Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 414 (MP)

Vishnu Agrawal v. State of M. P.

2009-03-31

A.K.SHRIVASTAVA, A.P.SHRIVASTAVA

body2009
JUDGMENT Shrivastava, J. -- 1. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order dated 13.2.2007 passed by learned Single Bench of this court in WP No. 646/2004 the appellants have preferred this writ appeal under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyaylaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005. 2. The order passed in this appeal would also decide the fate of connecting Writ Appeal No. 231/07 (Sushiladevi Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others) since both the appeals have arisen from a common order passed by learned Writ Court holding that the Gwalior Bench of this Court is not having territorial jurisdiction over the matter. 3. The facts necessary for disposal of this appeal lie in narrow compass. A sale deed executed by one Smt. Hardevi in favour of the appellant on 2.5.1998. This sale deed was tendered for registration before Sub-Registrar, Satna who found that the document does not disclose correct market value of the property which was sold and hence the Sub-Registrar referred the matter to the Collector of Stamps, Satna. The Collector of Stamps found that correct market value has not been described in the sale deed, which was required to be registered and hence passed an order making demand of deficit amount of stamp duty as well as registration charges indicated in the order. This order was challenged by the appellants before the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa who dismissed the appeal, and thereafter appellants preferred a second appeal in the Board of Revenue at Gwalior. The Board of Revenue dismissed the appeal of appellants on merit on 16.1.2004 vide Annexure P-5. 4. The appellants thereafter by filing writ petition before this Bench assailed the order of Board of Revenue as well as the order of Collector of Stamps, Satna and order of Commissioner Rewa Division, Rewa passed in an appeal. It would be relevant to quote the reliefs which have been sought by the appellants in their writ petition, which reads as under: "(a) That, a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Direction may kindly be issued for quashing the impugned order dated 16.1.2004 (Annexure P-5) passed by the Board of Revenue, M.P. Gwalior, where under the order dated 20.3.2003 (Annexure P-4) passed by Commissioner, Rewa Division and also the order dated 10.7.1998 (Annexure P-3) passed by the Collector of Stamps, Distt. Satna (respondent No.4 herein) have been upheld. Satna (respondent No.4 herein) have been upheld. The order dated 20.3.2003 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Commissioner, Rewa Division as well as the order dated 10.7.1998 (Annexure P-3) passed by the Collector of Stamps, Distt. Satna, may kindly be also ordered to be quashed by issuing a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Direction. (b) That, after quashing the said impugned orders Annexure P-3, P-4 and P-5, a further direction may kindly be given to the respondent No.4 Collector of Stamps as well as to the respondent No.5 Sub-Registrar, Registration Deptt., Satna, to deliver the instrument in question registered sale-deed dated 2.5.1998 to the petitioners being a validly registered document on adequate stamp duty. (c) Any other such orders or directions which the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, be also passed along with the costs of writ petition." 5. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the State Government before the learned Writ Court that the sale deed was submitted for its registration in the office of Sub-Registrar at Satna who referred the matter to Collector of Stamps, Satna who found that in the sale-deed, value of the property to be sold has been shown to be quite less, and therefore, directed to pay deficit stamp duty as well as registration charges in terms of the order passed by it. An appeal which was preferred by the appellants before Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa has also been dismissed, and therefore, material cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat of this Court. This objection was combatted by the petitioners. 6. The learned Single Bench of this Court upheld the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the State of M.P. and has held that this Bench, is not having territorial jurisdiction, on the contrary the Principal Seat at Jabalpur is having the territorial jurisdiction. Eventually, the learned Writ Court dismissed the writ petition. 7. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the order of Board of Revenue was also challenged by the appellants in the Writ Court and since the Board of Revenue is in Gwalior, therefore, the Bench of High Court at Gwalior is also having territorial jurisdiction. Eventually, the learned Writ Court dismissed the writ petition. 7. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the order of Board of Revenue was also challenged by the appellants in the Writ Court and since the Board of Revenue is in Gwalior, therefore, the Bench of High Court at Gwalior is also having territorial jurisdiction. In support of his contention learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and another, (2004) 6 SCC 254 . (ii) Devendra Bahadur Singh v. State of M.P. and four others, 1989 MPJR HC 721 (Division Bench). (iii) K.P. Govil v. Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalya, Jabalpur and another, 1987 JLJ 341 (Full Bench). (iv) State of M.P. v. Shabir Khan and others, 2006 (2) MPLJ 50 (Single Bench). 8. On the other hand it has been submitted by Smt. Ami Prabal, learned . Deputy Advocate General that since the document of sale was tendered for registration before Sub-Registrar Satna and the Collector of Stamps, Satna passed order making demand of the deficit stamp duty as well as the registration charges and it's order in appeal was also affirmed by the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa, therefore, merely because the said order was challenged before the Board of Revenue at Gwalior by filing an appeal by the writ petition would not confer any territorial jurisdiction to this Bench. Learned Deputy Advocate General in support of her contention has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court Alchemist Ltd. and another v. State Bank of Sikkim and others, (2007) 11 SCC 335 . 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties; we are of the view that the appeal deserves to be allowed. 10. True, the Collector of Stamps, Satna passed an order directing the appellants to deposit the deficit stamp duty as well as registration charges and the said order was affirmed in appeal by the Commissioner, Rewa Division Rewa, but both these orders were challenged in appeal filed by the appellants before the Board of Revenue at Gwalior, who also dismissed the appeal on merit, which would mean that the order of Collector of Stamps, Satna as well as the order of the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa merged in the order of the Board of Revenue. Three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) in para 27 has categorically held that when an order is passed by a Court or Tribunal or even by an executive authority under any of the provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action would also arise at that place. It would be profitable to quote para 27 of the said decision which reads as under: "27. When an order, however, is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority." The ratio decided of the decision of Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) is applicable in the present case because the Board of Revenue which is situated in Gwalior, has dismissed the appeal of appellants, and therefore, a part of cause of action has arisen to appellants at Gwalior also. 11. Undisputedly one of the order which was impugned in the Writ Court is the order of the Board of Revenue, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench and therefore, according to us if the order of the Board of Revenue as well has been challenged by filing Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before learned Single Bench of this Court, the part of cause of action also arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench, and merely because the original order was passed by Collector of Stamps, Stana, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench, would in itself is no ground to hold that this Bench is not having the territorial jurisdiction over the matter. Indeed, "cause of action wholly or on part thereof arises" can be looked upon from different angles and in this context we may also borrow sufficient light from section 20 of the CPC which speaks about the suit to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises. Under section 20(c) of the CPC a suit can also be instituted at a place where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. Since the part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench we are of the firm view that the writ petition was maintainable at this Bench. 12. The Full Bench of this Court in K.P Govil (supra) in para 9 has categorically held as under: "It must, therefore, follow and we hold that the expression in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts of Gwalior, Shivpuri, Dalia, Guna, Vidisha (Bhilsa), Bhind and Morena "means the place or places within the specified revenue districts where the whole or a part of cause of action arises. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place or places within the specified revenue districts, the Gwalior Bench will have jurisdiction." 13. The Four Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. STA Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331 took the decision by reversing the Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court Nirmal Dass Khatuira and others v. The State Transport (Appellate) Tribunal, UP Lucknow and others, AIR 1972 All 200 and has categorically held that the cause of action in a petition under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow Bench would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas of Oudh. It would be condign to quote para 36 of the said decision which reads as under: "36. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It would be condign to quote para 36 of the said decision which reads as under: "36. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression "cause of action" in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have, jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression "cause to action" is well-known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum convenience. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action. (emphasis supplied) If the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court is tested on the anvil and touchstone of the present factual scenario, it would reveal that this decision is squarely applicable to the point in hand because in the present case also the original and appellate orders were passed at Satna which is under the domain of Principal Seat of this Court at Jabalpur. However, the order in second appeal has been passed by the Board of Revenue at Gwalior, which is under territorial jurisdiction of this Bench and therefore the writ petition filed by appellants before this Bench is maintainable. 14. Yet there is another decision of the Supreme Court on the point which is Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 . In paras 8 and 9 of the said decision, the apex Court has held as under: "8. "Cause of action" is a phenomenon well understood in legal parlance. Mohapatra, J. has well delineated the import of the said expression by referring to the celebrated lexicographies. The collocation of the words "cause of action wholly or in part arises" seems to have been lifted from section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect of the Courts. As per that section the suit could be instituted in a Court within the legal limits of whose jurisdiction the "cause of action wholly or in part arises". Judicial pronouncements have accorded almost a uniform interpretation to the said compendious expression even prior to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution as to mean "the bundle of facts which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court." 9. In Read v. Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128 Lord Esher, M.R., adopted the definition for the phrase "cause of action" that it meant "every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved." 15. Similar is the view of the Division Bench of this Court in Devendra Bahadur Singh (supra). The other Division Bench of this Court in M.P. Cooperative Marketing Federation, Bhopal v. Bhojraj Ghanshyamdas and another [1991 RN 2] again also took the same view which was taken in the decision of Devendra Bahadur Singh (supra) by holding that although the original order was within the territory of Rewa, but the order of Board of Revenue has also been challenged and therefore, the Gwalior Bench of this Court is having territorial jurisdiction. Two Judge Bench decision of Supreme Court Alchemist Ltd. and another (supra) placed reliance by learned Deputy Advocate General would not come in the way because in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) it has been specifically held in para 27 that the cause of action would also accrue to the place where an order is passed by a Court or Tribunal or even by an executive authority under any of the provisions of a statute or otherwise, and therefore, according to us, the decision of Alchemist Ltd. and another (supra) relied by learned Deputy Advocate General is not applicable in the present case. 16. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we hereby hold that this Bench is having territorial jurisdiction over the matter and the writ petition filed by the appellants is maintainable. 17. Resultantly, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by learned Writ Court holding the writ petitions to be not maintainable on account of want to territorial jurisdiction is hereby set aside. The Writ Court is hereby requested to decide the writ petition on its own merit.