Judgment :- In all these Writ Petitions the petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of Section 27(2) and (3) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter for short referred to as ‘the Act’) as well as the procedure followed by the District and State Consumer Forum in issuing arrest warrants against them. Therefore, all these Writ Petitions are taken up for consideration together and disposed of by this common order. However, for proper appreciation of the rival contentions, the facts pleaded in W.P.No. 700/2008 and the statement of objections filed in W.P.No. 18465/2006 by the Union of India which was adopted by them as the statement of objections in all the Writ Petitions is set out as under. 2. The petitioner is a registered partnership firm. It is in the business of land development and construction. The petitioner entered into an agreement with the land owners for development of land bearing Sy. No. 4848 and 2878 at 6th Main, V.V. Puram, Devaraja Mohalla, Mysore, on 29.7.2002. The petitioner also entered into an agreement with the respondents on 22.4.2004 for assigning, developing and completion of Hi-land park apartments at Mysore. According to the petitioner the construction was completed in accordance with the agreement and possession was also handed over to the respondents. Thereafter, the petitioner called upon the respondents to co-operate with him in order to execute a sale deed. The respondents failed to pay the balance amount of Rs.43,316/- and register the sake deed. 3. The respondents filed Complaint No.12/2006 before the District Consumer Forum, Mysore, complaining of deficiency of service and the same came to be dismissed by an order dated 17.5.2006. Respondents filed Appeal No.1504/2006 before the State Commission which was disposed of by an order dated 26.3.2007 whereby the respondents were directed to pay Rs.43,000/- and the petitioner was directed to execute the absolute sale deed within two months after the receipt of the aforesaid amount. Respondents paid the amount accordingly. Thereafter, the petitioner by their letter dated 7.7.2007 intimated the respondents that on 13.7.2007 the sale deed would be executed. At the request of the respondents a draft copy of the sale deed was also sent. Lot of correspondences ensued between the parties. In fact the petitioner also made an offer to pay back the amount to the respondents if they are not interested in taking the apartment. At the request of the respondents a draft copy of the sale deed was also sent. Lot of correspondences ensued between the parties. In fact the petitioner also made an offer to pay back the amount to the respondents if they are not interested in taking the apartment. The case of the petitioner is that, he has already executed sale deeds in respect of the majority of the purchasers. When things stood thus the respondents filed an Execution Application for a direction to provide the things mentioned in the said application, to pay damages and for detention of the respondents until he has complied with the orders of the Commissioner and for imposition of fine. Notice was ordered on the said Execution Petition. After service of notice, the petitioner entered appearance through an advocate and the case was posted for objections on 1.1.2008. On 1.1.2008, the following order came to be passed:- “Sri PDM filed power for J.Dr. On 20.12.2007 the J.Dr. counsel was directed to comply the order or to file objection but nothing has been done. D.Hr. submits for issue of coercive steps. If P.F. paid issue NBW against J.Dr. as it appears that the J.Dr. unless a coercive step is taken is not inclined to comply the order, through P.I., Vontikoppal Police Station. Returnable by 17.01.2008”. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 27-A of the Act before the Karnataka State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The said appeal came to be dismissed on 9.1.2008. Therefore, the petitioner has preferred this Writ Petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 27(2) and (3) of the consumer protection Act, 1986 as amended by Act 62/2002 and for setting aside the impugned orders. 5. The Union of India has filed its statement of objections. It is contended that Section 27 is the key stone of the consumer jurisdiction which stands proudly apart from the ordinary and the tardy civil process. Without the sanction of Section 27 perhaps the consumer jurisdiction would only be a paper-tiger lacking teeth altogether. This is one of the rare provisions in the civil jurisdiction where the penal sanction of imprisonment and fine in terms has been provided for non-compliance with the orders of the Consumer Courts. Without the sanction of Section 27 perhaps the consumer jurisdiction would only be a paper-tiger lacking teeth altogether. This is one of the rare provisions in the civil jurisdiction where the penal sanction of imprisonment and fine in terms has been provided for non-compliance with the orders of the Consumer Courts. Section 27 does not create an offence stricto-sensu but is only a methodology of stringent penalty on pain of which the orders of the redressal agencies are to be complied with expeditiously. The Consumer Protection Act envisages the manner and procedure of dealing with complaint. The procedure codified in the Act has to be observed along with the principles of natural justice. For example, while dealing with an Execution Application, the concerned forum is required to give a notice to the opposite party to file its reply or objections. Upon receipt of objectionsreply it has to examine the facts and circumstances of the case and proceed to pass an order as provided for in Section 27 of the Act. In effect, the consumer Courts observe the principle of audi alterum partem (no man shall be condemned un-heard). Thus an opportunity of being heard is given to the opposite party before a penal order under Section 27 of the Act is passed by the Executing Court. Once a party defaults in compliance with the order of the Consumer Court, though the provisions of Section 27 automatically get attracted, yet following the principle of audi alterum partem, the Executing Court gives an opportunity to the defaulting party to file its objection/reply to the Execution Application. After this requirement is fulfilled, the Executing Court proceeds to pass order on the execution application. 6. By virtue of the various pronouncements of the National Commission, a procedure for disposal of execution application under Section 27 following the principles of natural justice are already being observed by the Consumer Courts. In terms of the Act, orders/directions passed by the National commission are binding on the State Commissions and District Forum in the country, unless otherwise the same is set aside by the Supreme Court. It may be submitted here that the Consumer Courts are following the procedure as laid down by the National Commission. In terms of the Act, orders/directions passed by the National commission are binding on the State Commissions and District Forum in the country, unless otherwise the same is set aside by the Supreme Court. It may be submitted here that the Consumer Courts are following the procedure as laid down by the National Commission. They refer to the procedure laid down by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (National Commission) in Revision Petition No.55/1992 and they have extracted the relevant portion which reads as under:- “If action is to be taken under Section 27 of the Act, natural justice requires that the person sought to be proceeded against should be issued a notice and his explanation should be heard before any conclusion is reached that an order of punishment and imposition of any sentence is called for”. 7. This procedure is being followed by the Consumer Courts in the country gives to the opposite party a reasonable opportunity for raising objection/providing replies and the same is in consonance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code/Criminal Procedure Code. However, all the technicalities/ procedures of CPC or the Cr.PC are not strictly followed as the Consumer Courts are guided by the principles of natural justice with an objective to provide simple, inexpensive and expeditious disposal to the consumer complaints through summary trials to meet the objective of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as enacted by the Parliament of India. 8. After Amendment Act 62 of 2002 the position was clarified by the National Commission when sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 27 were introduced on the procedure to be adopted for dealing with cases under Section 27. “Sub-section (I) creates no difficulty. Sub-section (2) has to be read as under: Power of Judicial Magistrate of the first class for trial of offences under the Act stand conferred as first portion of this sub-section says “that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure” a forum shall have the power of Judicial Magistrate of the first class. These powers thus immediately stand conferred and we have not to go to either to High Court or State Government. When powers of a judicial Magistrate of first class, as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, stand conferred then proceedings are to be conducted under the provisions of this Code, like any other Judicial Magistrate will do. These powers thus immediately stand conferred and we have not to go to either to High Court or State Government. When powers of a judicial Magistrate of first class, as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, stand conferred then proceedings are to be conducted under the provisions of this Code, like any other Judicial Magistrate will do. When a Consumer Forum thus has the power of Judicial Magistrate after coming into force of the amended Section, it has to proceed with the trial of the offence as provided under the said Code. 9. Sub-section (3) provides that offences may be tried summarily and that would mean as provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure”. 10. Therefore, it was contended that Section 27 is neither unconstitutional nor void, arbitrary and unguided, failing to provide any procedure in execution of orders. Therefore, they sought for dismissal of the Writ Petitions. 11. The principal contention urged challenging the vires of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 27 is, while striking down the proviso to the Section 27 of the act before amendment, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pramjit Singh Vs. Union of India and Others reported in 1992 (2) Kar. L.J 54 held that Article 21 of the Constitution contemplates procedure established by law, which means the initiation or staring of procedure of criminal nature before a Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute. It was contended that sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act do not deal with initiation and starting of proceedings, but on the contrary, the power of a Judicial Magistrate of First Class is conferred on the District Forum, State Commission and National Commission for the trial of offence under the Act and not for the period anterior to the commencement of the trial and thus this new provision also is unconstitutional. Secondly, it was contended that sub-section (3) provides that all offences under this Act may be tried summarily. However, what is the nature of summary procedure is not stipulated nor any rules are framed stipulating the summary procedure. Therefore, the said provision is vague and do not satisfy the requirement of procedure prescribed by law under Article 20 and 21 of the Constitution. However, what is the nature of summary procedure is not stipulated nor any rules are framed stipulating the summary procedure. Therefore, the said provision is vague and do not satisfy the requirement of procedure prescribed by law under Article 20 and 21 of the Constitution. Thirdly, it was contended that the penalty which can be imposed under Section 27(1) is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years. Under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code a person cannot be sentenced for a period of three years by following a summary procedure. Therefore, the aforesaid amended provision is unconstitutional, as it violates Article 20(1) of the Constitution. Lastly it was contended that this provision would have the effect of depriving a person of his personal liberty. It cannot be done except according to the procedure established by law and the procedure established by law do not satisfy the constitutional requirement. Therefore, sub-sections (2) and (3) of the Act are liable to be quashed as unconstitutional. 12. Therefore, the question that arise for consideration is: “Whether sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 would constitute “procedure established by law”, as contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitutions?” 13. The Constitutional validity of the consumer Protection Act, 1986, hereinafter referred to as the Act, was up held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Vishwabarathi House Building Co-Op. Society And Others, Reported In AIR 2003 SC 1043 . It was held, that the Act was enacted keeping in view the long felt necessity of protecting the common man from wrongs where for the ordinary law for all intent and purport had become illusory. In terms of the said Act, a consumer is entitled to participate in the proceedings directly as a result whereof his helplessness against a powerful business house may be taken care of. By reason of the said statue, quasi-judicial authorities have been created at the District, State and Central levels so as to enable a consumer to ventilate his grievances before a Forum where justice can be done without any procedural wrangles and hyper-technicalities. One of the objects of the said Act is to provide momentum to consumer movement. Therefore, independent authorities have been created. One of the objects of the said Act is to provide momentum to consumer movement. Therefore, independent authorities have been created. The rights of the parties have adequately been safeguarded by providing an alternative system of consumer jurisdiction. On summary trial, they are required to arrive at a conclusion based on reasons. Even when quantifying damages, they are required to make an attempt to serve the ends of justice aiming not only at recompensing the individual but also to bring about a qualitative change in the attitude of the service provider. Assignment of reasons excludes or at any rate minimizes the chances of arbitrariness and the higher Forums created under the Act can test the correctness thereof. Section 25 of the Act provides for enforcement of orders by the Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission. Only in the event of its inability to execute it, the said orders can be executed through the Courts within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the persons are residing. Section 27 of the Act also confers additional power upon the Forum and the Commission to execute its orders. The said provision is akin to Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure or the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act or Section 51 read with Order 21 Rule 37 of Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that Section 25 should be read in conjunction with Section 27. A parliamentary statute indisputably can create a tribunal and might say that non-compliance of its order would be punishable by way of imprisonment or fine, which can be in addition to any other mode of recovery. 14. It also further held that it is well settled that the cardinal principle of interpretation of the statute is that courts or tribunals must be held to possess power to execute their own order. It is also well settled that a statutory Tribunal which has been conferred with the power to adjudicate a dispute and pass necessary order has also the power to implement its order. Further, the Act which is a self contained Code, even though it has not been specifically spelt out, must be deemed to have conferred upon the Tribunal all powers in order to make its order effective. 15. Further, the Act which is a self contained Code, even though it has not been specifically spelt out, must be deemed to have conferred upon the Tribunal all powers in order to make its order effective. 15. However, prior to amendment the constitutional validity of the proviso to Section 27 was challenged before this Court on the ground that the proviso which provides for imposing a sentence of imprisonment or fine without providing for procedure for trial of offence violative of constitution guaranteed under Article 20 and 21 of the Constitution. 16. The proviso which was challenged read as under: “27. Penalties – Where a trader or a person against whom a complaint is made or the complainant fails or omits to comply with any order made by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, such trader or person or complainant shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extent to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the circumstances of any case so require, impose a sentence of imprisonment or fine, or both, for a term lesser than the minimum term and the amount lesser than the minimum amount, specified in this section.” 17. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Parmjit Singh Vs. Union of India And Others Reported In 1999(2) Kar L.L.J. 54, which went into the vires of the aforesaid proviso in the light of Articles 20 and 21 held as under: “4. ….. We are of the opinion that no person can be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence. The conviction envisaged under Article 20 of the Constitution contemplates the proceedings before a Court of law, which means an initiation or starting of proceedings of criminal nature before a Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute, which created the offence and regulated the punishment. The conviction envisaged under Article 20 of the Constitution contemplates the proceedings before a Court of law, which means an initiation or starting of proceedings of criminal nature before a Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute, which created the offence and regulated the punishment. Conviction without trial would amount to deprivation of the personal liberty of a person within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 puts a restriction upon the state to encroach upon the personal liberty of a person save in accordance with law and in conformity with the procedure prescribed in that behalf. Procedure established by law within the meaning of Article 21 is understood to mean the law prescribed by the legislature at any given point of time. Without prescribing the procedure, no person can be deprived of his personal liberty, which means freedom from physical restraint of a person by incarceration.” “6. As the proviso to Section 27 of the Act authorizes the Forum and the Commissions to impose a sentence of imprisonment or fine without providing any procedure resulting in deprivation of the nights conferred upon the persons under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution, the same is liable to be struck off being unconstitutional. The striking of the proviso to Section 27 of the Act would not, however, render the whole section unconstitutional. As the section creates the offence and provides the penalty, we are of the opinion that such offence has to be dealt with, tried and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 18. The aforesaid judgment of this Court was challenged by the State of Karnataka before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Parmjit Singh And Others Reported In II (2006) CPJ 6 (SC). During the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, the Parliament amended Section 27 introducing sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 27 of the Act. 19. The Supreme Court while taking note of the aforesaid amendment, observed as under: “4. Parmjit Singh And Others Reported In II (2006) CPJ 6 (SC). During the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, the Parliament amended Section 27 introducing sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 27 of the Act. 19. The Supreme Court while taking note of the aforesaid amendment, observed as under: “4. It is to be noted that by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002 (62 of 2002), as contained in Section 23 of the Amending Act, the proviso which was struck down as unconstitutional by the High Court has been omitted Sub-section (2) has been introduced which provides that the District Forum or the State Commission or the National commission, as the case may be, shall have the power of a Judicial Magistrate of First Class for the trial of offences under the Act and on such conferment of powers, the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, on whom the powers are so conferred, shall be deemed to be a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class of the Code. The amendments have been made effective with effect from 15.3.2003. The controversy has, therefore, become academic. The appeals are accordingly disposed of but without any order as to costs.” 20. Section 27 with newly introduced sub-sections (2) and (3) reads as under:- “27. Penalties:- Where a trader or a person against whom a complaint is made (or the complainant) falls or omits to comply with any order made by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, such trader or person (or complainant) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both: (Omitted by CP (Amdt.) Act, 2002, w.e.f. 15-3-2003 vide SO 270(E), dt. 10-3-2003) ((2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973(2 of 1974), the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, shall have the power of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class for the trial of offences under this Act, and on such conferment of powers, the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, on whom the powers are so conferred, shall be deemed to be a Judicial Magistrate of the first class for the purpose of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973. (3) All offences under this Act may be tried summarily by the District Forum or the State commission or the National Commission, as the case may be.)” 21. A reading of Section 27(1) shows that the object of the said provision is to create an offence under the Act and also provide for the sentence to be imposed on such offence being proved. It is interesting to note that it is not a mere penalty imposed on a defendant or judgment debtor in a case. A trader, or a person against whom a complaint is made or the complainant himself, if he fails or omits to comply with any order made by the authorities mentioned therein, such trader or person or complainant, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both. Therefore, both the complainant and the respondent in a complaint, if they fail or omits to comply with the order, they are said to have committed offence under this provision. Once the offence is held to be proved, the authorities under the said provision have no discretion except to sentence such a person for a period or term not less than one month or fine not less than Rs.2000. However, the discretion is vested with such authorities in the matter of upper limit of the sentence namely the imprisonment which may extend to three years and fine that may extend up to Rs.10,000. However, the discretion is vested with such authorities in the matter of upper limit of the sentence namely the imprisonment which may extend to three years and fine that may extend up to Rs.10,000. Therefore, the Parliament, by this provision has clearly set out who are the persons who can be prosecuted for offence under the Act, what is the minimum and maximum sentence and fine to be imposed in the event offence is proved. The constitutional validity of this provision is not under challenges. What is challenged is the vires of sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 27 of the Act. 22. Sub-section (2) starts with a non-obstante clause. It is important to notice that such a non-obstante clause is neither found in sub-section (1) nor in sub-section (3) and it is confined only to sub-section (2). Therefore, it is necessary to find out the meaning and the purpose of introducing this non-obstante clause. 23. Section 6 of the Code of Criminal procedure 1973, for short hereinafter referred to as “the code” defines Classes of Criminal Courts. It provides, besides High Courts and the courts constituted under any law, other than the Code, there shall be, in every State, the following classes of Criminal Courts, namely:- (i) Courts of Sessions: (ii) Judicial Magistrate of the first class and, in any Metropolitan area, Metropolitan Magistrates: (iii) Judicial Magistrate of the second class; and (iv) Executive Magistrate 24. Therefore, the constitution of Criminal Courts and the offences are clearly set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission are not one such class of Criminal courts as defined under the Code. Therefore, in order to vest these Forums and Commission, the power of Judicial Magistrate, which does not fall under Section 6 of the Code, it became necessary for the Parliament to state, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973, the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, shall have the power of Judicial Magistrate of I Class, for trial of offence under the Act. Therefore, by virtue of introduction of this non-obstante clause, these three authorities constituted under this Act are conferred with the powers of Judicial Magistrate of I Class in the matter of trial of offences. Therefore, by virtue of introduction of this non-obstante clause, these three authorities constituted under this Act are conferred with the powers of Judicial Magistrate of I Class in the matter of trial of offences. After constituting these three authorities under the Act as Criminal Courts, the Parliament further made it clear by the latter part of sub-section (2) of Section 27 that on such conferment of power, the District Forum or the State commission or the National Commission as the case may be on whom the powers are so conferred, shall be deemed to be a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class for the purpose of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973. Thus, the three authorities constituted under the Act, though, do not form class of Criminal Courts under Section 6 of the Code, they are deemed to be Judicial Magistrate of I Class under the provisions of the Code and they have been vested with the power of Judicial Magistrate of I Class for the trial of the offence under the Act. 25. In so far as Sub-section (3) of the Act is concerned, it is expressly made clear that all offences under the Act may be tried summarily, thus prescribing a procedure for trial of offences under the Act. 26. It is contended that the offence under Section 27(1) of the Act is punishable with three years imprisonment. It is a warrant case under Section 2(x) of the Code. Subsection (3) of Section 27 of the Act provides, all offences under the Act may be tried summarily. A warrant case cannot be tried summarily. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under the Act is not a procedure established by law and it violates Article 21 of the Constitution. Secondly it was contended that, by sub-section (2) of Section 27 though the power of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class is conferred on the Forum and the Commission, it is conferred only for the trial of the offences under the Act and no power is conferred for proceedings anterior to the trial of an offence. In other words, as the offences under the Act is punishable with three years imprisonment, the procedure under the Code to try such offences is that of a warrant case, and in a warrant case the trial commences after the charges are framed. In other words, as the offences under the Act is punishable with three years imprisonment, the procedure under the Code to try such offences is that of a warrant case, and in a warrant case the trial commences after the charges are framed. Therefore, the Forum and the Commission has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences, issue process and order for issue of arrest warrants bailable and non-bailable and, therefore, the impugned orders passed issuing non-bailable warrants before framing of charges are without the authority of law. 27. Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter for short referred to as ‘the Code’) provides for trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws. All offences under the Indian penal code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code. However, all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried or otherwise dealt with according to the procedure prescribed under the Code but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, enquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. As the Act do not regulate the manner or place of investigating, enquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences, the provisions of the Code are applicable to the offences under the Act in so far as its investigation, enquiry and trial is concerned. An option is given to try the offences summarily under Sub-section (3) of Section 27 of the Act. The word “summary” implies a short and quick procedure, instead of or, as an alternative to, the more elaborate procedure ordinarily adopted or prescribed for deciding a case. The proceedings before a Court, Tribunal, or an Authority are called summary proceedings if it is not required to follow the regular formal procedure but is authorised to follow a short and quick procedure for expeditious disposal. The word used is “may”. Therefore, it is left to the discretion of the Forum to decide the procedure but the said procedure is a procedure prescribed under the Code. The offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years. 28. Under the Code, Chapter 21 deals with summary trials. Therefore, it is left to the discretion of the Forum to decide the procedure but the said procedure is a procedure prescribed under the Code. The offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years. 28. Under the Code, Chapter 21 deals with summary trials. Section 260 of the Code confers on any Chief Judicial Magistrate; any Metropolitan Magistrate; any Magistrate of the First Class, the power to try summarily and it also sets out the offences which could be tried summarily. Sub-section (1) of Section 260 sets out what are the offences which can be tried summarily under the Code. One such category of offences are offences not punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. Therefore, an offence under the Act which is punishable with imprisonment for a term less than two years is triable summarily. The offence under Section 27 (1) of the Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years. It does not mean that in every case the punishment of imprisonment to be imposed has to be three years. 29. Sub-section (2) of Section 260 provides that when, in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try it summarily, the Magistrate shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to hear the case in the manner provided by this Code. Section 262 of the Code prescribes the procedure for summary trials. It states that, the trials under this Chapter, the procedure specified in the Code for the trial of summons case shall be followed except as provided under Section 263,264 and 265. Therefore, under the Code when an offence is tried in a summary way it is tried as a summons case. Section 263 deals with record in summary trials. Section 264 of the Code also provides in every case tried summarily in which the accused does not plead guilty, the Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence and a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding. Section 263 deals with record in summary trials. Section 264 of the Code also provides in every case tried summarily in which the accused does not plead guilty, the Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence and a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding. In fact Section 259 of the Code, empowers a Court under the Code to convert summons cases into warrant cases. It provides that when in the course of the trial of a summons case relating to an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, it appears to the Magistrate that in the interest of justice, the offence should be tried in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant cases, such Magistrate may proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided by this Code for the trial of warrant cases and may recall any witness who may have been examined. 30. From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that the Code provides for trial in a summary way, trial of summons cases by Magistrates and trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. It also provides for the Court to rehear the case. In other words, initially if an offence is tried in summary way, it could be re-heard as a summons case as well as a warrant case. When the offence is tried summarily the only limitation imposed under the Code is that no sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months shall be passed, in the case of any conviction under Chapter 21. However, if the Court feels that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try summarily and the punishment to be imposed is more than three months imprisonment, it is vested with the power to try such offence as a summons case. While conducting a trial of an offence as a summons case, it appears to the Magistrate that in the interest of justice it should be tried as a warrant case, the Court may try it as a warrant case. It is in this background sub-section (3) of section 27 is to be appreciated. It expressly provides that all offences under this Act may be tried summarily. In other words, trial of an offence under the Act as a rule should be summarily. It is in this background sub-section (3) of section 27 is to be appreciated. It expressly provides that all offences under this Act may be tried summarily. In other words, trial of an offence under the Act as a rule should be summarily. But, in a given case discretion has been vested with the Court to try as a summons case or as a warrant case. That is the significance of the word ‘may’ in sub-section (3) of Section 27. Therefore, the contention that in view of the punishment under Section 27(1) of the Act may extend to three years imprisonment, the offence cannot be tried summarily and, therefore, it violates Article 20 and 21 of the Constitution in as much as the procedure prescribed under law, namely sub-section (3) of Section 27 is contrary to the procedure prescribed under the Code for trial of offences in respect of a warrant case is without any substance. 31. The next contention urged is that the trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge, prior to it the proceedings are only an enquiry and the power conferred under Section 27 (2) of the Act on the Forum and Commission is only the power of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class for the trial of offences under the Act and no power under the Code is conferred during pre-trial or enquiry. Therefore, the non-bailable warrants issued by the Forum and Commission in all these cases even before framing of charge is violative of Article 20 and 21 of the Constitution. 32. The said submission is based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani Vs State of Maharashtra And Others [ AIR 1979 SC 94 ]. The Apex Court dealing with the difference between discharge and acquittal of an accused in a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report and also the question whether the Magistrate has the power under the Code to discharge the accused after framing of a charge in a warrant case instituted either on a complaint or a police report held as under:- 26. From the scheme of the provisions noticed above it is clear that in a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report ‘discharge’ or ‘acquittal’ of accused are distinct concepts applicable to different stages of the proceedings in Court. From the scheme of the provisions noticed above it is clear that in a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report ‘discharge’ or ‘acquittal’ of accused are distinct concepts applicable to different stages of the proceedings in Court. The legal effect and incidents of ‘discharge’ and ‘acquittal’ are also different. An order of discharge in a warrant case instituted on complaint, can be made only after the process has been issued and before the charge is framed. Section 253(1) shows that as a general rule there can be no order of discharge unless the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses has been taken and the Magistrate considers for reasons to be recorded, in the light of the evidence, that no case has been made out. Sub-section (2) which authorises the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if he considers the charge to be groundless, is an exception to that rule. A discharge without considering the evidence taken is illegal. If a prima facie case is made out the Magistrate must proceed under Section 254 and frame charge against the accused. Section 254 shows that a charge can be framed if after taking evidence or any previous stage, the Magistrate, thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable as a warrant case. 26-A. Once a charge is framed, the Magistrate has no power under Section 227 or any other provision of the Code to cancel the charge, and reverse the proceedings to the stage of Section 253 and discharge the accused. The trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge: prior to it the proceedings are only an inquiry. After the framing of charge if the accused pleads not gulity, the Magistrate is required to proceed with the trial in the manner provided in section 254 to 258 to a logical end. Once a charge is framed in a warrant case, instituted either on complaint or a police report, the Magistrate has no power under the Code to discharge the accused, and thereafter, he can either acquit or convict the accused unless he decides to proceed under Sections 349 and 562 of the Code of 1892 (which correspond to Section 325 and 360 of the Code of 1973). (underling by me) 33. (underling by me) 33. It is to be noticed here that the aforesaid judgment is rendered interpreting the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. However, a larger Bench of the Apex Court in the case of V.C. Shukla Vs State Through CBI [ AIR 1980 SC 962 ] while deciding the question when exactly the trial commences in a warrant case, interpreting the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 held as under:- “35. The last argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, which also appears to be very attractive, is that accepting the tests referred to above and applying to the facts of the present case, the order impugned should be construed as a final order inasmuch as the order completely terminates the proceedings preceding the trial. In other words, it was contended that until the charge is actually framed the trial does not start and all proceedings up to the framing of the charges are in the nature of an inquiry or a sort of a pre-trial proceeding which finality culminates either in the order of discharge or in the order framing of charges. Thus, in any event, an order framing charges must necessarily be held to be a final order and not an interlocutory one. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied on a decision of a Full Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case of State v. Ghani Bandar, AIR 1960 J & K 71” 36. This decision, however, in our opinion, does not appear to be of any assistances to the appellant for the reasons that we shall give hereafter. In the first place, the decision was rendered not on the provisions of the Code of 1973 but under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Jammu and Kashmir State which were quite different from the provisions of the Code of 1973 which does not apply to that State. Secondly, it would appear that the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 (Act X of 1872) expressly contained a definition of the word trial which was defined thus. “Trial” means the proceedings taken in Court after a charge has been drawn up, and includes the punishment of the offender. It includes the proceedings under Chapters XVI and XVIII, from the time when the accused appears in Court”. “Trial” means the proceedings taken in Court after a charge has been drawn up, and includes the punishment of the offender. It includes the proceedings under Chapters XVI and XVIII, from the time when the accused appears in Court”. Thus, the word “trial” clearly meant the proceedings after charges had been drawn up and included even the punishment of the offender. Furthermore, the definition was wide enough even to include proceedings right from the time when the accused appears in Court to the culmination of the proceedings. This definition is to be found in Section 4 of the Act X of 1872. The said Act defined “inquiry’ thus: “Inquiry” includes any inquiry which may be conducted by a Magistrate or Court under this Act” 37. Both the definition of the word ‘trial’ as also that of ‘inquiry’ underwent a radical change in the Code of 1898. The Code of 1898 completely dropped the definition of the word ‘trial’ and instead widened the definition of the term ‘inquiry’ Under S. 4(J) of the Code of 1898, ‘inquiry’ was defined thus: “Inquiry’ ‘inquiry’ includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court.” Thus, the position was that under the Code of 1898, trial was not defined at all but all proceedings except the trial were held to be inquiry within the meaning of S. 4(J). So far as the Code of 1973 is concerned, with which we are dealing while the definition of inquiry is retained, trial has not been defined at all. Prior to the amendment of 1955, under the Code of 1898, the procedure for trial of warrant cases by Magistrate was the same whether the case was instituted on a police report or otherwise than on a police report. The procedure is found in the unamended Sections 251 to 254 onwards. After referring to the aforesaid section it held as under:- 38. It is, therefore, clear that under the provisions extracted above, there was no question of the trial starting until the charges were framed because under Section 252 when the accused appeared or was brought before the Magistrate, the Magistrate had to hear the complainant and take evidence as may be produced by him. It is, therefore, clear that under the provisions extracted above, there was no question of the trial starting until the charges were framed because under Section 252 when the accused appeared or was brought before the Magistrate, the Magistrate had to hear the complainant and take evidence as may be produced by him. After summoning the witnesses under Section 252(2), the Magistrate had to take the evidence and after examining the same he had to determine whether a case was made out by the prosecution which, if unrebutted, would warrant the conviction of the accused. If the Magistrate was of the opinion from the examination of the evidence take at the earlier stage that the accused had committed on offence triable under the said Chapter, then only charge was to be framed. By the amendment of 1955, however, the procedure of the trial of warrant cases was split up into two parts. By the first part a different procedure was indicated. (which is contained in S. 251), in cases starting on the basis of a complaint whereas under Section 251-A a separate procedure was evolved for cases triable on the basis of a police report ….. As regards the argument that the trial preceded an inquiry which culminated in framing of the charges or discharge of an accused, we are of the opinion that this argument is also without any substance. Under the Code, the commitment inquiry preceding the trial has been completely abolished as indicated while referring to the objects and reasons of the Code. Under the Code the Magistrate is not to record any evidence or hold any inquiry but only to find out as to whether a case put up before him is exclusively triable by a Sessions Court and once this is so, he is to send the case to the Court for trial. Thus, there being no inquiry as was the case in the Code of 1898, there is no room for acceptance of the argument of the counsel for the appellant that an inquiry precedes the trial in such a case. This contention, therefore, appears to be without substance. Thus, there being no inquiry as was the case in the Code of 1898, there is no room for acceptance of the argument of the counsel for the appellant that an inquiry precedes the trial in such a case. This contention, therefore, appears to be without substance. Realizing this difficulty, the learned counsel for the appellant, put forward an alternative argument, viz., that S. 238 of the Code itself consists of two separate stages-one standing form Section 238 and ending up to Section 240 and the other standing from Section 242 and ending up to Section 248. We are, however, unable to agree with this argument because it appears that the enactment of Section 251-A by virtue of the amendment of 1955 the words ‘commencement of trial’ were introduced for the first time which clearly denote that the trial starts in a warrant case right from the stage when the accused appears or is brought before the Court. This appears to us to be the main intent and purpose of introducing the words ‘commencement of trial’ by the amendment Act of 1955 which did not appear in the Code of 1898 or in the various amendments made before the Act of 1955 to the Code. Thus, if the trial begins at that stage, it cannot be said that the proceedings starting with Section 251- A onwards amount to on inquiry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Code. Furthermore, it would appear that the amendment of 1955 in fact simplified the entire procedure for trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate by not requiring the Magistrate to record any evidence before framing of the charge or discharging the accused. All that the Magistrate had to do was to satisfy himself that the document referred to in Section 173 had been furnished to the accused and if that had not been done, to direct that the documents should be furnished. Thereafter, the Magistrate on consideration of the documents referred to in Section 173 only and without recording any evidence was to examine the accused if he considered necessary, and after hearing the parties proceed either to frame the charge or to discharge the accused. In other words, the simplified procedure introduced by the amendment of 1955, which is now retained by the Code in Sections 238 to 240, amounts to a trial from beginning to end. In other words, the simplified procedure introduced by the amendment of 1955, which is now retained by the Code in Sections 238 to 240, amounts to a trial from beginning to end. The fact that no evidence is to be recorded before framing of the charge and the Magistrate has to proceed only on the documents referred to under Section 173, i.e., the statement referred in the case diary, and other papers or materials collected by the police, clearly show that these proceedings are not an inquiry at all because the scheme of the Code generally appears to be that whenever an inquiry is held, evidence of affidavits have to be recorded by the Court, before passing an order. This, therefore, is an additional reason to hold that the proceedings starting from Section 251-A in the previous Code and Section 238 in the Code of 1973, do not amount to an inquiry at all but amount to the starting of a trial straightway. Contrasted with the procedure which prevailed under the Code of 1898, prior to the amendment of 1955, there was express provision for recording of evidence before the charge and that procedure undoubtedly amounted to an inquiry which has now been dropped by the amendment of 1955 and retained by the Code. For these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the proceedings starting with Section 238 of the Code including any discharge or framing of charges under Section 239 or 240 amount to a trial. The question of a pretrial, as suggested by the counsel for the appellant does not arise on a plain interpretation of the language of Section 238 and 239 which were the same as Section 251-A under the Code of 1898 as amended by the Act of 1955”. 34. A careful perusal of the aforesaid two judgments make it clear that in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani’s case the question which arose for consideration was not about when the trial commences in a warrant case. Secondly that is a judgment rendered under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. Subsequently, in V.C. Shukla’s case the Apex Court had an occasion to directly deal with the question when exactly the trial commences in a warrant case. Secondly that is a judgment rendered under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. Subsequently, in V.C. Shukla’s case the Apex Court had an occasion to directly deal with the question when exactly the trial commences in a warrant case. The Apex Court dealt with the said question with reference to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 before amendment to the same by introducing Section 251A, the position after 1955 as amended by Section 251A and the provisions of Section 251 to 254 under the Code. It has been categorically stated that the proceedings starting from Section 251A in the previous Code and Section 238 in the Code of 1973 do not amount to an enquiry at all but amount to the starting of a trial straightaway. Contrasted with the procedure which prevailed under the Code of 1898, prior to the amendment of 1955, there was express provision for recording of evidence before the charge and that procedure undoubtedly amounted to an enquiry which has now been dropped by the amendment of 1955 and retained by the Code. The proceedings starting with Section 238 of the Code including any discharge or framing of charges under Section 239 or 240 amount to a trial. In fact, Section 238 of the Code expressly states that when, in any warrant case instituted on a police report, the accused appears or it brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial, the Magistrate shall satisfy himself that he has complied with the provisions of Section 207. “At the commencement of the trial” in the aforesaid Section sets at rest the aforesaid controversy as held by the Apex Court. 1. 35. The Apex Court dealing with the word “tried found in Section 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 in the case of The State of Bihar vs. Ram Naresh Pandey and another [ AIR 1957 SC 389 ] has held:- “The whole argument of the learned counsel is based upon the use of the word “tried” and he emphasizes the well-known distinction between ‘inquiry’ and ‘trial’ in the scheme of the Code. Our attention has also been drawn to the definition of the word ‘inquiry’ in S.4(k) of the Code which runs as follows: “Inquiry’ includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under the code by a Magistrate or Court.” There is hardly anything in the definition which throws light on the question whether the word ‘trial’ is used in the relevant section in a limited sense as excluding an inquiry. The word ‘trial’ is not defined in the Code. ‘Trial’ according to Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary means “the conclusion, by a competent tribunal, of question in issue in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal” (Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn vol.4, p.3092), and according to Wharton’s Law Lexicon means “the hearing of a cause, civil or criminal, before a judge who has jurisdiction over it, according to the laws of the land” (Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 14th Edn, p. 1011). The words ‘tried’ and ‘trial’ appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number of sections in the Code to which our attention has been drawn the words ‘tried’ and ‘trial’ have been used in the sense of reference to the stage after the inquiry. That meaning attaches to the words in those sections having regard to the context in which they are used. There is no reason why where these words are used in another context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which they are used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the provision under consideration. It may also be mentioned that the words ‘inquiry’ and ‘trial’ were both defined in the Code of 1872 but that the definition of the word ‘trial’ was omitted in the 1882 Code and that later on in the 1898 Code the definition of the word ‘inquiry’ was slightly altered by adding the phrase “other than a trial” leaving the word ‘trial’ undefined. These various legislative changes from time to time with reference to S.494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the definition of the word inquiry’ confirm the view above taken that S. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide enough to cover every kind of inquiry and trial and that the word ‘trial’ in the section has not been used in any limited sense.” 36. Following the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court in the case of Omprakash Shivprakash vs K.I. Kuriakose and others (1999) 8 SCC 633 ] held as under:- When does the ‘trial’ begin as for an offence under the Act? The word “trial” is not defined either in the Act or in the Code. However, the Code has distinguished the trial from inquiry as could be noted from Section 2(g) of the Code wherein the word ‘inquiry’ is defined thus: “2. (g) ‘inquiry’ means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court” The term ‘trial’ cannot be given a fixed meaning to be applied in all cases uniformity. The connotation of that word changes with the difference in which the term is employed in a particular provision of any statute. 37. After referring to the aforesaid two judgments, Justice Rajendra Babu, as he then was, agreed with the said view in the case of Bipinchandra Parshottamdas Patel (Vakil) vs State of Gujarat (2003) 4 SCC 642 ] and held as under:- Therefore, the word ‘trial’ in Section 40 of the Act cannot be supplanted with a straitjacket meaning so as to cover all situation. No doubt, the world ‘trial’ used in part II of Section 40(1) is capable of two interpretation in the context of the present Act. One is the restricted interpretation so as to cover only the period after framing of the charge. This view is what the appellant advances. The second possibility is to assign a liberal meaning so as to cover “detention at any stage of the case”. Since the purpose of Section 40 is to “ensure the proper functioning of the office of the President or Vice-President of the Municipalities by keeping the public confidence”, the concentration is on the expression “detention in prison.” For obvious reasons a person who is detained in prison cannot effectively function as a President or Vice-President of a Municipality. Since the purpose of Section 40 is to “ensure the proper functioning of the office of the President or Vice-President of the Municipalities by keeping the public confidence”, the concentration is on the expression “detention in prison.” For obvious reasons a person who is detained in prison cannot effectively function as a President or Vice-President of a Municipality. So any person “detained in prison” cannot be allowed to hold the offices. This is the purpose of Part II in Section 40(1). The words “during trial” are used so as to exclude the situations like preventive detention or detention in police custody. If the words employed in a provision are capable of two meanings or cast doubts as to the actual meaning, then they have to be interpreted in the light of the object of the legislation. Word-by-word interpretation is not a welcome method of interpretation. Words, vehicles of legislative intention, take colour from the context in which they are used. Hence, the interpretation of the words “during trial” will have to promote the purpose of Section 40. As already pointed out, the object of this section is to keep shady characters away from local bodies and to pave way for ‘persons with high integrity and good moral conduct to hold public offices. The large interest could only be promoted if the word ‘trial’ is given a broad meaning. This intention is vividly displayed by choosing the expression “under the provisions of any law for the time being in force” in Part II of Section 40(1), which means the provision is designed to cover any “detention in prison” under provisions of any law. Only by this interpretation. The textual meaning of “during trial” matches the contextual spirit of Section 40 that aims to ensure the smooth functioning of the office and to keep the confidence of the people in the institution. In result, the word ‘trial’ should not be given a restricted meaning so as to include only proceedings after the accused is actually arraigned before the competent court for framing and facing of charges. Thus, detention in the present case took place during the process of trial. It served as a step in aid for trial. Dr. Justice A.R. Lakshmanan concurring with the said view in the aforesaid judgment held as under:- “This apart, the word “trial” has not been expressly defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, detention in the present case took place during the process of trial. It served as a step in aid for trial. Dr. Justice A.R. Lakshmanan concurring with the said view in the aforesaid judgment held as under:- “This apart, the word “trial” has not been expressly defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. The word, in my view, should not be given a restrictive meaning to include only proceedings after the accused is actually arraigned before the competent court for framing and facing the charge. In arriving at the said conclusion, the High Court has placed reliance on many judgments cited before it. I, therefore, agree with the interpretation of Section 40 of the Act given by my learned Brother S. Rajendra Babu. The learned Judge has also pointed out that the meaning of the words should be in perfect tune with the spirit of Section 40 of the Act, otherwise, the purpose of Section 40 of the Act, will be defeated and the word “trial” used in the expression “detained in prison during trial” cannot be singled out and cannot be accorded with a restricted meaning and that the meaning will have to promote the reason and spirit of Section 40 of the Act.” 38. The world ‘trial’ according to Collins’ English Dictionary means: “the act or an instance of trying of proving; test or experiment … Law. a. the judicial examination of the issues in a civil or criminal cause by a competent tribunal and the determination of these issue in accordance with the law of the land. b. the determination of an accused person’s guilt or innocence after hearing evidence for the prosecution and for the accused and the judicial examination of the issues involved.” 39. According to Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (2nd Edn.) ‘trial’ means: “an examination before a competent tribunal, according to the law of the land, of the facts or law put in issue in a cause, for the purpose of determines such issue. When a court hears and determines any issue of fact or law for the purpose of determining the right of the parties, it may be considered a trial” 40. When a court hears and determines any issue of fact or law for the purpose of determining the right of the parties, it may be considered a trial” 40. In Black’s law Dictionary (Sixth Edn.) Centennial Edn, the word ‘trial’ is defined thus: “A judicial examination and determination of issues between parties to action, whether they be issues of law or of fact, before a court that has jurisdiction… A judicial examination, in accordance with law of the land, of a cause, either civil or criminal, of the issues between the parties, whether of law or fact, before court that has proper jurisdiction.” 41. In Webstar’s Comprehensive Dictionary – International Edn., at p. 1339, the word ‘trial’ is defined thus: “The examination, before a tribunal having assigned jurisdiction of the facts or law involved in an issue in order to determine that issue. A former method of determining guilt or innocence by subjecting the accused to physical tests of endurance, as by or deal or by combat with his accuser… In the process of being tried or tested… Made or performed in the course of trying or testing….” 42. The word “trial” is not defined in the Code. The word trial has no fixed or universal meaning. In the Code the words tried and trial have been used in the context of reference to a stage after the Inquiry. That meaning attaches to the words in those sections having regard to the context in which they are used. There is no reason why they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which they are used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the provisions under considerations. The word “trial” should not be given a restricted meaning so as to include only proceedings after the accused in actually arrayed before the competent Court for framing or facing charges. The larger interest could only be promoted, if the word “trial” is given a broader meaning. If the words employed in a provision are capable of two meanings or cast doubts as to the actual meaning, then they have to be interpreted in the light of the object of legislation. Words, vehicle of legislative intention, take colour from the context in which they are issued. If the words employed in a provision are capable of two meanings or cast doubts as to the actual meaning, then they have to be interpreted in the light of the object of legislation. Words, vehicle of legislative intention, take colour from the context in which they are issued. The connotation of that word changes with the difference in which the term is employed in a particular provision of a statute. Hence, the interpretation of the word “trial’ will have to promote the purpose of Section 27 of the Act. Therefore, the word trial used in Section 27 of the Act, is wide enough to cover every kind of inquiry and trial and the word ‘trial’ in that section has not been used in any limited or restricted sense. 43. Therefore, the argument that the Commission and the Forum has no power to issue bailable and non-bailable warrants even before framing of charge is without any substance. In fact, the entire argument proceeds on the assumption that the offence under the Act is to be tried only as a warrant case. As discussed earlier it is not so. It is to be tried summarily. It is to be tried as a summons case. Only in the event, if it is to be tried as a warrant case even then the aforesaid contentions do not hold any water in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court. 44. Therefore, the argument that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law and as no procedure is prescribed under the Act for trial of offences under Section 27(1) of the Act has no substance after introduction of sub-section (2) of Section 27. After the proviso to Section 27(1) was struck down by this Court as offending Article 21 of the Constitution the Parliament has expressly conferred the power of a Judicial Magistrate of I Class for the trial of offences under this Act on the Forum and the Commission and they are deemed to be a Judicial Magistrate of the I Class for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Therefore, the procedure proscribed for trial of offences under the Act is the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which is the procedural law of the land. Therefore, the procedure proscribed for trial of offences under the Act is the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which is the procedural law of the land. The power to be exercised by the Forum and the Commission is that of the power of Judicial Magistrate of I Class under the Code. Therefore, it cannot be said the personal liberty of a person is sought to be taken away without following the procedure established by law. In this context it is also necessary to notice the observations of the Division Bench of this Court which struck down the proviso to Section 27 which gave raise to the amendment of Section 27 by introduction of sub-section (2) and (3) to Section 27. The Division Bench of this Court held that, the conviction envisaged under Article 20 of the Constitution contemplates the proceedings before a Court of law, which means an initiation or starting of proceedings of criminal nature before a Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute, which created the offence and regulated the punishment. Conviction without trial would amount to deprivation of the personal liberty of a person within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 puts restriction on any State to encroach upon the personal liberty of a person save in accordance with law and in conformity with the procedure prescribed in that behalf. Procedure established by law within the Article 21 is understood to mean the law prescribed by the legislature at any given point of time. Without prescribing the procedure no person can be deprived of his personal liberty, which means freedom from physical restraint of a person by incorporation. As the proviso to Section 27 did not provide any procedure before a sentence of imprisonment could be imposed it was struck down as unconstitutional. After striking down the said offending proviso this Court made it clear that the offences under the Act could be dealt with, tried and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is in this background sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 27 was introduced by way of amendment by the Parliament conferring on the Forum the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of I Class under the Code to try the offences under the Act. It is in this background sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 27 was introduced by way of amendment by the Parliament conferring on the Forum the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of I Class under the Code to try the offences under the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that no procedure is prescribed and the procedure prescribed is not a procedure established by law. 45. After introducing sub-section (2) and (3) to Section 27 of the Act, by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002, the Parliament has also introduced Section 27-A providing for appeals against the order passed under Section 27 of the Act, which reads as under: “27A. Appeal against order passed under Section 27 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (2 of 1974), an appeal under section 27, both on facts and on law, shall lie from; (a) the order made by the District Forum to the State Commission; (b) the order made by the State Commission to the National Commission; and (c) the order made by the National Commission to the Supreme Court. (2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal shall lie to any court from any order of a District Forum or a State Commission or the National Commission; (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of an order of a District Forum or a State Commission or, as the case may be, the National Commission; Provided that the State Commission or the National Commission or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if, is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. 46. Therefore, it is clear that orders to be passed under Section 27 has been made appealable and a right of appeal has been conferred on the party suffering an order under Section 27. Even though an offence punishable with three months imprisonment after holding a summary trial is not appealable under the Code, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal is provided both on facts and on law against the orders made under Section 27. Even though an offence punishable with three months imprisonment after holding a summary trial is not appealable under the Code, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal is provided both on facts and on law against the orders made under Section 27. It only shows the anxiety on the part of the Parliament in protecting the personal liberty of a person as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 47. In this background, one has to remember the settled legal position which a Court is required to notice, when the virus of an enactment or provision therein is attacked. The approach of the Court, while examining the challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment, is to start with the presumption of constitutionality. The Court should try to sustain its validity to the extent possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. The Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting much less inexactitude of language employed. Indeed, any such deceits of drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, Act made by the Legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared as void. There is a presumption in law, that every statute and its provisions enacted by the legislature, be it by the Parliament or any other law making authority, are constitutional. Unconstitutionality of any statute should not be easily inferred. The presumption is always in favour of be constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. Further, while considering the validity of the law the Court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State and would be free to satisfy itself whether under any provision of the Constitution the law can be sustained. That in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislations. That in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislations. The rule of constructions that if the statutory provision is susceptible or admits of two reasonably possible views then the one which would promote its constitutionality should be preferred on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to have intended an excess of its own jurisdiction, is subject to the further rule that it applies only where two views are reasonably possible on the statutory language. Viewed from this angle, there is no ground made out for striking down Section 27(2) and (3) of the Act. 48. It was contended by the respondents that if the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be followed for trial of offences under the Act, the very purpose of enacting Section 27 would be defeated. The aggrieved person is denied a speedy remedy. If after obtaining a decree or order upholding his claim, if the procedure prescribed under Code is to be followed there would be enormous delay in realizing the fruits of the decree/order, and amounts to denial of relief to the successful party. 49. Though the said argument looks attractive, on a careful examination, it shows it lacks merit. No doubt this Act is a special enactment meant for speedy adjudication of disputes of consumers. A summary procedure is prescribed for adjudications. However, after the conclusion of the adjudication and passing of the order the relief to which the successful party is entitled to is purely civil in nature. It may be in the nature of money compensation or some times specifically enforcing a term of the contract. Now, by virtue of Section 27 of the Act non-compliance to the orders passed by the Forum and the Commission is made an offence. Once a civil dispute and the civil remedy is converted into a criminal offence, what is sought to be done after trial of such an offence, if the person is found guilty is to deprive him of his personal liberty by way of imprisonment. Right to life, right to personal liberty is a fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen of this country. Right to life, right to personal liberty is a fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen of this country. In fact, this right is a right conferred on every person, not only the citizen. This right has to be contrasted with the right of a person who has a decree for money or for certain other benefits. If the personal liberty, a fundamental right is to be denied for non-compliance of a decree for money or other benefit, then it has to be in accordance with the procedure established by law. As the procedure prescribed by way of proviso to Section 27 was found to be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, it was struck down. It is thereafter the procedure prescribed for trial of offences under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is the procedural law of the country is made applicable to the extent it is required for trial of offences under the Act, to meet the constitutional requirement keeping in mind the supremacy of the fundamental right guaranteed to every person under Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, it cannot be said that by prescribing such procedure the very purpose of the enactment is defeated. In this regard it is worthwhile to notice what the Apex Court has said, about maintaining a proper balance between individual liberty and the interest of the public and the state, while issuing warrants. 50. In the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and another vs. State of Uttaranchal and others (2007 AIR SCW 6679) the Apex Court has observed as under:- “49 Civilized countries have recognized that liberty is the most precious of all the human rights. The American declaration of Independence 1776, French Declaration of the Rights of Men and the Citizen 1789, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 all speak with one voice – liberty is the natural and inalienable right of every human being. Similarity, Article 21 of our Constitution proclaims that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 50. The issuance of non-bailable warrants involves interference with personal liberty. Arrest and imprisonment means deprivation of the most precious right of an individual. Therefore, the courts have to be extremely careful before issuing non-bailable warrants. 51. 50. The issuance of non-bailable warrants involves interference with personal liberty. Arrest and imprisonment means deprivation of the most precious right of an individual. Therefore, the courts have to be extremely careful before issuing non-bailable warrants. 51. Just as liberty is precious for an individual so is the interest of the society in maintaining law and order. Both are extremely important for the survival of a civilized society. Sometimes in the target interest of the Public and the State it becomes absolutely imperative to curtail freedom of an individual for a certain period, only then the non-bailable warrants should be issued. When non-bailable warrants should be issued. 52. Non-bailable warrants should be issued to bring a person to court when summons of bailable warrants would be unlikely to have the desired result. This could be when: it is reasonable to believe that the person will not voluntarily appear in court; or the police authorities are unable to find the person to serve him with a summon; or it is considered that the person could harm someone if not placed into custody immediately. 53. As far as possible, if the court is of the opinion that a summon will suffice in getting the appearance of the accused in the court, the summon or the bailable warrants should be preferred. The warrants either bailable or non-bailable should never be issued without proper scrutiny of facts and complete application of mind, due to the extremely serious consequences and ramifications which ensue on issuance of warrants. The court must very carefully examine whether the Criminal Complaint or FIR has not been filed with the oblique motive. 54. In complaint cases, at the first instance the court should direct serving of the summons along with the copy of the complaints. If the accused seem to be avoiding the summons, the court, in the second instance should issue bailable warrant. In the third instance, when the court is fully satisfied that the accused is avoiding the court proceeding intentionality, the process of issuance of the non-bailable warrant should be resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we caution courts at the first and second instance to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants. 55. The power being discretionary must be exercised judiciously with extreme care and caution. The Court should properly balance both personal liberty and societal interest before issuing warrants. Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we caution courts at the first and second instance to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants. 55. The power being discretionary must be exercised judiciously with extreme care and caution. The Court should properly balance both personal liberty and societal interest before issuing warrants. There cannot be any stratt-jacket formula for insurance of warrants but as a general rule, unless an accused is charged with the commission of an offence of a heinous crime and it is feared that he is likely to tamper or destroy the evidence or is likely to evade the process of law, issuance of non-bailable warrants should be avoided. 56. The Court should try to maintain proper balance between individual liberty and the interest of the public and the State while issuing non-bailable warrant”. 51. In this background if we look at the impugned orders in all these writ petitions, there is substance in the apprehension in the mind of the petitioner, and justification for approaching this Court, in view of the procedure which is actually followed by the Commissions and Forums. The cause for such apprehension is the two circulars issued by the State Commission. 52. Two circulars issued by the Karnataka State Consumer Redressal Forum dated 24.8.2005 and 26.10.2005 are placed on record. In the circular bearing No. 11/2003-04 dated 24.8.2005 instructions are given regarding how applications filed under Section 25 and 27 of the Act have to be dealt with. It is stated therein that, whether the application is filed under Sections 25 or 27 a show causes notice is to be issued to the judgment debtor, If the judgment debtor does not appear before the Commission within 15 days therefrom or he does not file any objections or do not comply with the order passed by the Forum, then a non-bailable warrant is to be issued against such persons, secure his presence and thereafter proceed to pass orders under Section 27 of the Act. In the circular No. 11/2003-04 dated 26.10.2005, in reply to a query by the President of the District Forum of Bellary, seeking clarification, as to whether the procedure prescribed under the code or Civil Procedure to be followed while dealing with applications under Section 25 and 27 of the Act, it has been stated that if the order of the Forum cannot be executed under Section 25 of the Act and if the complainant wishes to avail the benefit of Section 27, a non-bailable warrant is to be issued and served through Police Superintendent of the District or other higher police officials and the judgment debtor is to be arrested and brought before the Forum and thereafter orders are to passed under Section 27 of the Act. It was made clear that while dealing with Execution Petitions, what is to be followed is only the principles of natural justice and the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure or Civil Procedure Code need not be followed. 53. From the aforesaid portions in the circulars it is clear that the State Commission has sent a circular to all the District Commissions making it clear that while dealing with an execution petition under the Act for non-compliance of the order passed by the District Forum all that they have to do is to follow the principles of natural justice as a procedure before orders are passed under Section 27 of the Act. Further, it categorically states the procedure prescribed under the Criminal Procedure is not to be strictly followed. Therefore, none of the District Forums as well as the State Forum have followed the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure as contemplated under Section 27(2) and (3) of the Act while passing the impugned orders. Even when the appeals are preferred against the order of the District Forums, the State Forum has dismissed such appeals. 54. In view of the circulars issued by the State Commission making it clear that, it is not necessary to follow the procedure prescribed under the Code in trial of offences under the Act, all the impugned order passed in these Writ Petitions are passed without following the procedure prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 54. In view of the circulars issued by the State Commission making it clear that, it is not necessary to follow the procedure prescribed under the Code in trial of offences under the Act, all the impugned order passed in these Writ Petitions are passed without following the procedure prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. In the circumstance, without going into the merits of the impugned orders, it is necessary to quash all these orders as it is contrary to the procedure prescribed under Section 27(2) and (3) of the Act, Accordingly, all these impugned orders are quashed. 55. As already enormous time is spent which has resulted in delay, in the facts of this case, I deem it proper to direct all the petitioners before the Court to appear before the respective Forums and Commissions which has issued warrants against them on 3rd August, 2009 without waiting for any notices, summonses or warrants. On such appearance/non-appearance the Forums/Commissions shall proceed with the trial of an offence under the Act in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, keeping in mind the observations made in this order. 56. Before parting with this case, I would like to place on record the valuable assistance rendered by learned Senior Counsel Sri. B.V. Acharya and Sri S.G. Bhagawan, as amicus curiae and the young advocates, who represented their parties, in deciding a constitutional issue of public importance. 57. Hence, the Order (i) The writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as amended by Act 62/2002 are hereby dismissed, upholding the vires of the said provision. (ii) The impugned orders challenged in all these Petitions are quashed, only on the ground that while passing the orders the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are not complied with. (iii) All the cases are remitted back to the respective Forums and the Commission, with a direction to try the offence in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure read with sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 27 of the Act, on merits, in the light of the observations made in this order. (iv) All the writ petitioner are directed to appear before the respective Forums and the Commission on 3rd August 2009, without waiting for any notice/summons. (iv) All the writ petitioner are directed to appear before the respective Forums and the Commission on 3rd August 2009, without waiting for any notice/summons. The High Court registry is directed to send a copy of this order forthwith to all the District Forums, as well as to the State Commission, for guidance and compliance.