Judgment :- T.S. SIVAGNANAM, J. The above writ petitions have been filed by one C. Rajamanickam against the common order dated 21.08.1998 in a Special Revision Petition Nos. 63 of 1992 and 6 of 1995 on the file of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred as Special Tribunal). SRP No. 63 of 1992 was filed by C. Rajamanickam under Section 83 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 581 of 1998 hereinafter referred to as the Act 58 of 1961, challenging the order passed by the Land Tribunal in L.T.CMA No. 34 of 1990 dated 16.03.1992 which confirms the order dated 112. 1989 passed by the Authorized Officer (Land Reforms, Tiruchirapalli). SRP No. 6 of 1995 was filed by the Director of Land Reforms under Sections 83 and 58 of 1961 to set aside the order passed by the Authorized Officer (Land Reforms), Tiruchirapalli dated 14.05.1972. 2. The facts, which led to the filing of the said revision petitions are follows: One Chockalingam Chettiar was the owner of the lands which are the subject matter in the present case. The Authorized Officer determined the total holdings of the family as on the crucial date i.e. 06.04.1960 and the total holdings of the family consisting of the land owner and his wife as 56.774 acres. This determination was made after allowing the ceiling of 30 standard acres for the family and 10 standard acres for his wife granting exemption in respect of 1.78 standard acres. The Authorized Officer determined as surplus an extent of 5.505 standard acres under Section I and 57. 0 standard acres under Section VI and in all 15.704 acres was determined as surplus. The land owner filed an appeal against such determination which came to be dismissed by the Land Tribunal. The original land owner died on 05.09.1964 and the wife and daughter of the original land owner filed the revision petition before this court in CRP No. 2508 of 1965 against the order of the Tribunal. This Court, by order dated 08.01.1971 allowed the said Civil Revision Petition with the observation that this court in CRP 2286 of 1966 (Radhasamy Charitable Society, by its Secretary Vs. This Court, by order dated 08.01.1971 allowed the said Civil Revision Petition with the observation that this court in CRP 2286 of 1966 (Radhasamy Charitable Society, by its Secretary Vs. The Authorised Officer, Cuddalore) held that where a gift is made to a female member, only for enjoyment of the property for life, without any power of alienation, such person cannot be said to be a limited owner as defined in the Act and that the lands given to her for enjoyment personally, cannot be taken to be the holding of that person for purpose of fixing her ceiling area and for acquiring the excess. Based on the decision of this court in CRP 2508 of 1965 dated 08.01.1971, the Authorized Officer fixed 5.504 standard acres as surplus under Section I. Subsequently, the Authorized Officer, by order dated 15.05.1972, observed that this court has taken the stand that the Authorized Officer is empowered to declare the surplus lands under Section 10(5) and Section 12, only if the person is alive on the date of preparation of final statement and that it is not sufficient if the person had been alive on the notified date and that the Authorized Officer has no jurisdiction to fix the ceiling area of a deceased person. Based on the said order, the Authorized Officer ordered further action to be taken separately in respect of the persons on whom the properties of the deceased land owner Chockalingam Chettiar have devolved. Based on such an order, fresh proceedings were initiated under Act 17 of 1970 against the legal heirs of the deceased land owner. By order dated 27. 1973, the Authorized Officer held that since the land owner held only 8.095 standard acres, which is below the ceiling limit, further proceedings were dropped. It is stated that the proceeding dated 22.07.1973 is the consequential proceeding to the earlier order dated 15.05.1972. Thereafter, the case was reopened based on a judgment of the Honorable Supreme Court in Bhikoba Shankar Vs. Mohan Lal Punchand, AIR 1982 SC 865 . The Authorized Officer directed the deceased land owner to furnish a list of holdings as on 06.04.1960 and notices were issued to the legal heirs, since the land owners wife passed away in the meantime. An order under Section 9(2)(b) of the Act was passed on 112. Mohan Lal Punchand, AIR 1982 SC 865 . The Authorized Officer directed the deceased land owner to furnish a list of holdings as on 06.04.1960 and notices were issued to the legal heirs, since the land owners wife passed away in the meantime. An order under Section 9(2)(b) of the Act was passed on 112. 1989 and an extent of 15.070 standard acres was declared as surplus in the hands of the land owner. The petitioner C. Rajamanickam, adopted son of the original land owner, filed an appeal against the said order before the Land Tribunal in L.T.CMA 34 of 1990 and the Land Tribunal, by order dated 16.03.1992 dismissed the appeal. As against the said order, SRP No. 63 of 1992 was filed before the Special Tribunal. 3. Since a contention was raised that the subsequent reopening of the proceedings cannot be done, as action was dropped by orders dated 14.05.1972 and 22.07.73, the Director of the Land Reforms filed SRP No. 6 of 1995 praying before the Special Tribunal to invoke its suo-motu power under Section 83 of the Act and to set aside the order passed by the Authorized Officer dated 14.05.1972 by which proceedings against the land owner were dropped. It is stated that the SRP was filed to get over any technical objection which may be raised. 4. The Special Tribunal heard both the revision petitions together and by a common order dated 21.08.1998, allowed SRP No. 6 of 1995 and disposed of SRP 63 of 1992 by remanding the matter back to the Authorized Officer to commence fresh proceedings after giving notice to all persons interested. The Special Tribunal further observed that all the earlier proceedings dated 14.05.1972, 22.07.1973 and 12.02.1989 and the order passed by the Land Tribunal dated 16.03.1992 were set aside. The correctness of the above orders are assailed in the present writ petitions. 5. Heard Mr. T.R. Rajagopoal, learned Senior Counsel for Mr. T.R. Rajaraman for the petitioner and Mrs. Malarvizhi Udayakumar, learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents. 6. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would first contend that the earlier order, passed by this court in C.R.P.2508 of 1965, dated 08.01.1971, has become final and the order of the Special Tribunal ought not to have been set aside and remanded for fresh consideration. The next contention put forth by the learned Senior Counsel is that SRP. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would first contend that the earlier order, passed by this court in C.R.P.2508 of 1965, dated 08.01.1971, has become final and the order of the Special Tribunal ought not to have been set aside and remanded for fresh consideration. The next contention put forth by the learned Senior Counsel is that SRP. No. 6 of 1995 which has been filed by the department, challenging the order dated 14.05.1972 has been presented after a period of 20 years and the Special Tribunal ought not to have entertained such a belated petition. It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel that there is no power for the Special Tribunal to order for reopening the entire issue after the proceedings were dropped. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the petitioner is the adopted son and the grand son of the original land owner. The adoption was on 09.02.1970 and the deed of adoption was registered on 20.03.1970 and the date of commencement of the Act was on 15.02.1970. It is further submitted that as on the notified date i.e. 010. 1970, there was a valid adoption and these factors were taken into consideration and thereafter the proceedings dated 22.07.1973 came to be passed. The Tribunal ought not to have reopened the entire issue. Finally, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that a draft statement has not been made for the purpose of calculating the ceiling area of the family holding on the date of commencement of Act. 7. Learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents would contend that the object of the enactment, namely Act 58 of 1961, was to secure that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. Since the Act seeks to achieve such laudable object, the operation of various provisions of Act cannot be said to be rigid and when it is found that the proceeding has been made erroneously, the Special Tribunal was justified in invoking its suo-motu power under Section 83 of the Act so as to set aside the illegal order. Exercise of such power is reasonable and fair, keeping in mind the object of the enactment. Exercise of such power is reasonable and fair, keeping in mind the object of the enactment. Learned Special Government Pleader would further contend that SRP No. 6 of 1995 was filed before the Tribunal, requesting the Tribunal to invoke its suo-motu power only with the reason to get over any technical objection which may be raised by relying upon the order dated 14.05.1972. It is further contended that in the order dated 14.05.1972, it has been stated that further action has to be separately taken against the person on whom properties of late Chockalingam Chettiar had devolved on his death. Therefore, the learned Special Government Pleader would contend that there is no bar for the Tribunal to reopen the matter and direct the Authorized Officer to decide the matter afresh after giving notice to all the persons who may be interested. 8. Learned Special Government Pleader would further contend that the decision of the Hourable Supreme Court in AIR 1982 SC 865 (Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal (dead) by Vs. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case, since the legislation in the Maharashtra State as well as the Tamil Nadu Act 58 of 1961 are in paramateria. As regards the plea raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings are grossly delayed, it is submitted by the learned Special Government Pleader that the fresh orders under Section 9(2)(b) of the Act were issued only after dismissal of the writ petition filed by the petitioner in 1989 and the petitioner filed an appeal before the Land Tribunal during 1990 and the same was dismissed on 16.03.1992 against which SRP No. 63 of 1992 has been filed. Learned Special Government Pleader would contend that the proceedings have been taken uninterruptedly and time lapse is solely attributable to the petitioner by his conduct in prolonging the matter by filing various petitions and therefore there is no delay. On question of dropping all further proceedings, it is contended that since the order of the Authorized Officer was erroneous, the petition was filed requesting the Tribunal to invoke suo-motu power to set aside such an order; that the basis for reopening the proceedings is the order passed by the Honourable Supreme Court in AIR 1982 SC 865 (Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal (dead) by Vs. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed); that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding upon the authorities; that the Tribunal in its earlier order in SRP No. 91 of 1993 has elaborately gone into this aspect and held that the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court AIR 1982 SC 865 (Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal (dead) by Vs. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed) was considering the question whether the proceedings commenced with filing of a return by a person holding, on the appointed day, land in excess of the ceiling area prescribed by the Maharashtra Ceiling Act would become infructuous and would have to be dropped, if such person dies before the notification regarding surplus and possession of such surplus land is taken over by the authorities concerned and the Honourable Supreme Court held that proceedings would become infructuous. 9. On the 2nd issue, regarding dropping of the proceedings, it is to be noted that the order dated 15.05.1972 has been passed after the decision of this court dated 07.01.1971 wherein it is held that the Authorized Officer is empowered to declare the surplus lands under Section 10(5) and Section 12, only if the person is alive on the date of preparation of final statement and that it is not sufficient if the person had been alive on the notified date and that the Authorized Officer has no jurisdiction to fix the ceiling area of a deceased person. Based on that judgment, the Authorized Officer ordered that further action to be taken separately in respect of the persons on whom the properties of the deceased land owner late Chockalingam Chettiar had devolved on the date of the death. It is based on such order dated 15.05.1972, subsequently, proceedings dated 22.07.1973 came to be passed. In such proceedings, it was noted that the patta for the lands stands in the names of the land owner (Tmt. Thailammai Ammal) and the land owners adopted son (Rajamanickam) and based on a written statement filed by the land owner and the partition deed dated 15.02.1979 between land owner and her adopted son C. Rajamanickam, held that the land owner had only 8.095 standard acres which is below the ceiling limit. Thailammai Ammal) and the land owners adopted son (Rajamanickam) and based on a written statement filed by the land owner and the partition deed dated 15.02.1979 between land owner and her adopted son C. Rajamanickam, held that the land owner had only 8.095 standard acres which is below the ceiling limit. Therefore, it is to be noted that the entire proceedings culminated in the order dated 22.07.1973 based on adoption of Rajamanickam and it is to be seen that the result of the proceedings was unconditional and the same cannot be now put against the department for initiating action. The Honourable Supreme Court has taken a decision while deciding the similar case in AIR 1982 SC 865 (Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal (dead) by Vs. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed)(Paras:13, 15, 18 & 19). 10. From the above decision, it is seen that the proceedings have to be continued and the surplus land in the hands of the land owner as on the appointed date should be determined and taken possession in accordance with law and the legal heirs of the land owner are entitled to participate the hearing and the ceiling area has to be determined as on the appointed date, even though such person is dead before determining the surplus and notified under the act. Therefore, in our view, the department was fully justified in approaching the Tribunal by filing SRP No. 6 of 1995 for requesting the Tribunal to exercise its suo-motu for revision. 11. We have perused the order passed by the Tribunal and the points referred by the Tribunal on the definition of the limited owner as defined in Section 3 (28) of the Act. As noted by the Tribunal, this court, earlier in CRP No. 2508 of 1965 dated 08.01.1971 did not go into the issues about the total holding, the surplus holding, the holdings of the legal heirs etc. Further, it is to be noted from the explanation of Section 3 (28) of the Act, a person who has a right to enjoy the land during his lifetime shall be limited to be deemed owner, notwithstanding that he has no power to alienate the land. This provision came to be inserted by amending Act 39 of 1972 and it was given retrospective effect in terms of such amendment. This provision came to be inserted by amending Act 39 of 1972 and it was given retrospective effect in terms of such amendment. Therefore, the reasoning given by the Tribunal with regard to the explanation to Section 3 (28), that it is deemed to be operational with effect from 06.04.1960 does not call for any interference. 12. Next question raised by the learned Senior Counsel is regarding the inordinate delay in approaching the Tribunal. It is to be noted that the proceedings are pending before Authorities and the fresh orders under Section 9(2)(b) of the Act were issued only after dismissal of the writ petition filed by the petitioner in 1989 and aggrieved by the same, the petitioner had preferred an appeal before the Land Tribunal during 1990 and the Land Tribunal dismissed the same by order dated 16.03.1992 as against which revision was filed before Special Tribunal in 1992. However, in view of the legal position having been settled by the Honourable Supreme Court, the department had filed a petition under Section 83 of the Act with a request to the Tribunal to invoke it suo-motu power. Therefore, the physical running of time from 1972 till 1995 when SRP No. 6 of 1995 came to be filed, should not be taken for the purpose of computing the time taken in the instant case, since the proceedings were being agitated at various levels by the petitioner and thus the delay if any, could be attributed only to the petitioner. The petition in SRP No. 6 of 1995 was filed in order to get over any technical objection which may be raised and further taking into consideration the decision of Honourable Supreme Court with regard to law laid down on the issue. Therefore, we hold that the department cannot be found fault for approaching the Tribunal during 1995 by filing a petition. However, it is to be noted that the power vested with the Special Tribunal under Section 83 could be exercised suo-motu or on application to call for to examine the order of the Authorized Officer Land Reforms, Land Commissioner or Land Tribunal in respect of any proceeding as regards its correctness, legality etc and the Tribunal is vested with power to modify, reverse, remand for reconsideration if the Tribunal found that there has been some irregularity in the proceedings. Therefore, the power vested upon the Special Tribunal is very widely couched and even without a petition being filed by the department, in order to review, the Tribunal can very well examine the correctness of the orders passed by the Authorized Officer or Land Tribunal while considering the revision petition which had been filed by the petitioner. Further, the Tribunal noted that all the legal heirs were not afforded an opportunity of hearing, since the Authorized Officer had enquired only the petitioner and not the other legal heirs, since the land had devolved on the next generation of the other legal heirs, they may also to be entitled to hearing. Therefore, the Tribunal held that since the order passed under Section 9 (2)(b) was not a speaking order, the same has to be interfered with. 13. For all the above reasons, we find that the order passed by the Tribunal is valid in law and accordingly writ petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.