JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. MA Parekh for appellants and Ms. Roopal Patel, learned Advocate for respondent NO.2 Corporation. 2. By filing this appeal, appellants have challenged common judgment and award made by MACT (Main) Ahmedabad Rural, Navrangpura at Ahmedabad in so far as it relates to MACP No. 1004 of 1989. Two claim petitions being MACP No.792/89 and MACP No. 1004/89 arising from same accident were filed before claims tribunal and were decided by claims tribunal by common judgment wherein claims tribunal dismissed both claim petitions on the basis of finding on issue no.1 alone, without examining issue no.2 in respect of quantum of compensation, while ordering that applicants of claim petition no. 1004 of 1989 are entitled to interim compensation at Rs. 25000.00 with interest at 9 per cent per annum from date of interim application Exh. 27 till realisation under No Fault Liability and said award was ordered to be satisfied after deducting court fee stamps equally between applicants no.2 and 3 and opponent no.3 cannot be apportioned amount as he is not legal heir of deceased. Opponent nO.1 driver of ST Bus was subsequently deleted by claimants and claims tribunal held that in absence of driver, ST Corporation cannot be held liable vicariously and, therefore, on that issue alone, claims tribunal dismissed claim petitions. Therefore, appellants original claimants in claim petition no. 1004 have challenged said award by filing this appeal. 3. Looking to facts emerging from record, on 20.4.1989 deceased Vallabhbhai Dhanjibhai and deceased Bhagwanbhai Parsotambhai were in Barvala ST Bus Stand at about 9.00 p.m. and they were standing at one side in open space of stand waiting for bus for Surat. At about 10.15 p.m., when Vallabhbhai and Bhagwanbhai were sitting on the ground and Jitendrabhai and Babubhai who were accompanying to them were standing, deleted opponent no.1 brought ST Bus bearing No.GRU.9108 from workshop and started to drive said bus rashly and negligently in high speed in compound of bus stand and because of such driving, he lost control over bus and bus came towards passengers who were waiting for bus and bus ran over deceased Vallabhbhai and Bhagwanbhai and Jitendrabhai and Babubhai were thrown away wherein Vallabhbhai and Bhagwanbhai sustained injuries and succumbed to same. Initially, opponent no.1 was joined as driver of offending ST Bus but subsequently, opponent no.1 was deleted. Initially, opponent no.1 was joined as driver of offending ST Bus but subsequently, opponent no.1 was deleted. While examining issue no.1, claims tribunal held that it is proved that accident is result of rash and negligent driving of bus by deleted driver and, therefore, issue no.1 was answered accordingly but thereafter, claims tribunal held that ST Corporation is owner of offending bus but they are not vicariously liable to satisfy claim, only Ghanshyamsinh Tapubha Jadeja means deleted opponent no.1 is liable to satisfy claim but since claimants have deleted opponent no.1, claims tribunal is unable to pass award on point of quantum and hence dismissed claim petitions. Therefore, claim petition no. 1004 of 1989 was filed by heirs and legal representatives of deceased Vallabhbhai claiming compensation of Rs.10,00,000.00 while claim petition no. 792 of 1989 was filed by heirs and legal representatives of deceased Bhagwanbhai for compensation of Rs.6,00,000.00 which were consolidated and decided by common judgment which is under challenge in this appeal at the instance of claimants in claim petition no. 1004 of 1989. 4. Before claims tribunal, reply was filed by opponent no.2 ST Corporation wherein averments made in claim petitions were denied and liability of ST Corporation was also denied. According to opponent no.2, deleted opponent no.1 was watchman and he was not authorised driver holding legal driving licence. It was also contended that he being a watchman to guard property lying in depot workshop and he drove bus on his risk without taking permission of any officer of Corporation, therefore, Corporation is not liable to pay compensation to claimants. Therefore, it was prayed to dismiss claim petitions with costs. 5. Before claims tribunal, eye witness Jitendrabhai Motibhai was examined at Exh. 48 who is also complainant. In his deposition, contents of complaint were reiterated by him which were also supporting averments made in claim petition regarding negligence. After examining facts of complainant and panchanama Exh. 139 and 140, it was held by claims tribunal that accident is result of rash and negligent driving of offending bus by deleted opponent no.1 in which deceased were crushed under bus and succumbed to crush injuries. Before claims tribunal, attempts were made by opponent no.2 to get examined deleted opponent no.1 who drove bus at the time of accident by summoning him but he has not come to step into witness box and thereafter, vide purshis Exh. Before claims tribunal, attempts were made by opponent no.2 to get examined deleted opponent no.1 who drove bus at the time of accident by summoning him but he has not come to step into witness box and thereafter, vide purshis Exh. 126, it was prayed by opponent no.2 not to draw adverse inference as driver is not examined. Therefore, after examining statement of deleted opponent no.1 given before police it was held by claims tribunal that deceased persons were not responsible for contributory negligence and based upon such finding, issue no.1 was answered accordingly by claims tribunal while rejecting plea of ST Corporation that there was contributory negligence on the part of deceased. 6. Thereafter, question of liability has been examined by claims tribunal. While examining this question, claims tribunal examined whether ST Corporation is vicariously liable for negligence of deleted opponent no.1 or not. Regarding vicarious liability of ST Corporation i.e. Opponent no.2, it has examined before claims tribunal one Bhupatsinh Karansinh Dodiya who was driver on offending bus on the date of accident, at Exh. 117 wherein it was deposed by him that he was on duty on route from Bhavnagar to Botad and from Botad, he has to go to Barwala. It was deposed by him in his evidence that he reached in Barvala ST Stand at 9.05 p.m. All passengers got down from bus, he took bus to diesel pump in workshop, filled 75 liters diesel in bus, made note of it in logsheet and deposited bus in workshop and went to staff room to put his bag and tiffin and started to talk with helper Kiritbhai regarding average of bus. It was also deposed by him that on asking to Kiritbhai about bus, he told that watchman Ghanshyamsinh Jadeja took bus and very same time, he heard noise and saw Ghanshyambhai running towards them and telling that an accident is occurred by him. It was also deposed by him before claims tribunal that Ghanshyamsinh ran away because behind him, there was a mob of people. He was cross examined and it came out from his cross examination that departmental action was taken against Ghanshyamsinh and is dismissed from service. 7. On behalf of ST Corporation, its Depot Manager Motibhai Shankarbhai Bhaskar of Barwala was also examined at Exh. He was cross examined and it came out from his cross examination that departmental action was taken against Ghanshyamsinh and is dismissed from service. 7. On behalf of ST Corporation, its Depot Manager Motibhai Shankarbhai Bhaskar of Barwala was also examined at Exh. 119 wherein it was deposed by him that deleted opponent no.1 was watchman of Barvala ST Bus Stand at relevant time he drove bus on his own risk. It was also deposed by him that he was informed about accident and he made inquiry about it and perused all police papers which were already prepared prior to his coming at place of accident. It was deposed by him that deleted opponent no.1 was employed as watchman to ensure that no unautorized person could drive or move vehicle of Corporation but watchman himself has driven bus and caused accident. According to said witness, act of driving bus by watchman unauthorizedly falls outside scope of his employment and hence corporation is not vicariously liable for unauthorized act of watchman who drove offending bus unauthorizedly and without permission of corporation. Map produced by ST Corporation at Exh. 122 was perused by claims tribunal and it was observed that accident has taken place in compound of ST Bus Stand. After examining aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, claims tribunal held that it is proved that ST Corporation is owner of offending bus but they are not vicariously liable to satisfy award, but only Ghanshyamsinh Tapubha Jadeja is liable to satisfy claim who has been deleted by claimants and, therefore, claims tribunal is unable to pass award on point of quantum and hence matters are required to be dismissed. Claims tribunal accordingly dismissed claim petitions in view of such finding on the issue of vicarious liability of opponent no.2, owner of offending bus. Claims tribunal considered decisions cited by claimants on issue of vicarious liability and held that same are not applicable to facts of case. Claims tribunal also considered judgment reported in 1900 Queens Bench Division 530 cited by opponent ST Corporation and held that claims tribunal is agreeing with said decision on point of vicarious liability of owner and claims tribunal dismissed claim petitions only on the issue of vicarious liability of ST Corporation by holding that ST Corporation is not vicariously liable. 8. Learned Advocate Mr. 8. Learned Advocate Mr. Parekh for claimants submitted that claims tribunal has committed gross error in dismissing claim petition by holding that ST Corporation is not vicariously liable though ST Corporation was owner of offending bus driven by deleted opponent no.1. He relied upon decision of this court in case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Cargo Motors Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2009 (2) GLR page 974 and submitted that in said decision, it has been held by this Court that driver is not a necessary party, even in absence of driver, claim petition can be decided by claims tribunal. He also relied upon certain decisions to establish vicarious liability of corporation, in case of State of Maharashtra and others versus Kanchanmala Vijaysing Shirke and others reported in 1995 ACJ 1021 ; Ratheshyam and another v. Nasir Hussain and others, reported in 1991 ACJ 755 , 1984 ACJ 72 Gujarat High Court Head Note B, 1993 ACJ 607 Bombay. He also relied upon decision of Madras High Court reported in 2008 ACJ 1071 and submitted that considering aforesaid decisions, impugned award is required to be set aside by awarding compensation to claimants as prayed for. 9. As against that, while supporting award made by claims tribunal, Ms. Roopal Patel learned advocate for ST Corporation submitted that claims tribunal has not committed any error which would require interference of this court. She submitted that watchman had driven bus unauthorizedly and, therefore, for such an act of watchman, an employee of ST Corporation, ST Corporation cannot be held vicariously liable and that aspect has been rightly appreciated by claims tribunal. She further submitted that view taken by claims tribunal is supported by judgment reported in 1900 Queens Bench Division 530 in respect of vicarious liability of owner and, therefore, no error is committed by claims tribunal which would require interference of this court and, therefore, this appeal is required to be dismissed by this court. 10. I have considered submissions made by both learned advocates. I have also perused impugned award made by claims tribunal. I have also kept in mind fact that finding of claims tribunal in respect of negligent driving of vehicle owned by ST Corporation has not been challenged by ST Corporation. Facts are not much in dispute between parties. 10. I have considered submissions made by both learned advocates. I have also perused impugned award made by claims tribunal. I have also kept in mind fact that finding of claims tribunal in respect of negligent driving of vehicle owned by ST Corporation has not been challenged by ST Corporation. Facts are not much in dispute between parties. Accident took place on 20.4.1989 in premises of ST Corporation by bus owned by ST Corporation and driven by its employee whoever he may be wherein deceased Vallabhbhai Dhanjibhai and deceased Bhagwanbhai Parsotambhai lost their lives. These facts have not been disputed by ST Corporation. Therefore, it is clear that employee of ST Corporation committed misconduct which resulted into loss of lives of two persons as stated earlier. It is required to be considered that being an owner of ST Bus, ST Corporation is joint tort feasor. Primary liability is that of driver/person driving vehicle and once it is found that driver was negligent, owner will be vicariously liable for negligent act of driver. This aspect, question of vicarious liability of owner, has been considered by this Court in New India Assurance CO. Ltd. v. Cargo Motors Ltd. (supra).It has been held by this court that non impleading of driver of offending vehicle in claim petition is not fatal to claim for compensation. 11. Law in this regard is very much settled and on that basis, it can be held that ST Corporation, being owner of offending bus, is vicariously liable for accident caused by its employee in its premises and, therefore, ST Corporation is liable to pay and compensate victims and/or heirs of such victims. 12. In this regard, I have considered decision of Madras High Court in case of Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Balaraman and others, 2008 ACJ 1066 wherein Water Board had taken tractor trailer on hire to supply water to public. Tractor trailer hit a person and he sustained injuries. It was contention of Board that it is not liable to pay compensation in capacity of hirer but owner is liable. Relevant observations made by Madras High Court in para 16, 17 and 18 of said decision are reproduced as under: 16. Tractor trailer hit a person and he sustained injuries. It was contention of Board that it is not liable to pay compensation in capacity of hirer but owner is liable. Relevant observations made by Madras High Court in para 16, 17 and 18 of said decision are reproduced as under: 16. The learned counsel appearing on the side of the appellant Board has contended that the appellant Board has only hired the vehicle from one Kannan by entering into a contract with him for the supply of water to the public and as per a particular clause of the terms and conditions of its works order, it is not liable to pay any compensation if the vehicle is involved in any accident during the time of its usage by it and it is only the owner of the vehicle who is liable to pay the compensation. 17. In this connection, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. v. Kailash Nath Kothari, 1997 ACJ 1148 (SC). In this case, the State Transport Corporation took a bus on hire from its owner for plying same in a particular route and due to negligence of its driver, the bus met with an accident involving the death of 23 passengers. The Transport Corporation contended that the driver was in the employment of the owner and it could not be held vicariously liable for rash and negligent act of the driver. The Transport Corporation further contended that as per terms and conditions of the agreement with the owner, it was only the owner who is liable to pay any compensation and not the hirer.But the apex court opined that the particular clause relied on by transport corporation is misconceived and the latter part of the said clause makes it clear that the transport corporation cannot escape from its liability under the clause and the relevant portion reads as under: 'Thus, the RSRTC cannot escape its liability under condition No.15 of the agreement either. Thus, both on facts and in law, the liability to pay compensation for the accident must fall on the RSRTC.' 18. Though it is argued by the counsel for the appellant Board that the owner has to pay the compensation, I am of the view that the term 'owner' has to be viewed in a broader perspective. Thus, both on facts and in law, the liability to pay compensation for the accident must fall on the RSRTC.' 18. Though it is argued by the counsel for the appellant Board that the owner has to pay the compensation, I am of the view that the term 'owner' has to be viewed in a broader perspective. Expression 'owner' must include the person who has the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose directions and commands, the driver is obliged to operate the vehicle. To confine the meaning of 'owner' to the registered owner, in a case where the vehicle is in the actual possession and control of the hirer, would not be proper for the purpose of fastening of liability in case of an accident. 13. In case of Radheshyam and another v. Nashir Hussain and others, reported in 1991 ACJ 755 , claimants failed to prove that vehicle was being driven by drive under employment of owner and tribunal dismissed claim petition. In appeal, it was held that claimants are not required to prove who was driver and only requirement for holding owner vicariously liable is that driver is in employment of owner which fact is admitted by owner. In case before hand also, ST Corporation admits that watchman who drove ST Bus in premises of ST stand was its employee also employee of watchman opponent No. 1 who is deleted. Relevant observations made by MP High Court in para 8 are reproduced as under : 8. PW 2 Kailashchand who is an eye witness of the accident, states that he had seen the incident and he had lodged the report Exth. P1 at Police Station, Sitamanu, The report Exh. P1 is a part of the record in Criminal Case No. 132 of 1986 in the court of JMFC, Sitamau. In that case, the respondent No. 2 is an accused in respect of the incident in question. The respondent No. 2 has not entered the witness box to say that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the incident. According to PW-2, he had not properly seen the driver who was driving the vehicle. Therefore, he had named Salim but later on he came to know that it was Ratansinh who was driving the vehicle. According to PW-2, he had not properly seen the driver who was driving the vehicle. Therefore, he had named Salim but later on he came to know that it was Ratansinh who was driving the vehicle. As such the statement to PW 2 Kailashchand does not help the case of the claimants on the point that it was Ratansingh who was driving the vehicle. But the averments in the petition have been accepted by the respondent No. 1 who was the owner of the bus and who had the knowledge as to the accident. There is no rebuttal of this admission by any witness on the record. Therefore, the learned Tribunal had clearly erred in dismissing the claim case of the appellants on that ground. When a vehicle is being driven rashly and negligently and dashes against a victim, then, it is not necessary for the victim to prove as to who was the driver of the vehicle. The only requirement for holding the owner vicariously liable is that the driver should be in the employment of the owner of the vehicle. The owner has admitted this fact. Therefore, the lower Tribunal could not ignore the admission of the owner and hod that the vehilce was not being driven by a person in the employment of the owner at the time of the accident. 14. In case of State of Maharashtra and other v. Kanchanmala Vijaysing Shirke and others, reported in 1995 ACJ 1021 , apex court explained when employer is vicariously liable for acts of his servant. Apex court observed as under in para 9,10 and 11: 9. The question of payment of compensation for motor accidents has assumed great importance during the last few decades. The road accidents have touched a new height in India as well as in other parts of the world. Traditionally, before Court directed payment of tort compensation, the claimant had to establish the fault of the person causing injury or damage. But of late, it shall appear from different judicial pronouncement that the fault is being read as because of someone's negligence or carelessness. Same is the approach and attitude of the Courts while judging the vicarious liability of the employer for negligence of the employee. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man is expected to do or a prudent man is expected not to do. Same is the approach and attitude of the Courts while judging the vicarious liability of the employer for negligence of the employee. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man is expected to do or a prudent man is expected not to do. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the person causing injury to the other was negligent or not has to be examined on the materials produced before the Court. It is the rule that an employer, though guilty of no fault himself, is liable for the damage done by the fault or negligence of his servant acting in the course of his employment. In some case, it can be found that an employee was doing an authorised act in an unauthorised but not a prohibited way. The employer shall be liable for such act, because such employee was acting within the scope of his employment and in so acting done something negligent or wrongful. A master is liable even for acts which he has not authorised provided they are so connected with acts which he has been so authorised. On the other hand, if the act of the servant is not even remotely connected within the scope of employment and is an independent act, the master shall not be responsible because the servant is not acting in the course of his employment but has gone outside. In Salmond's Law of Torts (Twentieth Edition) at page 458, it has been said : ".......................On the other hand it has been held that a servant who is authorised to drive a motor-vehicle, and who permits an unauthorised person to drive it in his place, may yet be acting within the scope of his employment. The act of permitting another to drive may be a mode, albeit an improper one, of doing the authorised work. The master may even be responsible if the servant impliedly, and not expressly, permits an unauthorised person to drive the vehicle, as where he leaves it unattended in such a manner that it is reasonably foreseeable that the third party will attempt to drive it, at least if the driver retains notional control of the vehicle." 10. The master may even be responsible if the servant impliedly, and not expressly, permits an unauthorised person to drive the vehicle, as where he leaves it unattended in such a manner that it is reasonably foreseeable that the third party will attempt to drive it, at least if the driver retains notional control of the vehicle." 10. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 16, paragraph 739, it has been stated : "Where the act which the employee is expressly authorised to do is lawful, the employer is nevertheless responsible for the manner in which the employee executes his authority. If, therefore, the employee does the act in such a manner as to occasion injury to a third person, the employer cannot escape liability on the ground that he did not actually authorise the particular manner in which the act was done, or even on the ground that the employee was acting on his own behalf and not on that of his employer." 11. In the case of London County Council v. Cattermoles (Garages) Ltd., (1953) 2 All England Reporter 582, a workman was employed as a general garage hand, for moving cars by pushing them or giving guidance to the drivers. He was not competent to drive, had no licence, and had been forbidden to do so. He got into a stationary van, started the engine, drove the van and went on to the highway. On the Highway he collided with the plaintiff's van. The employers were held liable. A person who is a servant has always a personal independent sphere of life and at any particular time he may be acting in that sphere. In that situation, the master cannot be responsible for what he does. When the act of the servant causes injury to a third party the question is not answered by merely applying the test whether the act itself is one which the servant was ordered or forbidden to do. The employer has to shoulder the responsibility on a wider basis. In some situation he becomes responsible to third parties for acts which he has expressly or implicitly forbidden the servant to do. 15. The employer has to shoulder the responsibility on a wider basis. In some situation he becomes responsible to third parties for acts which he has expressly or implicitly forbidden the servant to do. 15. In view of observations made by Apex Court and other High Courts in aforesaid decisions in respect of question of vicarious liability of employer, when act of tort was committed by an employee of such employer, such employer cannot escape from his liability to compensate victim of such tortious act committed by its employee, therefore according to my opinion, corporation, being owner of bus and employer of opponent No. 1 deleted driven by its employee in the premises of ST Corporation is vicariously liable to pay compensation to claimants because of fact that ST Corporation being employer is aware of these things and therefore, it had initiated departmental proceedings against watchman and thereafter, watchman was dismissed from service. Therefore, view taken by claim tribunal is erroneous in holding that ST Corporation is not vicariously liable and that finding is required to be set aside while holding that being an owner of vehicle involved in accident, St Corporation being employer is joint tort feasor and is liable to pay compensation to claimants. Therefore, interference of this court to that extent is warranted. In respect of question of driver or watchman who had driven bus at the relevant time, who was subsequently deleted by claimants. It is not necessary that driver must be joined as party in claim petition as per decision of this court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Cargo Motors Ltd and Ors, reported in 2009 (2) GLR page 974. Therefore, claims tribunal has committed gross error in dismissing claim petition on that ground. 16. After coming to conclusion as aforesaid, claims tribunal has not examined question of quantum, to which amount, claimants are entitled as compensation. Therefore, matter is required to be remanded back to claims tribunal for deciding question of quantum alone. 17. Date of accident is 20.4.1989, Therefore, claimants are waiting for compensation for more than 20 years and now, since claims tribunal has not given finding on the issue of quantum, this court is having no option but to remand matter back to claims tribunal. While deciding matter finally between parties. 17. Date of accident is 20.4.1989, Therefore, claimants are waiting for compensation for more than 20 years and now, since claims tribunal has not given finding on the issue of quantum, this court is having no option but to remand matter back to claims tribunal. While deciding matter finally between parties. it is not proper for court below to give finding only on one point and to refrain it from giving finding on other points. Such an approach of court below is not proper. While deciding matter finally, it is proper for court below to give finding on all issues for avoiding remand of proceedings to it in future. Here in case before had, trial court has, after deciding issue No. 1 and deciding question of vicarious liability of ST Corporation refrained itself from giving finding on issue of quantum by holding that ST Corporation is not vicariously liable to pay compensation to claimants which finding has been reversed by this court by this judgment and, therefore, after 20 years and 3 months from date of accident, this court is having no option but to remand matter to claims tribunal for deciding question of quantum of compensation on the basis of evidence on record. 18. Therefore, matter is remanded back to claims tribunal to examine merits of matter on issue of quantum of compensation alone and to decide as to which amount, claimants are entitled to receive as compensation from opponents. This being an old matter wherein date of accident is 20.4.89, therefore, claims tribunal concerned is directed to decide matter as per aforesaid directions and to pass appropriate award in accordance with law and evidence on record within 3 months from date of receiving copy of this order. 19. With these observations and directions, this appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated herein above with no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.