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2009 DIGILAW 415 (GAU)

Dinesh Chandra Shib v. Hiralal Saha

2009-06-12

P.K.MUSAHARY

body2009
JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. Both those petitions have been filed by the petitioner under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the maintainability of complaint cases being C.R. Case No. 2841/2006 and C.R. Case No. 2842/2006, filed by the respondent which are pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, court. No. 5, Agartala, Tripura. Similar facts and questions of law are involved in these two petitions and as such, for the sake of convenience, heard together for disposal. 2. The details of the facts are not necessary to be narrated, however, for consideration of the question of law involved, it may be stated that both the petitioner and the respondent are businessmen. The petitioner Sri Dinesh Chandra Shib is a resident of West Bank Jagannath Dighi under police station R.K. Pur in South Tripura District while the respondent Sri Hiralal Saha is a resident of Netaji Subash Road under police station West Agartala in West Tripura District. The petitioner sometime in the year 2002 approached the respondent to provide monetary advance as loan with assurance to return within the year 2003, The respondent provided the loan amount to the petitioner on different dates through cheques but he (petitioner) failed to return/repay the amount in time and the respondent demanded repayment of the same. A meeting was held for amicable settlement of the matter on 20.6.2005 at R.K. Pur, South Agartala and an agreement was entered into by the parties but the petitioner failed to comply with the terms and conditions embodied in the agreement. The petitioner made part payment of the loan amount by issuing cheques in favour of the respondent to be drawn on Tripura Gramin Bank at Udaipur Branch. The respondent submitted the cheques with his Banker, namely, Union Bank of India, Agartala Branch, for encashment but the same were dishonoured whereupon the respondent served a statutory demand notice upon the petitioner requesting him to make arrangement for payment of the loan amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of the demand notice but the petitioner failed to make payment of the loan amount. The respondent had to file the aforesaid complaint petitions in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala. Summons were issued upon the petitioner and on receipt of the same, he appeared before the court and obtained bail orders. The respondent had to file the aforesaid complaint petitions in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala. Summons were issued upon the petitioner and on receipt of the same, he appeared before the court and obtained bail orders. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application before the concerned Magistrate on 3.3.2008 challenging the maintainability of the aforesaid cases mainly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to try the aforesaid criminal cases. The said applications were heard and rejected by the trial court vide orders dated 7.11.208. The petitioner is now before this Court for quashing the proceedings of C.R. Cases No. 2841/2006 and 2842/2006. 3. Heard Mr. B. N. Majumder, Learned Counsel for the petitioners. Mr. Majumder, learned Counsel, submits that the aforesaid criminal proceedings are not maintainable in the court of Judicial Magistrate at Agartala within the Sessions Division of West Tripura District on the following grounds: (1) The petitioner resides at West Bank Jagannath Dighi under Police Station R.K. Pur in South Tripura District and ho carries on brick field and other business with establishments at R.K. Pur in South Tripura District, (2) The cheques in favour of the respondent to be drawn at Tripura Gramin Bank, Udaipur Branch, is located in South Tripura District, (3) The witnesses named in the complaint petitions are all from Udaipur in the South Tripura District, (4) The agreement/compromise as mentioned in the complaint petitions was arrived at a meeting held on 20.6.2005 at R.K. Pur in the South Tripura District, (5) The demand notice was issued by the respondent upon the petitioner at his residence at West Bank of Jagannath Dighi under Police Station R.K. Pur in South Tripura District, (6) The cause of action arose at Udaipur within the territorial jurisdiction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, which is within the Sessions Division of South Tripura District, and, (7) The residence of holder of the cheque and/or submission of a cheque to a Bank where the holder of the cheque has the Account does not give the cause of action to a criminal court where the Bank or the complainant is residing. 4. According to Mr. 4. According to Mr. Majumder, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, the learned trial court vide order dated 7.11.2008 dismissed the petitions filed by the petitioner with an observation that a bare reading of complaint (Annexure-P/1 to the petition) would show that the complainant willfully suppressed the relevant facts relating to handing-over of the money to the petitioner by the respondent as well as handing-over of the cheque by the petitioner to the respondent by making false statements in paragraph-21 of his complaint petition. The learned trial court also observed therein that the complainant is having his address and also the relevant cheque herein was submitted to the bank within the jurisdiction of this Id. Court and the learned court has pecuniary jurisdiction to try the instant case. In this regard, Mr. Majumder, learned Counsel, submits that the residence of holder of the cheque and/or submission of a cheque to a Bank where the holder of the cheque has the account would not give the cause of action to a criminal court where the Bank or the complainant is residing rather in view of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, read with Section 72 of the said Act would show that the cause of action arises only when the cheque is returned unpaid by a Bank on which the same was drawn. 5. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Majumder, Learned Counsel for the petitioner cites and relies upon the following decisions: (1) Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals NECO Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 609 , wherein the Apex Court held, amongst others, that a combined reading of Sections 3, 72 and 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, would leave no doubt that the law mandates that the cheque to be presented at the Bank on which it is drawn if the drawer is to be held criminally liable. (2) Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 100 , wherein the Apex Court has laid down the law that a criminal case will only lie ordinarily where the offence has been committed. (3) Prem Chand Vijay Kumar v. Yashpal Singh and Anr. (2) Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 100 , wherein the Apex Court has laid down the law that a criminal case will only lie ordinarily where the offence has been committed. (3) Prem Chand Vijay Kumar v. Yashpal Singh and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 417 , wherein it is held that a combined reading of Sections138 and 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, makes it clear that the cause of action is to be reckoned from the date of failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice within the meaning of Section 142(b). (4) Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhageerath Engg. Ltd. and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 658 , in which the petitioner sought for bringing home that submission of a cheque to a particular bank cannot give cause of action for launching a prosecution and the provisions made under Section 178 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which provides for place of inquiry or trial in the court i.e., jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. (5) Y.A. Ajit v. Sofana Ajit AIR 2007 SCW 3151, wherein it is held that the expression 'cause of action' has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense, 'cause of action' means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action in the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, the expression means every act, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance of the judgment of the court. Every act which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove such act, comprises in 'cause of action'. (6) Harman Electronics (P.) Ltd. and Anr. v. National Panasonic India Ltd. AIR 2009 SCW 410, wherein the Apex Court dealt with a situation like the present one in hand. Mr. Majumder, learned Counsel, particularly refers to paragraph-25 wherein the Apex Court observed, thus 25. (6) Harman Electronics (P.) Ltd. and Anr. v. National Panasonic India Ltd. AIR 2009 SCW 410, wherein the Apex Court dealt with a situation like the present one in hand. Mr. Majumder, learned Counsel, particularly refers to paragraph-25 wherein the Apex Court observed, thus 25. We cannot, as things stand today, be oblivious of the fact that a banking institution holding several cheques sent by the same borrower cannot only present the cheque for its encashment at four different places but also may serve notices from four different places so as to enable it to file four complaint cases at four different places, this only causes grave harassment to the accused. It is, therefore, necessary in a case of this nature to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of the accused vis-a-vis the provisions of the code of criminal procedure. (7) Prem Chand Vijay Kumar v. Yaspal Singh and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 417 , wherein the Apex Court dealt has clarified the position in Para-10 as under - ...A combined reading of a Sections 138 and 142 makes it clear that the cause of action is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) arises and can arise only once. 6. The Learned Counsel also refers to paragraphs 19 and 20 of the aforesaid judgment in M/s. Harman Electronics (supra), wherein it is held that Section 177 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, determines the jurisdiction of a court trying the matter. The court ordinarily will have the jurisdiction only where the offence has been committed. The provisions of Sections 178 and 179 of CrPC are exceptions to Section 177. These provisions presuppose that all offences are local. Therefore, the place where an offence has been committed plays an important role. It is one thing to say that a presumption is raised that notice is served but it is another thing to say that service of notice may not be held to be of any significance or may be held to be wholly unnecessary. According to Mr. Therefore, the place where an offence has been committed plays an important role. It is one thing to say that a presumption is raised that notice is served but it is another thing to say that service of notice may not be held to be of any significance or may be held to be wholly unnecessary. According to Mr. Majumder, learned Counsel, in the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court has laid down the law that although all statutes deserve their strict application but while doing so, the cardinal principles, therefore, cannot be lost sight of inasmuch as the court derives jurisdiction only when the cause of action arises within its jurisdiction and the same cannot be conferred by any act of omission or commission on the part of the accused. The Learned Counsel maintains that in view of the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, the present complaint proceeding is not at all maintainable in the court at Agartala. 7. Heard Mr. S. Talapatra, Learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. T.K. Debbarma, for the respondent. According to Mr. Talapatra, the decisions cited and relied upon by the petitioner are not relevant and applicable for the purpose of adjudication of this case inasmuch as the said decisions are not connected with jurisdiction of the court to entertain complaints and for trial of cases similar to the cases at hand. The issue involved has been decided already by the Apex Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan and Anr. AIR 1999 SC 3762 . The Learned Counsel relies upon paragraphs-12, 14 and 15 of the said decision and according to him, the reading of which would clarify the position that the court of Magistrate, West Agartala, in West Agartala District, has jurisdiction to try the matters and the learned trial court has rightly rejected the petitioner's application dated 3.3.2008 challenging the maintainability of the criminal cases vide impugned order dated 7.11.2008 which warrants no interference and the present petitions are liable to be dismissed with costs. Mr. Mr. Talapatra, Learned Senior Counsel, also relies on the decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Shamshad Begum v. B. Mohammed AIR 2009 SCW 775 wherein it is held that in the matter of dishonour of cheque, the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be completed with the concatenation of a number of acts and the jurisdiction to try the offence would lie in the court under whose jurisdiction, the notice in writing was sent to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount. For instance, if the notice in writing to drawer of cheque demanding payment of cheque amount was sent from place 'M' the court at 'M' has jurisdiction to try the case. 8. The further submissions made by Mr. Talapatra, Learned Counsel is that in Bhaskaran's case (supra), the Apex Court in paragraph-14 held that the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts like-(i) drawing of the cheque, (ii) presentation of the cheque to the Bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee Bank, (iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, and (v) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The Apex Court further held in paragraph-16 of the aforesaid case that if five different acts were done in five different localities, anyone of the courts exercising jurisdiction in anyone of the five local areas, can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In other words, the complainant can choose anyone of the local areas within the territorial limits of which anyone of those five acts were done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive, it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the said Act. 9. In replying to the submissions made by the Learned Counsel for the respondent, it is submitted by Mr. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive, it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the said Act. 9. In replying to the submissions made by the Learned Counsel for the respondent, it is submitted by Mr. Majumder, Learned Counsel for the petitioner that it cannot be the intention of the Legislature that the holder of a cheque may have different accounts in different places in India and only because he has presented the said cheque in a Bank situated at another State and has served the notice therefrom which is far from the place of where the actual transaction has taken place, the court can have the jurisdiction over the matter only because the cheque was presented in different places and notices were served therefrom. For example, Mr. X issues a cheque in favour of Mr. Y at Agartala. Mr. Y has a Bank Account at Delhi and presents the said Cheque at Delhi for his collection and on dishonour of the said cheque, Mr. Y serves a notice upon Mr. X who is a resident of Agartala and only due to that Mr. X files a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, before a criminal court at Delhi. In such a situation, it cannot be held that the court at Delhi will have the jurisdiction to try the matter. In such a situation, the Learned Counsel submits that it cannot be a good proposition of law that since the cheque deposited by Mr. X for collection at Delhi and the notice was served from Delhi, the criminal courts at Delhi will have the jurisdiction to try the case under Section 138 of the said Act. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that this example justifies the demand of the petitioner that the respondent/complainant should have filed the complaint case at Udaipur in South Tripura District. 10. Mr. Majumder, Learned Counsel further submits that Shamshad Begum's case (supra) was decided on 3.11.2008 whereas Harman Electronics's case (supra) was decided on 12.12.2008 and therefore, the latter decision would have precedence over the former decision. In other words, he submits that since the judgment in Harman Electronics's case (supra) was passed after the judgment of Shamshad Begum's case (supra), the decision in Harman Electronics's case (supra) should be followed as a binding decision. In other words, he submits that since the judgment in Harman Electronics's case (supra) was passed after the judgment of Shamshad Begum's case (supra), the decision in Harman Electronics's case (supra) should be followed as a binding decision. According to him, the decision in Shamshad Begum's case (supra), is not binding. 11. It is to examine whether the decisions cited by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner have answered the points required to decide in the present case. The case of Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. (supra) deals with the main object of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the use of words "a bank and the bank" under Section 138 vis-a-vis the drawee bank and the presentment of cheque to the drawee bank within the statutory period of six months. In the aforesaid case, it is observed that Section 138 of the Act creates an offence and the law relating to the penal provisions has to be interpreted strictly so that no one can ingenuously or insidiously or guilefully or strategically be prosecuted. The aforesaid case provides how the statutory period of six months is to be reckoned and does not deal with the jurisdiction of the court under which the criminal proceeding should be initiated. Therefore, the aforesaid cited case has no relevance with the present case. 12. The case of Abraham Ajit (supra) relates to criminal proceeding under Sections 498A and 406, IPC read with Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, against the husband and his relations. The wife, in the aforesaid cited case, herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on the ground of alleged dowry demand by the husband and his relations but there was no allegation about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence after she left the house of her husband. The wife, thereafter, filed a complaint before the Magistrate at a different city. The Apex Court held that the Magistrate of that city has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter inasmuch as no offence was committed by the husband and his relations subsequent to her leaving the house of her husband. No allegation of dowry demand was made and there was also no continuance of offence. The Apex Court held that the Magistrate of that city has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter inasmuch as no offence was committed by the husband and his relations subsequent to her leaving the house of her husband. No allegation of dowry demand was made and there was also no continuance of offence. The aforesaid case no doubt deals with 'cause of action' in an exhaustive manner but the same is found to be of no assistance to the petitioner on the facts and circumstances, mentioned above. 13. Similarly, the case of Y.A. Ajit v. Sofana Ajit (supra) deals with the similar issue as was done in Y. Abraham Ajit v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr. (supra), and the said cited case is also found not applicable to the present case. 14. The case of Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra) relates to dishonour of cheque under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The cheque was dishonoured due to inadequacy of funds. The payee presented the same cheque but it was again dishonoured. It was held that dishonour of cheque on each presentation, gives a fresh right to present it again during the period of its validity but it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action and in such case, complaint has to be filed within one month from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the first notice by the drawer expires. The aforesaid case largely deals with the cause of action and the right to bring in action and as such, no answer is available therefrom for the purpose of adjudication of the present case. 15. In Mosaraf's case (supra), the appellant entered into a contract with respondent company for supply of stone chips. The company used to hand-over postdated cheques to the appellant towards the price of stone chips as also transportation, handling, postage and other charges. The company issued 6 cheques of various amounts in favour of the appellant and the aforesaid cheques were deposited with a Gramin Bank at Suri Branch but they were returned by the banker stating 'full cover not received'. Demand notice was sent and the company paid some amounts but some balance amount still remained unpaid. The appellant filed a complaint petition in the court of CJM, Suri at Birbhum which was taken cognizance of. Demand notice was sent and the company paid some amounts but some balance amount still remained unpaid. The appellant filed a complaint petition in the court of CJM, Suri at Birbhum which was taken cognizance of. The respondent company admitted the claim of the appellant but on receipt of summons, instead of appearing before the court of CJM, Suri, Birbhum, filed a writ petition in the High Court of Kerala for quashing the complaint proceeding. The High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition. It is beyond comprehension how the aforesaid cited case, the facts and circumstances of which are quite different from the ones in the present case, would render any assistance to the present petitioner. 16. From amongst the cases cited by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner and the Learned Counsel for the respondent as well, as mentioned above, I find the case of K. Bhaskaran (supra) as the most appropriate case reliable and applicable to the present case. The material facts in the aforesaid case are to be noted first. The complainant presented a cheque before the Syndicate Bank Branch Office at Kayamkulam (Kerala) on 29.1.1993 for encashment which was bounced due to insufficiency of funds in the account of the accused. The complainant then issued a notice by registered post in the address of the accused on 2.2.1993 but the notice was returned on 15.2.1993 to the complainant due to absence of the addressee which remained unclaimed and returned to the sender with an endorsement 'unclaimed'. Then the complainant filed the complaint petition on 4.3.1993 in the court of JM, First Class, Adoor in Pathanamthitta district in Kerala against the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The accused raised the question of territorial jurisdiction of the said Magistrate to try the case as the Cheque was dishonoured by Syndicate Bank's Branch at Kayamkulam which is situated in another district in Kerala. The Magistrate upheld the contention that the court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the case as the cheque was dishonoured by a Branch Office of the Bank situated in a different district. The Magistrate also held that as the accused did not receive the notice, no cause of action had arisen and ultimately acquitted the accused. The Magistrate upheld the contention that the court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the case as the cheque was dishonoured by a Branch Office of the Bank situated in a different district. The Magistrate also held that as the accused did not receive the notice, no cause of action had arisen and ultimately acquitted the accused. On appeal preferred by the complainant, the High Court of Kerala set aside the order of acquittal and convicted and sentenced the accused. The matter having reached the Apex Court, provisions under Section177 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, were discussed in the aforesaid backdrop of the case and it was held that the locality where the Bank (which dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criteria to determine the place of offence. It must be remembered that offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, would not be completed with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains completion only with the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the cheque amount. It is in this respect that the Apex Court in paragraphs-14, 15 and 16, held thus: 14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. Following are the acts which are components of the said offence: (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, and (5) Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at 5 different localities. But concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In this context, a reference to Section 178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below. Where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 16. In this context, a reference to Section 178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below. Where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities in any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 17. The decision in Bhaskaran's case (supra) has been followed in Shamshad Begum's case (supra). The case of M/s Harman Electronics (supra) has been relied most by the Learned Counsel for the, petitioner and persuaded to give preference over the Shamshad Begum's case (supra) for, the former was decided on 12.12.2008, i.e., subsequent to latter which was decided on 3.11.2008. Before accepting the said submission of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, it would be appropriate to have a look at the relevant facts noted by the Apex Court. The appellant and the respondents in the aforesaid case entered into business transaction. The appellant is a resident of Chandigarh and carries on business in Chandigarh. The cheque in question was issued at Chandigarh. The complainant has also a Branch Office at Chandigarh although his Head Office is said to be located at Delhi. The fact as to whether the said cheque was sent for collection to Delhi was disputed although it was not admitted that the cheque was dishonoured at Chandigarh. However, the complainant respondent issued a notice upon the appellant asking him to pay the amount from New Delhi. Admittedly, the said notice was served upon the respondent at Chandigarh. On failure on the part of the appellant to pay the amount within a period of 15 days from the date of communication of the said letter, a complaint petition was filed at Delhi. Admittedly, the said notice was served upon the respondent at Chandigarh. On failure on the part of the appellant to pay the amount within a period of 15 days from the date of communication of the said letter, a complaint petition was filed at Delhi. In the aforesaid case, it was held that the Delhi High Court has no jurisdiction to try the case and it was directed that concerned complaint case pending before a court of Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi, be transferred to the court of District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, who shall assign the same to a court of competent jurisdiction. While holding that the Delhi High Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, the Apex Court took into consideration the grave harassment that may be caused to the accused in a situation that banking institution while holding several cheques by the same borrower at different places and may also serve notices from different places and criminal case proceedings may be initiated against the accused person at several places. In such a situation, it is also held that a balance between the right of a complainant and a right of an accused vis-a-vis the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, should be maintained. In the present case, it is found that the Tripura Gramin Bank, Udaipur Branch, having its Headquarter at Agartala is the drawer bank and the respondent complainant submitted the same in the drawee bank namely the Union Bank of India at Agartala Branch which was dishonoured due to insufficiency of fund, for which the respondent complainant served the statutory notice as required under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The respondent complainant sought to collect the amount through his drawee bank (Union Bank of India) at Agartala Branch and he instituted the criminal proceeding only at one place, i.e., at Agartala and no question of causing harassment by way of instituting case at several places to the petitioner has arisen. 18. One must not lose sight of the fact that the drawer bank, i.e., Tripura Gramin Bank, Udaipur Branch, is under the control of its Head Office at Agartala. Although the cheques in questions were dishonoured by the drawer bank at Udaipur, the respondent cannot be prevented from filing the criminal case at Agartala saying that the cause of action arises only at Udaipur. Although the cheques in questions were dishonoured by the drawer bank at Udaipur, the respondent cannot be prevented from filing the criminal case at Agartala saying that the cause of action arises only at Udaipur. The fact that the drawer bank has its Head Office at Agartala, the statutory notice was communicated from Agartala, the cheques were deposited in the drawee bank at Agartala and the petitioner had business relation with the respondent who resides and carries on business at Agartala would satisfy the concatenation of a number of acts. The decision in Bhaskaran's case (supra) is to be read with para-8 of the decision in Shamshad Begum's case (supra) wherein it is held as under: 8. It is not necessary that the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at 5 different localities. But concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion or the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 19. From amongst the five components of acts, find that at least four components are found to be present in the instant case. They are: (1) The cheque was presented to the bank, (2) The cheque was returned unpaid by the drawee bank, (3) The statutory notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of cheque amount was duly served, and (4) The drawer failed to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 20. The aforesaid discussions made on the basis of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Bhaskaran's case (supra) and also Shamshad Begum's case (supra) lead to a natural conclusion that the Magistrate's court at Agartala has the jurisdiction to try the criminal proceedings pending before it against the present petitioner. Because of this conclusion, the instant petitions must fail and accordingly, the same are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.