Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 410 (GAU)

Nikhil Das v. State of Tripura

2009-06-11

C.R.SARMA, T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2009
JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. The appellants-accused, namely, Sri Nikhil Das, Sri Jatindra Das and Sri Dipak Das, all are the sons of Late Jogesh Das, are challenging the judgment dated 29.6.2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in S.T. No. 72 (WT/A) of 1999 for convicting the appellants-accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 34 of IPC and the order dated 30.6.2004 whereby sentencing the appellants-accused to suffer imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 5,000 each and in default of payment of fine to suffer rigorous imprisonment for another one year. 2. Heard Mr. S. Talapatra, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. B. Banerjee, leaned counsel for the appellants-accused and Mr. D. Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent. 3. The prosecution story, as unfolded during the trial, in a nutshell, is that Shri Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1) lodged an Ejahar to the Officer-in-charge, Jirania P.S. on 15.6.1992 that today, i.e., on 15.6.1992, at night after closing the Bakery shop at Sachindranagar Colony market, he himself, his younger brother, Shibu Dey, Manik Dey, S/o. Monoranjan Dey of Sachindranagar Colony, Rakhal Das (PW No. 3) and Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) were returning together to their respective houses on bicycles. Manik Dey (deceased) and Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) were on one bicycle. At about 9.30 p.m. when they were near the house of Jogesh Das of British Card Colony the and his brother, Shibu Dey went along one road, whereas Manik Dey (deceased), Rakhal Das (PW No. 3) and Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) proceeded towards their houses along another road. After proceeding a distance of about 20/25 yards, suddenly on hearing alarm, raised by Manik Dey as well as others, he and his brother, Shibu Dey, left the bicycle there and started running towards the direction from where Manik Dey raised alarm. On the way, when they reached in front of the house of Rabi Debnath, found Jatindra Das, Dipak Das and Nikhil Das, i.e., appellant-accused, coming armed with dao and kirich (sharp edged weapons) in their hands and when the appellants-accused saw them, the appellants-accused raised their weapons towards them and rushed towards their house speedily. On the way, when they reached in front of the house of Rabi Debnath, found Jatindra Das, Dipak Das and Nikhil Das, i.e., appellant-accused, coming armed with dao and kirich (sharp edged weapons) in their hands and when the appellants-accused saw them, the appellants-accused raised their weapons towards them and rushed towards their house speedily. When they proceeded a little distance, found Manik Dey (deceased) lying in a ditch on road side of the British Card road with grievous bleeding injuries on his person and that Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) was standing beside Manik Dey. They found Rakhal Das (PW No. 3) running towards the house of Jogesh Das and they also came to learn that the appellants-accused, who were the sons of Jogesh Das pounced upon Manik Dey and caused grievous bleeding injuries on him with dao and kirich. At once he, his brother and Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) lifted Manik Dey (deceased) and carried him towards the road and immediately Manik Dey (deceased) was taken to Jirania hospital on a cycle Rickshaw of one Sri Dulal Das (PW No. 8). Manik Dey was in unconscious stage and doctor of Jirania hospital at once referred him (Manik Dey) to G.B. Hospital. It was also stated in Ejahar that for quite-some days there had been dispute between Manik Dey and three sons of Jogesh Das, i.e., the appellants-accused, over different issues and as a consequence of that, the incident had taken place. Manik Dey succumbed to his injuries at G.B. Hospital. 4. On receipt of the Ejahar, a case being Jirania P.S. Case No. 15(6) of 1992 was registered and the investigation was started. After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted the charge sheet. Since the case was exclusively triable by the court of Sessions, the concerned Magistrate committed the case to the court of learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. On transfer, the case was taken up by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala and framed charges against the appellants-accused and one Sri Uttam Das under Section 302 of, IPC read with Section 34 of, IPC and the appellants-accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. The prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited five documents including the post mortem examination report. The post mortem examination on the dead body of Manik Dey was conducted by one Dr. 5. The prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited five documents including the post mortem examination report. The post mortem examination on the dead body of Manik Dey was conducted by one Dr. N.N. Dutta and submitted the report on 18.6.1992, i.e., Exbt-P/3. As per the post mortem examination report, Exbt-P/3, Manik Dey (deceased) suffered as many as seven grievous injuries and the cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple homicidal injuries. PW No. 12, Dr. Ranjit Das, who knew the handwriting and Signature of Dr. N.N. Dutta, deposed on behalf of Dr. N.N. Dutta. In his cross-examination he deposed that all the injuries were insisted wound and the victim Manik Dey died of homicidal death. 6. PW No. 1, Shri Jiban Krishna Dey, informant, deposed his statement before the court supporting the facts spelt out in the Ejahar, Exbt.-P/1, lodged by him to the Officer-in-charge of Jirania P.S. In the night of 15.6.1992, he, his brother Shibu Dey, Manik Dey (deceased), Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) and Rakhal Das (PW No. 3) after closing the shops at Sachindranagar Colony market were returning home by bicycle and after reaching near the house of Jogesh Das, i.e., the father of the appellants-accused, he himself and his brother were proceeding in a different way towards their house and Bhajan Das (PW No. 2), Manik Dey(deceased) and Rakhal Das (PW No. 3) took different way together towards their houses. Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) along with Manik Dey (deceased) were in a bicycle and Rakhal Das (PW No. 3) in another bicycle were proceeding together towards their houses. After proceeding 20/25 yards, he and his brother, Shibu Dey, heard a cry coming from the side of Bhajan Das, Rakhal Das and Manik Dey (deceased) uttering "Bachow Bachow" and both of them, after hearing the cry, leaving their bicycles there ran towards that place. When they were proceeding towards that place, three sons of Jogesh Das, i.e., appellants-accused and another one, whom they could not identify, gave the blows of their kirich and dao to them but the appellants-accused could not hit them as they lowered down their head and thereafter, all the four persons, i.e., the appellants-accused ran away. He also stated that he could identify the appellants-accused because that night was a full moon night. In the moon light the appellants-accused were visible. He also stated that he could identify the appellants-accused because that night was a full moon night. In the moon light the appellants-accused were visible. On reaching the place of occurrence, he saw Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) standing near Manik Dey (victim)', who was seriously injured due to the blows of dao and kirich on different parts of his body. He himself, Shibu Dey and Bhajan Das shifted Manik Dey to Jirania hospital by the cycle rickshaw of one Dulal Das (PW No. 8) of that locality and on being query to Rakhal Das (PW No. 3) and Ehajan Das (PW No. 2) as to who caused the injuries to Manik Dey, they said that the appellants-accused and another had assaulted Manik Dey. He also deposed that at Jirania hospital doctor advised for shifting of Manik Dey to G.B. Hospital because of his serious condition and Manik Dey was taken to G.B. Hospital and thereafter he went to Jirania P.S. for lodging an Ejahar. He had narrated the incident orally to the police which had been recorded by the police and after recording his oral Ejahar, the police also read over the contents of the Ejahar to him and being satisfied he signed the Ejahar (Exbt.-P/1). In his cross-examination he stated that while going on running to the place of occurrence, he did not meet any other persons except the appellants-accused. He also stated that from corner of the house of Jogesh Das one road leads to British Card and another road leads to school tilla and in that night he himself and Shibu Dey were going through the road leading to school tilla by riding bicycle. When they hardly crossed 150 cubits from the house of Jogesh Das, they heard the cry and then leaving the bicycle there they ran at once towards the spot. There is a jungle in the western side of the road opposite to the house of Gopal Barman. He further stated that he had seen Manik Dey in injured condition lying near the hole in the jungle on roadside. 7. There is a jungle in the western side of the road opposite to the house of Gopal Barman. He further stated that he had seen Manik Dey in injured condition lying near the hole in the jungle on roadside. 7. PW No. 2, Shri Bhajan Das, who was going with Manik Dey (deceased) on one bicycle on the day of occurrence, stated that the occurrence took place on 15.6.1992 at about 9.30 p.m. in front of the house of Gopal Barman of British Card and also that Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1), informant, his brother Shibu Dey and Rakhal Das (PW No. 3), each of them by riding a bicycle; he himself and Manik Dey (deceased) in one bicycle were returning to their homes from Sachindranagar Colony market/bazaar. From near the house of Jogesh Das, Shibu Dey and Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1) followed the road leading to the school tilla. He himself and two others, namely, Rakhal Das and Manik Dey were proceeding British Card. He stated that Rakhal Das (PW No. 3) was going on his bicycle a little ahead and he himself and Manik Dey in another bicycle were behind him. He was sitting in the carrier of the bicycle and Manik Dey was driving the bicycle. When they had advanced a little distance of about half a kani land from the house of Jogesh Das, the appellants-accused and another person came out from the jungle by the side of the road and stopped their cycle. They first gave blow of kirich on him and he resisted it by the torchlight in his hand but the kirich hit his right hand causing injury. He then ran away and stood by the side of water supply point and he saw the appellants-accused, namely, Nikhil, Jatindra, Dipak and another one, the grandson of Jogesh Das, assaulting Manik Dey in a ditch with blows of dao and kirich and one of them was carrying lathi and he also assaulted Manik Dey with lathi. He identified the appellants-accused in the court dock. On hearing their cries, Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1) and his bother Shibu Dey also come to the place of occurrence. Then they lifted Manik Dey from the ditch on the side of the road and with the help of one rickshaw of Dulal Das (PW No. 8) they shifted Manik Dey (deceased) to Jirania hospital. On hearing their cries, Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1) and his bother Shibu Dey also come to the place of occurrence. Then they lifted Manik Dey from the ditch on the side of the road and with the help of one rickshaw of Dulal Das (PW No. 8) they shifted Manik Dey (deceased) to Jirania hospital. Thereafter they informed the father of Manik Dey about the occurrence. In his cross-examination he stated that it was a full moon night and the jungle was also not dark. He denied the suggestion that Manik Dey was assaulted somewhere else and kept in injured condition in the ditch. The police had been shown blood fallen on the earth. In the cross-examination he stated that he had not stated to Jiban Krishna Dey about the occurrence. 8. Mr. S. Talapatra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants-accused contended that there are major discrepancies in the statement of the PW No. 1 and PW No. 2 inasmuch as the PW No. 2, Sri Bhajan Das, in his cross-examination stated that he did not state the occurrence to Sri Jiban Krishna Dey. It is the statement of both the PW No. 1 and PW No. 2 that Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1) and his brother Shibu Dey immediately rushed to the place, on hearing the cry, where Manik Dey was lying injured and within a friction of time Rakhal Das, Jiban Krishna Dey and Shibu Dey reached the spot and they saw the appellants-accused and another rushing out from the spot where Manik Dey was lying injured. It is also the normal course of human conduct to enquire as to how Manik Dey got injuries on his person and who had assaulted him. As such the version of the PW No. 1, Jiban Krishna Dey, that he enquired as to how Manik Dey got injuries and who had assaulted him to Bnajan Das (PW No. 2), who was with Manik Dey at the time of assault, cannot be discarded only because of the some minor discrepancies. 9. PW No. 3, Sri Rakhal Das, in his deposition stated that the occurrence took place on 15.6.1992 at about 9.30 p.m. at Sachindranagar Colony at Batrish Card near the house of Gopal Barman. 9. PW No. 3, Sri Rakhal Das, in his deposition stated that the occurrence took place on 15.6.1992 at about 9.30 p.m. at Sachindranagar Colony at Batrish Card near the house of Gopal Barman. In that night five persons, namely, Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1) and his brother Shibu Dey, Manik Dey (deceased), he himself and Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) were returning home from Sachindranagar Colony market. Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1) and his brother Shibu Dey were driving one bicycle each Manik Dey and Bhajan Das were riding a bicycle, i.e., Bhajan Das's cycle and he was driving another bicycle. Three of them, i.e., Manik Dey, Bhajan Das (PW No. 2) and he himself were going to another road from the bifurcation near the house of Jogesh Das to the road leading to British Card and Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1) and his bother Shibu Dey leading to another road towards their house. He also stated that Briajan Das and Manik Dey in one cycle and he was riding his cycle in a little ahead to them. He also stated that he saw 3/4 persons sitting by the road side on a cut tree in the jungle area and he asked them who were they. One of them replied that he was Dipak. He could see them in the moon light as it was a full moon night. As he had been a little bit ahead, he heard a cry coming from behind. It was the cry of Manik Dey. Immediately after leaving the cycle came back on running to the spot and saw that four persons were fleeing on running and Manik Dey was lying in the ditch with bleeding injuries near the road side. He also stated that he could identify them and they are the appellants-accused. He also identified the appellants-accused in the T.I. Parade. He also stated in his cross-examination that he had stated to the I.O. that he first asked the appellants-accused at the place of occurrence who were they as he could not immediately recognize them. In his cross-examination he stated that he knew the appellants-accused since before. 10. He also identified the appellants-accused in the T.I. Parade. He also stated in his cross-examination that he had stated to the I.O. that he first asked the appellants-accused at the place of occurrence who were they as he could not immediately recognize them. In his cross-examination he stated that he knew the appellants-accused since before. 10. PW No. 8, Sri Dulal Das, a rickshaw puller, stated that on the day of occurrence at about 9.30 p.m. Jiban Krishna Dey (PW No. 1) came to his house and asked him to go with him with his rickshaw to shift the patient, i.e., Manik Dey, and he accordingly went with Jiban Krishna Dey with his rickshaw and from Sanhati school of Sachindranagar Colony he shifted Manik Dey in injured condition in his rickshaw to Jirania hospital and from Jirania hospital Manik Dey was shifted to G.B. Hospital. Later on Manik Dey succumbed to his injuries. He also stated that Jiban Krishna Dey and his brother Shibu Dey told him that the sons of Jogesh Das, i.e., the appellants-accused had assaulted Manik Dey. He also stated that Sanhati school is situated on the school tilla road. From near the house of Jogesh Das one road leads to the school tilla and another road runs through British Card which is called as British Card road. 11. PW No. 6, Sri Sishir Kumar Gupta stated that on 15.6.1992 at about 09-30 p.m. while returning from the Bazar with one Panchayat member, namely, Kiran Sankar Debnath by his cycle, he dropped him on a tri-junction of British Card road which leads to my house. From that place he started for his home on foot and he saw Manik Dey, Rakhal Das and Bhajan Das coming by riding their bicycles. Bhajan Das and Manik Dey were in one bicycle. While he was going on foot through the road leading to the school tilla, he heard a cry uttering 'Dhar' and he proceeded to the place from where the cry was coming and he saw Jiban and Shibu rushing to the spot. He also stated that he was after Shibu and Jiban (PW No. 1) and he saw that Shibu was trying to catch the persons running out from the spot from where the cry came. He also stated that he was after Shibu and Jiban (PW No. 1) and he saw that Shibu was trying to catch the persons running out from the spot from where the cry came. He further stated that the said persons, who were rushing out from the spot were carrying weapons and entered into the house of Jogesh Das. The PW No. 6 deposed that when Manik Dey (deceased) was being shifted to the hospital at that time his father Monoranjan Dey (PW No. 4), his mother and other persons of his family came to the place of occurrence. He further stated that the persons, whom he saw rushing out from the spot, one of them was Dipak Das, i.e., the appellant-accused. 12. The statement of the PW No. 1, i.e., the informant, was fully corroborated by the statement of the PW Nos. 2, 3, 6 and 8. The learned Additional District Judge after careful appreciation of the statement of the PWs and the exhibited documents had come to the findings that the prosecution succeeded in proving its case against the appellants-accused beyond reasonable doubt and that the appellants-accused were found guilty and convicted them under Section 302 of, IPC read with Section 34 of, IPC vide impugned judgment dated 29.6.2004. 13. Mr. Talapatra, learned senior counsel for the appellants-accused by referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Bachhu Narain Singh v. Naresh Yadav and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 3055 contended that there are material discrepancies in the statement of the PW No. 1 and PW No. 2 and as a result the prosecution case cannot be accepted. Mr. Talapatra relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Purushutam Pande v. State of Bihar AIR 2004 SC 506 contended that PW No. 2, Sri Bhajan Das, cannot be the eye witness. The facts in Purushutam Pande (supra) is diametrically different from the present case. It is fairly well settled that a little difference in facts creates a great change in the presidential value of the case and, as such, the decision of the Apex Court in Purushutam Pande (supra) will not help the case of the appellants-accused in the given case. The facts in Purushutam Pande (supra) is diametrically different from the present case. It is fairly well settled that a little difference in facts creates a great change in the presidential value of the case and, as such, the decision of the Apex Court in Purushutam Pande (supra) will not help the case of the appellants-accused in the given case. The Apex Court in Union of India and other vs. Dhanwanti Devi and other, (1996) 6 SCC 44 held that it is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitute its ratio decidendi. It is also well settled proposition that the ratio decidendi of a case is the principle of law that decided the dispute in the facts of the case and, therefore, a decision cannot be relied upon in support of the proposition which did not decide (Ref. Shin Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. vs. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and another, (2005) 7 SCC 234 ). A precedent operates to bind in similar situation (Ref. Makhija Construction & Engg. (Learned Counsel for the petitioner) Ltd. vs. Indore Development Authority and other, (2005) 6 SCC 304 . 14. The duty of the court is not only to see that no innocent man should be punished, but also to ensure that no person committing an offence should get scot free and also that the society suffers by wrong convictions and it equally suffers by wrong acquittals. Justice B.N. Agrawal in Krishna Mochi and another vs. State of Bihar, (2002)6 SCC 81 observed as follows:- 32. These days when crime is looming large and humanity is suffering and the society is so much affected thereby, duties and responsibilities of the courts have become much more. Now the maxim "let hundred guilty persons be acquitted, but not a single innocent be convicted" is, in practice, changing the world over and courts have been compelled to accept that "society suffers by wrong convictions and it equally suffers by wrong acquittals". I find that this Court in recent times has conscientiously taken notice of these facts from time to time. I find that this Court in recent times has conscientiously taken notice of these facts from time to time. In the case Inder Singh vs. State (Delhi Administration) (1978)4 SCC 161 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 564: AIR 1978 SC 1091 , Krishna Iyer, J. laid down that: (SCC p. 162, para 2) "Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish and guilty man cannot get away with it because truth suffers some infirmity when projected through human processes." In the case of State of U.P. vs. Anil Singh 1988 Supp SCC 686: 1989 SCC (Cri) 48: AIR 1988 SC 1998 , it was held that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform. In the case of State of W.B. vs. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri.) 107, it was held that justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law. In the case of Mohan Singh vs. State of M.R. (1999) 2 SCC 428 : 1999 SCC (Cri.)26: (1999) 1 SCR 276, it was held that the courts have been removing chaff from the grain. It has to disperse the suspicious cloud and dust out the smear of dust as all these things clog the very truth. So long chaff, cloud and dust remain, the criminals are clothed with this protective layer to receive the benefit of doubt. So it is a solemn duty of the courts, not to merely conclude and leave the case the moment suspicions are created. It is the onerous duty of the court, within permissible limit to find out the truth. It means, on one hand no innocent man should be punished but on the other hand to see no person committing an offence should get scot-free. If in spite of such effort suspicion is not dissolved, it remains writ at large, benefit of doubt has to be credited to the accused. 15. It means, on one hand no innocent man should be punished but on the other hand to see no person committing an offence should get scot-free. If in spite of such effort suspicion is not dissolved, it remains writ at large, benefit of doubt has to be credited to the accused. 15. The Apex Court in Krishna Mochi's case (supra) further observed that some discrepancy is bound to be there in each and every case which should not weigh with the court so long it does not materially affect the prosecution case. In a criminal trial a prosecutor is faced with so many odds. The court while appreciating the evidence should not lose sight of these realities of life and cannot afford to take an unrealistic approach by sitting in an ivory tower. Para 31 of SCC in Krishna Mochi's case (supra) reads as follows: 31. It is a matter of common experience that in recent times there has been a sharp decline of ethical values in public life even in developed countries much less a developing one, like ours, where the ratio of decline is higher. Even in ordinary cases, witnesses are not inclined to depose or their evidence is not found to be credible by courts for manifold reasons. One of the reasons may be that they do not have courage to depose against an accused because of threats to their life, more so when the offenders are habitual criminals or high-ups in the Government or close to powers, which may be political, economic or other powers including muscle power. A witness may not stand the test of cross-examination, which may be sometimes, because he is a bucolic person and is not able to understand the question put to him by the skilful cross-examiner and at times under the stress of cross-examination, certain answers are snatched from him. When a rustic or illiterate witness faces an astute lawyer, there is bound to be imbalance and, therefore, minor discrepancies have to be ignored. These days it is not difficult to gain over a witness by money power or giving him any other allurance or giving out threats to his life and/or property at the instance of persons, in/or close to powers and musclemen or their associates. These days it is not difficult to gain over a witness by money power or giving him any other allurance or giving out threats to his life and/or property at the instance of persons, in/or close to powers and musclemen or their associates. Such instances are also not uncommon where a witness is not inclined to depose because in the prevailing social structure the wants to remain indifferent. It is most unfortunate that expert witnesses and the investigating agencies and other agencies which have an important role to play are also not immune from decline of values in public life. Their evidence sometimes becomes doubtful because they do not act sincerely, take everything in a casual manner and are not, able to devote proper attention and time. 16. Justice Arijit Pasayat in Krishna Mochi's case (supra) observed that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, (also in everything) has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. Para 51 of Krishna Mochi's case (supra) reads as follows: 51. Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out the entire prosecution case. In essence, prayer is to apply the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. This plea is clearly untenable. Even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the court to separate the grain from the chaff. Where the chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove the guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is, that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called "a mandatory rule of evidence". (See Nisar Ali vs. State of U.R. AIR 1957 SC 366 : 1957 Cri LJ 550) Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. (See Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 : 1956 Cri LJ 827) The doctrine is a dangerous one, specially in India, for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because the witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in Home respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab vs. State of M.P. (1972)3 SCC 751 : 1972 SCC (Cri.) 819 and Ugar Ahir vs. State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277 : (1965)1 Cri. LJ 256) an attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate the truth from falsehood, because the grain and the chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation, an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel vs. State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 15 : 1954 Cri. LJ 230 and Balaka Singh vs. State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 511 : 1975 SCC (Cri.) 601: AIR 1975 SC 1962 ). As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Kalki (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri.) 593: AIR 1981 SC 1390 normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there, however, honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. Accusations have been established against the accused-appellants in the case at hand. 17. The Apex Court in State of U.P. vs. M.K. Anthony, AIR 1985 SC 48 held that much importance should not be given to minor discrepancies and technical errors. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. 17. The Apex Court in State of U.P. vs. M.K. Anthony, AIR 1985 SC 48 held that much importance should not be given to minor discrepancies and technical errors. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies. The Apex Court also discussed the terms 'material discrepancy' in evidence and 'normal discrepancy' in evidence. The discrepancy in that case was only with regard to overt acts by each of the accused while assaulting the victim and also the particular part they played in assaulting the victim and which part of the body of the victim they had assaulted. The Apex Court held that in the deposition of the witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however, honest and truthful they may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observations, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition, such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Material discrepancies are those, which are not normal and not expected of a normal person. 18. The Apex Court in Appabhai and another vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696 held that even if there are many contradictions in the evidence of the victim of assault and he has not attributed overt acts to individual accused in his statement before the police whereas he has attributed such overt acts in his evidence before the, court, there is no ground to reject the entire testimony Para 13 of the AIR in Appabhai (supra) reads as follows: 13. On the second contention, the learned Counsel highlighted many of the contradictions in the evidence of Devji (PW4) as against his previous statement, one recorded by the Executive Magistrate (Ex. 66) and another by the police during the investigation. We have, however, also examined the relevant evidence. It is true that there are many contradictions in the evidence of Devji. He has not attributed overt acts to individual accused in his statement before the police whereas he has attributed such overt acts in his evidence before the court. 66) and another by the police during the investigation. We have, however, also examined the relevant evidence. It is true that there are many contradictions in the evidence of Devji. He has not attributed overt acts to individual accused in his statement before the police whereas he has attributed such overt acts in his evidence before the court. But that is no ground to reject his entire testimony it must not be forgotten that he was a victim of the assault. Fortunately he has survived. He must, therefore, be considered as the best eye witness. The court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given duo allowance. The court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such witness, the propel course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy. Jaganmohan Reddy, J., speaking for this Court in Sohrab vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 2020 at p.2024): 1972 Cri. LJ 1302 at 1305 observed: This Court has held that falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one conies across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses when asked about details venture to give some answer, not necessarily true or relevant for fear that their evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main incident which they have witnessed but that is not to say that their evidence as to the salient features of the case after cautious scrutiny cannot be considered. 19. 19. Both the learned Counsel appearing for the parties had taken us to the statement of the PWs in support of their rival contentions that there are major discrepancies in the statement of the PW Nos. 1, 2 and 3, according to the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused, vis-a-vis, those discrepancies are only minor discrepancy and the discrepancy of normal nature and expected of a normal person. On careful scrutiny of the statement of the PW Nos. 1, 2 and 3, we find that there is no material discrepancy of abnormal nature and not expected of a normal person. Mere discrepancy in the statement of the PW Nos. 1 and 2 about the mentioning of occurrence to the PW No. 1 by the PW No. 2 is not the material discrepancy out the minor discrepancy expected of a normal person. 20. We have given our anxious consideration to the findings of the learned Additional Sessions Judge after appreciating the statement of the PWs and the material exhibits that the prosecution has succeeded to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and are of the considered view that there is no material in the present appeal which calls for interference with the impugned judgment and Order. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.