JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. Hearing and disposal of this Appeal earlier without formulating any substantial question of law was faulted seriously for, it amounted to assumption of jurisdiction by this Court under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Granting a leave and setting aside the judgment and order dated 6.8.2004, the hon'ble Apex Court remitted back the case for disposal afresh in accordance with law providing a liberty to this Court to frame the substantial question of law. On perusal of record, it is found that this Court, in fact, at the time of admission of the Appeal, formulated the following substantial question of law on 24.9.1997: (i) Whether the First Appellate court acted illegally in holding that the respondent claimed adverse possession by filing written objection to the counter claim notwithstanding admission of execution and registration of sale deed in respect of the land by the original pattadars in favour of the deceased defendant? After remand, this Court reformulated the substantial question of law as follows: Whether the plaintiff's claim of right of adverse possession can be sustained and his long continuous and uninterrupted possession becomes hostile to the right, title and interest of the true owner in view of the plea taken by the plaintiff in the written statement filed against the counter claim to the effect that they are in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit land and whether such a plea is sufficient to hold that the claim of the plaintiff has ripen by the right of adverse possession? 2. The brief facts of the instant case are as follows: The plaintiff, one Smt. Sailabala Nath instituted Title Suit No. 82/84 in the court of the Munsiff No. 1, Tezpur, praying for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants in the suit from disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. According to the plaintiff, she had purchased possessory rights over the suit land from one, Haji Monruj AH and according to the plaintiff, she had remained in possession of the suit land all along on payment of rent to the owner. On 9.8.1984, the plaintiff received a notice from the defendants that they had purchased the suit land from the original owner and, therefore, the plaintiff was required to vacate the suit land on or before 27.8.1984. On 9.8.1984, the plaintiff received a notice from the defendants that they had purchased the suit land from the original owner and, therefore, the plaintiff was required to vacate the suit land on or before 27.8.1984. Accordingly, the suit in question was filed claiming the reliefs already noticed. The defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement denying the claim made by the plaintiff. In the written statement filed, the defendants set up a counter claim of right, title and interest over the suit land by purchase and a right to have vacant possession of the same land by evicting the plaintiff therefrom. 3. Based on the plaint, written statement, counter claim and objection to counter claim, the learned trial court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form? (2) Whether there is any cause,of action for the suit? (3) Whether the plaintiff has not signed and verified the plaint? (4) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and mis-joinder of necessary parties? (5) Whether the plaintiff or defendant No. 1 has right, title and interest in the suit land? (6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for? (7) Whether the defendant No. 1 is entitled to recovery of possession of the suit land by delivery or has possession and eviction of the plaintiff therefrom on the counter claimed? (8) To what other relief are the parties entitled? The issue Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 were decided in favour of the plaintiff. The learned trial court decided the issue No. 5, partly in favour of the plaintiff in respect of possession over the suit land and partly in favour of the defendants in respect of right and interest over the suit land. The issue No. 7 is exclusively pertaining to counter claim which the learned trial court decided against the defendants. The suit was accordingly decreed. The defendants came in an appeal before the lower Appellate court. The findings on issue No. 5 was reversed by the learned lower Appellate court but it concurred with the eventual conclusion of the learned trial court. The plaintiff's suit stood decreed while the defendants' counter claim stood dismissed. The aggrieved defendants are thus before this Court as appellants. 4. Heard Mr. T.C. Khatri, learned senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. A.K. Roy, learned Counsel, for the, appellants. The plaintiff's suit stood decreed while the defendants' counter claim stood dismissed. The aggrieved defendants are thus before this Court as appellants. 4. Heard Mr. T.C. Khatri, learned senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. A.K. Roy, learned Counsel, for the, appellants. Also heard Mr. B.C. Das, learned senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. S.C. Biswas, learned Counsel, appearing for the respondents. 5. At the very outset, Mr. Khatri, learned Senior Counsel, persuades me to go through the Judgment and Order dated 6.8.2004, by which a learned Single Judge of this Court allowed this Appeal earlier, which I refuse to do with due regard to the learned Single Judge and prefer to remain uninfluenced thereby, in deference to Apex Court's directions to hear this matter afresh. It was nice of Mr. Khatri to appreciate my approach and make his submissions for the appellants. The main and first submission of Mr. Khatri, is that the respondents/plaintiffs never pleaded adverse possession hostile to appellants/defendants and the courts below seriously erred in law in deciding the issue which was not pleaded in the plaint and objection to the counter claim. According to Mr. Khatri, the appellant purchased the suit land on 9.11.1982, by a registered sale-deed, whereas the respondent claimed the suit land in 1984 only by filing the title suit and during this period of 2 years, even assuming but not admitting, he was in possession, the respondents cannot get the benefit of adverse possession under the existing law which requires at least 12 years of continuous possession hostile to title of the true owner of the land. Mr. Khatri, learned Counsel, places the decision of the Apex Court rendered in M. Durai v. Muthu (2007) 3 SCC 114 , and Md. Mohammad Ali v. Jagdish Kalita (2004) 1 SCC 277. The learned senior Counsel further submits that the registered sale deed executed by the original pattadar in favour of the appellant not being disputed, the lower courts should not have read any plea of adverse possession in their written objection to counter claim, more particularly, when no such plea of adverse possession was specifically made in the plaint itself. 6. Mr. Khatri, learned senior Counsel, refers to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, to comprehend the meaning of 'sale'. 6. Mr. Khatri, learned senior Counsel, refers to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, to comprehend the meaning of 'sale'. Section 54 is to be read with Section 8 of the said Act which would make it clear that on execution and registration of a sale deed, the ownership, title and all interest in the property is passed on to the purchaser. The learned senior Counsel bases his submission in the case of Bishundeo Narain Rai v. Anmol Devit (1998) 7 SCC 498 . In the present case, according to Mr. Khatri, the appellant/defendant No. 1, namely, Swadhinata Saha purchased the suit land by a registered sale deed, got her name mutated, has been paying the land revenue and thus, indisputably acquired ownership, title and interest in the suit land within the meaning of Sections 54 and 8 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. Mr. B.C. Das, learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, before dwelling upon the main question involved, attempts to explain the meaning and purport of adverse possession by reading out certain paragraphs from the cases decided by the Apex Court in Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram (2007) 9 SCC 641 ; T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa (2006) 7 SCC 570 and Amarendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati (2004) 10 SCC 65 . In order to make his points clearer, Mr. Das, learned Counsel, submits that the suit land was in possession of the respondent since the year 1964, i.e., ever since the same was purchased by executing a Katcha Deed which has been proved by adducing sufficient evidence and the respondent has been successful in showing that her possession of the suit land is expressly in denial of title of the true owner or the original pattadar. 8. Mr. Das, learned senior Counsel, then, engages himself in convincing that the plea of adverse possession may be made either specifically or implicitly. He fairly admits that the term 'adverse possession' has not been used in the pleadings but on reading of the plaint and the objection to counter claim in entirety, one could easily gather that the respondent/plaintiff made the plea of 'adverse possession'. He fairly admits that the term 'adverse possession' has not been used in the pleadings but on reading of the plaint and the objection to counter claim in entirety, one could easily gather that the respondent/plaintiff made the plea of 'adverse possession'. The learned Counsel draws my attention to the averments made in paragraph-4 of the Projection to counter claim, the relevant portion of which, runs as under: ...The plaintiff is all along in possession of the suit land by constructing residential houses thereon since 1964 and hence resistance by the defendants and their men at any point of time does not arise at all.... 9. Further Mr. Das, learned senior Counsel, also refers to paragraph-7 of the objection to counter claim, which incorporates the following averments: ...The plaintiff being in continuous possession of the suit land since 1964, question of handing-over or taking possession of the suit land by anybody does not arise at all. From the above, it also proves that the defendant No. 1 has no right or title over the suit land and she is not entitled to get declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land and consequential relief of recovery of possession as prayed.... 10. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties. I have also carefully gone through the pleadings of the parties. From the pleadings in the objection to counter claim, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents and as quoted above, it is more than convincing that although no term like 'adverse possession' has been expressly employed, all the facts necessary to constitute adverse possession have been set-out clearly and unambiguously therein and it is so implicit that the appellants/defendants were not taken by surprise thereby leaving any scope to take an objection that the question of adverse possession cannot be raised or dealt with in the second appeal. No doubt, the courts below, for reasons best known to them only, did not frame a definite issue on the question of adverse possession but nevertheless, the respondent/plaintiff led cogent and convincing evidence to establish their claim of adverse possession over the suit land. No doubt, the courts below, for reasons best known to them only, did not frame a definite issue on the question of adverse possession but nevertheless, the respondent/plaintiff led cogent and convincing evidence to establish their claim of adverse possession over the suit land. The lower courts below duly considered the said evidence and came to a finding that the possession of the suit land by the plaintiff/respondent continued uninterrupted since the year 1964 and against the true owner, if any, and accordingly, they acquired the right by adverse possession against the true owner. After all, the question of adverse possession is basically a question of fact and the same is to be proved by evidence. This fact of adverse possession having been proved by adducing sufficient evidence, the same cannot be interfered with in the second appeal. 11. The next question is whether the proved continuous uninterrupted adverse possession has become hostile to the right, title and interest of the true owner. Now, the question that has to be ascertained by this Court is as to who is the true owner of the suit land in the instant case. There are apparently as many as three owners - (i) The original pattadars namely Sailendra, Satyendra and Sourendra Moitra from whom the appellant/defendants purchased the suit land, (ii) The appellant defendants themselves who purchased the suit land by registered sale deed from the said original pattadars, and, (iii) Haji Momruj Ali from whom the respondent/plaintiff purchased the occupancy right. The respondent's possession over the suit land is hostile to all the owners as they have acquired the title by adverse possession on account of default or inaction on the part of the owners to assert their claim for more than 12 years. To make the possession adverse, it must be shown either that- (i) the true owner had knowledge of the adverse holding, or (ii) the possession was so open, visible and notorious as to raise a presumption of notice not only to the true owner but also to the world. In other words, it is a possession inconsistent with the title of the true owner. In order to dispossess the person in adverse possession, it has to be shown by the true owner that such possession is consistent with the recognition of his title. In other words, it is a possession inconsistent with the title of the true owner. In order to dispossess the person in adverse possession, it has to be shown by the true owner that such possession is consistent with the recognition of his title. The true owner is to bring in action against such inconsistent possession within a prescribed statutory period failing which the adverse possessor would convert into the owner. In the instant case, the appellant, as he claims to be a tenant under the original pattadars from whom he purchased the said suit land, had the knowledge about the possession of the respondent in an illegal and unauthorized manner since 1964 openly, notoriously and continuously. The appellant silently allowed the respondent to continue in possession of the land until he brought in action in 1984, i.e., beyond the prescribed statutory period. It has produced the effect of depriving him the right of action to recover his land and also barring his right of a true owner and, thus, converting the adverse possessor into the owner who becomes protected under the law. This necessarily leads to an infallible conclusion that the claim of adverse possession hostile to true owner/owners has ripen. 12. In my considered view, the legal position by now is too clear to be subjected to any mincing. It is held by the Apex Court in T. Anjanappa (supra) that adverse possession really means hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession, the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity or in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. It is further held that the classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owners, must be peaceful, open and continuous. In addition to above, I would like to refer to the case of Harballav Sarma v. Mohodar Sharma AIR 1975 Gau. 76 , wherein this Court held that the adverse possession becomes hostile to the rightful owner when a person openly or continuously possesses land under a claim of right adverse to the title of the true owner for the statutory period and it is immaterial whether he believed the land does not belong to the true owner. 76 , wherein this Court held that the adverse possession becomes hostile to the rightful owner when a person openly or continuously possesses land under a claim of right adverse to the title of the true owner for the statutory period and it is immaterial whether he believed the land does not belong to the true owner. What is material is that he believed the land belongs to himself. 13. Last of all, the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Amarendra (supra) in paragraph-22 are quoted below, which I consider to be appropriate and gainful: ...The process of acquisition of title by adverse possession springs into action essentially by default or inaction of the owner. A person, though having no right to enter into possession of the property of someone else, does so and continues in possession setting up title in himself and adversely to the title of the owner, commences prescribing title on to himself and such prescription having continued for a period of twelve years, he acquires title not on his own but on account of the default or inaction on the part of the real owner, which stretched over a period of twelve years, results in extinguishing of the latter's title. It is that extinguished title of the real owner which comes to vest in the wrongdoer. The law does not intend to confer any premium on the wrongdoing of a person in wrongful possession; it pronounces the penalty of extinction of title on the person who though entitled to assert his right and remove the Wrongdoer and re-enter into possession, has defaulted and remained inactive for a period of twelve years, which the law considers reasonable for attracting the said penalty. Inaction for a period of twelve years is treated by the doctrine of adverse possession as evidence of the loss of desire on the part of the rightful owner to assert his ownership and reclaim possession. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in this Appeal and dismiss the same with no order as to costs. The substantial question of law aforesaid, is answered accordingly. Appeal dismissed.