plaintiff - Questions not to be put to jury in absence of evidence on which to base a finding of want of such belief. - Legal advice as defence. In actions for malicious prosecution- (a) the question whether the defendant honestly believed that the accused was guilty of the offence does not necessarily arise in every action; it should not be put to a jury unless there is alternative evidence of the want of such belief, or some contested evidence bearing directly on that belief (see p. 700, letter p. 706, letter B, and p. 707, letter G, post; cf., p. 710, letter H, p. 711, letters E and G, and p. 715, letter B, post). (d) the duty of the defendant prosecutor. before bringing the criminal charge which is the subject of the action, was to have found out whether there was reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution rather than whether there was a possible defence or whether the proposed accused was guilty (see p. 701, letter H, P. 706, letter B, and p. 710, letter A, post). Lord Denning in Glinski v. Mclver (supra) also observed that: My Lords, in Hicks v. Faulkner (15) Hawkins, J., put forward a definition of "reasonable and probable cause" which later received the approval of this House. He defined it as an "honest belief., in the guilt of the accused" and proceeded to detail its constituent elements. The definition was appropriate enough there. It was, I suspect, tailor-made to fit the measurements of that exceptional case. It may fit other outsize measurements too. But experience has shown that it does not fit the ordinary run of cases. It is mistake to treat it as a touchstone. It cannot serve as a substitute for the rule of law which says that, in order to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution. the plaintiff must prove to the satisfaction of the Judge that, at the time when the charge was made, there was an absence of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. Let me give some of the reasons which show how careful the Judge must be before he puts to the jury the question : "Did the defendant honestly believe that the accused was guilty? 21. Let me give some of the reasons which show how careful the Judge must be before he puts to the jury the question : "Did the defendant honestly believe that the accused was guilty? 21. Lord Denning in Dallison v. Caffery (1964) 2 All ER 610, observed that: Malicious prosecution. Three points are raised on malicious prosecution: (a) whether the Judge asked the right question; (b) whether he ought not to have asked a question as to "honest belief and (c) whether the Judge's ruling was right. Lord Diplok in Dallison v. Caffery (supra) also observed that: Malicious prosecution thus, differs from wrongful arrest and detention, in that the onus of proving that the prosecutor did not act honestly or reasonably, lies on the person prosecuted. A person, whether or not he is a police officer, acts reasonably in prosecuting a suspected felon if the credible evidence of which he knows rules a case fit to go to a jury that the suspect is guilty of the felony charged. This is what in law constitutes reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. 22. Halsbury's Laws of India, Volume 29 (1) : Tort, had defined the meaning of the terms "Malice and liability" thus: (285.020) Malice and liability. Malice in fact, does not generally render an act otherwise lawful as something that is actionable. However, malice in fact is relevant in some contexts for disproving the right of the defendant to act as he did. For example, the plea of qualified privilege as a defence to an action for libel or slander may be defeated if it is shown that the defendant did not publish the defamatory words in the legitimate exercise of a privilege but for the purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff from a feeling of spite or ill-will towards him. Similarly, in some instances of nuisance, proof of malice in fact will establish that the defendant was not making a reasonable use of his property. Once the defendant's use of his land is held to be unreasonable, liability for nuisance can follow. Malice in fact is also relevant as it is the gist of action for malicious prosecution or the burgeoning tort of abuse of process. Once the defendant's use of his land is held to be unreasonable, liability for nuisance can follow. Malice in fact is also relevant as it is the gist of action for malicious prosecution or the burgeoning tort of abuse of process. The law of tort is generally not concerned with the motive of the defendant but only whether he acted intentionally, with knowledge of what he was doing, for the absence of a probable and reasonable cause is not by itself sufficient evidence of malice. Malice in law is an act done wrongly and without reasonable and probable cause, or conduct borne by a motive other than a sense of duty or interest; malice in law is generally accepted as an ingredient of several different kinds of liability. 23. The Apex Court in N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P. (1994) 6 SCC 205 : AIR 1994 SC 2663 held that sovereign immunity cannot be invoked where the officers of the Government are guilty of interfering with life and liberty of a citizen not warranted by law. The State is vicariously liable and bound, constitutionally, legally and morally to. to compensate and indemnify the wronged person. The Apex Court Amrik Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1980 SC 1447 , held that even the concerned employee cannot suffer because of the administrative lapses and also that because of the administrative lapses the concerned employee could not be victimized. The Apex Court in Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union 1997 (2) Supreme 165 : AIR 1997 SC 645 , held that the arm of the High Court is long enough to reach wherever there is injustice. 24. The Apex Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 : AIR 2001 SC 965 , held that the first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind. The task of the appellate Court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind. The task of the appellate Court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The appellate Court agreeing with the view of the trial Court need not restore the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court: expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary AIR 1967 SC 1124 ]. 25. This Court is in full agreement with the reasons given by the trial Court in the impugned judgment and order dated 3-1-2000 that there were not only absence of reasonable and probable cause but also malicious mind to prosecute the plaintiff. For the sake of repetition, this Court reiterate that no prudent person will think that there are reasonable and probable cause in prosecuting the plaintiff-respondent by filing the complaint to the O/C Belonia police station in the present given case inasmuch as the said complaint case was a result of the directions issued by the SDO (Food and Civil Supplies), Belonia, South Tripura with whom the licence of the plaintiff-respondent was pending for revalidation/renewal and also delayed the renewal of the licence with the noting on the licence of the plaintiff-respondent "wait for obvious reason" and there was no order for cancellation of the said licence of the plaintiff-respondent, when the defendant-appellants took drastic step of seizing all the stock of the plaintiff-respondent's shop and put the same to auction sale and also that the defendant-appellant No. 4 had clearly stayed in the Court that during his tenure of service he did not institute any other case except the case of the plaintiff-respondent for not having licence whereas the licence was presented to the Office for renewal. 26. For the foregoing discussions and observations, the present appeal is devoid of merit. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Parties are to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed