Executive Engineer, Central Public Works Department v. Raju Banduji Raut
2009-03-30
S.B.DESHMUKH
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT:- Heard learned counsel for the parties. Rule, made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties. 2. The petitioner, is the respondent in complaint (ULP) No.43 of 2007 pending in the Court of learned Judge, Labour Court at Aurangabad, Said complaint is filed by the respondent. Parties hereinafter are referred to their status as complainant and respondent for convenience. Copy of the complaint is on record. (Page 19 of the compilation). In paragraph no.1 statement is made that complainant and respondent are having relationship of employer and employee. In paragraph no.2 it is pleaded that complainant has been appointed as a Clerk in the stores department of the respondent. Said appointment is oral. made in the month of January, .1994. From the appointment, complainant was in continuous service for more than 240 days till the date of oral termination. This oral termination is alleged in the month of January. 2007. In paragraph no.2 it is stated that cause of action arose on January 24, 2007. He claims that he was driving salary of Rs.5,000/- on the date of oral termination, was required to remain present for 24 hours, was working with stores department, quarter was allotted to the complainant for residence purpose, quarter was in Possession of the complainant. Overtime was paid to the complainant. Grievance is raised in paragraph no.4 that complainant has been terminated without following due process of law and thus respondent is engaged in unfair labour practice. There is no compliance of provisions of section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act according to the complainant. In paragraph no.7 contention is raised that all concerned documents in respect of service of complainant are in custody of the respondent. Some documents which were in possession of the complainant have been filed alongwith the complaint. This complaint seems to have been filed on 24.1.2007 under section 28. 30 r/w. Item no.1 (a). (b). (f) of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act. 1971 ("Act. 1971 for short). After filing the complaint, application has been filed by the complainant seeking allotment of work and setting aside oral termination dated 24.1.2007. After entering appearance respondent filed written statement} say to the complaint. Annexure •'R'" is copy of the said written statement (page 44).
(b). (f) of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act. 1971 ("Act. 1971 for short). After filing the complaint, application has been filed by the complainant seeking allotment of work and setting aside oral termination dated 24.1.2007. After entering appearance respondent filed written statement} say to the complaint. Annexure •'R'" is copy of the said written statement (page 44). In paragraph no.1 it has been pleaded that complainant was never employed by the answering respondent in any of the capacities and the employer and employee relationship never existed between complainant and respondent. In paragraph no.7 same thing is reiterated with further pleading that the watch and ward of CPWD. Stores located at Air-port premises. Chikalthana. Aurangabad was arranged by calling tenders from different security Agencies/service providers. It is further pleaded that security agency to whom the work contract is given by the CPWD., has employed the complaint. Further it is pleaded that Oil account of termination of the contract it seems that the security agency has terminated the services of the complainant. Further statement is made that CPWD, is not at all responsible for termination, This written statement Seems to have been filed on 21.7.2007. 3. Learned trial Court after hearing the parties, on Exh.U-2 application framed four issues for determination. Issue no. 1 framed by the trial Court was in respect of prima facie case, if proved by the complainant. Second issue was in respect of balance of convenience. Third issue was regarding irreparable loss. Fourth issue is as to whether the complainant approached the Court with clean hands. Finding on this issue/issues is recorded in affirmative in favour of the complainant. The trial Court allowed the application Exh.U-2. directed the respondent to keep the complainant on work (reinstatement) with wages. This order by the trial Court was dated 11.4.2008. This order was subjected to Revision under section 44 of the Act of 1971 by the respondent. This revision complaint (ULP) no.66 of 2008 has been dismissed by the Member. Industrial Court. Aurangahad by" order passed on January 14. 2009. annexure "E" to the petition. It is this order which is challenged in this Petition. 4. I heard learned counsel for the parties. Advocate Mr. Chaudhari for the petitioner relied on three judgments of the Supreme Court. Mr.
Industrial Court. Aurangahad by" order passed on January 14. 2009. annexure "E" to the petition. It is this order which is challenged in this Petition. 4. I heard learned counsel for the parties. Advocate Mr. Chaudhari for the petitioner relied on three judgments of the Supreme Court. Mr. Hon learned counsel for the respondent relied on two judgments of this court: (i) Judgment of the learned Single Bench of this Court and (ii) judgment of Larger Bench of this Court. would refer to these judgments at appropriate stage. 5. Act of 1971, is a local act applicable 10 the State of Maharashtra. Sub-section 3 of Section 2 of Act, 1971 provides that except as otherwise hereinafter provided, this act shall apply to the industries to which the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. 1946 (Bom.) (XI of 1947). for the time being applies and also to any industry as defined in clause (j) of section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 and the State Government in relation to any industrial dispute, concerning such industry is the appropriate Government in this Act. Definitions arc given under section 3 of Act of 1971. "Central Act" means the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 (2) of 3 Act of 1971. "Court" is also defined under section 3 sub-section 4, for the purposes of chapters VI and VII meaning thereby the Industrial Court, or as the case may be Labour Court. Definition of employee is covered by section 3(5) and of employer is provided under section 3 sub-section 6 of the Act. 1971. The State Government appointed committee, called "Committee on unfair labour practices" for defining certain activities of employers and workers and their organization which could be treated as unfair labour practices and have suggested action which could be taken against employers or workers or their organisations for engaging in such unfair labour practices.
1971. The State Government appointed committee, called "Committee on unfair labour practices" for defining certain activities of employers and workers and their organization which could be treated as unfair labour practices and have suggested action which could be taken against employers or workers or their organisations for engaging in such unfair labour practices. It was the aim and object of the State Government while bringing this statute in operation -enforcement-application to provide fur the recognition of the trade unions for facilitating the collective bargaining for certain undertaking: to state their rights and obligation; to confer certain powers on un-recognised unions, to provide for declaring certain strikes and lock-outs as illegal strikes and lock outs, to define and provide for the prevention of certain unfair labour practices, to constitute Courts (as independent machinery) for carrying out the purposes of recognition to start unions and for enforcing the provisions relating to unfair practices and to provide for matters connected with the purposes aforesaid. 6. On my query to both the learned counsel as to which statute applies to the parties in the case on hand, learned counsel Mr. Hon could not reply. Mr. Chaudhari learned counsel for the petitioner made available, copy of the Central Civil Services annual, according to him, classification has been provided as A, B, C and D. According to him present complainant is not employee of the respondent, however if it is accepted or presumed in that circumstances, he comes in "C" class. He however, strongly contended that complainant is not employee of the petitioner. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1965"), These Rules, 1%5, have been framed, under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, It is clarified under these rules that these rules are framed under Article 309 subject to Article 311 of the Constitution and therefore these rules arc not applicable to civil employees of Defence Department. In part II of the Rules of 1965, classification of services IS enumerated as (i) Central Civil Services, Group-A (ii) Central Civil Services. Group-B: (iii) Central Civil Services, Group-C; (iv) Central Civil Services, Group-D, Part III, or Rules of 1965 is titled as "Appointing Authority", Under Rule 8 It is provided that all appointments to Central Civil Services. Class I and Central Civil Posts. Class I shall he made by the President.
Group-B: (iii) Central Civil Services, Group-C; (iv) Central Civil Services, Group-D, Part III, or Rules of 1965 is titled as "Appointing Authority", Under Rule 8 It is provided that all appointments to Central Civil Services. Class I and Central Civil Posts. Class I shall he made by the President. There is rider i.e. proviso to this Rule 8. So far other appointments are concerned Rule 9 is relevant i.e. appointments to other services and posts. While parting from this part of the order it is noticed that the rules of 1965. are holding the filed, Classification of the post, appointments to be made by the specific authorities, procedure for suspension is provided in these rules. Mr. Chaudhari submits that forum available to complainant is Central Administrative Tribunal. 7. In foregoing paragraphs of this order. I have referred to the provisions of Act of 1971 provisions of Rules. 1965, brief pleadings of complainant and respondent 111 their plaint and written statement as well as reference in nut shell is made to the order passed by the learned trial Court and the revisional Court. 8. I would refer to the judgment of the larger Bench of this Court since the judgments of the Supreme Court pointed out by Mr. Chaudhari have been referred to and considered by the larger Bench. It is in the matter of Tukaram Tanaji Mandhare and anr. Vs, Raymond Woolen Wills Ltd, and others, 2005(4) Mh,L.J. 1045, In this judgment, the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matter of Vividh Kamagar Sabha Vs. Kalyani Steels Ltd., (2001)2 SCC 381 ; Sipla Ltd. Vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union, (2001)3 SCC 101 ; Sarva Shramik Sangh Vs. Indian Smelting and Refining Company Ltd., (2003)10 SCC 455 have been referred to. This was writ petition no.1204 of 2003 with other two writ petition decided by the larger Bench of this Court on June 6. 2005 at Mumbai. Some other judgments of this Court were also considered by the larger Bench of this Court. The facts have been narrated by the larger Bench in paragraph No.1 of the judgment. There the respondent Company had disputed the status of the employees and contended in written statement that there is no relationship of employer-employee with any of the petitioners. Employment of the complainant was through contractors.
The facts have been narrated by the larger Bench in paragraph No.1 of the judgment. There the respondent Company had disputed the status of the employees and contended in written statement that there is no relationship of employer-employee with any of the petitioners. Employment of the complainant was through contractors. Contention was raised on behalf of the Company, that complaints would have to be decided regarding maintainability by the Court. There the Industrial Court-Labour Court had upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondent Company and it was upheld that complaints deserve to be dismissed. Accordingly complaints were dismissed, i.e. how petitioners in that case filed the writ petitions challenging the dismissal of the complaints. The learned Single Judge of this Court, before whom the writ petitions came up for hearing had noted that all the cases decided by the Supreme Court, which are also referred to in foregoing paragraphs are covered by provisions of Act of 1947 whereas the petition before the Court relate to industries covered by the provisions of Bombay Industrial Relations Act. 1946. (B.I.R. for short) Noticing conflicting judgments/orders of the Court the learned Single Bench of this Court made the reference, Questions which are referred for resolution to larger Bench have been recorded in paragraph no.2 of the judgment. Question no. 1 was whether a person who is an employee with a contractor who undertakes that execution of any or whole of the work or any part of the work which is ordinarily the work of the undertaking is an employee within the meaning of section 3(5) of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act. 1971. Two other questions formulated were pertaining to definition under section 3(3) of Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Answers recorded by the larger Bench to the questions referred are noted in paragraph no.19 of the judgment. Mr. Chaudhari the learned counsel has cited the judgments of the learned Single Bench of this Court in the matter of Janprahha Offset Works Vs. Sarva Shramik Sangh and anr., 2007(3) Bom.C.R. 91 . Counsel Mr. V. D. Hon for the petitioner has relied on judgment of the learned Single Bench of this Court in the matter of Akhil Bharatiya Shramik Kamgar Vs. Build tech Constructions and ors, reported in 2004(3) Mh.L.J. 142 . There the counsel Mr.
Sarva Shramik Sangh and anr., 2007(3) Bom.C.R. 91 . Counsel Mr. V. D. Hon for the petitioner has relied on judgment of the learned Single Bench of this Court in the matter of Akhil Bharatiya Shramik Kamgar Vs. Build tech Constructions and ors, reported in 2004(3) Mh.L.J. 142 . There the counsel Mr. v. D. Hon relied on observations that mere statement of denial of relationship in the reply affidavit or for that matter written statement by itself cannot be the basis for taking the view that the Coul1 has no jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint. There in paragraph nos.4 and 6 this Court has observed that Industrial Court in that case has held that it had no jurisdiction to try and decide his complaint as filed by the petitioners under the provisions of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act. 1976. 9. Mr. Hon learned counsel submits that though written statement is filed on behalf of the respondent, specific ground is not raised, that the learned Judge Labour Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. According to him, in the absence or such contention raised in the pleadings, it was not for the Courts to investigate and record any finding on employer-employee relationship. H" further submits that the learned Labour Judge in paragraph no.12. though has referred the contention of defendant disputing the relationship as employer and employee no evidence is led on behalf of the respondent and the Court therefore prima facie has considered the material on record and granted relief at interim stage in favour of the complainant. He also points out from the judgments of the revisional Court paragraph nos. 5 and 6 that the issue of jurisdiction has not been raised in the written statement by the respondent and learned revisional Court has observed that such issue can be raised by amending the written statement. He supports the order passed by the Courts below. 10. The learned Judge, Labuur Court, in paragraph no.6. has noticed the contentions raised in the written statement denying the alleged relationship of employer and employee amongst the complainant and respondent. In paragraph no.12 learned Judge has made a brief reference to this contention however, proceeded to examine prima facie case and recorded a finding in favour of the complainant.
10. The learned Judge, Labuur Court, in paragraph no.6. has noticed the contentions raised in the written statement denying the alleged relationship of employer and employee amongst the complainant and respondent. In paragraph no.12 learned Judge has made a brief reference to this contention however, proceeded to examine prima facie case and recorded a finding in favour of the complainant. The revisional Court while considering the revision application filed by the petitioner in paragraph no.6 observed that the point of jurisdiction which goes to the root of the matter can be raised by the petitioner herein by way of amending the written statement. Further it has been observed that in the written statement no such point is raised though such point may be a law point however at this stage cannot be concluded. It is not possible to accede to the observations of the learned revisional Court. Copy of the written statement is on record. There the petitioner has in clear terms denied the alleged relationship of employer and employee among the parties i.e. complainant and respondent. Noticing such pleadings it was for the Court below i.e. learned Judge as well as revisional Court, to find out as to whether they have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. Issue of jurisdiction hits the Court or authority, at the thresh hold and such issue in fact goes to the root of the matter. Once it is held that Court is having jurisdiction, there is no difficulty for the Court to proceed with the case before the Court. These are the Courts, functioning under the provisions of the Act. 1971. It was for these Courts, to take into consideration, the case of the complainant himself as to whether he is being governed by a particular or specific statute and/or can resort to provisions of Act. 1971. Unless Courts are satisfied that the complaint filed by the complainant is maintainable. Court should not have proceeded to examine and decide the application for interim relief under section 30 of the Act of 1971, 11. Second aspect of the matter which have noticed is that relief claimed in the main complaint virtually is sought in the interim application under section 30 of the Act. 1971. The trial Court awarded the said relief which is in the nature of final relief at the interim stage.
Second aspect of the matter which have noticed is that relief claimed in the main complaint virtually is sought in the interim application under section 30 of the Act. 1971. The trial Court awarded the said relief which is in the nature of final relief at the interim stage. The revisional Court which is expected to consider this aspect of the matter, dismissed the revision and confirmed the order passed by the trial Court in my view orders impugned in this writ petition requires to be quashed and set aside. 12. Having considered the conspectus of the judgments cited, in my view case for allowing the petition is established. However it is made clear that this Court has not recorded a finding, on the issue of maintainability of the complaint before the learned Judge, Labour Court under the provisions of Act. of 1971. It is for the Court concerned before whom to decide maintainability of the complaint on merits, after hearing the parties and affording opportunity to lead evidence, if they desire to do so. 13. In this view of the matter, writ petition is allowed. Orders impugned in this writ petition are quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute in above terms without any order as to costs. Petition allowed,