JUDGMENT : Pradip Mohanty, J. - Aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in S.T. No. 215 of 1998 convicting the Appellant u/s 302, I.P.C. and sentencing him to imprisonment for life, the Appellant has preferred this Jail Criminal Appeal. 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 25.05.1998 at about 4.00 P.M., the Appellant along with his wife was returning from his in laws house. Near Rajabasa-Siliguda road, a dispute arose between the couple, inconsequence whereof, the Appellant lost his temper, picked up a stone from the roadside and pounded the head of the deceased with that stone, as a result of which, she sustained bleeding injury and died instantaneously. On the next day, the Grama Rakhi went to the spot and found the deceased lying there and a lot of blood had come out from her head. He orally reported the matter at Tensa Out Post and the S.I. reduced it to writing and transmitted the same to Lahunipada Police Station for registration of the case. After investigation, Final Form was submitted u/s 302, I.P.C. against the present Appellant. 3. The plea of the accused-Appellant is complete denial of the allegation. 4. Prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses and proved fifteen documents to bring home the charge to the Appellant. Defence did not choose to adduce or produce any evidence. The trial Court, by its judgment convicted the present Appellant u/s 302, I.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for life basing upon the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3, before whom the alleged extra judicial confessional had been made by the accused-Appellant. 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant assails the impugned judgment mainly on the ground that extra judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. That apart, the so-called extra judicial confession made by the Appellant before P.Ws. 1 and 3 is inadmissible, since P.W.1 is a Grama Rakhi. As the conviction is based only on the extra judicial confession the same is liable to be set aside. In support of his submission, he relies on the decisions in Mandan ' Undu Barik v. State of Orissa, 43(1977) CLT 512; Dusasan Bhoi and Others Vs. The State of Orissa, ; Boisakhu Kollar v. State 60 (1985) CLT 61 and Pandru Khadia Vs. State of Orissa, . 6. Mr. In support of his submission, he relies on the decisions in Mandan ' Undu Barik v. State of Orissa, 43(1977) CLT 512; Dusasan Bhoi and Others Vs. The State of Orissa, ; Boisakhu Kollar v. State 60 (1985) CLT 61 and Pandru Khadia Vs. State of Orissa, . 6. Mr. Mohapatra, learned Counsel for the State, vehemently contended that there is sufficient material against the present Appellant P.Ws. 1 and 3, before whom the Appellant made the extra judicial confession, are reliable witnesses. Moreover, Grama Rakhis not a police officer and the extra judicial confession made before him can be acted upon. In this connection he draws our attention to the decisions in Raj Kumar Karwal Vs. Union of India and others, and Khageswar Khatua Vs. State of Orissa, . 7. Perused the records and the decisions cited by the parties. In the instant case, P.W.1-Bishnu Patra, the Grama Rakhi is the informant. He has stated in his deposition that about four years back in a Monday night, the accused-Appellant came to him and confessed his guilt saying that he had killed his wife by means of a store in the jungle path near Rajabasa. After confessing his guilt, the accused-Appellant requested him to take him to the police station. As it was dead of the night, P.W.1 asked the accused-Appellant to sleep in his house with assurance that he would take him to the police station on the next day. That night, the accused-Appellant Slept in his house. Next day, the accused-Appellant led him to the place where the dead body was laying. Thereafter, both P.W.1 and the accused-Appellant went to the Tensa police Out Post where P.W.1 orally reported about the incident before the S.I., who reduced the same to writing. P.W.2 is the Medical Officer, who conducted the autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and found the following external injuries: (i) A lacerated wound of the size 3 c.m. x 4 c.m. situated over 5 c.m. above from the left ear. (ii) a lacerated wound of the size 4 c.m. x 1/2 c.m. situated over 9 c.m. above from the left ear. (iii) A lacerated wound of the size 2 c.m.x 2 1/2 c.m. situated over 15 c.m. above from the left ear. (iv) A lacerated injury of the size 3 x 31/2 c.m. situated above 4 c.m. above the right eye brow. (iii) A lacerated wound of the size 2 c.m.x 2 1/2 c.m. situated over 15 c.m. above from the left ear. (iv) A lacerated injury of the size 3 x 31/2 c.m. situated above 4 c.m. above the right eye brow. (v) One lacerated wound of size 3 c.m. x 1/2 c.m. situated over 5 c.m. above the right eye brow. (vi) One lacerated wound of size 2 c.m. x 1/2 c.m. situated over 6 1/2. c.m. above from the right ear. (vii) One lacerated wound of the size 4 c.m. x 1/2 c.m. situated over 7 c.m. from right ear. (viii) Two lacerated wounds of sizes 4 1/2. c.m. x 1/2 c.m. and 5 c.m. x 1/2 c.m. on the right occipital part of the head. He specifically opined that the injuries found on the head of the deceased were ante mortem in nature and were sufficient to cause the death of the deceased. On examining the stone produced before him by the I.O., he opined that the injuries on the person of the deceased were possible by that stone. Nothing has been elicited by the defence through cross-examination to discredit his testimony. P.W.3 was the Ward Member of the village at the relevant time. He stated on oath that P.W.1., the Gram Rakhi, told him that the accused had committed murder of his wife. Then he along with the accused, P.W.1 and some other persons proceeded towards the spot. On their query, the accused confessed before them that there was a quarrel between the couple and that he picked up a stone from the ground and assaulted the deceased on her head by means of the said stone, thereby causing her death. In cross-examination, he specifically stated that P.W.1 proceeded towards Tensa Out Post whereas he along with Ors. stayed near the dead body. P.W.4 also corroborated the statement of P.W.3. P.W.5 is a witness to the inquest. P.W.6 is a constable. P.W.7 also corroborated the statements of P.Ws. 1 and 3. P.W.8 is a constable, who took the dead body to the medical for post mortem examination. P.W.9 is the S.I., who investigated into the matter and ultimately filed charge-sheet. 8. After scrutinising the entire evidence, the trial Court has held that the offence has been well made out against the accused-Appellant. It is, however, found that except the evidence of P.Ws. P.W.9 is the S.I., who investigated into the matter and ultimately filed charge-sheet. 8. After scrutinising the entire evidence, the trial Court has held that the offence has been well made out against the accused-Appellant. It is, however, found that except the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3, there is no other evidence. P.W.1 is the Grama Rakhi, before whom the Appellant made confessional statement. At that time, P.Ws. 3, 4 and 7 were present. Now, the question is whether Grama Rakhi is a police officer and whether the confession made before him is admissible in evidence. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is very clear that no confession made before a police officer shall be proved as against an accused of any offence. In the cases of Madan ' Undu Barik, Dusasan Bhoi and Pandru Khadia (supra) it has been laid down by this Court that Grama Rakhi is a police officer. The relevant portion of Madan ' Undu Barik's case (supra) is quoted below: Tested by the guidelines indicated and keeping in view the fact that the powers of a Grama Rakshi in terms of the Orissa Act and the Rules made thereunder are analogous to that of a Chaukidar, we have no hesitation to hold that a Grama Rakshi is indeed a substitute of the Chaukidar in the relevant field and for the reasons that a Chaukiar has been found to be a Police Officer, a Grama Rakshi functioning under the Orissa Act must also be held to be a Police Officer. While deciding the above case, the Division Bench also relied upon two earlier decisions of this Court where the question as to whether a Grama Rakhi is a Police Officer was examined. Those are Sanatan Bindhani v. State 38 (1972) CLT 428; and Bhaja v. State of Orissa 42 (1976) CLT 80. While deciding the above case, the Division Bench also relied upon two earlier decisions of this Court where the question as to whether a Grama Rakhi is a Police Officer was examined. Those are Sanatan Bindhani v. State 38 (1972) CLT 428; and Bhaja v. State of Orissa 42 (1976) CLT 80. In the said case reference was also made to Rajaram v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 833, wherein the Apex Court observed as follows: ...The test for determining whether such a person is a 'police officer' for the purpose of Section 25 of the Evidence Act would, in our judgment, be whether the powers of a police officer which are conferred on him or which are exercisable by him because he is deemed to bean officer in charge of police station establish a direct or substantial relationship with the prohibition enacted by Section 25, that is, the recording of a confession. In other words, the test would be whether the powers are such as would tend the facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession from a suspect or a delinquent. If they do, then it is unnecessary to consider the dominant purpose for which he is appointed or the question as to what other powers he enjoys.... 9. The test for determining whether Grama Rakhi is a Police Officer is what other powers he enjoys. Relying upon the above ratio and keeping in view the fact that powers of a Grama Rakhi in terms of the Orissa Grama Rakhi Act and the Rules made thereunder, the Division Bench in Madan ' Undu Bank's case (supra) held that a Grama Rakhi is indeed a substitute of a Chaukidar and that since a Chaukidar has been found to be a Police Officer, a Grama Rakhi functioning under the Orissa Grama Rakhi Act must also be held to be a Police Officer. The Division Bench thus came to the conclusion that a Grama Rakhi being a Police Officer, the confession made before him is inadmissible in evidence. By applying the aforesaid ratio, this Court in Boisakhu Kollar v. State 60 (1985) CLT 61, held that an extra judicial confession made in presence of a Grama Rakhi, who is a Police Officer, is not admissible in evidence. 10. By applying the aforesaid ratio, this Court in Boisakhu Kollar v. State 60 (1985) CLT 61, held that an extra judicial confession made in presence of a Grama Rakhi, who is a Police Officer, is not admissible in evidence. 10. However, in a later decision in Khageswar Khatua's case, (supra) relying on the apex Court decision in Raj Kumar Karwal (supra), this Court came to the conclusion that only when an officer is empowered to investigate and submit final form u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be held to be a police officer u/s 25 of the Evidence Act. Raj Kumar Karwal was a case under the NDPS Act. The Apex Court after examining all relevant factors upheld the view expressed by the Delhi High Court that the officers of the Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) invested with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act, are not Police Officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, since they are not entitled to exercise all the powers under Chapter 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure including to submit a report or charge-sheet u/s 173 Code of Criminal Procedure 11. In The State of Punjab Vs. Barkat Ram while deciding a matter under the Customs Act, the Apex Court held that the Custom Officer is not a Police Officer. By interpreting the expression of "Police Officer" and distinguishing the duties of a Police Officer and a Custom Officer, the Court held as follows: The Police Act,1861 (Act v. of 1861), is described as an Act for the regulation of police, and is thus an act for the regulation of that group of officers who come within the word 'police' whatever meaning be given to that word. The preamble of the act further says: 'whereas it is expedient to re-organise the police and to make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and detention of crime, it is enacted as follows". This indicates that the police is the instrument for the prevention and detection of crime which can be said to be the main object and purpose of having the police. Sections 23 and 25 lay down the duties of the police officers and Section 20 deals with the authority they can exercise. This indicates that the police is the instrument for the prevention and detection of crime which can be said to be the main object and purpose of having the police. Sections 23 and 25 lay down the duties of the police officers and Section 20 deals with the authority they can exercise. They can exercise such authority as is provided for a police officer under the Police Act and any Act for regulating criminal procedure. The authority given to police officers must naturally be to enable them to discharge their duties efficiently. Of the various duties mentioned in Section 23, the more important duties are to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace, to prevent the commission of offences and public nuisances and to detect and bring offenders to justice and to apprehend all persons whom the police officer is legally authorized to apprehend. It is clear, therefore, in view of the nature of the duties imposed on the police officers, the nature of the authority conferred and the purpose of the Police Act, that the powers which the police officers enjoy are powers for the effective prevention and detection of crime in order to maintain law and order. The powers of customs officers are really not for such purpose. Their powers are for the purpose of checking the smuggling of goods and the due realization of customs duties and to determine the action to be taken in the interests of the revenues of the country by way of confiscation of goods on which no duty had been paid and by imposing penalties and fines. Reference to Section 9(1) of the Land Customs Act may be usefully made at this stage. It is according to the provisions of this Sub-section that the provisions of the Sea Customs Act and the orders, rules etc., prescribed thereunder, apply for the purpose of levy of duties of land customs under the Land Customs Act in like manner as they apply for the purpose of levy duties of customs on goods imported or exported by sea. This makes it clear that the provisions of conferring various powers on the Sea customs officers are for the purpose of levying and realization of duties of customs on goods and that those powers are conferred on the Land Customs Officers also for the same purpose. This makes it clear that the provisions of conferring various powers on the Sea customs officers are for the purpose of levying and realization of duties of customs on goods and that those powers are conferred on the Land Customs Officers also for the same purpose. Apart from such an expression in Section 9(1) of the Land Customs Act, there are good reasons in support of the view that the powers conferred on the customs officers are different in character from those of the police officers for the detection and prevention of crime and that the powers conferred on them are merely for the purpose of ensuring that dutiable goods do not enter the country without payment of duty and that articles whose entry is prohibited are not brought in. It is with respect to the detecting and preventing of the smuggling of goods and preventing loss to the central Revenues that customs Officers have been given the power to search the property and person and to detain them and to summon persons to give evidence in an enquiry with respect to the smuggling of goods. The preamble of the Sea Customs Act says: "Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to the levy of Sea customs-duties". Practically, all the provisions of the act are enacted to achieve this object. Section 167 gives a long list of offences, but it is to be noticed that with the exception of certain offences, all the Ors. are to be dealt with by the customs Officers in view of Section 182, The customs Officers are given the power to confiscate, to fix the duty and to impose penalties which can, in certain cases, be of enormous amounts. The offences mentioned in Section 167, which are to be dealt with by a Magistrate, are mostly of the type in which the customs Officers have nothing to investigate. Offences at items Nos. 23 to 28 are with respect to certain acts committed by a pilot or a master of a vessel. The Customs staff has merely to report the conduct for trial before a Magistrate. They have nothing to investigate about It. Similarly, the offence at item 72 relates to a person's making a false declaration. Offences at items Nos. 74, 75 and 76 are with respect to the conduct of the Customs Officers themselves. The Customs staff has merely to report the conduct for trial before a Magistrate. They have nothing to investigate about It. Similarly, the offence at item 72 relates to a person's making a false declaration. Offences at items Nos. 74, 75 and 76 are with respect to the conduct of the Customs Officers themselves. Items N0S.76-A, 76-B and 78 deal with the obstruction by smugglers to the performance of duty by the customs Officers. The offence at item No. 77 relates to an offence where a police officer neglects to do his duty. Item 81 creates ar offence with respect to a person doing certain things to defraud the government. The customs Officer, therefore, it not primarily concerned with the detection and punishment of crime committed by a person, but it mainly interested in the detection and prevention of smuggling of goods and safe guarding the recovery of customs duties. He is more concerned with the goods and customs duty, that with the offender. 12. There is direct authority of the Patna High Court on this point. In the case of Emperor v. Mt. Jagia AIR 1938 Patna 308, the said High Court held that a Choukidar is a Police Officer. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Madan ' Undu Barik v. State of Orissa. But in case of Khageswar Khatua Vs. State of Orissa it has been held that the ratio decided in Madan ' Undu Barik v. State is no longer good law. By following the decision of the apex Court in Raj Kumar Karwal, it has also been held that the confessional statement made before the Grama Rakhi is admissible since Grama Rakhi is not a Police Officer and the confession before him does not attract operation of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 13. The Constitution Bench of the apex Court in Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. Etc., held that the judgment rendered by the Court without following or distinguishing the earlier decision is not binding. 13. The Constitution Bench of the apex Court in Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. Etc., held that the judgment rendered by the Court without following or distinguishing the earlier decision is not binding. It was further held that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court is binding on a Division Bench consisting of the same or a smaller number of judges, and in order that such decision be binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by the Full Bench or a constitution Bench of the Court. The Apex Court in the case of Nirmal Jeet Kaur Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another also held that a decision without reference to the statutory prescription must be treated as rendered per incuriam having no precedential value. Further, in the case of Babu Parasu Kaikadi (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Babu (Dead) through Lrs. the Apex Court held that the rule of per incuriam can be applied where a Court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same Court or the superior Court rendered on the same issue or where a Court omits to consider any statute while deciding that issue. In the case of Raj Kumar Karwal (supra), while deciding that only those officers who have the power to investigate into the commission of cognizable offence and also the power to prosecute the offender by filing a report or a charge-sheet u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be treated as Police Officers, the earlier decisions of the apex Court were not taken note of. That apart, Raj Kumar Karwal's case is one under the NDPS Act and the accused had confessed his guilt before the officers of Central Excise and Customs. The facts and circumstances of that case were quite different. But, by applying that judgment, this Court in Khageswar Khatua held that a Grama Rakhi is not a police officer and the confession before him does not attract the operation of Section 25 of the Act. However, we find that in the case of Raj Kumar Karwal, the decision in Barkatram, which is a Larger Bench decision, though referred, was not distinguished or discussed. However, we find that in the case of Raj Kumar Karwal, the decision in Barkatram, which is a Larger Bench decision, though referred, was not distinguished or discussed. Since in Khageswar Khatua's case, the decision rendered by the apex Court in Raj Kumar's case (supra) was followed, we are not in agreement with that view. 14. It is well settled that if a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction disagrees with Anr. Bench of coordinate jurisdiction whether on the basis of 'different arguments' or otherwise, on a question of law, it is appropriate that the matter be referred to a larger Bench for resolution of the issue rather than to leave two conflicting judgments to operate, creating confusion. It is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. Judicial decorum, no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs. One Bench of this Court, it is trite, does not sit in appeal over the other bench particularly when it is a coordinate Bench. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, we direct the matter to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute an appropriate Bench to examine the question whether Grama Rakhi is a police officer or not. Appellant being in custody, an early constitution of the Bench is requested. L. Mohapatra, J. 16. I agree.