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Gauhati High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 426 (GAU)

Nagchong Kipgen v. State of Manipur

2009-06-19

NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2009
JUDGMENT Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. Six writ petitions, viz. W.P.(C) No. 406 of 2005, W.P.(C) No. 488 of 2005, W.P.(C) No. 489 of 2005, W.P.(C) No. 492 of 2005, W.P.(C) No. 557 of 2007 and W.P.(C) No. 558 of 2007 challenging the same impugned order dated 4.3.2005 issued by the Government of Manipur canceling the regularization orders of the 24 Assistant Inspector of Schools (for short "AI of Schools") and also W.P.(C) No. 371 of 2002, challenging the impugned order of the Government of Manipur dated 13.7.2001 canceling the order of the regularization of the AI of schools on the similar question of fact and law, as prayed for by the learned Counsel for both the parties, were taken up for joint hearing for disposal by a common judgment and order. 2. Heard Mr. H.S. Paonam, and Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Counsels appearing for the writ petitioners as well as Mr. S. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondents. 3. In order to avoid the repetition of similar facts, the learned Counsels appearing for both the parties, in the course of hearing of the writ petitions, opted to refer to the facts, leading to the filing of W.P.(C) No. 406 of 2005, and accordingly, W.P.(C) No. 406 of 2005 was taken up as a leading case for the purpose of consideration of the facts. The facts, in a nutshell, of the petitioners' case as well as the State respondents are noted. 4. The writ petitioners initially joined the service of the Government of Manipur as graduate teachers and had successfully completed B.Ed. course and as such they are all trained teachers. After working a considerable length of service as graduate teachers, the authority, in order to meet the exigency of service, initially allowed the writ petitioners to work as AI of schools against the available vacancies. The service of the petitioner No. 1 in W.P.(C) No. 406 of 2005 was utilized as AI of school in the office of the DDO, Kangpokpi vide order dated 3.5.1991. By a subsequent order dated 26.8.1991, the utilization of the service of the petitioner as AI of school was partially modified by issuing an order of transfer and posting as in-charge AI of school. The petitioner No. 2 of W.P.(C) No. 406 of 2005 was also transferred and posted for utilizing his service as AI of school. By a subsequent order dated 26.8.1991, the utilization of the service of the petitioner as AI of school was partially modified by issuing an order of transfer and posting as in-charge AI of school. The petitioner No. 2 of W.P.(C) No. 406 of 2005 was also transferred and posted for utilizing his service as AI of school. In the same manner the petitioner No. 3 of W.P.(C) No. 406 of 2005 was transferred and posted for utilizing his service as AI of school by an order dated 31.7.1991. It is stated that by the subsequent order of the authority, the petitioners had been allowed to enjoy the pay and allowances attributable to the posts of AI of school with effect from the date of their joining. The petitioners and Ors. in-charge AI of school, filed a number of writ petitions including W.P.(C) No. 954 of 2001 before this Court for giving a suitable direction for regularization/absorption of their services as AI of schools. The said W.P.(C) No. 954 of 2001 was allowed by an order dated 12.6.2001 whereby directing the State respondents to consider case of the writ petitioners for absorption of their services in the posts of AI of school in terms of the related Promotion Rules/Service Rules within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the orders and that the then service condition of the writ petitioners as AI of schools should not be disturbed by the respondents and they shall be paid their monthly salaries regularly. For easy reference, the operative-portion of the judgment and order of this Court dated 12.6.2001 passed in W.P.(C) No. 954 of 2001 is quoted hereunder: In view of the above position, these present 5 (five) petitioners should also get same benefits of it as they have a right for consideration for their absorption in their service in the post of AI of schools. Accordingly, I direct the respondents/authority concerned to consider the case of these five writ petitioners in terms of the related Promotion Rules/Service Rules within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order for regularization or absorption of their service in the post of AI of schools and it is also made clear that the present service condition and status of the writ petitioners as AI of schools should not be disturbed by the respondents and they shall be paid their monthly salaries regularly. 5. The State respondents preferred an appeal being W.A. No. 71 of 2002 (Principal Seat)/W.A. No. 01 of 2002 (Imphal Bench) against the said judgment and order of this Court dated 12.6.2001 passed in W.P.(C) No. 954 of 2001. The Division Bench of this Court passed an order dated 19.2.2002 in W.A. No. 71 of 2002 staying only the operation of the judgment of this Court (learned single Judge) in the judgment and order dated 12.6.2001 that "the petitioners should be allowed to continue as AI of schools and they should be paid their monthly salaries regularly." This Court in one of the writ petitions filed by the in-charge AIs of schools for a direction for regularization of their services as AI of schools passed an order to the effect that "if the petitioners are eligible as per the Recruitment Rules, their cases for regular promotion may be considered along with other eligible and similarly situated persons. This may be done early and also subject to availability of posts." 6. In supersession of all the previous orders issued in this regard and in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Manipur made the rules regulating the method of recruitment to the post of Assistant Inspector of Schools in the Education Department, Manipur called 'Education Department (Assistant Inspector of Schools) Recruitment Rules, 1976 vide Notification No. 1/67/76-S , Imphal, the 4th November, 1976. Under the said Recruitment Rules, 1976, the post of Assistant Inspector of school is a selection post, methods of recruitment are 50% by promotion and 50% by direct recruitment. Teachers having at least 10 years administrative/Class-III teaching experience in the case of the Matriculate trained in NT/CT/Sr. enjoying the pay scale of Rs. Under the said Recruitment Rules, 1976, the post of Assistant Inspector of school is a selection post, methods of recruitment are 50% by promotion and 50% by direct recruitment. Teachers having at least 10 years administrative/Class-III teaching experience in the case of the Matriculate trained in NT/CT/Sr. enjoying the pay scale of Rs. 240-390/- or the teachers having at least 7 years teaching experience and/or administrative experience in the case of intermediate enjoying the pay scale of Rs. 260-500/- and in the case of graduate teachers having 5 years administrative/teaching experience enjoying the pay scale not less than Rs. 260-500/- are eligible for appointment by promotion to the post of AI of schools. Under the Recruitment Rules, 1976, the appointment by promotion to the posts of AI of schools should be on the recommendation of the duly constituted DPC. As such under the Recruitment Rules, 1976, the method of promotion to the post of AI of schools is on the recommendation of the duly constituted DPC. 7. The petitioners also stated that pursuant to the directions of this Court in the said judgment and order for considering their case for absorption of their services in the posts of AI of schools in terms of the related Recruitment Rules had regularized their services as AI of schools by relaxing the portion of the related Recruitment Rules, i.e., "on recommendation by the duly constituted DPC" vide order of the Governor of Manipur being No. 12(HC)/156/2001-SE(S)Pt., Imphal, the 26th February, 2003 (Annexure-A/12 to the W.P.(C) No. 406 of 2005), which reads as follows: GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR SECRETARIAT : EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (SCHOOL SECTION) ORDERS BY THE GOVERNOR : MANIPUR Imphal, the 26th February, 2003 No. 12(HC)/156/2001-SE(S)Pt. : Whereas, the Hon'ble High Court in W.P.(C) No. 2/2003, W.P.(C) No. 954/2001, W.P.(C) No. 1044/2001, W.P.(C) No. 1045/2001 and W.P.(C) No. 1046/2001, have directed to consider the case of the petitioners (in-charge AI's) namely, (i) Shri S. Tomchou Singh, (ii) Shri S. Prafullo Singh, (iii) Shri Y. Shantikumar Singh, (iv) Shri L. Brajamani Sharma, (v) Kh. Ibotombi Singh, (vi) Shri L. Somorjit Singh, (vii) Mrs. Ng. Ibotombi Singh, (vi) Shri L. Somorjit Singh, (vii) Mrs. Ng. Kipgen, (viii) Shri S. Biren Singh, (ix) Shri L. Chandrakumar Singh, (x) Shri L. Dilip Meetei and (x) Shri S. Ranbir Singh for regularization or absorption of their services in the posts of AI's of schools in terms of Service Rules/Promotion Rules and also to consider for regular promotion along with other eligible and similarly situated persons if the petitioners are eligible as per the Recruitment Rules. 2. And whereas, the petitioners have been working as AI's on in-charge/officiating capacity against the regular/substantive vacancies which were available before the new R/R of AI came into force. In other words, the vacancies against which the petitioners were appointed as AI's on in-charge/officiating capacities were old vacancies which are governed by the (old) R/R of AI of dated 4.10.1976. 3. And whereas, all the petitioners have been allowed to enjoy the pay scales of AI of schools as per Court's order. 4. And whereas, Department of Personnel has been consulted on the exemption of requirement of DPC in connection with the regularization/absorption as AI's, and they have opined that AD may take its own view to exercise the "power to relax" clause for exemption of DPC in question considering the provision of R/R of AI of 4.10.1976 and legal proceedings that may be initiated. 5. And whereas, as per R/R of A-1 of 4.10.1976, AD is competent to do exemption from any provision of the Recruitment Rules. 6. And whereas, other 3 (three) similarly situated persons namely, Shri L. Chourajit, A. Jamini Devi and Shri Y. In-aocha Singh have been regularized as AI's without holding DPC for which also the Hon'ble High Court still stands for the petitioners. 7. And whereas, the petitioners are found eligible as per R/R of AI and they all are similarly situated since they all obtained similar orders from the Hon'ble High Court on the mater. Now, considering the above positions and in compliance with Hon'ble High Court's order stated above, the Governor of Manipur is pleased to order the regularization of the petitioners as stated at Para-1 above to the post(s) of AI's of Schools. By the orders and in the name of the Governor: Sd/- (Ch. Birendra Singh) Commissioner (Edn/S) Government of Manipur. 8. Now, considering the above positions and in compliance with Hon'ble High Court's order stated above, the Governor of Manipur is pleased to order the regularization of the petitioners as stated at Para-1 above to the post(s) of AI's of Schools. By the orders and in the name of the Governor: Sd/- (Ch. Birendra Singh) Commissioner (Edn/S) Government of Manipur. 8. The state respondents issued show cause notices vide Memorandum dated 28.6.2003 to the petitioners as to why the said orders of the Governor of Manipur dated 26.2.2002 for regularizing their services should not be cancelled. In response to that show cause notices dated 28.6.2003, the petitioners filed the show cause statement on 17.7.2003 and 18.7.2003 explaining the circumstances leading to the regularizing of their services as AI of school after due consultation of the Department of Personnel, Government of Manipur as the posts of AI of schools being a Class-Ill post as per the Recruitment Rules, 1976. The Government of Manipur after considering the show cause statement of the petitioners and also taking into consideration of the circumstances leading to the issuance of the said orders of the Governor of Manipur dated 26.2.2003 for regularizing the service of the petitioners as AI of schools without holding DPC and also the orders of this Court for considering their case for regularizing, had passed the orders (impugned orders) being No. 12(HC)/4/2003-SE(S), Imphal, the 4th March, 2005 for cancelling the regularization order of the Governor of Manipur dated 26.2.2003. For easy reference, the said order of the Governor of Manipur dated 4.3.2005 (impugned orders) (Annexure-A/27 to the W.P,(C) No. 406 of 2005) is quoted hereunder: GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR SECRETARIATE : EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (EDUCATION SECTION) ORDERS BY THE GOVERNOR : MANIPUR Imphal, the 4th March, 2005 No. 12(HC)/4/2003-SE(S) : Whereas the Graduate Teachers and Head Masters of Primary Schools listed in column 2 of the Annexure hereto where allowed to hold the charges of Assistant Inspectors of Schools (AIS) without promotion to the post of AI with effect from the dates indicated against their names in column 5 of the Annexure to meet the exigencies of service; And whereas the said i/c AIS filed Writ Petition (C) Nos. 1047/2001, 2/2003. 1047/2001, 2/2003. 954/2001, 1044/2001, 1046/2001, 426/2003 and 371/2002 before the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court for issue of direction to the Government for the regularization of their service in the posts of AIS; And whereas the Hon'ble High Court disposed of the said writ petitions by order passed on different dates directing the Government to consider the case of the petitioners for regular promotion to the posts of AIS along with other eligible/similarly situated persons in terms of the related Promotion Rules/Service Rules; And whereas under the related Promotion/Service Rules promotion to the posts of AIS is to be made by selection from amongst eligible Graduate Teachers and Head Masters of Primary Schools within the Zone of consideration on the recommendation of a competent DPC. And whereas the said i/c AIS have been regularized in the posts of AIS under the Government orders indicated in column 6 of the Annexure purportedly in compliance with the orders passed in the said writ petitions but without considering the case of other eligible persons within the zone of consideration for promotion to the post of AIS and without the recommendation of a competent DPC; and accordingly in violation of the related Promotion/Service Rides and the orders passed by the Hon'ble High Court in the said Writ Petitions; And whereas the said AIS regularized as above, were required to submit written explanation as to why their regularization order should not be cancelled for violation of the related Promotion/Service Rules and the orders of the Hon'ble High Court passed in the said Writ Petitions vide Government Memorandum No. 12(HC)/154/2003-SE(S) dated 28.6.2003. And whereas the written explanations submitted by the said AIS in response to the said Government Memorandum have been carefully examined and found unsatisfactory; Now, therefore, the Governor of Manipur hereby cancels the regularization orders of the said 24 AIS shown in column 6 of the Annexure, provided that they shall continue to hold the charge of the posts of AIS till the posts are filled up on regular basis in accordance with the related Promotion/Service Rules. By orders and in the name of the Governor: Sd/- (P. Bharat Singh) Commissioner (Education/s) Government of Manipur. 9. Being aggrieved, the petitioners and others filed the present writ petitions challenging the impugned order dated 4.3.2005. By orders and in the name of the Governor: Sd/- (P. Bharat Singh) Commissioner (Education/s) Government of Manipur. 9. Being aggrieved, the petitioners and others filed the present writ petitions challenging the impugned order dated 4.3.2005. In the writ petitions, inter alia, grounds for challenging the impugned order dated 4.3.2005 are that (i) the regularization of the service of the petitioners as AI of schools were effected in compliance of the High Court's orders in terms of the Recruitment Rules, 1976 by dispensing with the DPC after due consultation with the Department of Personnel, Government of Manipur by relaxing the portion of the Recruitment Rules, 1976 "on the recommendation of the duly constituted DPC"; (ii) even if dispensing with the DPC by the administrative department in regularizing the service of the petitioners as AI of schools was in violation of the Recruitment Rules, the petitioners cannot be victimized for the fault and irregularly committed by the authority that too after a gap of considerable period of about two years; and (ii) dispensing with the DPC in regularizing the service of the petitioners as AI of schools was in relaxation of the portion of the Recruitment Rules, 1976, i.e., "promotion to the post of AI of school will be on the recommendation of the duly constituted DPC." 10. The State respondents filed their affidavit-in-opposition opposing the case of the writ petitioners. The State respondents filed their affidavit-in-opposition opposing the case of the writ petitioners. In the affidavit-in-opposition the respondents stated that none of the orders of this Court directed the State respondents to regularize the service of the writ petitioners as AI of schools in violation of the relevant Recruitment Rules, rather this Court directed the State respondents to consider the case of the petitioners for regularizing of their service as AI of schools in terms of the related Recruitment Rules, that the service of the petitioners as in-charge AI of schools had been regularized without considering their seniority position in the feeder posts and that Office Memorandum dated 22.8.1994 for regularizing the ad hoc service of the direct employees is not applicable to the case of the writ petitioners and also that they are not within the zone of consideration for appointment by promotion to the 27 posts of AI of schools in the promotion quota, and also that there was no order of the Governor of Manipur for relaxation of the portion of the Recruitment Rules, 1976, i.e., "the promotion will be on the recommendation of the duly constituted DPC" for regularizing the service of the petitioners and in-charge AI of schools. For easy reference, the relevant portion of the affidavit in opposition filed by the State respondents are quoted hereunder: (i) That, during the year 1989 to 1996, about 107 Graduate Teachers/Headmasters of Primary Schools were allowed to function as in-charge AI of schools to meet the exigencies of services without considering inter-se-seniority against the 82 sanctioned posts of which now retained only 54 posts after down sizing and right sizing of posts. (ii) That, out of the above said 107 in-charge AI of schools 27 in-charge AI of schools filed different writ petitions praying inter alia for regularization of their services to the post of AI of schools and same were disposed of by Hon'ble Court on different dates directing the State respondents to consider the case of the petitioners for regular promotion to the post of AI of schools along with other eligible/similarly situated persons in terms of the related promotion rules/service rules. For better appreciation of the Hon'ble Court, the operative portion of one of the Hon'ble Court's order is reproduced hereinbelow. For better appreciation of the Hon'ble Court, the operative portion of one of the Hon'ble Court's order is reproduced hereinbelow. If the petitioners are eligible as per the RR, their case for regular promotion may be considered along with other eligible and similarly situated persons. This may be done early and also subject to the availability of posts. Purportedly, in compliance of the aforesaid direction of the Hon'ble Court, the services of the writ petitioners were regularized without considering other eligible teachers who are within the zone of consideration for promotion to the post of AI of schools and also without the recommendation of any regular DPC. (iii) That, there is a Recruitment Rules for the post of AI of schools which was published on 4.11.1976 (Annexure-A/14 to the writ petition). As per the 1976 RR the of post of AI of schools is to be filled up from two sources i.e. 50% by promotion and another 50% by direct recruitment. The aforesaid 1976 RR has been superseded by another RR of 2001 which was published in the Official Gazette on 4.1.2002. As per the aforesaid RR of 2001, the posts of AI of schools is to be filled up only by promotion in the ratio of 5:1 from Graduate Teachers and Head Masters of Primary Schools i.e., 83% from Graduate Teachers 17% from Headmasters of Primary Schools (Annexure-A/15 to the writ petition). (iv) That, three teachers who have been allowed to hold the post of AI of schools on in-charge basis, filed Civil Rule No. 949 of 1994 before the High Court praying inter alia for a direction to regularize their services as AI of Schools. The Hon'ble High Court by an order dated 29.1.2001, was pleased to dispose of with a direction to the respondents to consider their cases in terms of promotional rules. Purportedly, in compliance of the aforesaid direction of the Hon'ble Court, Government issued an order on 23.5.2001 thereby regularizing the in-charge services of the aforesaid three teachers to the post of AI of schools under the Office Memorandum dated 22.8.1994. True copy of the O.M. dated 22.8.1994 is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-C/1. Purportedly, in compliance of the aforesaid direction of the Hon'ble Court, Government issued an order on 23.5.2001 thereby regularizing the in-charge services of the aforesaid three teachers to the post of AI of schools under the Office Memorandum dated 22.8.1994. True copy of the O.M. dated 22.8.1994 is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-C/1. (v) That, by an order dated 13.7.2001, Government cancelled the aforesaid regularization order dated 23.5.2001 on coming to know that O.M. dated 22.8.1994 is not applicable in the case of the aforesaid teachers as they were holding the post of AI of schools on in-charge basis. As the order dated 23.5.2001 has been issued in pursuance of misleading notes made by the then OSD (Legal) of Education(s) Department and as such the concerned OSD (Legal) was placed under suspension vide order dated 19.7.2001. True copies of the orders dated 13.7.2001 and dated 19.7.2001 are annexed hereto and marked as Annexures-C/2 and C/3 respectively. (vi) That, aforesaid cancellation order dated 13.7.2001 came to be challenged by the said teachers in W.P.(C) No. 371 of 2002 and the same is now pending before the Hon'ble Court. (vii) That, in pursuance of the aforesaid order of regularization dated 23.5.2001, many cases have been filed by the in-charge AI of schools and the Hon'ble Court passed orders for consideration of their cases. In pursuance of the direction of the Hon'ble Court passed in different writ petitions, Government regularized the in-charge services of as many as 24 (twenty four) AI of Schools. (viii) That, subsequently many cases have been filed by the teachers either who are holding the post of AI of schools on in-charge basis or who are eligible to be considered for promotion to the post of AI of school under the Recruitment Rules. Thereafter, the Government re-examined the matter again and after careful examination of the matter and in consultation with the Law Department and Department of Personnel, Government of Manipur, cancelled those regularization order of 24 (twenty four) AI of schools vide common order dated 4.3.2005 by giving show cause notices to the respective teachers. This cancellation order came to be challenged in the present writ petition and other writ petitions. 11. Mr. This cancellation order came to be challenged in the present writ petition and other writ petitions. 11. Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in order to substantiate the case of the petitioners had placed heavy reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in (i) Roshan Deen v. Preetilal, (2002) 1 SCC 100 ; (ii) Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P. and Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 188 , (iii) State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ram Kumar and Ors., (2002) 9 SCC 703, (iv) Narendra Chandra and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1986) 2 SCC 157 , (v) State of Manipur and Anr. v. R.K. Manikanta Singh and Ors., (2003) 12 SCC 511 and (vi) Central Diary Farm v. Glindia Ltd. and Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 55 . 12. To the contra, Mr. S. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondents in support of the case of the State respondents had placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in (i) Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Anr. v. T.K. Suryanarayan and Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 766 , (ii) Union of India and Anr. v. Narendra Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 750 , (iii) Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr., (2002) 3 SCC 496 , (iv) Suraj Parkash Gupta and Ors. v. State of J & K and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 561 and also the decision of this Court in Om Prakash Pthark v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (2006) 1 GLT 28 and M. Laitphlang (Dr.)(Ms.) and Ors. v. State of Meghalaya and Ors., 2004 (1) GLT 308. 13. Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned Counsel for the petitioners relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Roshan Deen case (supra) contended that the purpose of the power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is to advance justice and not to thwart it. Even where justice is the by product by an erroneous interpretation of law, the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law. The fact in that case spelt out in para Nos. 6 and 7 of the SCC was that the appellant filed an application dated 12.3.1999 for withdrawing the petition, which was filed for claiming compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs plus medical expenses of Rs. The fact in that case spelt out in para Nos. 6 and 7 of the SCC was that the appellant filed an application dated 12.3.1999 for withdrawing the petition, which was filed for claiming compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs plus medical expenses of Rs. 2 lakhs in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and it was stated that the application filed for withdrawal of the claim petition was not signed by the appellant and as such the Commissioner recalled the order by referring to the Section 17 of the said Act. The said order of the Commissioner was challenged by the respondents by filing petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Single Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition by setting aside the said order of the Commissioner on the ground that no fraud had been practiced upon the Court, rather the intention of the Roshan , Deen, appellant, had become bad. Subsequently, he wanted to withdraw his compromise which is not permissible. The Apex Court in para No. 12 of the SCC in Roshan Deen case (supra) held as follows: 12. We are greatly disturbed by the insensitivity reflected in the impugned judgment rendered by the learned single Judge in a case where judicial mind would be tempted to utilize all possible legal measures to impart justice to a man mutilated so outrageously by his cruel destiny. The High Court non-suited him in exercise of a supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution. Time and again this Court has reminded that the power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it (vide State of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao, (1984) 2 SCC 673 : AR 1984 SC 1401). The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The lookout of the High Court is, therefore, no merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the by-product of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law. If justice became the by-product of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law. It is clear that there was no violation of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in passing the order by the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation recalling the earlier order for allowing the claim petition to dispose of on withdrawal. In that given fact, the Apex Court held that if justice became the by-product of an erroneous view of law, the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law. 14. Mr. Paonam, learned Counsel by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Sharma Transport case (supra) contended that the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel' has been evolved by the Courts on the principles of equity to avoid injustice. He further contended that the State respondents are stopped from issuing the impugned order dated 4.3.2005 for cancelling the regularizing orders in the given case. On close perusal of the judgment and orders of the Apex Court in Sharma Transport case (supra), this Court is of the considered view that the ratio decendi of the decision of the Apex Court in Sharma Transport case (supra) will not help the case of the present petitioners inasmuch as in para No. 24 of the SCC in Sharma Transport case (supra) the Apex Court held that promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law. Para No. 24 of the SCC in Sharma Transport case (supra) read as follows: 24. It is equally settled law that the promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by lata or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public authority to make. Doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield place to the equity, if larger public interest so requires, and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it. The Court on satisfaction would not, in those circumstances raise the equity in favour of the persons to whom a promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or the public authority. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1991) 1 SCC 761 : AIR 1991 SC 14 , STO v. Shree Durga Oil Mills, (1998) 1 SCC 572 : (1997) 7 Scale 726 and Ashok Kumar Maheshwari (Dr) v. State of U.P., (1998) 2 SCC 502 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 592. Above being the position, the plea relating to promissory estoppel has no substance. 15. Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned Counsel for the petitioners by relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Ram Kumar case (supra) and the Central Diary Farm case (supra) strenuously contended that the administrative order of the Government cannot overrule a judgment. Para No. 5 of the SCC in Ram Kumar case (supra) reads as follows: 5. This order dated 8.3.2000 was not brought to the notice of this Court on 10.4.2000 and apart from that, it is not known under what authority the Government can refuse to pay back wages etc. by way of an administrative order when the High Court order dated 20.5.1999 was in full force. By an administrative order the Government cannot overrule a judgment. Such an administrative order is no ground for review. Para No. 18 of the SCC in Central Diary Farm (supra) reads as follows: 18. In the earlier judgment of the High Court (W.P. No. 16526 of 1988 decided on 14.10.1998), the power of the State Government to fix the prices of milk and milk products under Section 15 of the Act was recognized and it was held that the Additional Milk Commissioner as the licensing authority had no power to interfere in the matter of fixation of price of milk and milk products. The operative part of the judgment in the earlier writ petition, however, settled the controversy between the parties that the prices of supplies by the respondent company were to be regulated by the directions made by the High Court in the said writ petition. The earlier judgment in the writ petition between the same parties (supra) has attained finality. The operative part of the judgment in the earlier writ petition, however, settled the controversy between the parties that the prices of supplies by the respondent company were to be regulated by the directions made by the High Court in the said writ petition. The earlier judgment in the writ petition between the same parties (supra) has attained finality. The written directions issued in the earlier judgment (supra) have been quoted by us above. Those binding directions of the Court could not have been nullified by invoking the power of the State of issuing price fixation notification under Section 15 of the Milk Act. The issuance of the impugned notification has rightly been held by the High Court to be an attempt to nullify the directions made by the High Court in its earlier judgment. Direction (ii) in the operative part required determination of the price of cream/paneer by an agreement and in the absence of any agreement on the basis of price payable by cooperative societies to purchasers with overhead charges. The dispute about overpayment was directed to be resolved by a committee to be appointed by the two companies comprising officers of the two organizations and the high officials designated under the Milk Act. The statutory power under Section 15 of the Milk Act of issuing notification for price fixation could not have been invoked by the State to bypass or commit breach of the directions made by the High Court in the earlier writ petition. The High Court was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that the issuance of notification under Section 15 of the Act was an exercise done for oblique purpose and to somehow get over the judgment of the High Court in the earlier writ petition. The notification was ineffectual to frustrate the agreement and settlements reached on price fixation through mutual negotiations between the authorized representatives of the two companies and the authorized officers of the State. 16. This Court is in complete agreement with the proposition of law made by Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned Counsel for the petitioners, by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Kumar case (supra) and Central Diary Farm case (supra) that an administrative order cannot overrule a judgment. 16. This Court is in complete agreement with the proposition of law made by Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned Counsel for the petitioners, by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Kumar case (supra) and Central Diary Farm case (supra) that an administrative order cannot overrule a judgment. In the present case in hand, there was no judgment and order of this Court directing the State respondents to regularize the service of the petitioners in violation of the law, i.e., Recruitment Rules, 1976 made by the Governor of Manipur in exercise of power conferred by proviso to Article309 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Kumar case (supra) and Central Diary Farm case (supra) will not help the case of the petitioners. 17. At the outset, Mr. S. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate for the State respondents by relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Indian Council of Agricultural Research case (supra) contended that if an erroneous promotion is given by wrong interpreting the rules, the employer cannot be prevented from applying the rules rightly in correcting the mistake, it may cause hardship to the employee but the Court of law cannot ignore the statutory rules. Para No. 8 of the SCC in Indian Council of Agricultural Research (supra) reads as follows: 8. We are, however, unable to accept the submission made by the learned Counsel appearing in both these SLPs. Even if in some cases, erroneous promotions had been given contrary to the said Service Rules and consequently such employees have been allowed to enjoy the fruits of improper promotion, an employee cannot base his claim for promotion contrary to the statutory service rules in law Courts. Incorrect promotion either given erroneously by the Department by misreading the said Service Rules or such promotion given pursuant to judicial orders contrary to Service Rules cannot be a ground to claim erroneous promotion by perpetrating infringement of statutory service rules. In a Court of law, employees cannot be permitted to contend that the Service Rules made on 1.10.1975 should not be adhered to because in some cases erroneous promotions had been given. The statutory rules must be applied strictly in terms of the interpretation of rules as indicated in the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Court in Khetra Mohan case. The statutory rules must be applied strictly in terms of the interpretation of rules as indicated in the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Court in Khetra Mohan case. When the said Service Rules were introduced w.e.f. 1.10.1975, one-time exercise was required to be made to decide the fitment of the employees in different grades. Except in case of fitment in Grade T-l-3 of Category 1 and consequential accelerated promotion to Grade T-2-3 of Category 2 on the basis of qualification in no other case accelerated promotion on the basis of educational qualification is permissible. If relaxation of educational qualification is made effective on the date of enforcement of the said Service Rules it will be a case of review of initial fitment. In all other cases, promotion is to be given in accordance with the said Service Rules and not otherwise. The respondents in these appeals were not entitled to get initial fitment in Grade T-l-3. As a matter of fact, they got initial fitment in grade lower than Grade T-l-3 of Category 1. Therefore, they are not entitled to accelerated promotion on the basis of educational qualification consequent upon the initial fitment in Grade T-l-3 of Category 1. The impugned decisions of the Tribunal, therefore, cannot be sustained. 18. This Court in order to ascertain as to whether the State respondents had passed the order for relaxing the portion of the Recruitment Rules, 1976, i.e., "promotion shall be on the recommendation of the duly constituted DPC", in regularizing the service of the petitioners as AI of schools had directed Mr. S. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate to produce the relevant files. Accordingly, Mr. Nepolean had placed the relevant files of the Government of Manipur, Secretariat, Education(s) Department being No. 12(D)/275/94-SE(S). This Court had carefully perused the notings in the file and also the materials available in the file and had found that there was no order of the Government of Manipur for relaxing the said portion of the Recruitment Rules, 1976 for regularizing the service of the petitioners as AI of Schools. Para 5 of the said Recruitment Rules, 1976 reads as follows: These rules shall be effective with immediate effect.-Provided that the Governor , of Manipur, if satisfied that there are special grounds for so ordering exempt any person from the operating of this rules. Para 5 of the said Recruitment Rules, 1976 reads as follows: These rules shall be effective with immediate effect.-Provided that the Governor , of Manipur, if satisfied that there are special grounds for so ordering exempt any person from the operating of this rules. As stated above, there is no order of the Governor of Manipur for relaxing or exempting, by giving special reasons/grounds, the petitioners from the operation of the Recruitment Rules, 1976. 19. Mr. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Narendra Singh case (supra) contended that mistakes are mistakes and they can always be corrected by following due process of law and further contended that if there be any relaxation of any provision of the Recruitment Rules due to certain mistake it can be corrected by following the process of law. He further contended that as there was mistake in regularizing the service of the petitioners as AI of schools who were not even in the zone of consideration in violation of the provisions of Recruitment Rules, 1976, without considering the other eligible persons, the State respondents issued the impugned order dated 4.3.2005 by following the due process of law, i.e. after giving show cause notice to the petitioners to file their show cause statement. Para Nos. 32 and 34 of the SCC of Narendra Singh case (supra) reads as follows: 32. It is true that the mistake was of the Department and the respondent was promoted though he was not eligible and qualified. But, we cannot countenance the submission of the respondent that the mistake cannot be corrected. Mistakes are mistakes and they can always be corrected. Mistakes are mistakes and they can always be corrected by following due process of law. In ICAR v. T.K. Suryanarayan it was held that if erroneous promotion is given by wrongly interpreting the rules, the employer cannot be prevented from applying the rules rightly and in correcting the mistakes. It may cause hardship to the employees but a Court of law cannot ignore statutory rules. 34. True it is that before such an action is taken and a person is actually reverted, he must be given and opportunity to show cause why the proposed action should not be taken. He may be able to satisfy the authorities that there was no such mistake. 34. True it is that before such an action is taken and a person is actually reverted, he must be given and opportunity to show cause why the proposed action should not be taken. He may be able to satisfy the authorities that there was no such mistake. But even otherwise, principles of natural justice and fair play require giving of such opportunity to him. But as observed earlier, in the instant case, in accordance with Rule 31-A of the Fundamental Rules, notice was issued to the respondent employee, explanation was sought and thereafter the order was passed. The said order, in our considered view, was just, proper and in consonance with law and it ought not to have been set aside by the Tribunal or by High Court. To that extent, therefore, the orders impugned in this appeal deserve to be set aside. 20. Mr. S. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate strenuously contended that this Court shall not interfere with the impugned order dated 4.3.2005 inasmuch as the action taken by the administrative authority is one of the several possible courses of action in the case of mistake in regularizing the service of the petitioners as AI of schools. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Jagdamba Oil Mills case (supra). Para 10 of the SCC in Jagdamba Oil Mills case (supra) reads as follows: 10. The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi-judicial authorities are bound to observe. It is true that the distinction between a quasi-judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this Court as far back as 1970 in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India. Even so that extent of judicial scrutiny/judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi-judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an Appellate Authority over the decisions and orders of quasi-judicial authorities, it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of administrative action, it is well known, more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities; they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. In the matter of administrative action, it is well known, more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities; they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have "a right to chose between more than one possible course of action on which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred" (as per Lord Diplock in Secy. of State for Education and Science v. Metropolitan Borough Council of Tameside All ER at p. 695f). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases. Only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the Court intervene. To quote the classic passage from the judgment of Lord Greene, M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation All ER pp. 682H-83A. It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers, familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word "unreasonable" in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with the discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it law within the powers of the authority. 21. Mr. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate further contended that this Court by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Snraj Parkash Gupta case (supra) in M. ...Laitphlang (Dr.) case (supra) held that there can be no relaxation of the basis and fundamental rules of recruitment. Para 31 of the SCC in Suraj Parkash Gupta case (supra) reads as follows: 31. The result of the discussion, therefore, is that the wholesale regularization by order dated 2.1.1998 (for the Electrical Wing), by way of implied relaxation of the Recruitment Rule to the Gazetted category is invalid. Para 31 of the SCC in Suraj Parkash Gupta case (supra) reads as follows: 31. The result of the discussion, therefore, is that the wholesale regularization by order dated 2.1.1998 (for the Electrical Wing), by way of implied relaxation of the Recruitment Rule to the Gazetted category is invalid. It is also bad as it has been done without following the quota rule and without consulting the Service Commission. Further, the power under Rule 5 of the J&K (CCA) Rules, 1956 to relax the Rules cannot, in our opinion, be treated as wide enough to include a power to relax rules of recruitment. Para 26 of the M. Laitphlang (Dr.)(Ms.) case (supra) reads as follows: 26. We express our complete agreement with he position of law laid down in Ananda Ram Borah (supra) subject to only one clarification that if the recruitment rules, in themselves, provide for relaxation of conditions of recruitment, the conditions of recruitment maybe relaxed, provided that such relaxation does not make the conditions of recruitment nugatory and that interpretation of such provisions of relaxation contained in the recruitment rules must not be liberal, but very strict. 22. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the writ petitioners had utterly failed to made out a case for interference with the impugned order dated 4.3.2005 for cancelling the order of the regularization of their service as AI of schools and also for the same reasons, there is no materials for interfering with the impugned order dated 13.7.2001 in W.P.(C) No. 371 of 2002. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed. However, in the given case, it is left to the wisdom of the State respondents to consider the case of the petitioners so that they may get some benefits for their long and continuous service as AI of schools. The parties are to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed