RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J. 1. The defendants No.1and2 in this suit for declaration and recovery of monies have applied under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2. The plaintiffs are members of a family. The plaintiffs in or about the year 1997-98 were selling and purchasing stocks/shares. The defendant No.3 M/s. R.K. Relan and Co., a partnership firm of the defendants No.1and2 was carrying on business as a stock/share broker. The defendant No.3 was a member of the Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd. impleaded as defendant No.4. The plaintiffs were selling/purchasing shares through the defendant No.3. The defendant No.3 is stated to have defaulted in making payments and delivery of shares to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs complained to the various Regulatory Authorities including SEBI and the defendant No.4. The plaintiffs claimed to have received a letter dated 5th March, 1999 from SEBI stating that the defendant No.3 M/s R.K. Relan and Co., Member, Delhi Stock Exchange had been referred to Default Committee for declaring them as defaulter on account of non redressal of investors? complaint. The plaintiffs claimed to have received another letter dated 22nd October, 1999 from SEBI stating that the defendant No.3 M/s R.K. Relan and Co. had been declared as a defaulter by the Delhi Stock Exchange and the plaintiffs could approach the Delhi Stock Exchange (Defendant No.4) for their complaints and the same shall be settled after due verification. The plaintiffs at that time had claims of recovery of principal sum of Rs.4,26,144.78 and Rs.63,599/-against the defendant No.3 besides of delivery of certain shares. The plaintiffs further pleaded that they received letters from the defendant No.4 Delhi Stock Exchange asking the plaintiffs to sign on prepared letters, acknowledging receipt of the said Rs.4,26,144.78 and Rs.63,599/-as well as the shares which the defendant No.3 had failed to deliver. The plaintiffs claim to have signed the said prepared letters with their own endorsement that they were accepting the full and final settlement of principal amount. Otherwise, it was printed on the said letters that the said amounts were received in full and final settlement of claims against M/s R.K. Relan and Co. (dissolved). 3. The plaintiffs claim to have signed the said prepared letters with their own endorsement that they were accepting the full and final settlement of principal amount. Otherwise, it was printed on the said letters that the said amounts were received in full and final settlement of claims against M/s R.K. Relan and Co. (dissolved). 3. The plaintiffs after receiving the principal amount and the shares instituted the present suit for recovery of Rs.4,40,768/-towards interest at 24% per annum for delay from 21st August, 1998 to 24th May, 2002 in payment of the principal amount, for recovery of Rs.13,90,000/-for losses caused due to fluctuation in price on account of delay in delivery of shares. The plaintiffs thus claimed a declaration that the settlement dated 24th May, 2002 got signed by the defendant No.4 Delhi Stock Exchange from the plaintiffs was null and void and of no effect and for cancellation and setting aside thereof and for recovery of Rs.20,00,768/-from the defendants No.1,2and3 with future interest at 24% per annum. 4. The defendants No.1and2 on receipt of summons applied under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. It is the case of the defendants No.1and2 that as per the bye laws of the Delhi Stock Exchange, no sale or purchase of shares can be affected without execution of a contract in terms of the said bye-laws; that such contract notes were prepared in relation to the transaction of the defendant No.3 with the plaintiffs also; that the said contract notes were filed by the plaintiffs themselves in the complaint being pursued by the plaintiffs against the said defendants before the Consumer Courts; that the said contract notes contain a clause for arbitration of all claims, differences or disputes in respect of any dealings, transactions and contracts, in terms of the rules, bye laws and regulations of the Delhi Stock Exchange. It is further pleaded by the defendants No.1and2 that the plaintiffs had as such complained to the Delhi Stock Exchange and on receipt of the complaints of the plaintiffs as well as others against the defendant No.3, the Delhi Stock Exchange appointed a Default Committee headed by Justice M.M. Goswami (Retd.) to look into all the claims of the investors against the defendant No.3; that pursuant to the appointment of Justice M.M. Goswami as arbitrator, the defendant No.3 was declared as a defaulter and the defendants No.1and2 were directed to deposit certain monies; that on demise of Justice Goswami, Justice M.K. Chawla was appointed on the Default Committee; that notices were issued to the plaintiffs by the Default Committee and the plaintiffs had pursued their claims before the Default Committee and had accepted the monies and the shares in full and final settlement. It is further pleaded that the claims in the present suit emanate from sale and purchase of shares subject matter of the contract notes containing an arbitration clause and thus this court under Section 8 had no other option but to refer the parties to arbitration. 5. The plaintiffs filed a reply to the said application of the defendants No.1and2 contending that there was no agreement in writing of arbitration as required by Section 7 of the Act; that the contract notes relied upon by the defendants were signed by the defendant No.3 only and were not signed by the plaintiffs. It was further urged that the application under Section 8 was even otherwise not maintainable being not accompanied by the original arbitration agreement. 6. The defendants have along with their application filed certified copies of the contract notes which of course are signed on behalf of the defendant No.3 only. The said contract notes on the face thereof contain a clause as under:-?This contract constitutes and shall be deemed to constitute as provided overleaf an agreement between you and us that all claims (whether admitted or not) differences or disputes in respect of any dealings, transactions and contracts of a date prior or subsequent to the date of the contract (including any question whether such dealings, transactions or contracts have been entered into or not) shall be submitted to and decided by arbitration in New Delhi as provided in the rules, bye laws and regulations of the Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd. New Delhi.? 7. 7. The contract notes on their reverse reproduce the arbitration clause of the Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd. 8. Even though the plaintiffs have contested the application only on the ground of there being no agreement in writing signed by them of arbitration and of the application being unaccompanied by such an agreement, it may be noticed that the Apex court in Madan Mohan Rajgarhia Vs. M/s Mahendra R. Shah and Bros. (2003) 7 SCC 138 has held that the para materia clause of the Bombay Stock Exchange is comprehensive and covers disputes and claims between sellers and purchasers of shares and the stock broker. 9. The argument of the plaintiffs in the present case proceeded on a misconception that Section 7 requires not only an agreement in writing but also such agreement to be signed by the parties. The same is not the language of Section 7. To constitute an arbitration agreement, it is not necessary that the writing should bear the signatures of the parties. Requirement of law is only that it should be in writing. See Shri Chander Nath Ojha v Shri Suresh Jhalani 1999 (6) Scale 338 and Patanjal v Rawalpindi Theatres (P) Ltd AIR 1970 Delhi 19 10. There is no change in this regard in the definition of arbitration agreement under 1940 Act and under the 1996 Act. Under 1940 Act also the arbitration agreement was merely required to be in writing and did not require any signatures. In fact, the 1996 Act takes care to emphasise that an agreement signed by the parties is just one of the forms in which the arbitration agreement may be made but it can be in the manners provided in Section 7(4) (b) and (c) and Section 7(5) also. 11. The Apex Court in Shri Chander Nath Ojha v Shri Suresh Jhalani 1999 (6) Scale 338 held that an arbitration agreement under the 1940 Act was not required to necessarily bear the signatures of the parties and the requirement is only of the same being in writing. The Division Bench of this court in Patanjal v Rawalpindi Theatres (P) Ltd AIR 1970 Delhi 19 also held that the agreement need not necessarily be signed by the parties. The Division Bench of this court in Patanjal v Rawalpindi Theatres (P) Ltd AIR 1970 Delhi 19 also held that the agreement need not necessarily be signed by the parties. Similarly this court in Krishan Chander Ramesh Chander v Sohan Lal 20 (1981) DLT 454 held that where the reverse of sale bills contained writing of reference of disputes to Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association of which seller only was a member, there comes into existence an agreement between the seller and buyer of arbitration of the said Association. To the same effect is Bharat Steel Tubes v State of Bihar 50(1993) DLT 577. Under the 1996 Act also, this court in Unipack Industries v Subhash Chand Jain 2001 (94) DLT 710 has held that an arbitration agreement need not be signed in situations contemplated under Section 7(4)(b) and (c) 12. Here it is not disputed that the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant No.3 forming the basis of the claims of the plaintiffs were evidenced by the contract notes. The defendants have averred and the plaintiffs have not denied that the plaintiffs themselves have before the Consumer Court filed the said contract notes, copies of which have been filed along with the application under Section 8. It is also not in dispute that the said contract notes were accepted by the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs acted on the same. In fact, the claims of the plaintiffs for monies and delivery of shares were on the basis of the said contract notes. The plaintiffs thus had knowledge of the arbitration agreement and are deemed to have given their consent to arbitration agreement. The intention of the parties to refer to the arbitration is thus clearly spelt out and there is no mandatory requirement that such agreement should bear signatures of both the parties. That is but one of the facets of Section 7(4) of the Act. Otherwise an arbitration agreement in writing can also be made out from exchange of letters, tele faxes, telegrams or other means of telephonic communication which provide a record of the agreement. In the present case the contract notes provide a record of the agreement between the parties and were exchanged between the parties. The said contract notes contain the arbitration agreement in writing. Thus, the requirements of Section 7 are met and the plea of the plaintiffs is misconceived. 13. In the present case the contract notes provide a record of the agreement between the parties and were exchanged between the parties. The said contract notes contain the arbitration agreement in writing. Thus, the requirements of Section 7 are met and the plea of the plaintiffs is misconceived. 13. Having found the subject matter of the present suit to be subject matter of Arbitration Agreement and the defendants having applied under Section 8 not later than when submitting their first statement on the substance of the dispute, this court under Section 5 of the Act is barred from proceedings further with the suit and has no option but to refer the parties to arbitration. 14. As far as the plea of the defendants of the claim having already been the subject matter of arbitration is concerned, the same is not required to be adjudicated herein. It may only be noticed that nothing has been filed on record to show that the procedure of arbitration has been followed in settlement of claims of the plaintiffs. The documents, refer to a Default Committee appointed by the defendant No.4 only and do not refer to any arbitral award. 15. The counsel for the plaintiff had also argued that the arbitrators are not empowered to grant relief of declaration claimed in the suit. However, the said contention is also not tenable. The Apex court in S.B.P. and Co. v Patel Engineering Ltd AIR 2006 SC 450 has held that the plea of whether there has been a full and final settlement between the parties also can be referred to arbitration (See para 38 of the judgment). If the plaintiffs chose to pursue the remedy of arbitration, it shall be open to the Arbitration Tribunal to entertain all pleas including of the nature and status of the proceedings whereunder payment of principal amount and delivery of shares has been made to the plaintiffs as well as of adjudicating whether the plaintiffs had received the monies in full and final settlement or towards principal amount only. 16. The application of the defendants No.1and 2 thus succeeds. The subject matter of the suit being the subject matter of an arbitration agreement, the suit cannot proceed and is disposed of under Section 8 of the Act by referring the parties to arbitration.