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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 461 (MP)

DEVENDRA MINERALS v. STATE OF M P

2009-04-09

DIPAK MISRA, R.K.GUPTA

body2009
Judgment ( 1. ) THE petitioner, a partnership firm engaged in the business of minerals and mining operations, has filed two separate writ petitions being W. P. No. 6377/2006 and W. P. No. 12011/2006. The main reliefs which are prayed for in w. P. No. 6377/2006 are reproduced as under: (i) To command the respondents No. 1,2, 3 to stop all illegal activities including excavation and sale of the minerals atkari mines, Dist. Tikamgarh by issuance of an appropriate writ and/or direction; (ii) To command the respondents No. 1,2,3 to restrain the respondent No. 4 from the work of excavation at Kari Mines district Tikamgarh and also from dealing with the excavated minerals by issuance of an appropriate writ and/or direction; (iii) To command the respondents No. 1,2, 3 to sell the excavated minerals as per the established procedure and law and also to consider the application of the petitioner whereby he is ready to purchase the minerals at the higher rate to the extent of 10% which is being received as on todr y by the respondent no. 2 and 3 by issuance of an appropriate writ and/or direction; (iv) To command the respondent No. 1 to enquire into the illegalities which have been committed till date by the respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 and to deal with them as per law by issuance of an appropriate writ and/or direction. . . . . ; The reliefs which are prayed for in W. P. No. 12011/2006 are reproduced as under: (i) To command the respondents to start the tender process immediately inviting tenders for the sale of minerals of the kari Mines and to award the tender to the successful tenderer by issuance of an appropriate writ and/or direction; (ii) To restrain the respondent no. 2 from carrying out any operations at Kari Mines till the completion of the tender process by issuance of an appropriate writ and/or direction; (iii) To command the respondent no. l to make an enquiry into the matter in respect to the alleged joint venture of the respondent no. 2 with M/s Katni Bauxite Private Limited and its offer for purchase of the minerals and also about the cancellation of the tender process and to deal with the same as per law by taking proper action in the matter by issuance of an appropriate writ and/or direction. . . " ( 2. 2 with M/s Katni Bauxite Private Limited and its offer for purchase of the minerals and also about the cancellation of the tender process and to deal with the same as per law by taking proper action in the matter by issuance of an appropriate writ and/or direction. . . " ( 2. ) FROM the aforesaid reproduction of the reliefs it is discernible that the reliefs which are prayed for in both the petitions are interrelated and the questions of fact and law involved in the petitions also being identical, both the petitions are heard together and a common order is passed. ( 3. ) FOR the sake of convenience the facts of the case are referred to from W. P. No. 63 77/2006, which state that the M. P. State Mining Corporation Ltd. , the second respondent, was granted mining lease for extraction of Pyrophyllite and Diaspore by the State Government over an area of five hectares in village Kari of District tikamgarh. Tenders were invited by the second respondent for purchase of pyrophyllite material and pursuance thereof petitioner had submitted its tender on 28. 1. 2003. The tender of the petitioner was accepted by the second respondent vide order dated 7. 2. 2003 (Annexure P-l.) for purchase of Pyrophyllite from the kari Diaspore Pyrophyllite mines of the Corporation to the tune of Rs. 3300 tons at the rate of Rs. 351/per ton. The said order clearly stipulated that the entire quantity of Pyrophyllite was to be lifted within a period of 90 days and royalty/ commercial tax/sales tax and all other relevant taxes, if applicable, were payable additionally at the approved rates. The order dated 7. 2. 2003 also envisaged that all terms and conditions of the tender notice dated 28. 1. 2003 were applicable. Thereafter, another tender was floated by the second respondent for purchase of pyrophyllite Grade-II and the petitioner had submitted his bid on 25. 8. 2003, which was also accepted by the respondents for about 2000 tons of Pyrophyllite Grade-II at the rate of Rs. 529/- on the terms and conditions envisaged in the letter of acceptance dated 2. 9. 2003 (Annexure P-2 ). 8. 2003, which was also accepted by the respondents for about 2000 tons of Pyrophyllite Grade-II at the rate of Rs. 529/- on the terms and conditions envisaged in the letter of acceptance dated 2. 9. 2003 (Annexure P-2 ). The contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner had completed the aforesaid work and had lifted the whole material under the aforesaid tenders but thereafter the respondents No. 2 and 3 did not invite any tender and, instead, granted the material/lease of the Kari mines to the fourth respondent i. e. M/s Katni Bauxite Ltd. in the year 2005. According to the petitioner, he made an application, Annexure P/3, to the third respondent for lifting the entire material of the mines @10% above the rates of the fourth respondent to whom the work was allotted but to no avail. In this background, the petitioner by filing the petitions has prayed for issue of directions to the respondents to stop all illegal activities in relation to Kari Mines of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. ( 4. ) ON the other hand, the respondents No. 2 and 3 by filing their reply have stated in para 2 of their return that in pursuance of order dated 7. 2. 2003 (Annexure p-l) for purchase of 3300 tone Pyrophyllite @rs. 351/per ton the petitioner had failed to lift the material within the stipulated period of 90 days but took sixmonths to lift the same. Thereafter also when the petitioner was granted order on 2. 9. 2003 (Annexure P-3) for purchase of 2000 tone of Pyrophyllite @ Rs. 529/- per ton from the mines of respondent No. 2 he took about six months as against the prescribed period of 60 days to lift the material and thus, the petitioner had not carried out the work of lifting the minerals as per the work order and delayed the same. It is further submitted by them that the respondent No. 2, Corporation has entered into a joint venture agreement with M/s Katni Minerals Pvt. Ltd. and has set up a joint venture company under the name and style as M/s Katni Bauxite pvt. Ltd. for bauxite mining and the respondent No. 4 being a joint venture company has offered to purchase Diaspore mineral @ Rs. 755. 00 per ton and Pyrophyllite mineral @rs. 840. Ltd. for bauxite mining and the respondent No. 4 being a joint venture company has offered to purchase Diaspore mineral @ Rs. 755. 00 per ton and Pyrophyllite mineral @rs. 840. 00 per ton and also agreed to pay royalty and other taxes separately which is more than the offer given by the Corporation. The respondents have accepted the offer of respondent No. 4 and order dated 14. 1. 2005 (Annexure r-l) was placed on the above rates for a period of one year specifying that if the work was found satisfactory the same shall be extended by enhancing 6% of the sale price. On this basis it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the corporation is bound to give preference to the offer given by the joint venture company and as such there was no necessity to call any tender. It is further submitted on their behalf that the petitioner is not ready to purchase the material at the rates given by the respondent No. 4, therefore, the act of the Corporation cannot be said to be illegal. ( 5. ) THE respondent No. 1, the State Government, by filing their return has simply adopted the return filed by the respondents No. 2 and 3 and has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. ( 6. ) WE have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record and now we proceed to examine the contentions put forth on behalf of the parties. ( 7. ) WHILE arguing the matter, learned counsel for the petitioner informed us that after the interregnum period the respondent No. 2 had auctioned the mines in the year 2008 by inviting the tenders and against the same the petitioner has no objection and the present dispute relates only to the interregnum period. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent No. 2 arbitrarily and by adopting unfair means had given contract to the respondent No. 4 in the interregnum period. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent No. 2 arbitrarily and by adopting unfair means had given contract to the respondent No. 4 in the interregnum period. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision passed by the apex Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and referring to para-11 of the same he submitted that the Apex Court has held that in a welfare State, the Government has to regulate and dispense special services and the State being provider of large number of benefits, without adopting a fair method and procedure could not have given the contract in favour of the respondent No. 4. ( 8. ) PER contra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 and 3 relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in M/s Kasturi Lai lakshmi Reddy v. The State of Jammu and Kahmir and another, AIR 1980 SC 1992 and on the authority of the same submitted that the Mines Act, 1952 does not provide any rates for selling of the excavated material and it is also submitted that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the contract which has been entered into with the respondent No. 4 is a proper one. It is further contended that when the petitioner was given the work of lifting the excavated material by inviting tender and a condition was imposed that the said excavated mineral shall be lifted within 60 days, he failed to lift the same within the stipulated time, therefore, extension was granted and during the extension period also the petitioner could not lift the complete material. On the basis of the same, it is submitted by the respondents that the petitioner had failed to perform his own obligation under the contract by not lifting the material within the stipulated period even though initially the period was extended. On the other hand, when contract was entered into with the respondent No. 4 not only better rates have been offered by respondent No. 4 but it has also performed the contract work satisfactorily by lifting the considerable quantity within the stipulated period and quantity as such lifted, was more than what was lifted by the petitioner. On the other hand, when contract was entered into with the respondent No. 4 not only better rates have been offered by respondent No. 4 but it has also performed the contract work satisfactorily by lifting the considerable quantity within the stipulated period and quantity as such lifted, was more than what was lifted by the petitioner. Learned senior counsel for the respondents No. 2 and 3 submitted that keeping in view the fairness of the action and also after considering the totality of the circumstances, the allotment of contract in favour of respondent No. 4 fulfills the requirement not only of reasonableness but also of public interest. To bolster his contentions, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 and 3 took us through paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in M/s Kasturi Lais case (supra), which are reproduced as under:- " 11. So far as the first limitation is concerned, it flows directly from the thesis that, unlike a private individual, the State cannot act as it pleases in the matter of giving largesse. Though ordinarily a private individual would be guided by economic considerations of. self-gain in any action taken by him, it is always open to him under the law to act contrary to his self-interest or to oblige another in entering into a contract or dealing with his property. But the government is not free to act as it likes in granting largess such as awarding a contract or selling or leasing out its property. Whatever be its activity, the Government is still the Government and is, subject to restraints inherent in its position in a democratic society. The constitutional power conferred on the Government cannot be exercised by it arbitrarily or capriciously or in an unprincipled manner, it has to be exercised for the public good. Every activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must, therefore, be informed with reason and guided by public interest. Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest; the Government cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated. Every activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must, therefore, be informed with reason and guided by public interest. Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest; the Government cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated. If the Government-awards a contract or leases out or otherwise deals with its property or grants any other largesse, it would be liable to be tested for its validity on the touchstone of reasonableness and public interest and if it fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and invalid. 12. Now what is the test of reasonableness which has to be applied in order to determine the validity of governmental action. It is undoubtedly true, as pointed out by Patanjali, Sastri J. , instate of Madras v. V. G. Row (1952) SCR 597 : ( AIR 1952 SC 196 ), that in forming his own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the Judge participating in the decision, would play an important part, but even so, the test of reasonableness is not a wholly subjective test and its contours are. fairly indicated by the Constitution. The concept of reasonableness in fact pervades the entire constitutional scheme. The interaction of Articles 14,19 and 21 analysed by this Courtinmaneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621 ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) clearly demonstrates that the requirement of reasonableness runs like a golden thread through the entire fabric of fundamental rights and, as several decisions of this Court show, this concept of reasonableness finds its positive manifestation and expression in the lofty ideal of social and economic justice which inspires and animates the Directive Principles. It has been laid down by this court in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 2 SCR 348 : ( AIR 1974 SC 555 ) and Maneka Gandhis case (supra)that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and since the principle of reasonableness and rationality, which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, is projected by this article, it must characterise every governmental action, whether it be under the authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. So also the concept of reasonableness runs through the totality of Article 19 and requires that restrictions on the freedoms of the citizen, in order to be permissible, must at the best be reasonable. Similarly art. 21 in the full plenitude of its activist magnitude as discovered by Maneka Gandhis case, insists that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law and such procedure must be reasonable, fair and just. The Directive Principles concretise and give shape to the concept of reasonableness envisaged in Articles 14, 19 and 21 and other articles enumerating the fundamental rights. By defining the national aims and the constitutional goals, they set forth the standards or norms of reasonableness which must guide and animate governmental action. Any action taken by the Government with a view to giving effect to any one or more of the Directive principles would ordinarily, subject to any constitutional or legal inhibitions or other overriding considerations, qualify for being regarded as reasonable, while an action which is inconsistent with or runs counter to a Directive Principle would prima facie incur the reproach of being unreasonable. 14. Where any governmental action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest discussed above and is found to be wanting in the quality of reasonableness or lacking in the. element of public interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. It must follow as a necessary corollary from this proposition that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the State; such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. element of public interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. It must follow as a necessary corollary from this proposition that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the State; such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. The Government, therefore, cannot for example, give a contract or sell or lease out its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of course there are other considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so. Such considerations may be that some Directive Principle is sought to be advanced or implemented or that the contract or the property is given not with a view to earning revenue but for the purpose of carrying out a welfare scheme for the benefit of a particular group or section of people deserving it or that the person who has offered a higher consideration is not otherwise fit to be given the contract or the property. We have referred to these considerations only illustratively, for there may be an infinite variety of considerations which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total evaluation of various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particular action, that the Court would have to decide whether the action of the Govt, is reasonable and in public interest. But one basic principle which must guide the Court in arriving at its determination on this question is that there is always a presumption that the governmental action is reasonable and in public interest and it is for the party challenging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with public interest. This burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the Court by proper and adequate material. This burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the Court by proper and adequate material. The court cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the government is unreasonable or without public interest because, as we said above, there are a large number of policy considerations which must necessarily weigh with the Government in taking action and therefore the Court would not strike down governmental action as invalid on this ground, unless it is clearly satisfied that the action is unreasonable or not in public interest. But where it is so satisfied, it would be the plainest duty of the Court under the Constitution to invalidate the governmental action. This is one of the most important functions of the Court and also one of the most essential for preservation of the rule of law. It is imperative in a democracy governed by the rule of law that governmental action must be kept within the limits of the law and if there is any transgression, the Court must be ready to condemn it. It is a matter of historical experience that there is a tendency in every government to assume more and more powers and since it is not an uncommon phenomenon in some countries that the legislative check is getting diluted, it is left to the Court as the only other reviewing authority under the Constitution to be increasingly vigilant to ensure observance with the rule of law and in this task, the court must not flinch or falter. It may be pointed out that this ground of invalidity, namely, that the governmental action is unreasonable or lacking in the quality of public interest, is different from that of mala fides though it may, in a given case, furnish evidence of mala fides. ( 9. ) MR. Jaiswal, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 and 3 further placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Rayalaseema paper Mills Ltd. and another v. Government of A. P. and others, (2003) 1 SCC 341 . He submitted that in this decision the Apex Court also approved the action of the State Government wherein an agreement was entered into by the State government with a private Paper Mill for supply of certain soft and hardwood to them every year for a specified period for manufacture of paper. He submitted that in this decision the Apex Court also approved the action of the State Government wherein an agreement was entered into by the State government with a private Paper Mill for supply of certain soft and hardwood to them every year for a specified period for manufacture of paper. In that case also the question of judicial scope under Article 226 of the Constitution of India coupled with the matter with regard to price fixation including the tenure of the agreement was considered. The relevant paragraphs 14 and 15 from the said decision are quoted as below:-"14. Before we enter the discussion, it is made clear that the determination of rates of royalty for supply of forest produce to paper mills is not governed by any statute or a statutory order. The Government while entering into the agreement with the paper mills had undertaken to supply a certain specified quantity of wood each year for a period of 20 years. The Government had not assured the mills that it will supply bamboo and other forest produce required by them at a particular rate. Nor was there an agreement between them with respect to the manner in which the rates of royalty would be determined. There was no assurance that the mills would be consulted or associated while fixing the rates of royalty. Even where the matter is governed by a statute or a statutory order, the scope of judicial enquiry is limited. This Court in Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. examined the scope of judicial interference in the matters of price fixation and observed: (SCC pp. 734-35, paras 4-6)"4. We start with the observation, price fixation is neither the function nor the forte of the Court1. We concern ourselves neither with the policy nor with the rates. But we do not totally deny ourselves the jurisdiction to enquire into the question, in appropriate proceedings, whether relevant considerations have gone in and irrelevant considerations kept out of the determination of the price. For example, if the legislature has decreed the pricing policy and prescribed the factors which should guide the determination of the price, we will, if necessary, enquire into the question whether the policy and the factors are present to the mind of the authorities specifying the price. But our examination will stop there. We will go ho further. For example, if the legislature has decreed the pricing policy and prescribed the factors which should guide the determination of the price, we will, if necessary, enquire into the question whether the policy and the factors are present to the mind of the authorities specifying the price. But our examination will stop there. We will go ho further. We will not deluge ourselves with more facts and figures. The assembling of the raw materials and the mechanics of price fixation are the concern of the executive and we leave it to them. And, we will not re-evaluate the considerations even if the prices are demonstrably injurious to some manufacturers or producers. The Court will, of course, examine if there is any hostile discrimination. That is a different cup of tea altogether. 5. The second observation we wish to make is, legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not subject to rules of natural justice. In the case of parliamentary legislation, the proposition is self-evident. In the case of subordinate legislation, it may happen that Parliament may itself provide for a notice and for a hearing there are several instances of the legislature requiring the subordinate legislating authority to give public notice and a public hearing before say, for example, levying a municipal rate - in which case the substantial non-observance of the statutorily prescribed mode of observing natural justice may have the-effect of invalidating the subordinate legislation -. The right here given to rate payers or others is in the nature of a concession which is not to detract from the character of the activity as legislative and not quasi-judicial. But, where the legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it and it will not be permissible to read natural justice into such legislative activity. 6. Occasionally, the legislature directs the subordinate legislating body to make such enquiry as it thinks fit before making thex subordinate legislation. In such a situation, while such enquiry by the subordinate legislating body as it deems fit is a condition precedent to the subordinate legislation, the nature and the extent of the enquiry is in the discretion of the subordinate legislating body and the subordinate legislation is not open to. question on the ground that the enquiry was not as full as it might have been. question on the ground that the enquiry was not as full as it might have been. The provision for such enquiry as it thinks fit is generally an enabling provision, intended to facilitate the subordinate legislating body to obtain relevant information from all and whatever source and not intended to vest any right in anyone other than the subordinate legislating body. It is the sort of enquiry which the legislature itself may cause to be made before legislating, an enquiry which will not confer any right on anyone. " 15. This Court was examining the scope of judicial scrutiny in the matters of price fixation where it was governed by statutory provisions. The scope of judicial scrutiny would be far less where the price fixation is not governed by the statute or a statutory order. Where the legislature has prescribed the factors which should be taken into consideration and which should guide the determination of price, the Courts would examine whether the considerations for fixing the price mentioned in the statute or the statutory order have been kept in mind while fixing the price and whether these factors have guided the determination. The Courts would not go beyond that point. In the present appeals, there is no law, or any statutory provision laying down the criteria or the principles which must be followed, or which must guide the determination of rates of royalty. No doubt, any arbitrary action taken by the State would be subject to the scrutiny by the Courts because arbitrariness is the very antithesis of rule of law. But this does not mean that this Court would act as an appellate authority over the determination of rates of royalty by the Government. Government is the owner of the products. While it had agreed to supply a particular quantity every year for specified period, it had never agreed to supply at a particular rate; not did it stipulate with the mill owners the basis upon which it would determine the rates of royalty. It is open to the Government to fix such price as it thinks appropriate having regard to public interest, which inter alia, may include interest of revenue, environmental, ecology, the need of mills and the requirements of other consumers. The price is not to be fixed keeping in mind the requirements of the mills alone. " ( 10. It is open to the Government to fix such price as it thinks appropriate having regard to public interest, which inter alia, may include interest of revenue, environmental, ecology, the need of mills and the requirements of other consumers. The price is not to be fixed keeping in mind the requirements of the mills alone. " ( 10. ) THE principles of judicial review have been considered by the Apex Court in its decision rendered in Reliance Energy Ltd. and another v. Maharashtra state Road Development Corpn, Ltd. and others, (2007) 8 SCC 1 wherein their Lordships of the Apex Court after taking into consideration its earlier decision rendered in Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, (2006) 10 SCC 1 , held in paragraph 39 as under. -. "39. In Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports authority of India the Division Bench of this Court has held that in matters of judicial review the basic test is to see whether there is any infirmity in the decision-making process and not in the decision itself. This means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and he must give effect to it otherwise it may result in illegality: The principle of "judicial review" cannot be denied even in contractual matters or matters in which the Government exercises its contractual powers, but judicial review is intended to prevent arbitrariness and it must be exercised in larger pubic interest. Expression of different views and opinions in exercise of contractual powers may be there, however, such difference of opinion must be based on specified norms. Those norms may be legal norms or accounting norms. As long as the norms are clear and properly understood by the decision-maker and the bidders and other stakeholders, uncertainty and thereby breach of the rule of law will not arise. The grounds upon which administrative action is subjected to control by judicial review are classifiable broadly under three heads, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. In the said judgment it has been held that all errors of law are jurisdictional errors. One of the important principles, laid down in the aforesaid judgment is that whenever a norm/benchmark is prescribed in the tender process in order to provide certainty that norm/standard should be clear. As stated above "certainty" is an important aspect of the rule of law. One of the important principles, laid down in the aforesaid judgment is that whenever a norm/benchmark is prescribed in the tender process in order to provide certainty that norm/standard should be clear. As stated above "certainty" is an important aspect of the rule of law. In Reliance Airport developers the scoring system formed part of the evaluation process. The object of that system was to provide identification of factors, allocation of marks of each of the said factors and giving of marks at different stages. Objectivity was thus provided. " ( 11. ) IN the light of the aforesaid decision, the action on the part of the respondents with regard to fairness in the action has to be taken into account by applying the basic test whether there is any infirmity in the decision-making process and not in the decision itself. In the present case, it is seen that the respondent No. 4 while submitting its return has filed a document, Annexure R-l. This is the order issued by the second respondent to the respondent No. 4 on 14. 1. 2005 and relates to allotment of mine under the joint venture. This order itself indicates that offers from different joint venture companies were called and the offer which was submitted by the respondent No. 4 under the joint venture was accepted and accordingly the work of lifting the mineral was allotted to the respondent No. 4. On the basis of the same, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 2 after taking the work from the petitioner was interested to allot the work to respondent No. 4 only. There had been offers given to other companies to carry out the work of removing the excavated minerals under the joint venture. No other company has come forward to challenge the acceptance of offer of respondent No. 4 by the respondent no. 2 and it is only the petitioner who has agitated the matter. It is also not a case of the petitioner that it was ready to work with the respondent No. 2 in a joint venture. ( 12. No other company has come forward to challenge the acceptance of offer of respondent No. 4 by the respondent no. 2 and it is only the petitioner who has agitated the matter. It is also not a case of the petitioner that it was ready to work with the respondent No. 2 in a joint venture. ( 12. ) THE petitioner has also filed rejoinder and the only objection on its part seems to be that no fresh tender was invited in the interregnum period after the two contract works which were allotted to the petitioner were completed by him and without calling tenders the work was allotted to the respondent No. 4. ( 13. ) TO consider the submission so put forth on behalf of the petitioner, it would be further appropriate to judge the action of the respondents by the test of reasonableness and public interest, as it has been held in M/s Kasturi Lais case (supra ). It is seen that earlier when the petitioner was granted the contract work, the petitioner failed to perform its contract within the stipulated period despite there having been extension granted by the respondent No. 2. Once the petitioner had failed to discharge its contractual obligation, the other joint venture companies which were registered with the respondent No. 2 were offered to carry out the work of and one of the offeree was respondent No. 4 whose offer, being appropriate one, was accepted. It cannot be said that without calling any offer from the other companies which were ready to work in joint venture the respondent No. 4 has been allotted the work. ( 14. ) IN view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that it is not a case where the J respondent No. 2 has acted arbitrarily. I ( 15. ) SHRI Dixit, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited our attention to the order dated 30. 7. 1999/5. 8. 1999 (Annexure P/8) by which the lease of the Kari- Mines for excavation of the minerals was granted to the second respondent. He submitted that the condition No. 8 of the order Annexure P/8 clearly stipulates that the mines so allotted to the. respondent No. 2 shall not be re-allotted to any other person or institution and the excavation shall only be done by the Corporation otherwise the permission shall be cancelled. He submitted that the condition No. 8 of the order Annexure P/8 clearly stipulates that the mines so allotted to the. respondent No. 2 shall not be re-allotted to any other person or institution and the excavation shall only be done by the Corporation otherwise the permission shall be cancelled. It is further contended that the respondent No. 4 is excavating the minerals and also dealing with the same and it is alleged that the action of the respondents No. 2 and 4 in connivance with each other is. illegal and violative of the terms and conditions laid down in the order, Annexure P/8. ( 16. ) WHILE we minutely consider the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to condition No. 8 of the order dated 30. 7. 1999/5. 8. 1999 (Annexure P-8) we do not find any material on record to show that in the joint venture with the respondent No. 4 the respondent No. 2 has permitted the respondent No. 4 to carry out the mining operation. It is stated on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that respondent No. 4 has agreed to pay royalty other than the cost of excavated material. From the material on record, it is only gathered that. the activities of respondent No. 4 in a joint venture with the respondent No. 2 are only restricted for the purposes of lifting the excavated material and the mining operations are being carried out by the respondent No. 2. It does not mean that the mine has been transferred to the respondent No. 4 and therefore, a joint venture agreement has been entered into by respondent No. 2 with the respondent No. 4. ( 17. ) LASTLY, it is further put forth on behalf of the petitioner that an application was submitted under the Right to Information Act, 2005 on 31. 1. 2006 but it was returned and the respondent No. 3 refused to give any information saying that it was confidential. The petitioner has filed the copies of correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 on record as Annexures P/4 to P/6. The petitioner has also submitted an appeal under the Right to Information Act to the respondent No. 2 but it is stated that no decision has been taken. ( 18. The petitioner has filed the copies of correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 on record as Annexures P/4 to P/6. The petitioner has also submitted an appeal under the Right to Information Act to the respondent No. 2 but it is stated that no decision has been taken. ( 18. ) THE respondents No. 2 and 3 in their return in para-7 have submitted that the appeal of the petitioner under the Right to Information Act, 2005 is not pending and same has been dismissed by order dated 2. 5. 2006 (Annexure R-3) in default of deposit of requisite fees. In this view of the matter, we do not find any illegality in the action of the respondents in this regard. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that no case for interference is made out and both the petitions stand dismissed accordingly. Petition dismissed.