Judgment :- 1. As common questions of law and facts are involved in both the writ petitions, they are taken up together and disposed of by a common order. 2. Facts of the case in W.P. No. 2628 of 2010 are as follows: The petitioner joined Tamil Nadu cements corporation (hereinafter referred to as “the corporation”) on 05.02.1969. By hard work, he was promoted to the post of Deputy Manager (Materials). The petitioner was served with a charge sheet, dated 111. 1990, issued by the respondent, alleging that inspite of instructions from the General Manager to issue warning to the transporter, that any increase in moisture exceeding the specifications would be charged from the transporter and the monetary value would be deducted from the bills and further informed that only fine materials should be brought to the plant by taking care at the time of loading of the material, the petitioner prevented the letter from being sent to the Transporter viz. M/s. Phosparous and chemicals (Travancore) Limited, by blocking the letter addressed to the Transporter, thereby committed an act of wilful insubordination and that he has a tendency to extend favourtism to the transporter for personal gains amounting to dishonesty in connection with the corporation’s business/property. In response to the same, the petitioner sent a detailed reply, dated 30.11.1990, denying the charges. In the explanation, the petitioner has bought to the notice of the respondent that he was not given any opportunity to see the letter, wherein, he have marked it as “Need not sent”. 3. The petitioner has further submitted that an explanation was submitted to the effect that immediately, on receipt of the information from the General Manager regarding receipt of slag with high moisture and lumps, he has instructed the transporter, M/s. National Truck-movers, Alangulam, over phone to avoid transport of slag with high moisture and lumps and to transport only good slag. It is the further contention of the petitioner that confirming the above information, he has also issued a letter No. Tanceas/MM/ADM/S1 AG/98, dated 8. 98 to the transporter. He has also stated in his explanation that the above said letter was acknowledged by the transporter for having received it, which was very much available in the subject file, now under the custody of General Manager. 98 to the transporter. He has also stated in his explanation that the above said letter was acknowledged by the transporter for having received it, which was very much available in the subject file, now under the custody of General Manager. The petitioner has further submitted that subsequently, another letter prepared by the purchase Executive was said to have been blocked by him was also put up on the same day and that he has also signed the said letter. Having certain doubts over the subsequent letter, he has directed the concerned Assistant to release the said letter prepared by the purchase Executive after verifying, as to whether the first letter was issued and not to avoid duplication. Accordingly, the concerned Assistant confirmed the issue of his first letter to the transporter and put up the letter prepared by the purchase Executive on 07.098. 4. The petitioner has further submitted that since the letter had already been issued to the transporter, he has instructed not to issue the letter prepared by the Purchase Executive to avoid duplication and written with intimation, “Need not sent” with his signature on 07.08.98 on the letter prepared by the Purchase Executive. It is the grievance of the petitioner that notwithstanding the above explanation, the respondent conducted an enquiry. Two witnesses, viz., Thiru. A. Sakthivel, Personnel Executive, Alangulam Cement Works and Thiru. A. Sundaram, Purchase Executive were examined in the oral enquiry. The petitioner examined himself as defence witness. According to him, the original letter, containing the notice “Need not sent” was not produce in the enquiry. He therefore submitted that there was no evidence to establish that he deliberately instructed his subordinate not to sent the letter, to the transporter and that there was absolutely no evidence indicating favourtism to the transporter for personal gains, amounting to dishonesty in connection with the Corporation’s business/property. 5. It is the grievance of the petitioner that without forwarding the copy of the Enquiry officer’s Report and without giving a reasonable opportunity of making his further representation on the findings recovered by the enquiry officer, the respondent, by his letter, dated 27.02.99, straightaway imposed a penalty of stoppage of one annual increment with cumulative effect. 5. It is the grievance of the petitioner that without forwarding the copy of the Enquiry officer’s Report and without giving a reasonable opportunity of making his further representation on the findings recovered by the enquiry officer, the respondent, by his letter, dated 27.02.99, straightaway imposed a penalty of stoppage of one annual increment with cumulative effect. Thereafter, he made a representation for supply of a copy of the Enquiry officer’s report and on receipt of the same, found that the enquiry officer, without considering his explanation in proper perspective and without any semblance of evidence, held the charges as proved. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Appeal to the Board on 14. 1999, clearly pointing out as to how the charges alleged against him was also basis and the procedural infirmities committed by the respondent were also pointed out. It is the grievance of the petitioner that though he had pointed out that the Enquiry Officer has concluded the enquiry on a single day, without providing a reasonable opportunity to peruse the specific documents, wherein, an endorsement was made, stating that “Need not sent” and the deprivation of his legitimate right to make a further representation on the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, the appellate authority, without adverting to the above said contentions in proper perspective, rejected the appeal, by order, dated 30.12.1999, instead of placing the appeal before the Board. By the above said order, the respondent instead of setting aside the entire punishment, has modified the order to stoppage of one annual increment without cumulative effect. 6. Facts of the case in W.P. No. 2629 of 2010 are as follows: On 111. 1990, he was issued with a charge memo, alleging that the Earnest Money Deposit, payable to M/s. Ganesh Minerals, Station Road, Bhadravathi, was not returned to the party, inspite of the approval obtained from the General Manager, Alangulam Cement Works on 19.098. It was further alleged that such act of unnecessary holding of Earnest Money Deposit repayable to the party with ulterior motive is a clear deviation of tender procedures and connected rules and regulations therewith. In response to the charge memo, the petitioner submitted a explanation, dated 30.11.1998, denying the charges, wherein, he has brought out that when he received the charge Memo on 111. 1998, the relevant file was not available in the Materials Management Department. In response to the charge memo, the petitioner submitted a explanation, dated 30.11.1998, denying the charges, wherein, he has brought out that when he received the charge Memo on 111. 1998, the relevant file was not available in the Materials Management Department. It was further brought to the notice of the respondent that the relevant file was handed over to General Manager by the Purchase Executive, his subordinate without his knowledge. Hence, he requested General Manager, vide his letter dated 111. 1998 to make available the file to give his reply. He has also submitted that the General Manager, has accorded approval to release the proceedings for refund of the E.M.D., to M/s. Ganesh Minerals, Bhadravathi, on 13. 98 and subsequent to that, with regard to a “bit paper” instructions of the General Manager, the petitioner learnt that for Iron ore loads received during the months of July and August’ 1998, a recovery of Rs.5/-per Metric Tonne towards unloading of Iron ore by his Corporation Crane, has to be made from M/s. Ganesh Minerals. In these circumstances, the petitioner has directed his subordinates to release the proceedings only after the receipt of recovery particulars from the Quality Control Department, which was looking after the function of unloading raw materials. 7. The petitioner has further submitted that it was brought to the notice of the respondent that the Quality Control Department has sent the particulars along with the General Manager’s approval, dated 9. 98, to the petitioner on 9. 98, and as a matter routine, he has directed the Purchase Executive, on the same day itself, to verify and put up the details. He had put up the recovery papers only on 19. 98 and it was forwarded to the Accounts Department for necessary action. Since 20.9.98 was a Sunday, the petitioner released the refund proceedings on the next day, i.e. on 29. 98. Thus, it would clearly prove that there was no delay in refunding the Earnest Money Deposit. The petitioner has further contended that notwithstanding the above explanation, the respondent decided to hold an enquiry. In the enquiry the management examined Thiru A. Sakthivel and Thiru. A. Sundaram, Purchase Executives as witnesses. The petitioner examined himself as defence witness. 98. Thus, it would clearly prove that there was no delay in refunding the Earnest Money Deposit. The petitioner has further contended that notwithstanding the above explanation, the respondent decided to hold an enquiry. In the enquiry the management examined Thiru A. Sakthivel and Thiru. A. Sundaram, Purchase Executives as witnesses. The petitioner examined himself as defence witness. It is the grievance of the petitioner that without appreciating the evidence in proper perspective and without any iota of evidence, the enquiry officer held that the charge framed against him as proved. 8. The petitioner has further submitted that the Enquiry officer has failed to consider his submission that due to the subsequent instruction given by the General Manager for recovery of Rs.5/- per Metric Tonne towards unloading of Iron ore by the Corporation’s Crane for the materials supplied in the months of July and August’ 1998, the Earnest Money could not be refunded. According to him, absolutely there was no evidence to establish that there was any ulterior motive in not releasing the Earnest Money Deposit. Without even giving an opportunity to represent on the findings, the respondent has imposed the punishment of reduction to a lower rank to the post of Assistant Manager (Tech). On receipt of the findings and penalty, the petitioner filed an appeal on 12.04.1999 to the Board of Directors. His appeal was erroneously disposed of by the respondent on 30.12.1999 by modifying the punishment into one of reduction to a lower rank, as Assistant Manager for a period of 10 years. The above said proceedings are under challenge in this Writ Petition. 9. In both the Writ Petitions, Mr. Balan Haridas, learned counsel for the petitioner has made the following grounds of attack. (i) The respondent has grosslyerred in relying upon certain complains made against the petitioner, without considering the explanation in proper perspective and without giving sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to peruse the contents of the same. (ii) The respondent has traveled beyond the scope of the charge and adverted to matters, which are not the subject matter of the charge, which has influenced the mind of the disciplinary authority to inflict a penalty of reduction to a lower rank. (ii) The respondent has traveled beyond the scope of the charge and adverted to matters, which are not the subject matter of the charge, which has influenced the mind of the disciplinary authority to inflict a penalty of reduction to a lower rank. (iii) When an enquiry is conducted and findings are recorded, the delinquent is entitled to have a copy of the said report and he must be given an opportunity to make a further representation on the findings recovered by the enquiry officer. In the case on hand, the petitioner was denied of a reasonable opportunity of making his submissions on the report and hence, there is a procedural violation. (iv) Though the above said lacunae and the prejudice caused to the petitioner, was pointed out, the appellate authority has mechanically rejected the appeal, without adverting to the above said issue and thus, there is a miscarriage of justice. 10. Apart from the above, in respect of the allegations contained in W.P.No. 2268 of 2001. learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent has failed to consider that there was no evidence to show that the petitioner had deliberately not sent the communication to the transporter and thereby, committed an act of insubordination. He further submitted that the respondent ought to have found that there was no loss of revenue to the Corporation. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that an element of bias of the respondent is evident from the fact that he himself had taken up the appeal and decided the same, without placing it before the Board for its disposal and therefore, the entire proceedings are vitiated on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd., V. Kamal Swaroop Tondon reported in 2008 (2) SCC 41 , and Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank reported in 2009 (2) SCC 570 . 12. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd., V. Kamal Swaroop Tondon reported in 2008 (2) SCC 41 , and Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank reported in 2009 (2) SCC 570 . 12. In respect of W.P.No. 2269 of 2001, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even assuming that there was a delay in disbursement of the Earnest Money Deposit without admitting the same, there is no ulterior motive or bad intention in relating the amount payable to a third party and at the most, it could be said that there was a delay in disbursement or failure to adhere to the instructions, regarding refund of the Earnest Money Deposit for which the penalty is excessive. 13. On the merits of the case, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no evidence to show that the petitioner had deliberately not released the Earnest Money Deposit to M/s. Ganesh Minerals and that the respondent ought to have considered that, due to a direction issued by the General Manager through a slip, the petitioner was constrained to check the same and hence, on receipt of adequate information, regarding recovery particulars from the Quality Control Department, money was released. In such circumstances, the respondent ought to have exonerated the petitioner from the charges. 14. He also submitted that the impugned punishment of reduction to the post of Assistant Manager (Materials) and also to a different post of Assistant Manager (Tech-Mech), is in violation of Rule 5(3) (f), which contemplates only to a reduction to the lower rank of post or to a lower time to time scale or to a lower stage in the time scale of pay. According to him, the penalty is disproportionate to the gravity of the charges. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the respondent, who has passed the original order of penalty of reduction to a period of two years, ought to have recused himself from the deliberations and proceedings of the Board and that he has no jurisdiction to pass any order in the appeal filed by the petitioner and reduce the penalty for a period of 10 months. According to him, the act of bias, on the part of the respondent is apparent on the face of the record. 16. According to him, the act of bias, on the part of the respondent is apparent on the face of the record. 16. The Manager, Personnel and Administration of the respondent – Corporation has filed separate counter affidavit in both the writ Petitions. Reiterating the counter affidavit filed in W.P.No. 2268 of 2001, Mrs. A.V. Bharathi, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that while the petitioner was working as Deputy Manager (Materials), the General Manager, Alangulam Cement Works on 37. 1998, during inspection, noticed two loads of slag received from M/s. Phosperous & Chemicals (Travancore) Ltd., were dumped inside the crane gantry with high moisture contamination probably by adding water with a motive to increase the Weight and that the material contained lot of lumps. Therefore, the General Manager, Alangulam Cement Works, by communications, dated 1-8-98, instructed the petitioner to issue necessary warning to the transporter that any increase in moisture exceeding the specification would be deducted from the bills and also to instruct the transporter that only fine material should be brought to the plant. Inspite of specific instructions from the General Manager to forward the letter to the transporter, the petitioner did not act on the instructions of his superior. When the Purchase Executive drafted and put up a letter to the petitioner, advising the transporter on the lines of the General Manager, the petitioner blocked the letter by ordering “Need not sent” and as such, the letter was not dispatched. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the above act of the petitioner amounted to wilful insubordination of the orders of the superior officer and also to extend favouritism to the transporter for personal gains, amounting to dishonesty in connection with the Corporation business/property. The above acts are serious misconducts as per Rule 5.2 (a) and (c) of the Service Rules of TANCEM. Therefore, a charge memo, dated 13-11-1998 was issued to the petitioner, calling upon him to submit his explanation for willful insubordination in respect of reasonable orders of the superior and entertaining the transporter by extending favouritism, thereby getting personal gains and acted in a dishonest manner, causing loss to the Corporation. Since the reply, dated 30-11-1998 given by the petitioner was not satisfactory, a domestic enquiry was conducted and in the enquiry, the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved and that he was found guilty. Since the reply, dated 30-11-1998 given by the petitioner was not satisfactory, a domestic enquiry was conducted and in the enquiry, the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved and that he was found guilty. Though the above said serious misconducts warranted severe punishment, the petitioner has been awarded only a lesser punishment of stoppage of one year annual increment with cumulative effect, as per the TANCEM service Rule 5.3 (f) on 27-2-99. The petitioner preferred an appeal petition and that the same was examined by the appellate authority in proper perspective and reduced the order of punishment of stoppage of annual increment with cumulative effect into that of without cumulative effect. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent further denied the contention that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to see the letter, wherein, it was marked as “Need not sent”, but on the contrary, the relevant letter was shown to the petitioner and he had also gone through the entire letter on 26-11-98 in the presence of Thiru. J. Maria Susai, Manager (Per. & Admn.) (i/c) and Thiru A. Sakthivel, witness examined in the departmental enquiry. She further submitted that when the petitioner had given an explanation that he had marked on the purchase executive’s letter as “Need not sent”, because of the earlier letter said to have been sent to the transporter, in response to G.M’s Note dated 3-8-98, the contention that there was no evidence to prove that the petitioner had blocked a letter to the transporter regarding moisture contamination, cannot be countenanced. 19. Denying the averments that the petitioner had already instructed the transporter, M/s. National Truck Movers, Alangulam, over phone to avoid transport of slag with high moisture and lumps and the letter dated 5-8-98 as a routine matter, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner had deliberately stopped the letter prepared by his subordinate, Purchase Executive, in response to the G.M’s instructions, dated 1-8-98. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the domestic enquiry conducted by the Enquiry officer on 30-12-98, it was clearly established that the letter dated 5-8-98 issued by the petitioner to the transport Contractor was only in response to a Note, dated 3-8-98, from the General Manager. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the domestic enquiry conducted by the Enquiry officer on 30-12-98, it was clearly established that the letter dated 5-8-98 issued by the petitioner to the transport Contractor was only in response to a Note, dated 3-8-98, from the General Manager. The explanation of the petitioner has been considered in proper perspective and that he was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend the charges and there was no violation of principles of natural justice. 21. On the aspect of bias in taking up the appeal and disposing of the same, by the Managing Director himself, instead of placing it before the Board, learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the appeal, dated 12-04-99 was placed before the Executive Sub Committee of the Board of Directors/Appellate Authority, held on 29-12-99 and the Executive Sub Committee of the Directors reduced the punishment of stoppage of annual increment in the cadre of Deputy Manager (Materials) for a period of one year without cumulative effect as against the earlier order of stoppage of annual increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect in the lower post of Asst. Manager (Materials) (after implementation of the punishment of reduction to a lower rank ordered in a different disciplinary case, subject matter of W.P. No.2269 of 2001) and the orders to that effect was also communicated, vide letter, dated 30-12-99, of the chairman and Managing Director. Therefore, the appeal petition was duly scrutinized only by the Executive Sub Committee of the Board of Directors. The contention that the chairman and Managing Director took up the appeal by himself and disposed of the same, is liable to be rejected. In this context, she relied on a decision of this Court in W.P. No.3273 and 32090 of 2004 [G.K. Anbu v. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., and another] and contended that there was no personal bias. 22. In respect of W.P. No. 2269 of 2001, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that while the petitioner was working as Deputy Manager (Materials), it was reported by the General Manager, Alangulam Cement Works that the Earnest Money Deposit amount of Rs. 15,000/- repayable to M/s. Ganesh Minerals, Bhatravathy, a supplier of Iron Ore, was not returned to the party after completion or the supply, inspite of the approval on 19.08.1998. 15,000/- repayable to M/s. Ganesh Minerals, Bhatravathy, a supplier of Iron Ore, was not returned to the party after completion or the supply, inspite of the approval on 19.08.1998. She further submitted that such an act of unnecessarily holding of Earnest Money Deposit repayable to the party with an ulterior motive is a clear deviation of Tender procedure and connected rules and regulations. The above said act is a serious misconduct, amounting to willful insubordination of the reasonable orders of the superior, breach or rules and neglect of work, as per Rule 5.2(a) (g) and (k) of the Service Rules of TANCEM. 23. Learned counsel for the Corporation further submitted that inspite of the approval given from the General Manager to refund the Earnest Money Deposit to M/s. Ganesh Minerals, the Petitioner did not act on the lines of his superior and thus, failed to refund of EMD amount. Therefore, a charge memo, dated 111. 98 was issued to the petitioner, calling upon him to submit his explanation. Since, the reply, dated 30.11.98 given by him was not satisfactory, a domestic enquiry was conducted, after giving him sufficient opportunities. In the enquiry, the charges were proved beyond reasonable doubt and that he was found guilty of the misconduct of withholding Earnest Money Deposit amount for a period of one month. 24. Learned counsel for the Corporation further submitted that though the petitioner has committed serious misconduct, warranting severe punishment, he was awarded only a lesser punishment of reduction to a lower rank from Deputy Manager (Materials) to Assistant Manager (Materials) for a period of 2 years, with effect from 3. 99, as per the TANCEM Service Rule 5.3(f) on 299. According to her, the appeal petition preferred by the petitioner was examined by the Appellate Authority in proper perspective and the said authority has reduced the punishment by awarding a punishment of reduction to lower rank from Deputy Manager (Materials) to Assistant Manager (Materials) for a period of 10 months, instead of 2 years. 25. On the merits of this case, learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the General Manager, Alangulam Cement Works, in his letter, dated 10. 98, addressed to the respondent, has brought out various acts of commission and omission committed by the petitioner. The petitioner, who was earlier working as Assistant Manager (Technical-Mechanical) had voluntarily opted for Materials Department in the year 1992. 98, addressed to the respondent, has brought out various acts of commission and omission committed by the petitioner. The petitioner, who was earlier working as Assistant Manager (Technical-Mechanical) had voluntarily opted for Materials Department in the year 1992. Materials Department could not be achieved. The General Manager has to therefore request the respondent to transfer the petitioner from Alangulam Cement Unit To Tamil Nadu Asbestos (Sheets), Alangulam unit to Alangulam Cement works. 26. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that inspite of the General Manager’s sincere attempts to correct the petitioner, he did not come up to the expectation of the respondent. On more than five occasions, memos have been issued by General Manager, Alangulam Cement Works, to the petitioner, for various lapses and dereliction of duties. The petitioner was in the habit of forwarding the bills for payment belatedly by keeping most of the bills in his custody till the concerned supplier/contractor meets the petitioner never worked to the expectation of the superiors and also failed to the uplifted of the respondent corporation and that the petitioner has acted the rules and regulations of the respondent corporation. 27. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the direction given by the General Manager to recover Rs. 5.00 per M.T. of Iron Ore towards unloading charges by respondent crane related to the supplies in the months of July and August’ 1998, whereas the refund of Earnest Money Deposit pertains to the order supplied by the same party, viz., M/s. Ganesh Minerals, during the year 1996- 1997. Even if penal deduction towards unloading charges has to be given effect, the petitioner could have easily effected from the running bills amounting to nearly Rs. 17,00,000/-, pending with Alangulam Cement Unit, as unpaid to M/s. Ganesh Minerals. Therefore, she submitted that the explanation of the petitioner that the direction to recover the unloading charges and that the petitioner waited for the recovery particulars from the Quality Control Department and on receipt of particulars on 19. 98 and thereafter, he had approved the refund, cannot be accepted. She further submitted that the refund order by the petitioner was forwarded to the Accounts Department only after receiving the Warning Note, dated 19. 98, from General Manager, Alangulam and thereafter, the explanation offered by the petitioner is not acceptable. 28. 98 and thereafter, he had approved the refund, cannot be accepted. She further submitted that the refund order by the petitioner was forwarded to the Accounts Department only after receiving the Warning Note, dated 19. 98, from General Manager, Alangulam and thereafter, the explanation offered by the petitioner is not acceptable. 28. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the explanation, dated 30.11.1998, submitted by the petitioner, was duly considered by the disciplinary authority in proper perspective and that the enquiry was conducted in a fair and reasonable manner, after giving due opportunity to the petitioner to put forth his contentions. The refund of EMD relates to the Iron Ore order supply made by M/s. Ganesh Minerals during the year 1997 and even after the General Managers approval on 19.09.1998 to refund the EMD, the petitioner has no locus to retain the same. Therefore, the charges attracting service Rules 5.2 (a) (g) and (k) that the petitioner willfully disobeyed the reasonable orders of the superior in releasing the payment of EMD to M/s. Ganesh Minerals, Bathravathy, have been held as proved. According to her, the copy of the enquiry report and the proceedings, as per the petitioners request, were furnished to the petitioner, vide letter, dated 13. 99 and therefore, there is no violation of principles of natural justice. 29. On the aspect of non-consideration of the grounds in the appeal, dated 12.04.99, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appeal memorandum was placed before the Executive Sub Committee of the Board of Directors/Appellate Authority, held on 212. 99 and that the Executive Sub Committee of the Directors reduced the punishment of reduction to lower rank from Deputy Manager to Assistant Manager for a period of 10 months, instead of the earlier order of two years and that the said order was also communicated, vide letter, dated 30.99. In sum and substance, she submitted that there is no procedural irregularity in conducting the disciplinary proceedings and the punishments imposed for the above two charge memos, subject matter of the present Petitions, are commensurate with the delinquencies and therefore, prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petitions. 30. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 31. Before adverting to the merits of this case, it is relevant to extract few provisions in TANCEM Service Rules and the charges famed against the petitioner. 30. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 31. Before adverting to the merits of this case, it is relevant to extract few provisions in TANCEM Service Rules and the charges famed against the petitioner. Rule 5.2 deals with enumerated acts of misconduct and the relevant sub-clauses are as follows: “(a) Wilful insubordination or disobedience whether alone or in combination with another or others, of any lawful and reasonable order of a superior. (c) Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the corporations business property. (g) Habitual breach of any rules in force. (k) Negligence or neglect of work.” 32. Rule 5.3 deals with penalties and it reads as follows: “Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, as staff member/officer found guilty of any misconduct on the basis of the records available are enquiry shall be awarded penalties a hereafter provided: (a) Warning (b) Censure (c) Stoppage of increment with or without cumulative effect; (d) Imposing of fines; (e) Recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the corporation by negligence or breach of orders; (f) Reduction to a lower rank, or post or to a lower time scale or to a lower stage in the time scale. (g) Suspension (h) Removal from Service (i) Dismissal from Service. Note: Item a to d shall be classified as minor punishment while items, e to I shall be classified as major punishments. The penalty of fine as such shall be imposed only on a person who is a member of the category of Driver, Attendar, Peon, Watchman.” 33. Appeals preferred in Rule 5.7 of the said Rules, has to be considered in Rule 5.12 with reference to the following aspects, “(a) Whether the facts on which the order was based have been established, (b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action, (c) Whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate and after such consideration, shall pass such orders as it thinks proper, (d) It shall be open to the Appellate Authority to call for the records in respect of any disciplinary proceedings and review any order made under these rules and pass orders as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. Wherever controlling/appointing authority is Chairman and Managing Director, both posts being held by one and same Officer, the Chairman and Managing Director shall be disciplinary authority and in the case of those officers drawing more than Rs.1350/-the Board of Directors shall be the Appellate authority and in the case of officers drawing upto a basic of Rs.1350/- the Chairman and Managing Director shall be the disciplinary authority and appellate authority shall be the Executive Committee of Directors.” 34. The charges leveled against the petitioner, subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings in W.P.No.2628 of 2001, vide charge memo, dated 111. 1998 are as follows: “It is reported, that the Earnest Money Deposit amount repayable to M/s. Ganesh Minerals, Station Road, Bhadravathi was not returned to the party inspite of the approval obtained from the General Manager, Alangulam Cement Works on 19.08.1998 act of unnessary holding of Earnest Money Deposit repayable to the party with ulterior motive is a clear deviation of tender procedures and connected rules and regulations therewith. The above act is a serious misconduct amounting to willful insubordination, of the reasonable orders of a superior, breach of rules in force, & negligence and neglect of work etc., liable for taking disciplinary action as per Rule 5.2 (a), (g) and (k) of the Service Rules or TANCEM. Thiru. K.A. Gurusamy, Dy. Manager (Mtls.) is therefore, directed to offer his explanation with in 7 days from the date of receipt of this charge memo as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him, failing which it will be construed that he has no explanation to offer and further action will be taken on merit.” 35. The charges, subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings in W.P.No.2629 of 2001 relates to the charge memo, dated 111. 1998 are as follows: “It is reported that, during the inspection of General Manager, Alangulam Cement Works on 31.07.1998, he has noticed two loads of Slag received from M/s. Phosporous & Chemicals (Travancore) Ltd., were dumped inspite the Crane gandry with high moisture contamination probably by adding water with a motive to increase the weight of the material and the material contained lot of lumps. Accordingly vide reference 1st cited, you were asked to issue necessary warning to the transporter that any increase in moisture exceeding the specifications would be charged from the transporter and the monetary value would be deducted from the bills and also to inform the transporter that only fine materials should be brought to the plant by taking care at the time of loading of the material. When the Purchase Executive, drafted a letter, advising the transporter to the above affect, Thiru. K.A. Gurusamy, Dy. Manager (Mtls.) has blocked the letter, by ordering “Need not sent” and the letter was not dispatched. The above acts of Thiru. K.A. Gurusamy, Dy. Manager (Mtls.) amounts to willful in subordination of the reasonable orders of his superior and also a tendency to extend favouritism to the transporter for personal gains amounting to dishonesty in connection with the Corporation’s business/property. The above acts are construed as serious misconducts liable for disciplinary action as per Rule 5.2(a) and (c) of Service Rules of TANCEM.” 36. As appreciation of evidence is very much limited in the disciplinary proceedings, except to the extent of finding as to whether there is any perversity or it is a case of no evidence, this Court, at the foremost, is inclined to consider as to whether, there is any procedural violation in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings, before dealing with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. 37. First of all, as per Note to Rule 5.3 of TANCEM Service Rules, items (a) to *d) of the penalties are classified as minor punishments, whereas, items (e) to (i) are classified as major punishments. Stoppage of increment with cumulative effect has been classified as a minor punishment in Rule 5.3, but certainly such punishment has an impact of pension and therefore, this Court is of the considered view that whenever, it is proposed, after considering the representation, if any, made by the employee, to withhold of increment of pay an such withholding of increment is likely to affect adversely on the amount of pension payable to the employee the procedure to be followed is that before passing orders before the penalty, the employee shall be given an opportunity to submit his further representation on the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. If the employee is denied of an opportunity of making further representation, on the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, then, he would be deprived of his legitimate right to pinpoint any procedural impropriety or non-consideration of his defence, if any, before arriving at a conclusion on the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. In such view of the matter, in domestic enquiries, where major penalties are imposed, a report of the enquiry officer shall be prepared by the authorities holding enquiry and such report shall contain sufficient record of evidence and the findings thereof. If any finding adverse to the delinquent is drawn up, the employee should be given an opportunity of making his further representation. 38. In the above background, this Court deems it fit to consider as to whether there is any procedural impropriety in the conduct of departmental enquiry, which resulted in imposing punishments of stoppage of one annual increment with cumulative effect, in respect of charges, subject matter in W.P.No.2268 of 2001 and reduction to a lower rank to the post of Assistant Manager (Materials) for a period of two years, in respect of charges, subject matter in W.P.No.2269 of 2001. As stated supra, as per Note to Rule 5.3 of the TANCEM Service Rules, the latter penalty has been classified as Major Punishment. 39. In the case on hand, pursuant to the disciplinary action taken by the respondent for two different sets of charges, two witnesses were examined on behalf of the respondent-Corporation and the petitioner examined himself as defence witness. In proceedings in Rc.No.5407/A3/98, dated 27.02.1999, the petitioner has been inflicted with a penalty of reduction in lower rank under Rule 5.3 of the TANCEM Service Rules as Assistant Manager (materials) from Deputy Manager (Materials) and that the same was directed to be in operation for a period of two years (W.P.No.2269 of 2001). In proceedings in Rc.No.5968/A3/98, dated 27.02.1999, the petitioner has been inflicted with a penalty of stoppage of annual increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect in the lower post under Rule 3. of the TANCEM Service Rules (W.P. No. 2255 of 2001). 40. It is evident from the letter, dated 05.03.1999 of the Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd., respondent herein, the petitioner has pointed out that he was not furnished with the copy of the enquiry officer’s report. of the TANCEM Service Rules (W.P. No. 2255 of 2001). 40. It is evident from the letter, dated 05.03.1999 of the Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd., respondent herein, the petitioner has pointed out that he was not furnished with the copy of the enquiry officer’s report. In this context, it is worthwhile to consider the some of the decisions, as to whether non-furnishing of the copy of the enquiry officer’s report is necessary, before inflicting a penalty. 41. In M. Natanam v. The Assistant Commissioner, HR & CR, reported in 1999 (III) CTC 657 , an employee of a temple was removed from service. The said order was challenged inter alia that a copy of the enquiry officer’s report was not furnished. Though an alternative remedy was available, having regard to the violation of principles of natural justice that was apparent on the face of the record, this Court, at Paragraph 27, held as follows: “It has been repeatedly held that when there is failure of principles of natural justice, and when the contention goes not only to the root of the matter, but also renders the proceedings a nullity or non est, it is not necessary for the writ petitioner to prefer an appeal and thereafter approach of this Court. As the failure of principles of natural justice is evident on the face of the record, this Court is well justified in entertaining the writ petition and deciding the two contentions raised by the writ petitioner.” 42. In Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. Secretary, S.M. School for Girls reported in 2002 (10) SCC 293 , the termination of a teacher was challenged on the ground that the copy of the enquiry report was not furnished and therefore, there was a violation of principles of natural justice. Admittedly, the School was governed by the Management for Recognished Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided) Rules, 1969. As violation of principles of natural justice was per se apparent, the Apex Court set aside the order of termination and remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority. 43. In director of Rural Development vs. A. Periyanayagam and The Registrar, Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal reported in 2006 (3) MLJ 674 , this Court has held as follows: “We find that the enquiry authority in this case is the Tribunal which has given it’s enquiry report. 43. In director of Rural Development vs. A. Periyanayagam and The Registrar, Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal reported in 2006 (3) MLJ 674 , this Court has held as follows: “We find that the enquiry authority in this case is the Tribunal which has given it’s enquiry report. The delinquent employee did not receive the copy of the enquiring authority’s report before the disciplinary authority arrived at the conclusion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee on the charges leveled against him. Therefore, the right of the employee to defend his case before the disciplinary authority, is taken away as the issue has been pre-judged. This will amount to denial of a reasonable opportunity for the delinquent to prove his innocence and it will be breach of principles of natural justice.” 44. In M. Rajagopal Vs. The Principal Labour Court and The Special Officer reported in 2009 (4) MLJ 1216 , the Division Bench of this Court, after extracting catena of decisions, held as follows: “A close reading of all the above judgments would make it abundantly clear that irrespective of whether there is any rule or regulation providing of furnishing of a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer and a further opportunity of personal hearing to the delinquent, in compliance with principles of natural justice, it is mandatory on the part of the employer to furnish Enquiry Officer’s report and to afford yet another opportunity to him to make his submissions except in certain circumstances as indicated in State Bank of Patiala’s case.” 45. In the light of the above decisions and the prejudice, caused to the petitioner, on account of non-furnishing of the copy of the report, this Court is of the considered view that the respondent has grossly erred in imposing the punishments of reduction to lower rank and stoppage of annual increment, without furnishing a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner and thus, there is a violation of the principles of natural justice. 46. The next contention to be considered as to whether the respondent has taken extraneous matters into consideration before inflicting the penalty. 46. The next contention to be considered as to whether the respondent has taken extraneous matters into consideration before inflicting the penalty. The charge in W.P.No.2268 of 2001, relate to unnecessary holding of Earnest Money Deposit repayable to the third party with an ulterior motive and that there was a deviation of tender procedures and likewise, the charge in the other disciplinary proceedings, subject matter of W.P.No.2269 of 2001, is that the petitioner has failed to carry out the instructions and issue necessary warning to the transporter, regarding dumping of slag with moisture contamination. 47. The proceedings, dated 27.02.1999, impugned in W.P.No.2268 of 2001, shows that the disciplinary authority, apart from taking into consideration, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, has also considered some other materials, which are extraneous to the charges, which is, in my opinion, has certainly influenced the mind of the Appellate Authority in interfering with the findings. The extraneous matters recorded in the order of penalty reads as follows: “Also it is seen from the records, that he is not able to discharge his functions in the Materials Department effectively and satisfactorily.” 48. Similarly, in the impugned order, dated 27.02.1999, by which, the penalty of stoppage of annual increment was imposed, the disciplinary authority, on perusal of records, has taken into consideration some other complaints leveled against the petitioner. The relevant passage from the impugned order is extracted hereunder: “Also from the records and complaints received against him, it is clear that he is not able to discharge his duties and responsibilities in the Materials Department effectively and satisfactorily.” 49. Thus, reading of the impugned orders in both the Writ Petitions, clearly shows that the disciplinary authority has not only considered the charges in the enquiry report, but as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, has traveled beyond the charge and adverted to certain matters, which were not the subject matter of the charges, for his conclusion and imposition of the penalties. 50. Another important point to be considered is, whether the disciplinary authority has properly considered the three important aspects while arriving at the conclusion of the guilt, viz., (a) whether the facts on which the order was based have been established, (b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action, and (c) Whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate. In this context, it is necessary to extract the manner, in which, the Disciplinary Authority, has concluded the guilty. 51. It is well settled that while agreeing with the report of the enquiry officer, the Disciplinary authority, need not narrate the entire evidence recorded by the enquiry officer and pass a final order like a judgment. However, it is mandatory that being the disciplinary authority, conferred with powers to impose a major penalty, it is necessary to record his reasons for such conclusions. A penal order should reflect the application of mind of the disciplinary authority to the above said aspects and mere reproduction of enquiry officer’s report is not sufficient. In this context, this Court deems it fit to extract the relevant passages from the impugned orders. After extracting the facts and findings recorded by the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority has simply observed as follows: “It is thus established beyond all reasonable doubts that Thiru. K.A. Gurusamy, Dy. Manager (Mat) has committed the serious misconduct of disobedience of reasonable orders of superior which amount to willful insubordination, breach of rules in force and negligence and neglect of work which are considered as serious misconduct as per rule 5.2(a), (g) and (k) of Service Rules of TANCEM.” 52. Similarly, in respect of the disciplinary proceedings, subject matter of W.P.No.2269 of 2001, the disciplinary authority has observed as follows: “it is thus established beyond all reasonable doubts that Thiru. K.A. Gurusamy, Dy. Manager (Mat) has committed the serious misconduct of willful insubordination of the reasonable orders of the superior and a tendency to extend favouritism to the Transporter for personal gains amounting to dishonesty in connection with the Corporation’s business/property in connection with the Corporation’s business/property as per rule 5.2(a), (g) and (k) of Service Rules of TA.” 53. Apparently, in both the cases, the disciplinary authority has failed to consider the defence put up by the petitioner and after merely extracting the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, has proceeded to impose the punishment, holding that the acts of omissions and commissioner, warranted punishment. The impugned orders do not reflect independent application of mind of the disciplinary authority and the mere statement that he has taken into consideration and analysed the record of proceedings of the enquiry officer, will not stand the test of reasonableness. The impugned orders do not reflect independent application of mind of the disciplinary authority and the mere statement that he has taken into consideration and analysed the record of proceedings of the enquiry officer, will not stand the test of reasonableness. What is reflected in the impugned orders is only conclusions and not reasons, however, brief it may be, as required under law. 54. It is to be noted that when the service conditions of an employee, is affected by an order, involving civil consequences and particularly, when a major penalty of reduction in rank to a lower post or order of stoppage of increment, which has an impact on his pension is imposed, then the disciplinary authority has to apply his mind independently to the facts, charges, defence put up by the delinquent employee and pass a reasonable order, however brief it may be on the aspects stated supra. Useful reference can be made to the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in The Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited and another v. S. Sampath reported in 2005 (1) LW 795 , wherein, this Court, at Paragraphs 5 to 8, held as follows: “5. A perusal of the order dated 30.3.1990 shows that no reasons have been given therein, but only conclusions. There is a difference between reasons and conclusions, vide Union of India v. M.L. Capoor ( AIR 1974 SC 87 ). In paragraph 28 of the aforesaid decisions, the Supreme Court observed:- “Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decisions whether it is purely administrative or quasi judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable.” 6. Thus what has been recorded in the impugned order, as can be seen from its perusal, is only conclusions and not reasons. 7. It has been held by the Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India ( AIR 1990 SC 1984 ) that even administrative orders which have civil consequences must give reasons. Thus what has been recorded in the impugned order, as can be seen from its perusal, is only conclusions and not reasons. 7. It has been held by the Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India ( AIR 1990 SC 1984 ) that even administrative orders which have civil consequences must give reasons. In paragraph 35 of the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court observed that recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions making. It is not necessary that the reasons should be an elaborate as in the decisions of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. However, what is necessary is that the reason should be clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. 8. In the present case the respondent (writ petitioner) had furnished explanations to the show cause notices. It was, therefore, incumbent on the Corporation to have considered that explanation and given its reasons why it is not accepting the same. That however has not been done in the impugned orders of the Corporation. Hence the said orders cannot be sustained in law.” 55. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered view that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that both the disciplinary as well as appellate authorities have mechanically approached the issue and failed to considered that there has been an infringement of a constitutional right of fair and reasonable opportunity in disciplinary proceedings, has to be accepted. 56. Yet another aspect to be considered is whether the appellate authority has properly exercised its jurisdiction and considered parameters set out in Rule 5.12 of TANCEM Service Rules, which reads as follows: “(A) Whether the facts on which the order was based have been established. (b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action, (c) Whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate and after such consideration, shall pass such orders as it thinks proper. (b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action, (c) Whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate and after such consideration, shall pass such orders as it thinks proper. (d) It is shall be open to the Appellate Authority to call for the records in respect of any disciplinary proceedings and review any order made under these rules and pass orders as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. Wherever controlling/appointing authority is Chairman and Managing Director, both posts being held by one and same Officer, the Chairman and Managing Director shall be disciplinary authority and in the case of those officers drawing more than Rs.1350/-the Board of Directors shall be the Appellate authority and in the case of officers drawing upto a basic of Rs.1350/- the Chairman and Managing Director shall be the disciplinary authority and appellate authority shall be the Executive Committee of Directors.” 57. Perusal of the appellate order, dated 30.12.1999 shows that the appellate authority, after setting out the details of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner, till passing of the orders, has passed the following orders, “The appellate authority, after a perusal of all the connected records, pertaining to the Charge Memos, explanations given by the Thiru K.A. Guruswamy, the enquiry proceedings and findings submitted by the Enquiry Officer punishment awarded, the contents of the Appeal Petitions has felt the punishment awarded required to be reduced. It has accordingly passed the following modified order. (i) He is reduced to the lower rank/post of Asst. Manager in the pay scale of Rs.8000-275-13500 with effect from 01.03.1999 for a period of ten months from 01.03.1999 to 312. 1999, instead of two years from 01.03.1999 as ordered in proceedings No.5407/A3/98, dated 27.02.1999. (ii) His next annual increment in the cadre of Dy. Manager (mat) in the pay scale of Rs.10000-325-15200 is postponed for a period of one year without cumulative effect against the orders issued in the proceedings No.5407/A3/98, dated 08.03.1999.” 58. Time and again, the Supreme Court as well as this Court in catena of decisions have stressed the importance of the word, “consider” in the Service Rules, particularly, in the matter, relating to the disciplinary proceedings, which involves the rights of the employees and the specific parameters to be dealt with by the appellate authorities, whenever an appeal is preferred against the order, imposed by the original authority. 59. 59. While explaining the word “consider: employed in Rule 27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification and Appeal) Rules, 1965, the Supreme Court in R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India reported in AIR 1986 SC 1040 , at paragraphs 4 and 5, observed that, “The word ‘consider’ in R.27(2) implies ‘due application of mind’. It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the appellate authority is required to consider (1) Whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such noncompliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) Whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc, the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. R.27(2) casts a duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any findings on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were unwarranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (2) of R.27(2), viz., whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of R.27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside.” 60. Following the R.P. Bhatt’s case, the Supreme Court in Ram Chander v. Union of India reported in 1986 (3) SCC 103 , held that the Appellate Authority must not only give a hearing to the government servant concerned but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised by him in the appeal. 61. Following the R.P. Bhatt’s case, the Supreme Court in Ram Chander v. Union of India reported in 1986 (3) SCC 103 , held that the Appellate Authority must not only give a hearing to the government servant concerned but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised by him in the appeal. 61. In Arokiadoss v. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, reported in 1989 Writ L.R. 274, this Court, while dealing with the powers of the appellate authority under Rule 6(1) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, at Paragraph 4, held as follows: “the order of the appellate authority does not indicate, whether the appellate authority considered the materials on record in the light of Rule 6(1) of the Rules. He should have discussed the relevant evidence and found whether the facts on which the order of the disciplinary authority was based have been established. He should have also considered whether the facts afford sufficient ground for taking disciplinary action and whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate. As the order of the appellate authority does not show that he has considered the relevant matters prescribed under R.6(1) of the Rules, the order is vitiated.” 62. In G.M. (P. W.), Canara Bank v. M. Raja Rao reported in 2001 (II) LLJ 819 , Supreme Court had an occasion to consider as to whether the appellate authority is required to pass a detailed order, while concurring with the decision of the disciplinary authority. The penalty imposed was affirmed by the learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court. On appeal, the Division bench held that the disciplinary Authority, while agreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer, is required to give reasons under Banking Regulation and therefore, by observing that there was failure on the part of the appellate authority, set aside the order of removal. Testing the correctness of the Division bench order, the Apex Court, at Paragraphs 4 and 5, held as follows: “4. ……… The order of the Disciplinary Authority unequivocally the Enquiring Authority and agreed with the same. When a Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Enquiring Authority, it is not necessary in law to give any detailed reasons as to why the intends to agree with the findings of the Enquiring Authority. ……… The order of the Disciplinary Authority unequivocally the Enquiring Authority and agreed with the same. When a Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Enquiring Authority, it is not necessary in law to give any detailed reasons as to why the intends to agree with the findings of the Enquiring Authority. It is of course true that in the matter of award of punishing if Enquiring Authority considers materials other than the materials which had been produced before the EO then the delinquent must be given a notice thereof or else the conclusions of the Disciplinary Authority would get vitiated. 5. So far as the order of the Appellate Authority is concerned, it is undoubtedly true that as provided in the Regulation, the Appellate Authority is required to pass a reasoned order.” 63. In Janarthanan Assistant Executive Engineer, Palacode v. The Chief Engineer Distribution, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and others reported in 2004 Writ L.R. 535, this Court, at paragraph 7, held that the appellate authority has merely confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority, stating that no new points had been urged. If an appeal has been filed, it is the duty of the appellate authority to consider the contentions raised by the application of independent mind. That having not been done, such order passed by the appellate authority cannot be sustained. 64. A policeman was inflicted with a penalty of reduction in time scale of pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect on the charges of insubordination of abusing his superior officer and acting in a manner of unbecoming a Government servant. The appellate authority dismissed his appeal without giving any reasons. When the order was tested by this Court, following the decision rendered in Arokiadoss’s case, a learned single Judge of this Court in K. Kandasamy v. Deputy I.G., of Police, reported in 2006 (4) MLJ 1382 , at paragraph 7, held as follows: “It is seen from the aforesaid portion of the impugned order that the Appellate Authority did not deal with any of the grounds of appeal raised by the petitioner. A departmental appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. It is needless to point out that the last opportunity available for a delinquent, to canvass his case on merits, is at the appellate stage. A departmental appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. It is needless to point out that the last opportunity available for a delinquent, to canvass his case on merits, is at the appellate stage. After the appeal, a delinquent loses his right to challenge any disciplinary proceedings on merits, since the scope of interference on a revision or on a writ petition is very limited. Therefore, the rules themselves contemplate Appellate Authorities to go into the factual details and consider all the grounds of appeal before deciding an appeal. Unfortunately, the first respondent has chosen to dismiss the appeal by a non-speaking order and hence the Appellate Authority’s order is liable to be set aside. 65. In Vanaja, N. v. The Board of Directors of Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Ltd., reported in 2006 (4) CTC 52 , at Paragraph 3 and 4, this Court held as follows: “3. It is brought to the notice of this Court, Rule 6.25-A of the Service Rules of Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Ltd., which contemplates that when an Appeal is preferred imposing penalties specified in Rule 6.15, the Appellate Authority shall consider whether the penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe and pass orders (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed on the penalty with such direction as it may deem fit to the Appellate Authority to call for the records in respect of any disciplinary proceeding and review any order made under these rules and pass such orders as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. 4. After going through the order impugned in the Writ Petition, this Court is prima facie satisfied that the Appellate Authority except informing that after detailed examination a resolution has been passed to reject the Appeal made by the petitioner and confirm the order dated 01.06.2005 passed by the Managing Director, nothing has been stated, has not followed the Rules contemplated under Rule 6.25-A of the above said Rules. Except saying that after detailed examination, no reason was given as specified under Rule 6.25-A of the above said service rules as to whether the Appellate Authority had considered that the punishment imposed was adequate or inadequate. What is the detailed examination is also not mentioned in that order.” 66. In Director (Marketing), Indian Oil Corpn. Except saying that after detailed examination, no reason was given as specified under Rule 6.25-A of the above said service rules as to whether the Appellate Authority had considered that the punishment imposed was adequate or inadequate. What is the detailed examination is also not mentioned in that order.” 66. In Director (Marketing), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., v. Santhosh Kumar reported in 2006 (11) SCC 147, the order of the appellate authority was assailed on the ground of total non-application of mind, as the said authority, in verbatim, extracted the order of the disciplinary authority. The orders of the disciplinary as well as appellate authority, as extracted in the above reported judgment, are produced hereunder: “10. For the sake of convenience, we extract both the orders available at pp.51-52 of the paper-book: “I have carefully gone through Shri Santhosh Kumar’s (Emp.No.19957, ex-AM (Operations), Hissar depot) appeal dated 25-3-2000 together with all papers relating to the disciplinary case initiated against him vide Charge-sheet No.IR/1461 (N-113) dated 24-6-1997 in the capacity of the competent disciplinary authority. I have applied my mind and I find Shri Santosh Kumar has not brought out any point in his appeal dated 25-3-2000 which may warrant any change in the said final order passed by me as the competent disciplinary authority. The appeal of Shri Santosh Kumar is hereby forwarded to the Director (Marketing), the Appellate Authority for his kind consideration and orders. General Manager (Operations) I have carefully gone through Shri Santosh Kumar’s (Emp.No.19957, ex-AM (Operations), Hissar depot) appeal dated 25-3-2000 together with all papers relating to the disciplinary case initiated against him vide Charge-sheet No.IR/1451/(N-113) dated 24-6-1997. Shri Santosh Kumar has preferred an appeal against the order of penalty of ‘dismissal’, inflicted upon him by General Manager (Operations), the competent disciplinary authority vide Reference No. IR/1461/(N-113) dated 30-12-1999 as a measure of disciplinary action against Shri Santosh Kumar. I have applied my mind and I find that Shri Santosh Kumar has not brought out any point which may warrant my interference with the said orders passed by the competent disciplinary authority. Accordingly, I hereby reject the appeal of Shri Santosh Kumar. Let Shri Santosh Kumar be advised accordingly. Director (Marketing)” 67. I have applied my mind and I find that Shri Santosh Kumar has not brought out any point which may warrant my interference with the said orders passed by the competent disciplinary authority. Accordingly, I hereby reject the appeal of Shri Santosh Kumar. Let Shri Santosh Kumar be advised accordingly. Director (Marketing)” 67. The Supreme Court, while setting aside the orders passed by the above said authorities, directed the disciplinary authority therein to consider the detailed representation made by the respondent therein, the report of the Enquiry Officer in proper perspective and decide the matter afresh. The judgment rendered in National Fertilisers Limited and another v. P.K. Khanna reported in 2005 (7) SCC 597 , was into consideration. 68. In Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem & ors. V. Madhusudan Rao reported in 2008 (1) Supreme 617 , after considering the Constitutional Bench judgment in State of Madras v. A.R. Srinivasan ( AIR 1966 SC 1827 ), Som Datt Datta v. Union of India ( (1969) 2 SCR 177 ), Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi ( (1977) 1 SCC 472 ), R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India ( (1986) 2 SCC 651 ) and Ram Chander v. Union of India ( (1986) 3 SCC 103 ), the Apex Court, at paragraph 19, held as follows: “19. It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum, but in our view, in the interests of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know atleast the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower forum. 69. In yet another decision in Bhikubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat reported in 2008 (4) SCC 144 , the Supreme Court explained the word “consider”, used in a statute, means, “to think it over”, it connotes that there should be active application of mind. In other words the term “consider” postulates consideration of all the relevant aspects of the matter. 70. In M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd., v. STO, Rourkela-I Circle & Ors. In other words the term “consider” postulates consideration of all the relevant aspects of the matter. 70. In M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd., v. STO, Rourkela-I Circle & Ors. Reported in 2008 (5) Supreme 281 , the Supreme Court testing the correctness of an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax against the assessment, at paragraph 10, held as follows: “10. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same it becomes lifeless.” 71. It is worthwhile to reproduce the views of Lord Denning in M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union ((1971) 1 All. ER 1148) and Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd., v. Crabtree (1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)), found at paragraph 11 of the above reported judgment. “Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union, (1971) 1 All ER 1148, observed: “The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.” In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd., v. Crabtree (1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)), it was observed: “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice.” Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.” Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of juridical review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before the Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can known why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made; in other words, a speaking-out. The “inscrutable face of the sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.” 72. In V. Arivuselvan v. State of T.N., reported in 2008 (5) MLJ 1327 , this Court, at paragraph 9, held as follows: “Thus the appellate authority has to consider including other things, whether the order of the original authority has to be confirmed, enhanced, reduced or set aside. In V. Arivuselvan v. State of T.N., reported in 2008 (5) MLJ 1327 , this Court, at paragraph 9, held as follows: “Thus the appellate authority has to consider including other things, whether the order of the original authority has to be confirmed, enhanced, reduced or set aside. When specific grounds have been raised by the petitioner explaining the circumstances under which the said amount had been utilized and also pleading for mercy, it is expected that the appellate authority has to consider the said grounds taken by the petitioner. Admittedly, the appellate authority has not considered whether the punishment awarded to the petitioner is on the higher side and whether it requires any modification or reduction. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the appellate authority has not considered whether the punishment of removal imposed by the original authority is adequate or inadequate.” 73. Another Division Bench of this Court in The Joint Commissioner of Police, Traffic Zone, Vepery & another v. Anandan, reported in 2008 Writ. L.R 86, held that, “Under Rule 6(1), the appellate authority shall give a finding while considering the appeal as to whether the facts on which the order is based have been established, among other things – No such finding is given by the appellate authority except by stating that he has gone through the representation of the appellant therein, minutes and the order passed by the punishing authority – Hence, we are unable to confirm the order of the appellate authority as it is not a speaking order passed in terms of Section 6 (1) of the Rules.” 74. In N. Sivakumaran Vs. State of Tamilnadu, rep. In N. Sivakumaran Vs. State of Tamilnadu, rep. by its Secretary to the Government, Chennai and others reported in (2009) 1 MLJ 701 , this Court has held as follows: “In the case of an appeal against the order of imposing any penalty under Rules 8 and 9 of Rule 23 gives a mandate to the appellate authority to consider (a) Whether the factors on which the order was passed have been established (b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action and (c) Whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate/ and pass orders confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty, with such direction as it may be deemed fit in the circumstances of the case. Clause II of the Rule 234(1) any error or defect in the procedural violation in imposing penalty may be disregarded by the appellate authority if such authority considers for the reason to be recorded in writing that the error or defect was not material and had neither caused injustice to the person concerned or affect the decision of the case. The order of the Appellate Authority must therefore ex facie show that the matters referred to Rule 23 have been considered by the Appellate Authority Penalty suffered by a government servant affects his service promotion and monetary benefits and casts a stigma in his career. (Para 32) The Appellate Authority must not only give a hearing to the government servant concerned but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contention raised in the appeal. (para 12) In the interest of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know atleast the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in disposing of the appeal or revision. (para 20) If the Appellate Authority merely confirmed the order of the Disciplinary Authority stating no new points had been urged without considering the contentions raised by the appellant by application of independent mind, such order cannot be sustained. (para 15) The right of appeal is a substantive right and the appellate authority is the final fact finding authority and essentially an appeal is at continuation of the original proceedings. QA judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is restricted to the decision making process and the High Court cannot substitute the findings of the disciplinary or appellate authority. (para 26). QA judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is restricted to the decision making process and the High Court cannot substitute the findings of the disciplinary or appellate authority. (para 26). If there is a statutory provision dealing with the exercise of powers by the original or appellate authority, the same has to be examined in the manner provided in the statute and not otherwise. (para 27). The Appellate Authority in dealing with the appeal merely stated that the opinion of the Public Service Commission had been independently considered. The punishment of removal awarded by the Principal Commissioner for Revenue Administration is not excessive and therefore, the Government had decided to reject the appeal and accordingly rejected the appeal. The impugned order is unsustainable and has to be set aside the matter remitted to the Appellate Authority for consideration of the appeal on merits according to Rule 23.” 75. In K. Elayaperumal Vs. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Madurai Range, Madurai and another reported in 2009 Writ L.R. 112, a Division Bench of this Court held that, “order of the disciplinary authority and the subsequent order passed by the appellate authority are bereft of any reasons-Order passed by the appellate authority should indicate the application of mind and reasons, however brief they may be, should be incorporated in the order-Appellate authority by a very laconic order has merely recounted the allegations and observed that no new point has been brought to the notice.” 76. Except recording the findings of the disciplinary proceedings, the appellate authority has appellate failed to consider, (a) Whether the facts on which the order was based have been established and (b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action. All that is considered by the appellate authority is there is a failure to consider the important parameters set out in sub-Rule (a) and (b) of Rule 5.12 of the TANCEM Rules. Thus, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is a failure to exercise the discretion conferred on the appellate authority, merits consideration. 77. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others reported in 2009 (2) SCC 570 , the Apex Court, at Paragraph 23, held as follows: “23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. 77. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others reported in 2009 (2) SCC 570 , the Apex Court, at Paragraph 23, held as follows: “23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.” 78. Another aspect to be considered is whether the appellate order, passed by the Board with the presence of the Managing Director/Chairman, TANCEM Limited, who had earlier acted as Disciplinary Authority, is valid or not. It is well known principle that no person can be the Judge of his own case and the adjudicating authority must be impartial and act without any kind of bias. Bias has its origin from the maxim known as “nemo debt esse jundex in propria causa”, which is based on the principle that justice not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. 79. Though the petitioner has contended that the very same Chairman/Managing Director of the respondent-Corporation presided over the deliberations of the executive Committee of the Board and sat over his own decisions, which is disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent, there is no material to ascertain the same. 79. Though the petitioner has contended that the very same Chairman/Managing Director of the respondent-Corporation presided over the deliberations of the executive Committee of the Board and sat over his own decisions, which is disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent, there is no material to ascertain the same. According to the respondent, the then Chairman/Managing Director was replaced by another officer and in such circumstances, the question of considering as to whether there was any personal bias in the decision taken in the appeals, does not arise. To support the said contention, the respondent has not produced any material. However, in view of the discussions made earlier, relating to the procedural violation supported by legal pronouncements and in the absence of any materials placed by either of the parties, this Court is not inclined to delve into the matter. 80. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that if the proceedings would be set aside for the above said grounds, the matter may be remitted back to the original authority for fresh consideration and appropriate orders. At the time of filing of the Writ Petitions, the petitioner was aged 56 years and by this time, he would have attained the age of superannuation and retired from service. There is no rule or regulation in TANCEM Service Rules to continue the disciplinary proceedings, after superannuation. In P. Muthusamy v. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd., reported in 2006 (4) MLJ 504 , a Division bench of this Court has held that in the absence of specific reserving the right to continue disciplinary proceeding, after superannuation, is illegal and without jurisdiction. 81. Useful reference can also be made to the few decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. In Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Director, O.S.F.C. Reported in 1999 (3) SCC 666 , the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 7, held as follows: “7. In view of the absence of such a provision in the above said regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retrial benefits of the appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in the case of misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retrial benefits. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in the case of misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retrial benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30.06.1995, there was no authority vested in the Corporation for continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retrial benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such an authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retrial benefits on retirement.” 82. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Karupiah reported in 2005 (3) CTC 4, this Court, at paragraph 29, held as follows: “29. From the above note it is also clear that to proceed against a Government servant, who is under suspension on a charge of misconduct, after his retirement, the fulfilling of the requirements under Rule 56(1)(C) of the Fundamental Rules is a mandatory one, otherwise, the competent authority cannot have any jurisdiction on the retired Government servant to proceed against him and the non-compliance of the said Rule has vitiated all the proceedings initiated against the first respondent and therefore, the same are not sustainable under law and are liable to be set aside.” 83. Following the above decisions, another Division Bench of this Court in N. Kunnai Gowder v. The Coimbatore District Co-operative Milk Producers’ Union Ltd., reported in 2007 (5) CTC 491 , at paragraph 6, held as follows: “6. A departmental proceeding can continue so long as the employee is in service. In the event, a disciplinary proceeding is kept pending by the employer, the employee cannot be made to retire. In the instant case, no rule has been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. There has to be a specific provision of law or regulation or a byelaw governing the service conditions of the person in question for continuing a departmental enquiry, initiated before the date of superannuation, even after the employee had retired from service. Without such a provision being available, there cannot be an employer-employee relationship surviving after the employee retires from service. Therefore, continuing the enquiry proceedings or conducting an action against the person after his retirement from service cannot be sustained in the eye of law.” 84. Without such a provision being available, there cannot be an employer-employee relationship surviving after the employee retires from service. Therefore, continuing the enquiry proceedings or conducting an action against the person after his retirement from service cannot be sustained in the eye of law.” 84. In the light of the ratio decidenti in P. Muthusamy’s case, with reference to the same service (TANCEM), the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, cannot be countenanced. In sum and substance, this Court is of the considered view that both the disciplinary as well as the appellate orders, are liable to be set aside for the reasons stated supra and accordingly, set aside. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to all service and monetary benefits, as if he was not imposed with the penalties of stoppage of increment and reduction in rank. The respondent shall restore his position notionally to the post of Deputy Manager (Materials), TANCEM from the date of imposition of penalty and consequently, pay him all backwages, arrears of pay and such other emoluments, including revision in pay and pension, as expeditiously as possible. 85. The Writ Petitions are allowed. No costs.