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2009 DIGILAW 458 (JHR)

Lalan Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2009-03-26

D.G.R.PATNAIK

body2009
JUDGMENT : The petitioner in this writ application, has prayed for an order for quashing the order dated 14.09.2004 passed by the Revisional Authority-cum-Secretary, Department of Forest and Environment, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi in Revision Case No. C-11/2004, whereby the order passed in Confiscation Appeal No. 7 of 2001 in favour of the petitioner, was set aside and the original order of confiscation of the petitioner’s truck, was restored. 2. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent State. 3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent State. 4. Facts of the petitioner’s case in brief is that the petitioner is the owner of the truck bearing Registration No. BHU 2713. On 15.5.2001 the truck was seized within the forest area when it was found that it was carrying four pieces of Bija logs and 8 pieces of Gamhar logs and the driver of the truck could not produce any permit under the provisions of the Forest Act for transporting the timber on the vehicle. After seizure of the vehicle, a confiscation proceeding was initiated in respect of the vehicle. Defence raised by the petitioner in the confiscation proceeding was that though, he was the owner of the vehicle, but the illegal use of the vehicle by the driver was never authorized by him, nor was the transportation of the timber on the truck, made in connivance with the petitioner in any manner. It was further stated that the original driver having gone on leave, the petitioner had engaged another driver as a temporary hand for driving his truck and the driver was instructed by the petitioner only to transport bricks and deliver the same at the specified destination. After unloading the bricks, when the driver was returning with the empty truck, one raiyat of the village namely, Jeevan Bara had prevailed upon the driver to load his timber, which was felled from within his raiyati lands, and to deliver the same at the sawmill at Simdega and it was when the vehicle was in transit, that it was stopped by the forest Ranger. 5. 5. Counsel for the petitioner would argue that the Appellate Authority on considing the evidences on record, as adduced by the petitioner in support of his claim that the alleged illegal use of the vehicle by the driver for carrying the timber was not with his connivance or under his instruction to the driver and upon such evidence, had recorded its findings that the petitioner has not incurred any liability for confiscation of the vehicle as laid down under the provisions of section 52 of the Indian Forest Act. Learned counsel submits that the Revisional Authority, in his impugned order, had failed to consider this aspect of the findings of the Appellate Authority on the evidences adduced by the petitioner and has set aside the order of the Appellate Authority only on the basis of the presumption, conjectures and surmises. 6. Counsel for the respondent State, on the other hand, would argue that the facts of the case, even as admitted by the petitioner, is that the petitioner’s vehicle was seized at the time when it was found carrying timber without obtaining permit under the relevant provisions of the Forest Act and therefore, the vehicle was liable to be confiscated. This very fact in itself leads to the presumption that the illegal use of the vehicle by its driver was made with the connivance and consent of the owner namely, the petitioner. 7. Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act which provides for seizure of vehicles and lays down procedure for confiscation, also lays down in sub-clause 5 that no order of confiscation of the vehicle shall be made if any person (petitioner / owner in the present case) satisfy the authorized officer that the vehicle was used without the knowledge or connivance or without the knowledge or connivance of his servant or agent and that all reasonable and necessary precautions had been taken against the use of the vehicle, in commission of the of the alleged offence. 8. Counsel for the petitioner would argue that the petitioner had taken specific stand in the confiscation proceeding that the driver had used the vehicle for the purpose of carrying timber without his instruction, knowledge and connivance and this fact has been supported by the statement on affidavit even by the raiyat whose timber was being transported. 8. Counsel for the petitioner would argue that the petitioner had taken specific stand in the confiscation proceeding that the driver had used the vehicle for the purpose of carrying timber without his instruction, knowledge and connivance and this fact has been supported by the statement on affidavit even by the raiyat whose timber was being transported. Referring to the evidences on record, learned counsel would submit that the raiyat, in categorical terms, has stated that when the truck was returning after unloading the bricks, it was he who had stopped the vehicle and had prevailed upon the driver to carry the timber to the sawmill. This fact has been further affirmed by the Mukhiya and other responsible persons of the village who had witnessed the entire transaction and the circumstances under which the timber was loaded on the truck. Learned counsel argues that while the Appellate Authority had taken into consideration this very aspect, as appearing in the evidences adduced by the petitioner, the Revisional Authority had totally ignored the same and on the basis of conjectures and surmises, had reverted the findings of the Appellate Authority. 9. The provisions of section 52 (5) of the Forest Act, which lays down procedure for confiscation, also provides an opportunity to the owner of the vehicle to prove that the vehicle was not used for illegal purposes without his knowledge or connivance. In the instant case, the petitioner appears to have adduced evidence by way of rebuttal against the presumption. Such evidence was considered by the Appellate Authority which on being satisfied that the petitioner had satisfactorily rebutted the presumption against him, had set aside the order of confiscation as passed by the confiscating authority. 10. From the impugned order, as passed by the Revisional Authority, it does appear that this aspect of the evidence and the findings of the Appellate Authority have not been adverted to at all by the Revisional Authority before setting aside the findings of the Appellate Authority, and as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order was passed only on the basis of conjecture and surmises. 11. In the light of the above discussions, I find merit in this application. Accordingly, the same is allowed. The impugned order of the Revisional Authority dated 14.09.2004 (Annexure-5), is hereby set aside. 11. In the light of the above discussions, I find merit in this application. Accordingly, the same is allowed. The impugned order of the Revisional Authority dated 14.09.2004 (Annexure-5), is hereby set aside. The order of the Appellate Authority dated 10.3.2004 (Annexure-4) is hereby restored and pursuant to the order of the Appellate Authority, petitioner’s vehicle is directed to be released forthwith to him.