NARAYAN DUTT RAJENDRA KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
2009-08-17
V.K.GUPTA
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Vide Order dated 7th September, 2006 passed in Arbitration Application No. 11 of 2006 [under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act” for short)], this Court had appointed Sri Kripal Singh, Chief Engineer (Retd.), PWD, Dehradun, as a Single Member Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate upon and decide the disputes between the parties. However, in the concluding part of the aforesaid Order, this Court had also issued a direction upon the aforesaid learned Arbitrator to submit the Arbitral Award within a period of three months. As far as the remuneration part is concerned, this Court had fixed the sitting fee at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per sitting subject to a maximum of 10 sittings. 2. Admittedly, the learned Arbitrator appointed by the aforesaid upon the reference, but a Recall Application later on was filed, being Recall Application No. 1155 of 2007, with respect to Court order dated 7th September, 2006, which was rejected by this Court vide its order dated 19th November, 2007. Admittedly, none of the parties have challenged the said order before any superior court with the result that the appointment of Sri Kripal Singh, as the Single Member Arbitral Tribunal, by Order of this Court has now attained finality. 3. The arbitration proceedings started by Sri Kripal Singh have not been concluded so far. Through his Communication dated 9th July, 2009, addressed to the petitioner/applicant, the learned Arbitrator has opined that “revised orders” from the High Court are required for extending the time period for making of the Award. 4. Whereas under Arbitration Act, 1940 (since repealed), [refer to clause (3) of the First Schedule to Arbitration Act, 1904], a time period of four months was prescribed for an Arbitrator to make the Arbitration Award, under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, no such prescription with respect to the time period during which an Arbitral Award has to be made, exists. Because under the 1996 Act there does not exist any prescription with respect to the time period during which an Arbitrator has to pass the Arbitral Award, any direction issued by the court with respect to such time period has to be treated as non est in the eyes of law. The Arbitrator, under the scheme of 1996 Act, has to decide himself about the period during which the Award has to be passed.
The Arbitrator, under the scheme of 1996 Act, has to decide himself about the period during which the Award has to be passed. This Court has no doubt in its mind that under the Scheme of the 1996 Act, the constraint or limitation about any time period within which an Arbitral Award has to be passed by the Arbitrator does not exist. In other words, the Arbitrator cannot be compelled or directed, even by an order of the court which appoints him as the Arbitrator, to pass the Arbitral Award within a specified time period. 5. In the light of whatever has been stated herein above, the request or opinion of the learned Arbitrator about the extension in time period loses relevance on the ground that he still continues to function as the Arbitrator because he has not concluded the arbitration proceedings nor has passed the Arbitral Award so far. Mr. Kripal Singh, the learned Arbitrator has not become functus officio and, in all respects, therefore, continues to be the Arbitrator. Reference in this regard is made to Section 32 of 1996 Act which clearly stipulates and lays down that the arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award only or by an order of the arbitral tribunal passed under sub-section (2) of Section 32. No order as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 32 has been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and, admittedly, since the Arbitral Award has not been passed so far by the learned Arbitrator, the arbitral proceedings cannot be said to be terminated on that ground also. The Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, continues to function. 6.
No order as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 32 has been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and, admittedly, since the Arbitral Award has not been passed so far by the learned Arbitrator, the arbitral proceedings cannot be said to be terminated on that ground also. The Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, continues to function. 6. Even though I have clearly expressed an opinion, in unambiguous terms, that time period within which an Arbitral Award has to be passed under 1996 Act cannot be fixed or prescribed even by an order of the court appointing the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator has to conclude the proceedings and pass the Arbitral Award at his own, in this particular case since the proceedings have dragged on for a long time resulting in miscarriage of justice and the sufferance of the parties, it shall not be out of place to make an observation impressing upon the learned Arbitrator, in the interest of justice as well as in the interest of parties, to conclude the arbitration proceedings with utmost dispatch, without loosing any further time and without granting any unnecessary adjournment to any party and to pass the Arbitral Award at this immediate convenience and as expeditiously as possible. 7. With the aforesaid observations, the Application is disposed of. Since Section 11(6) Application already stands disposed of, this case shall not be listed again for orders in the Court because this Court has become functus officio in this matter.