Judgment R.K. Merathia, J.-This Civil Revision application has been filed against the judgment dated 29.11.2006 passed in Title (Eviction) Suit No. 17 of 2004 by learned Subordinate Judge-I, Dmmka decreeing the suit filed by the opposite party against the petitioner. 2. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, appearing for the petitioners-defendants-tenants submitted that in view of Clause 7 of the lease deed the opposite party-plaintiff-landlord was bound to renew the lease, though on mutual terms, and therefore, expiry of period of tenancy could not be a ground to pass order of eviction against the petitioners. He further submitted that the requirement of the opposite party was not bona fide and in any event any such requirement could be substantially satisfied by evicting the petitioner from a part of the suit premises and allowing it to continue occupation of the part of the premises. 3. This Title (Eviction) Suit was instituted by the opposite party-landlord, against the petitioners-tenants, under the provisions of Section 11 (1)(c) i.e. on the grounds of personal requirement of the landlord and (e) on the ground of expiry of period of tenancy. 4. According to the landlord a notice dated 13.9.2004 was given to the tenant, after expiry of the period of lease to vacate the suit premises on the ground that the period of lease had expired and he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. According to the tenants, a reply dated 5.10.2004 was sent to the said notice, saying, inter alia, that as per Clause 7 of the lease deed, the tenants are legally entitled to continue in possession of the suit premises and the landlord is bound to execute a fresh lease with fresh terms and conditions. Similar stands were taken by the parties in the suit. 5. The trial court framed several issues including the issues whether after expiry of the period of lease, the tenant could continue in the suit premises; and whether the requirement of the suit premises by the landlord was bona fide. and whether he has alternative accommodation; and whether partial eviction would serve the purpose of the landlord; and whether the suit premises can be divided and partial eviction will serve the purpose of the landlord or not. 6. and whether he has alternative accommodation; and whether partial eviction would serve the purpose of the landlord; and whether the suit premises can be divided and partial eviction will serve the purpose of the landlord or not. 6. It is not disputed that the petitioners were inducted as tenant under a registered lease dated 17.12.1988 with effect from 1.9.1988 to 31.8.2004 i.e. for about 16 years at the rent of Rs. 500/- per month. It is also not disputed that after expiry of the period of lease, the landlord requested the tenant to vacate the premises saying that he is not inclined to renew the lease as he had requirement of the suit premises for his own use and occupation. Clause 7 of the lease deed dated 17.12.1998 reads as follows:- "Yah ki awadhi ke samapt ho jane par Makan-Malik ko Kirayedar isi shart par punah dusra lease denge jiska kanuni taur se nibandhan kiya jayega: Ubhay paksha ke rai se jo shart manjur ki jayegi usi ke anusar awadhi ke sam apt hone par punah dukan kiraya par diya jayega. " 7. Thus. Clause 7 means that after expiry of lease, a fresh registered lease was to be executed by the landlord on mutually settled terms between the parties. The said Clause 7 cannot be construed to mean that the landlord was bound to renew the lease even if he did not want to enter into a fresh lease on the ground of personal necessity. The stipulation of renewal of lease is apparently based on mutually agreeable terms. Mutually agreed terms will not only mean the rate of rent and period of lease but it will also include the willingness of the landlord to enter into a fresh lease. Any other construction will make the said Clause 7 self-contradictory. 8. The tenant could not produce anything to show that the landlord was ready and willing to enter into fresh lease. Rather, from the legal notice got issued by the landlord it appears that he was not willing to enter into a fresh lease after expiry of the period of lease on the ground that he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. Rather, from the legal notice got issued by the landlord it appears that he was not willing to enter into a fresh lease after expiry of the period of lease on the ground that he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. Thus, it has been rightly held by the learned trial court that the tenant could not continue in the suit premises after expiry of the period of lease and the landlord was not bound to renew the lease as he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. 9. The landlord has proved his case of personal necessity. It has come in evidence that he is running a shop adjacent to the suit premises where he is dealing in boxes and plastic furniture. He said that his son Sidhartha was married and he was unemployed and for him he required the suit premises for opening a furniture shop. He also said that the suit premises was suitable for the said purpose. The son of the plaintiff was also examined he also said that he wanted to start business of wooden furniture in the said premises. The defendant witness No.1 said that the landlord and his son were engaged in said shop adjacent to the suit premises and they had given wrong statement with regard to their personal necessity. In paragraph-11, he admitted that the landlord required the suit premises for engaging his son. There is nothing to disbelieve the case of the plaintiff about his reasonable and bona fide requirement of the suit premises for his own occupation or for the occupation of his son for whose benefit the said premises was held by him. 10. On the question of partial eviction it has come in evidence that the width of the suit premises in front side is 14 fit. It has also come in evidence that partial eviction would not serve the purpose of the landlord. While considering the issue of partial eviction the court cannot direct partition of the suit premises as held in Paragraph-12 of the Division Bench judgment reported in 1985 PLJR 390 . 11. The case of Krishna Murari Prasad, 1994(1) PLJR (SC)87, relied by Mr. Ranjan is of no help to the petitioner, In that case, the matters remanded to the trial court to examine the question of partial eviction afresh. 11. The case of Krishna Murari Prasad, 1994(1) PLJR (SC)87, relied by Mr. Ranjan is of no help to the petitioner, In that case, the matters remanded to the trial court to examine the question of partial eviction afresh. The other case relied by him-1991 BBCJ 192.Bata Shoe is also of no help to the petitioner. The matter was remitted back to the trial court an the ground that the discussion an the question of personal necessity was perfunctory and the issue which were necessary to be examined to arrive at a finding with regard to personal necessity, were not at all framed or considered and a bald finding was recorded. In the present case, the trial court has considered evidences brought on the record by the parties and has arrived at correct findings as noticed above. The other judgment reported in 2006(4) JLJR 37 -Surendra Sao is also of no help to the petitioner. It was inter alia, held in the said case that the provisions of Section 18 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is not applicable in the case of a concluded agreement far renewal at the option of the landlord. Herein this case fact situation is different as noticed above. 12. Far the reasons indicated above, I find no merit in this civil revision application which is, accordingly, dismissed. However, no casts.