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2009 DIGILAW 443 (DEL)

Deepak Kumar Sharma v. Dominos Pizza Ltd.

2009-04-17

V.K.SHALI

body2009
Judgment V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral) 1. The petitioner in the instant writ petition has challenged the interlocutory order passed by the learned Labour Court No.I in LCA No. 81/2004 in case titled Mr. Deepak Sharma Vs. M/s Domino’s Pizza India Ltd. 2. By virtue of the aforesaid order, the learned Labour Court has dismissed the application of the claimant/petitioner seeking framing of issues and adducing of evidence before deciding the said petition. The facts of the case relevant to decide the issue are that the petitioner filed a petition under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 wherein he claimed that he was working with the respondent/management from 26th June, 1997 and his monthly salary was Rs.5804/-. It was alleged by him that his services were terminated on 12th August, 2004 without compliance of the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore, the said termination was void ab initio. Accordingly, the petitioner has filed the petition claiming his salary from the date of termination i.e. 12th August, 2004 till the date of filing of the petition along with interest @ 18%. The respondent filed its written statement and took objection regarding the maintainability of the petition itself on the ground that there is no pre-existing right or claim of the petitioner after the termination of the service which could be granted to him in exercise of powers by the Court under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was further stated that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak & Anr. 1995 LAB I.C. 330 has specifically laid down that claim for entitlement of workmen to certain benefit cannot be granted under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 if there is no pre-existing right or recognition of a money claim. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. The legal position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ganesh Razak case (supra) is not in dispute. So the job which is left to the learned Labour Court to do is to only calculate the amount of money which is payable to such workman. In Jeet Lal Sharma Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court-IV 84 (2000) DLT 706, a Single Judge of this Court has also followed the same view. So the job which is left to the learned Labour Court to do is to only calculate the amount of money which is payable to such workman. In Jeet Lal Sharma Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court-IV 84 (2000) DLT 706, a Single Judge of this Court has also followed the same view. This legal position could not be refuted by the learned counsel of the petitioner. 5. Therefore, I find that there was no infirmity in the order which has been passed by the learned Labour Court in the impugned award dated 3rd August, 2005 so as to warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review because the petitioner’s claim is neither recognized nor adjudicated in any Forum or Labour Court earlier. 6. In addition to this, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.P. Maheshwari Vs. Delhi Admn. Vs. Ors 1983 3 SCR 949 has laid down that the nature of jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate, and therefore, the exercise of such a jurisdiction should not be resorted to so as to hamper the work of the special tribunal at the interlocutory stage and on preliminary issues. It has been observed that the tribunals like Industrial Tribunal are constituted to decide expeditiously special kind of disputes, and therefore, jurisdiction to decide is not of stifled by all means of preliminary objections and “journeying up and down”. 7. The present writ petition seems to be doing the same thing what has been prohibited by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It seems the whole ploy of the petitioner seeking setting aside the impugned award and directing the learned Labour Court to frame issues and permit him to adduce evidence is nothing but only to prolong proceedings so as to burn the energy and patience of the respondent so as to force them to arrive at some kind of settlement. This cannot be permitted to be done. 8. For the foregoing reasons mentioned above, I am of the considered opinion that the writ petition is without any merit, and accordingly, the same is dismissed.