JUDGMENT By means of this petition, the petitioners have sought writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 18.12.1999 (copy Annexure-6 to the writ petition), passed by respondent No. 1 i.e. Additional District Magistrate (E)/Rent Control and Eviction Officer (for short RCEO), rejecting the release application of the landlord, and order dated 25.01.2000 (copy Annexure-8 to the writ petition), passed by said authority, whereby building known as Standard Hotel has been allotted to Bhupal Singh Bhakuni (respondent No. 2). A mandamus has also been sought directing the respondents to handover immediate possession of House No. 166-67, Upper Floor, Standard Hotel, Mallital, Nainital. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the affidavit, counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit filed on the record. Facts of the Case : 3. Brief facts of the case are that petitioners are landlords of building known as Standard Hotel, bearing Municipal Board No. 166-67 (Upper Storey), Mallital, Nainital. Previously, respondent No. 3 Joseph Menzes and his sister were tenants in said accommodation, after death of their mother (original tenant). Proceedings were initiated by Competent Officer/District Supply Officer under Section 12 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972) for declaring deemed vacancy in respect of accommodation in question. And deemed vacancy was declared vide order dated 19.03.1990. Said vacancy was confirmed vide order dated 17.08.1990 (copy Annexure-1 to the writ petition) by respondent No. 1 in Case No. 51/7 of 1989-90 in respect of aforesaid accommodation. It appears that certain persons including respondent No. 2 Bhupal Singh Bhakuni sought allotment of the accommodation in their favour under Section 16 of the aforesaid Act. On the other hand, the landlord sought release of the accommodation on the ground that he has to settle his sons in the business. The previous tenant Joseph Menzes challenged the order declaring deemed vacancy before Allahabad High Court by filing Writ Petition No. 29713 of 1990, in which the landlord as well as the prospective allottee (Bhupal Singh Bhakuni) were impleaded as respondents. Allahabad High Court vide its interim order dated 10.01.1991 stayed the proceedings of allotment in pursuance to the order dated 17.08.1990 by which deemed vacancy was confirmed. Allahabad High Court vide its interim order dated 10.01.1991 stayed the proceedings of allotment in pursuance to the order dated 17.08.1990 by which deemed vacancy was confirmed. However, it appears that Rent Control & Eviction Officer proceeded with the allotment proceedings and rejected the release application of the landlord vide its order dated 25.10.1990, against which a revision was preferred under Section 18 of the aforesaid Act before District Judge, Nainital, which was registered as Rent Control Revision No. 62 of 1990. The revision was allowed vide order dated 01.12.1998 (copy Annexure-5 to the writ petition) by District Judge, Nainital, who remanded the matter to RCEO for fresh decision on the release application of the landlord. The petitioners’ case is that respondent No. 1 (RCEO) in collusion with respondents No. 2 & 3 proceeded with the allotment proceedings in violation of the stay order passed by the Allahabad High Court showing false substituted service on the landlords. It is further alleged by the petitioners (landlords) that the respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order dated 18.12.1999 (copy Annexure-6 to the writ petition) rejecting the release application of the landlords. In para 11 and 11-A of the writ petition it has been stated that the petitioners had no knowledge that their release application has been rejected. The petitioners have further pleaded that without serving the petitioners with notices, respondent No. 1 vide another impugned order dated 25.01.2000 allotted the accommodation in favour of respondent No. 2 in clear violation of the interim order passed by the Allahabad High Court. It is further alleged by the petitioners that false service of notice of Form-B has been shown on the landlord. The allotment in favour of respondent no. 2 is stated to be in violation of provisions of sub section (9) of Section 16 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It is further stated that notice in Form-C was also not sent to the petitioners and without issuing any Form-D respondent No. 1 has shown that possession has been taken from respondent No. 3 and given to the respondent No. 2. It is further stated that notice in Form-C was also not sent to the petitioners and without issuing any Form-D respondent No. 1 has shown that possession has been taken from respondent No. 3 and given to the respondent No. 2. It has also been stated in this writ petition by the landlords that the Writ Petition No. 29713 of 1990, which was filed by respondent No. 3 before Allahabad High Court was transferred to this Court after creation of State of Uttarakhand and was renumbered as Writ Petition No. 5195 (M/S) of 2001 and in default of respondent no. 3 (who was petitioner in said case), and the same was dismissed for want of prosecution. It is pleaded bys the landlords that on getting knowledge of dismissal of the writ petition filed by respondent No. 3 the landlords moved an application on 07.05.2002 before respondent No. 1 (RCEO) to pass orders on his release application. Said authority after fixing some dates in collusion with the other respondents got fabricated the order sheet. It is further alleged that respondent No. 2 who is a political man played fraud on the judicial system and got grabbed the property of the petitioners, without paying even a single paisa to the petitioners. It is further alleged by the petitioners that not only the respondent No. 2 illegally occupied the building in collusion with respondent No. 1 but also made alterations in the building and let out the building to various persons who are running shops in the name and style of Standard Travel Agency, Nayana Colour Laboratory, Faiz Hair Dresser and Standard Hair Dresser. Lastly, it is pleaded that children of Devil Lal Sah (original landlord) are unemployed and their need has become very acute and demanding with the passage of time. With these averments, the impugned orders are sought to be quashed. Defence/counter affidavits 4. The writ petition was contested by respondent No. 2 who filed two counter affidavits one a short counter affidavit and another a supplementary counter affidavit. In the short counter affidavit, the contesting respondent No.2 Bhupal Singh Bhakuni has stated that this writ petition is not maintainable as alternative remedy was available to the landlords. Defence/counter affidavits 4. The writ petition was contested by respondent No. 2 who filed two counter affidavits one a short counter affidavit and another a supplementary counter affidavit. In the short counter affidavit, the contesting respondent No.2 Bhupal Singh Bhakuni has stated that this writ petition is not maintainable as alternative remedy was available to the landlords. It is further stated that after rejection of release application when the revision was filed by the landlords it was the landlord himself who gave the impression to the revisional court that no stay order was in operation. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that from the order dated 01.12.1998, by which the revisional court (District Judge, Nainital) remanded the matter to RCEO for fresh disposal of the release application, it is apparent that the revisional (landlord) was represented by his counsel before the revisional court and as such had the knowledge of the date fixed (21.12.1998) on which the parties had to appear before RCEO. It is further pleaded by the answering respondent that the notices were sent to the petitioner on his correct address by RCEO and it is wrong to say that he was not served with the notices as alleged in the writ petition. It is further pleaded that interim order passed by Allahabad High Court had no operation after the stay vacation application moved by answering respondent in the writ petition filed by the previous tenant before Allahabad High Court and the same was not disposed of within a period of 14 days. As to the non payment of rent it has been stated that the answering respondent sent the rent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per annum, but the landlord refused to accept the same. Consequently, the answering respondent had to deposit the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It is further pleaded that the petitioners had full knowledge of the allotment made in favour of respondent No. 2 in the year 2000, and the present writ petition is filed almost after three years without any sufficient explanation. As to the passing of allotment order in favour of respondent No. 2 by respondent No. 1in violation of interim order passed by the Allahabad High Court, it is further stated that after the revisional court remanded the matter, the RCEO could not have defied it. As to the passing of allotment order in favour of respondent No. 2 by respondent No. 1in violation of interim order passed by the Allahabad High Court, it is further stated that after the revisional court remanded the matter, the RCEO could not have defied it. In this regard, it is further stated that the RCEO was never served with copy of interim order dated 10.01.1991 passed by the Allahabad High Court. 5. In the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 it has been stated that the procedure of service of notice on the landlord was followed by the authorities concerned. It is further stated in the supplementary counter affidavit that allotment order in Form-B and Form-C were duly issued after complying the provisions of law. It is denied by answering respondent that building was sub let to various persons. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the shops of Barber, Photographer etc. are part of the Hotel business, which is being run by the answering respondent No. 2 in the accommodation in question. It is also stated in the supplementary counter affidavit that the landlord could have moved a review application under Section 16 and Revision under Section 18 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 against the dismissal of his release application and he cannot approach the High Court directly. 6. In the rejoinder affidavit the petitioners have reiterated the averments made in the writ petition. Relevant Provisions of Law 7. Section 12 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972), makes a provision as to when a deemed vacancy can be declared in respect of a building covered under the Act. It provides that a landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if he has not a member of his family or in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence elsewhere. Section 16 of the Act provides procedure by which a fresh allotment to a tenant can be made in respect of a vacant building. It also provides procedure for release of the building in favour of the landlord of such vacant building in respect of which deemed vacancy has been declared. Section 16 of the Act provides procedure by which a fresh allotment to a tenant can be made in respect of a vacant building. It also provides procedure for release of the building in favour of the landlord of such vacant building in respect of which deemed vacancy has been declared. Sub section (9) of Section 16 of the Act further provides that where the building is let out to an allottee District Magistrate (or the person authorized on his behalf) require the allottee to pay the landlord rent in advance equivalent to one-half of the yearly presumptive rent for the building situated in a hill municipality. The explanation to sub-section (9) of Section 16 provides that expression ‘presumptive rent’ means an amount of rent which the District Magistrate prima facie considers reasonable and shall not be less than the amount of rent which was payable by the last tenant. Section 18 of the Act provides that revision can be preferred before the District Judge within a period of fifteen days by a person aggrieved by final order passed under Section 16. Section 25 of the Act provides that no tenant shall sub-let the whole or any part of building under his tenancy. 8. Rule 8 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, provides that before declaring vacancy under Section 12 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, the building shall be inspected. It also requires that so far as possible such inspection shall be made in the presence of the landlord and the tenant. Sub Rule (3) of Rule 9 of the aforesaid Rules provides that on receiving the intimation of vacancy, notices shall be issued to the landlord to inform him about the date on which any application for allotment is to be considered. Clause (b) of Rule 22 empowers the District Magistrate/prescribed authority or the appellate authority/revisional court to proceed ex parte or set aside the ex parte order. Rule 28 of the aforesaid Rules provides the procedure for service of notice and permits service by affixation on some conspicuous part of his last known place of abode if the other modes of service are not available. 9. Rule 28 of the aforesaid Rules provides the procedure for service of notice and permits service by affixation on some conspicuous part of his last known place of abode if the other modes of service are not available. 9. Clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India provides that where an ex parte interim order or stay is made in a writ petition by the High Court, against a party and such party moves an application for vacation of the stay order, if such application remains undisposed of, the interim order shall stand expired after a period of two weeks. Arguments advanced and discussions thereon : 10. Alternative Remedy when fraud is played : On behalf of respondent No. 2, it is argued that the landlords (petitioners) had an alternative remedy to approach the appellate/revisional authority (District judge) under Section 18 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 to challenge the order of allotment in favour of respondent No. 2, and also the order of rejection of application of release. It is further argued that under Rule 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, the petitioners could have sought setting aside of the ex parte orders before respondent No. 1 (RCEOI). As such, this writ petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed on that score. Reliance is placed on behalf of respondent No. 2 to the principle of law laid down in Parbhash Chandra Jain vs. A.D.J. 2005 (1) A.W.C. 781. Reference is also made to Para 17 of the judgment reported in Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union vs. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and Another (2005) 13 SCC 777, in which in respect of the powers of labour court it has been held that where the ex parte award is passed, the Tribunal can set aside the same on sufficient cause being shown by a party by which it was prevented from putting its appearance. Undoubtedly, this Court finds that the petitioners could have moved an application for recall of the ex parte orders under Rule 22 of the aforesaid Rules. It is also clear from the record that the revision was also maintainable under Section 18 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 against the order passed under Section 16 by the respondent No. 1. It is also clear from the record that the revision was also maintainable under Section 18 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 against the order passed under Section 16 by the respondent No. 1. But, the manner in which the entire proceedings are dealt with by the respondents, as contented by the learned counsel for the petitioners, there was no hope of justice by approaching the same authority under the aforesaid Rule. In para 21 of the writ petition it is pleaded that respondent No. 2 is a political man who in collusion with respondents No. 1 & 3 could obtain orders (including the impugned orders) in his favour, by playing fraud on the judicial system. Neither content of said para are denied in the short counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 nor in the supplementary counter affidavit filed on his behalf. In para 22 of the judgment reported in State of H.P. and others Vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited and another (2005) 6 Supreme Court Cases 499, the Apex court has held that where the proceedings are itself an abuse of process of law, the High Court instead of directing a party to exhaust alternative remedy, can entertain a writ petition. Apart from this, this writ petition was filed in the year 2003 and after hearing the parties admitted on 22.09.2005. In such circumstances, after parties have exchanged the affidavits and the matter has been heard on merits at the stage of final hearing it is not proper to throw the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. (Reliance is placed in Para 29 of Kanak and another Vs. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and others (2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 693). Also, in Para 22 of A.V. Papayya Sastry and others Vs. Govt. of A.P. and others (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 221, the Apex court has observed as under :- “It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order-by the first court or by the final court – has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. Such a judgment, decree or order-by the first court or by the final court – has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.” 11. Having considered the facts of the case, in the above circumstances, this Court is of the view that the present case is one of the exceptional cases in which the writ petition cannot be thrown merely on the ground of alternative remedy. Whether the impugned orders passed in violation of stay order of Allahabad High Court : 12. On behalf of petitioners, it is vehemently argued that both the impugned order i.e. allotting the building to the respondent No. 2, and rejecting the release application of the petitioners, passed by respondent no. 1, are in blatant violation of the stay order passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 29713 of 1990 Joseph Menzes Vs. Additional District Magistrate (E)/RCEO, Nainital and others. It is pertinent to mention here that before the impugned orders are passed, the vacancy was declared vide order dated 19.03.1990 by District Supply Officer/prescribed authority which was confirmed vide order dated 17.08.1990 (copy Annexure-1 to the writ petition) passed by respondent No. 1 Additional District Magistrate (E)/RCEO. It appears that neither petitioners (landlords) nor the respondent No. 2 (new allottee) are aggrieved by this order, but the previous allottee Joseph Menzes challenged said order by filing the Writ Petition No. 29713 of 1990, before Allahabad High Court in which the present petitioner No. 1 and present respondents No. 2 & 3 were impleaded as respondents. The interim stay order dated 10.01.1991 (copy Annexure-4 to the writ petition) passed by Allahabad High Court in said writ petition reads as under :- “Learned counsel for the petitioner is directed to serve respondent 2 and 3 by Dasti notices. The office shall issue Dasti notice on completion of formalities, within three days. The petitioners undertakes to serve the respondents within 15 days. The office shall also issue notices by Registered post. List this case for admission on 21st February, 1991. Until further orders of this court the proceedings for allotment in pursuance of the impugned order dated 17.08.90 shall remain stayed. Sd/- S.C.V. 10.01.1991" 13. The petitioners undertakes to serve the respondents within 15 days. The office shall also issue notices by Registered post. List this case for admission on 21st February, 1991. Until further orders of this court the proceedings for allotment in pursuance of the impugned order dated 17.08.90 shall remain stayed. Sd/- S.C.V. 10.01.1991" 13. On behalf of respondent No. 2 it is argued that said interim order stood automatically vacated in view of clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the present respondent No. 2 had moved application for vacation of stay in aforesaid writ petition, which remained un-disposed of. On examination of the record, this Court finds that the argument advanced on behalf of respondent No. 2 is lame excuse to cover up the impugned orders passed by the respondent No. 1 in violation of the stay order. Annexure RA-1 filed with the rejoinder affidavit is copy of order dated 31.03.1999, passed by Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Contempt Petition No. 872 of 1999. From said order it is clear that Joseph Menzes (previous tenant) filed a contempt petition against Sri O.N. Khandelwal, the then District Judge, Nainital, for proceedings with the Rent Control Revision No. 62 of 1991, arising out of the earlier order passed by respondent No. 1 on release application of the landlord, whereby said revisional court (District Judge, Nainital) remanded the matter to the respondent No. 1 for fresh decision. Civil Misc. Contempt Petition No. 872 of 1999 shows that Allahabad High Court has observed that the interim stay order dated 10.01.1991 was confirmed on 05.08.1991 in Writ Petition No. 29713 of 1990. The Allahabad High Court while disposing of the contempt petition has observed that since the vacancy of the building was not touched by the revisional court, as such it cannot be said that the District Judge has willingly committed any disobedience of the court’s order. But the Allahabad High Court in its order dated 31.03.1999 further observed that the learned District Judge, Nainital, should have restrained himself from passing even the order remanding the matter to respondent No. 1. Not only this, it is lastly observed in said order by the Allahabad High Court that the stay continues. 14. But the Allahabad High Court in its order dated 31.03.1999 further observed that the learned District Judge, Nainital, should have restrained himself from passing even the order remanding the matter to respondent No. 1. Not only this, it is lastly observed in said order by the Allahabad High Court that the stay continues. 14. Sri L.P. Naithani, learned Senior Advocate, on behalf of respondent No. 2 contended that there is nothing on record to show that the stay order was in the knowledge of the respondent No. 1, and as such it cannot be said that he passed the impugned orders in violation of the stay order. Again, on examination of record, this Court finds that the argument advanced on behalf of respondent No. 2 has no legs. It is needless to say that from the record it is clear that present respondent No. 1 Additional District Magistrate(E)/RCEO, who passed the impugned orders, was also respondent no. 1 in the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 29713 of 1990. That being so, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 had no knowledge of the stay order passed by the Allahabad High Court. Perusal of the record further shows that said writ petition which was filed by the present respondent No. 3 before Allahabad High Court was transferred to this Court after creation of State of Uttarakhand and renumbered as Writ Petition no. 5195 of 2001 (M/S), which was dismissed for non prosecution on 07.05.2002 and the interim order was vacated on that day. That being so, till 07.05.2002 stay order remained in operation. Both the impugned orders dated 25.01.2000, allotting the accommodation in question to respondent no. 2 Bhupal Singh Bhakuni, and 18.12.1999, dismissing the release application of the petitioners were passed when stay order passed by the Allahabad High Court was in operation. Therefore, the respondent No1. 1 has passed the impugned orders totally in disregard of, and ignoring the stay order passed by the Allahabad High Court. The stay order, quoted above, clearly shows that the proceedings for allotment in pursuance to the order of vacancy dated 17.08.1990 were expressly stayed, on the date when the impugned order dated 25.01.2000 was passed in favour of the present respondent No. 2 allotting the accommodation in question to him. Reference was made on behalf of respondent no. The stay order, quoted above, clearly shows that the proceedings for allotment in pursuance to the order of vacancy dated 17.08.1990 were expressly stayed, on the date when the impugned order dated 25.01.2000 was passed in favour of the present respondent No. 2 allotting the accommodation in question to him. Reference was made on behalf of respondent no. 2 to the case of Mulraj vs. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1386, and it is submitted that the petitioners could have moved an application under Section 151 of C.P.C. before the authority concerned for setting aside the order passed by respondent No. 1 during the operation of the stay order. I have gone through said case law. In my opinion, this case law is of no help to respondent No. 2 as the respondent No. 1 was himself a party in the writ petition before Allahabad High Court and it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 had no knowledge of the stay order. Laches 15. An objection was raised on behalf of respondent No. 2 before this Court that the writ petition suffers from laches as the same is filed after three years of the impugned orders are passed. In reply to this, Sri H.P. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that since the proceedings of allotment were stayed, the petitioners had no knowledge of the impugned orders. It is also contended that the service of notices shown on the record by the respondent No. 1 is fabricated. But, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 drew attention of this Court to Rule 28 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules 1972, and submitted that the service by affixation in the presence of witnesses, when other modes of service were not possible, is sufficient service on the party (landlord). Assuming for a moment that the service was affected on the landlord as alleged by respondent No. 2 even then the impugned orders cannot be said to have been lawful, for the reasons as already discussed above. Assuming for a moment that the service was affected on the landlord as alleged by respondent No. 2 even then the impugned orders cannot be said to have been lawful, for the reasons as already discussed above. As far as delay and laches are concerned, since the writ petition was admitted after hearing both the parties and the court in its wisdom did not dismiss the writ petition at that stage summarily on the ground of laches, now at the stage of final hearing after exchange of affidavits and counter affidavits, when the parties have already been heard on merits it is not just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case to dismiss the petition on the ground of laches. Non Fixation of Rent/Non Payment of Rent by the tenant in advance :- 16. Sri H.P. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that neither the respondent No. 1 fixed the rent nor the respondent No. 2 deposited it in advance as required under sub section (9) of Section 16 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, as such, the proceedings before respondent No. 1 stand vitiated. Sub section (9) of Section 16 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 requires that the District Magistrate (or the person authorized on his behalf) shall while making an order of allotment under clause (a) of Section 16 shall require allottee to pay to the landlord an advance of one-half of the yearly presumptive rent. In reply to this, on behalf of respondent No. 2 it is argued that the order of allotment and form-B itself shows that the rent was fixed at the rate payable by the previous tenant. It is further argued on behalf of respondent No. 2 that the rent was offered and sent by money order to the landlord, but the same was refused hence it was deposited before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Annexure-5 to the short counter affidavit filed on behalf of contesting respondent No. 2 shows that the money orders were sent in the year 2002. The impugned allotment was made in the year 1999. From the papers filed with the short counter affidavit, it is apparent that neither any advance rent was paid nor offered. Annexure-5 to the short counter affidavit filed on behalf of contesting respondent No. 2 shows that the money orders were sent in the year 2002. The impugned allotment was made in the year 1999. From the papers filed with the short counter affidavit, it is apparent that neither any advance rent was paid nor offered. That being so, it further discloses the conduct of respondent No. 2 and also that of respondent No.1 in dealing with entire matter and occupying the building without paying rents. Aforesaid paper filed with the short counter affidavit indicates that according to respondent No. 2 the rate of rent payable by the previous tenant was Rs. 2,000/- per year, which means the rent fixed by respondent No. (RCEO) of the building in question is Rs. 167/- per month. This Court cannot close its eyes that admittedly the building in question is situated in Mallital Nainital and a Hotel is being run by the respondent No. 2 in it. From no stretch of imagination a rent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per annum (Rs. 167/- per month) can be said to be a reasonable or logical rent of a building in which a Hotel is being run by the respondent No. 2. Not only this, it is also pertinent to mention that in the writ petition it has been specifically pleaded that the respondent No. 2 has let out several shops in the building to various sub tenants who are running Barber shop, Photographer shop etc. Said fact has not been specifically denied by respondent No. 2 in his short counter affidavit. What has been stated in reply of said fact is that these shops are necessary for running a Hotel and part of it. But it is not made clear by respondent No. 2 whether he is accepting rent from these shops or not. Section 25 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 clearly provides that a tenant cannot sub let the building allotted to him or any part of such building. Conclusion 17. For the reasons as discussed above, after considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that respondents No. 1 & 2 have played fraud and committed abuse of process of law. Conclusion 17. For the reasons as discussed above, after considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that respondents No. 1 & 2 have played fraud and committed abuse of process of law. As such, both the impugned orders i.e. 25.01.2000, allotting the building to respondent No. 2 and 18.12.1999, rejecting the application of the landlord, are liable to be quashed. Ordinarily, in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court after quashing the orders, remand the matter for fresh decision of case, but considering peculiar facts of this case and the conduct of respondents No. 1 & 2, as mentioned above, and further considering the facts stated on behalf of landlord that his children are grown up and need accommodation for running their business, this Court to do complete justice between the parties, does not think it proper to remand the matter back to respondent No. 1. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned orders are quashed. Also, the release application of the landlord shall stand allowed. The Additional District Magistrate/RCEO (respondent No. 1) shall ensure that the possession of the building is delivered to the petitioners within a period of 45 days from today. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case respondent No. 2 is directed to pay special costs of Rs. 10,000/- to the petitioners.