Judgment :- Basheer, J. Appellant was charge sheeted by Perinthalmanna Police for committing murder of his wife Mehaboobi, aged 32 years, by setting her ablaze after pouring kerosene over her body at about 7.30 a.m. on July 17, 2001. According to the prosecution, Mehaboobi and her three minor children were living with the appellant in his residence at the relevant point of time. He doubted the chastity of his wife who was working as an agent in the Life Insurance Corporation of India. 2. Police had registered the crime on July 18, 2002 after recording Ext.P13, statement of the victim, at Alshifa hospital in Perintalmanna. The Head Constable who recorded the statement, noticed burn injuries on the face, neck, chest, abdomen, etc. of the victim. Those injuries were recorded in Ext.P13 statement and pursuant to that Ext.P14, First Information Report, was registered for the offence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. Investigation was conducted by PW14 and 16 and charge sheet was laid by PW15. But since the victim succumbed to the injuries later, charge sheet was laid after investigation for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 3. Prosecution examined PW1 to PW16 and marked Exts.P1 to P19 and M.O.1 on its side. There was no oral or documentary evidence on the side of the defence. 4. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, after evaluating the oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the prosecution had succeeded in proving the charge against the appellant under Section 302 IPC and accordingly convicted and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of two years. 5. Sri.Vijayabhanu, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the court below had committed serious illegality in holding the appellant guilty in the absence of any legal proof as regards the actual cause of death of the victim. He contends that neither Ext.P9, dying declaration, allegedly recorded by PW9, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Perinthalmanna nor Ext.P13, First Information Statement, could have been admitted in evidence as valid pieces of evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act to hold the appellant guilty. He contends that neither Ext.P9, dying declaration, allegedly recorded by PW9, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Perinthalmanna nor Ext.P13, First Information Statement, could have been admitted in evidence as valid pieces of evidence under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act to hold the appellant guilty. Alternatively, it is also contended by the learned counsel that even assuming the so called dying declaration is accepted in evidence, appellant could not have been convicted and sentenced under Section 302 IPC. According to the learned counsel, having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, appellant can be found guilty only under Section 304 Part II IPC. Are the above contentions legally tenable and valid? 6. It may at once be noticed that some of the material witnesses like the daughter and mother of the victim and neighbours had failed to support the prosecution. PW1, one of the neighbours, deposed before the court that she had come to the courtyard of the residence of the appellant on hearing a loud cry at about 7 a.m. According to this witness, she saw a fireball collapsing on the heap of sand in the courtyard. She realised that it was the deceased. She saw the deceased herself trying to douse the fire by putting sand on her body. PW1 tried to pour some water on the body of the victim. By that time the appellant, the husband of the victim, came to the scene. The children were standing nearby. According to this witness, she poured some water on the body of the victim and the appellant also tried to do so. He also sustained some burn injury in the process. Appellant brought a jeep to take the victim to the hospital. PW1 went along with the appellant to the hospital. According to PW1, the victim was in a position to talk. She found some burn injuries on the chest, face near the eye etc. According to this witness, the victim had walked up to the jeep. She was taken to Alshifa Hospital. She further stated that the husband and the victim had been leading a cordial marital life. 7. PW2, the minor daughter of the victim (she was aged about 13 years at the time of the incident) stated that she woke up at about 5.30 a.m. on that day. She was taken to Alshifa Hospital. She further stated that the husband and the victim had been leading a cordial marital life. 7. PW2, the minor daughter of the victim (she was aged about 13 years at the time of the incident) stated that she woke up at about 5.30 a.m. on that day. At 5.35 a.m. her father also woke up, since her mother had failed to prepare the morning tea. At this stage of the examination in chief, the learned Public Prosecutor sought permission of the court to declare PW2 hostile. PW2 deposed that whatever statement the police recorded, incriminating her father in the crime, was not given by her. We do not intend to go into the several contradictions in her statement before the police in detail. In short, though this witness did describe how the incident took place, she did not implicate her father/appellant in any manner in the crime. PW3, who was yet another neighbour was an attester to Ext.P3, scene mahazar. This witness was declared hostile, since he stated that the marital relationship between the appellant and his deceased wife had been quite cordial. This statement was, according to the prosecution, totally contradictory to what he had stated before the Police. 8. PW4 was the Medical Officer, who examined the victim on July 17, 2001 immediately after her admission in the hospital. In Ext.P4 certificate, PW4 stated that the victim had suffered 30% burn injuries. He further stated that the details shown in column No.3 of Ext.P4 certificate were furnished by the bystanders. Patient was discharged from the hospital on July 27, 2004. In Ext.P4 wound certificate PW4 stated that at the time of discharge, the patient had developed septicemia. We will refer to Ext.P4 certificate and the evidence of this witness a little later. 9. PW5 had conducted postmortem and issued Ext.P5 certificate. The following ante mortem injuries were recorded by the doctor in Ext.P5 postmortem certificate: Dermoepidermal burns over front of chest 32 x 24 cm, front and sides of neck, under aspect of chin 16 x 10 cm, front of abdomen 28 x 16 cm. Side of right chest 20 x 10 cm, side of left chest 24 x 12 cm, back of right chest and abdomen 50 x 12 cm. Side of right chest 20 x 10 cm, side of left chest 24 x 12 cm, back of right chest and abdomen 50 x 12 cm. Multiple spit like burns on back of left side of chest 20 x 14 cm, front of right thigh 16 x 8 cm and 4 x 3 cm, front of left thigh 12 x 2 cm, Around left 20 x 8 cm just above ankle, back of right thigh and buttocks 24 x 8 cm. Scar formed areas seen in between the wounds, Edges of burns showing healing. Floor of the wounds blackish yellow in color. No burns seen over feet and fingers of hands. Top of head not burnt. Hairs of sides of head singed and burnt. Scars of healed burns seen over face. 10. It is not necessary to refer to the other findings in the certificate apart from the opinion as to cause of death as recorded by the doctor which is extracted hereunder: "deceased died of infective complications of burns" 11. PW6 - Doctor had examined the appellant for some alleged blisters on his left hand ring and index fingers. Ext.P6 was the certificate issued by the doctor in this regard. PW7 was a witness to Ext.P7 inquest report. 12. PW8, the mother of the victim, deposed before the court that her daughter, was conscious till the time of her death. According to this witness, about 5 to 8 days after the incident, the deceased told her that she had set fire to herself. This witness was also declared hostile, since she resiled from the statements given by her to the police implicating the appellant. She disowned the statement given by her to the Police that her daughter had told that the appellant had poured kerosene on her body and set her ablaze. Her contradictory statement was marked as Ext.P8. In cross examination by the public prosecutor, this witness admitted that the three children were now living with the appellant, though for about 2 = years after the incident, they had been under her care and custody. 13. PW9, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Perinthalmanna, had recorded Ext.P9, dying declaration of the victim at Alshifa hospital on July 19, 2001 implicating the appellant. 13. PW9, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Perinthalmanna, had recorded Ext.P9, dying declaration of the victim at Alshifa hospital on July 19, 2001 implicating the appellant. This witness categorically stated that the declarant was conscious through out the process of recording her statement and that she was in a fit condition to give the declaration. In short, this witness asserted before the court that Ext.P9, dying declaration was recorded after complying with all the legal and procedural formalities. Since the procedure followed by PW9 had not been subjected to any kind of challenge by the defence, we do not propose to deal with the evidence of this witness any further. 14. PW10, Village Officer, had prepared the scene plan. PW11 had forwarded the material objects for chemical examination. Ext.P11 was the forwarding note and Ext.P12 the photographs with negatives. PW13 recorded Ext.P13 F.I. Statement of the victim. PW14 and 16 conducted the investigation. As mentioned earlier, PW15 laid charge sheet before the court. 15. The primary contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the court below ought not to have relied on Exts.P9 and P13 dying declarations to convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC. 16. It is contended by the learned counsel that no legal sanctity could be attached to Ext.P9 dying declaration in as much as the prosecution had miserably failed even to establish or to bring on record the actual cause of death of the victim. According to the learned counsel, Ext.P13 presents a much worse scenario as far as the prosecution case is concerned. 17. The above contention is primarily based on the so called lacuna on the part of the prosecution in failing to elicit from the doctor who conducted postmortem, his opinion as to the cause of death of the victim. It is pointed out by the learned counsel, rightly to a great extent, that the doctor had only spoken with regard to the fact that he had conducted postmortem and issued Ext.P5 certificate which bore his signature. 18. It is true that in the course of his chief examination the doctor had reproduced the ante mortem injuries. Nothing else was spoken by him and no further question was put to this witness either by the learned Public Prosecutor or by the court. 18. It is true that in the course of his chief examination the doctor had reproduced the ante mortem injuries. Nothing else was spoken by him and no further question was put to this witness either by the learned Public Prosecutor or by the court. It is in this context that the learned counsel has invited our attention to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana Vs. Ram Singh [2002 (2) SCC 426]. In the above case, it was held thus: "The significance of the evidence of the doctor lies vis-à-vis the injuries appearing on the body of the deceased person and likely use of the weapon therefor and it would then be the prosecutor's duty and obligation to have the corroborative evidence available on record from the other prosecution witnesses." 19. Learned counsel contends that all the material witnesses having failed to support the prosecution case, the only trump card that the prosecution had in its possession was the postmortem certificate. But the witness who was examined by the prosecution to prove the postmortem certificate did not speak anything about the cause of death. 20. It is trite that postmortem certificate by itself is not a substantive piece of evidence. The oral testimony of the doctor who conducted post mortem assumes significance when the injuries found on the dead body have to be correlated to the weapon allegedly used by the assailant or when there is glaring ambiguity about the cause of death and also if there is doubt as to whether the injury found on the body would have been sufficient enough to cause death under normal circumstances. These are only some of the instances which could be cited illustratively, and not exhaustively. It cannot be said as a general proposition of law that the evidence of the doctor and the post mortem certificate issued by him, would have to be eschewed totally, if he omits to mention the cause of death while he is being examined in the court, albeit the certificate unerringly states the cause of death. 21. Section 45 of the Evidence Act empowers the Court to form its opinion upon a point of science or art or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions with the help of an expert. 21. Section 45 of the Evidence Act empowers the Court to form its opinion upon a point of science or art or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions with the help of an expert. The opinion that may be given by such a person who is skilled or well versed in that particular science, art etc. shall be a relevant fact in the case concerned. The person who gives evidence before the Court as an expert must have the requisite skill and adequate knowledge in his field of expertise. 22. The opinion of the doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the victim in a murder case is such a relevant fact which may have a bearing on the ultimate finding of the Court, on analysis of the entire oral and documentary evidence. It is the settled position of law that the opinion of the doctor in such matters may not be the last word, especially if there is conflict between his opinion and the version given by the ocular witnesses. 23. In Darsan Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 10 SCC 283), the Apex Court held that the opinion of the Doctor in such a case cannot override the unimpeachable testimony of eye witnesses. 24. In Prem v. Doula (1997 (9) SCC 754) the doctor gave evidence that the injury in question could not have been caused by the weapon (ranbi) allegedly used by the accused. However the evidence of eye witnesses that the injury was caused by "ranbi" was found unimpeachable. The assertion made by these witnesses that the two accused caught hold of the deceased and inflicted a forceful blow with the "ranbi" was found to be more creditworthy than the opinion given by the doctor. 25. In Sail Singh v. Mohinder Pal (1998 SCC (Crl.) 383) also the oral testimony of eye witnesses was found more acceptable than the opinion evidence of the doctor as regards the injuries found on the body of the victim. A similar view was taken in State of Shimla v. Rampadarath Singh (1998 (6) SCC 240). 26. In State of U.P. v. Harban Sahai (1998 (6) SCC 50), their Lordships held that testimony of eye witnesses would be preferable unless medical evidence is so conclusive as to rule out even the possibility of eye witness's version to be true. 27. A similar view was taken in State of Shimla v. Rampadarath Singh (1998 (6) SCC 240). 26. In State of U.P. v. Harban Sahai (1998 (6) SCC 50), their Lordships held that testimony of eye witnesses would be preferable unless medical evidence is so conclusive as to rule out even the possibility of eye witness's version to be true. 27. We have referred to the above judicial precedents only to highlight the fact that the opinion of the medical expert as regards the injuries or cause of death can only be a relevant fact which ultimately may have a bearing on the outcome of the case. But in some cases, the opinion evidence of the expert may have a larger bearing if such opinion is corroborated by other material pieces of evidence on record, especially in a case where prosecution relies entirely on circumstantial evidence. The position is altered when there are other clinching pieces of evidence which would establish the prosecution case. Therefore the mere omission of the doctor who conducted post mortem to reproduce his opinion recorded in the post mortem certificate before the Court while he is in the witness box shall not impair or nullify his evidence. 28. We have already noticed the cause of death as recorded by PW5. It is significant to note that the defence did not have a case that the victim had not suffered burn injuries on July 17, 2001. The fact that she was admitted in Alshifa hospital on the same day with burn injuries and that she remained there as an inpatient till July 27, 2001 is also beyond dispute. Yet again, the fact that the victim was discharged from the said hospital and admitted in the Medical College Hospital on July 27, 2007 due to certain complications (septicemia) and that ultimately the poor lady succumbed to "infective complications of burn injuries" on July 30, 2001 is also beyond controversy. 29. It is true that the Public Prosecutor or atleast the court ought to have been a little more diligent and careful while the doctor was being examined in the court. 29. It is true that the Public Prosecutor or atleast the court ought to have been a little more diligent and careful while the doctor was being examined in the court. Even if the prosecutor failed to be diligent while examining the doctor and thus omitted to put the most relevant and crucial questions to him in order to bring out his opinion as to cause of death as recorded in the postmortem certificate, the Presiding Officer of the court could not have remained a silent spectator. The presiding Judge should assume a more active and participatory role, particularly in a murder trial, as otherwise, cause of justice will be the first casualty. 30. Significantly, in the case on hand, all the relevant materials were available on record. In Ext.P5 certificate, the doctor had recorded all the necessary findings. What was required was only to alert and prompt the witness to refresh his memory with reference to the certificate and speak before the court what he had recorded in the certificate. In that view of the matter, the contention raised by the learned counsel that the appellant cannot be held guilty of culpable homicide in the absence of oral assertion by the Doctor who conducted postmortem about the cause of death, is totally misconceived and untenable. 31. In this context, we may refer to yet another aspect. The deceased lady had given Ext.P9 statement before the learned Magistrate on the second day of the alleged incident. A perusal of Ext.P9 statement will undoubtedly show that it was a voluntary revelation of what had actually happened on the dreadful day. The learned Magistrate had noted that all faculties of the declarant were intact. She had given statement while she was in a sound mental condition. The statement was recorded by the learned Magistrate in the manner described in the questionnaire. The doctor who was present at the time of recording the statement had also certified the mental condition of the patient (victim). If we consider the said declaration (Ext.P9) along with the evidence of PW9, it can be seen that the victim had in unambiguous terms spoken as to how she had suffered the burn injuries. She had specifically implicated the appellant in the crime. 32. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the victim had been undergoing treatment for burn injuries till her death, is beyond dispute. She had specifically implicated the appellant in the crime. 32. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the victim had been undergoing treatment for burn injuries till her death, is beyond dispute. The mere fact that the doctor had failed to speak about the cause of death in his oral testimony will not in our view take away the evidentiary value of the postmortem certificate. 33. Having regard to the facts and circumstances revealed from material pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution, we have no hesitation to hold that there cannot be any doubt about the cause of death of the victim. As pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, Ext.P5 postmortem certificate was never challenged by the defence though he concedes that his counterpart in the court below could have been a little more alert while PW5 doctor was being examined in the court. In any view of the matter, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is liable to be repelled. We do so. 34. But as regards the legality of the conviction under Section 302 IPC, we find some force in the submissions made by the learned counsel especially in the backdrop of the evidence of PW4, the doctor attached to Alshifa Hospital. He deposed that the victim had developed Septicemia at the time of her discharge from that hospital. Obviously she was discharged when her condition had become quite serious and critical. According to this witness, the victim had 30% burn injuries at the time of her admission. Ext.P4 certificate reveals that the victim had suffered superficial burn injuries on chest, abdomen, left upper limb, face, neck, right upper limb and thumb. She was treated as an inpatient at Alshifa hospital for 10 days. At the time of discharge, the victim had developed septicemia as spoken to by PW4 himself. 35. We had called for the case sheet maintained at the Medical College Hospital in the course of hearing of the appeal. We have perused the same. Though it has not been marked in the case in the manner prescribed under the procedural law, we have ventured to peruse it in order to satisfy the conscience of this court. We will only refer to one aspect of the matter in relation to the said document. The doctors who treated the victim in the Medical College Hospital had found her condition quite critical. We will only refer to one aspect of the matter in relation to the said document. The doctors who treated the victim in the Medical College Hospital had found her condition quite critical. It was also recorded in the said report that she had extensive burn injuries (45%). We hasten to add that we are not relying on any of the entries in the case sheet for the purpose of disposal of this appeal. But as indicated by us earlier we called for the records, since evidence of PW4 doctor who treated the patient initially did not appear to be satisfactory at all. 36. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel, the evidence on record suggests that the unfortunate victim might not have got adequate medical care initially and that she might have survived under normal circumstances with 30% superficial burn injuries if only she had been given proper medical care and attention. We do not propose to make any comment on this, especially in the absence of any evidence on record. However, it is common knowledge that burn injuries are prone to develop into life threatening complications, if not properly attended to. A victim of burn injury has to be necessarily given the best possible medical care and attention with adequate precaution to ensure that wounds do not get infected. Though the alleged lack of proper medical care to the victim cannot be taken advantage of by the appellant, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that he is entitled to get some leniency; particularly since, it has been brought in evidence that he had been looking after his children and in fact the eldest daughter was given in marriage at his own expense. Therefore, we are satisfied that the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC can be set aside. We do so. In our view, ends of justice will be met if he is found guilty under Section 304 Part II IPC. Ordered accordingly. The appellant has to be given adequate sentence for the crime committed by him. According to the prosecution, he had perpetrated the crime, since he had doubted his wife's chastity. Ext.P9 statement will also clearly reveal this. 37. In our view, ends of justice will be met if he is found guilty under Section 304 Part II IPC. Ordered accordingly. The appellant has to be given adequate sentence for the crime committed by him. According to the prosecution, he had perpetrated the crime, since he had doubted his wife's chastity. Ext.P9 statement will also clearly reveal this. 37. Accordingly, the appellant is found guilty under Section 304 Part II IPC and convicted and sentenced thereunder to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.30,000/- and in default of payment of fine, appellant shall suffer imprisonment for a further period of two years. On realisation of the fine amount, it shall be released to the three children of the deceased woman. Appellant is entitled to get the benefit of set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Appeal is disposed of as above.