JUDGMENT Since the controversy involved in all the three writ petitioners is similar, therefore, for the sake of convenience, they are being decided together by this common judgment. 2. Brief facts of the case giving rise to the present writ petitions, according to the petitioners, are that a notice under Section 10(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (for short the Act) was given by the Prescribed Authority to the petitioner no. 1 Smt. Rani Padma Devi (since deceased) proposing to declare 523.04 acres of land as surplus out of the entire holding of the said petitioner assumed to be 619.83 acres. The petitioner No. 1 filed objection on 27.12.1975 alleging therein that the notice given to her is against law and the same is ultra vires. It was also alleged that the present notice is barred by the principle of res judicata because earlier also proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under the Act, which attained finality, therefore, for the same land notice ought not to have been issued again under the U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973. It was also alleged that there is no surplus land in possession of the petitioner No. 1 and that land to the tune of 200-54 hectares has wrongly been shown as irrigated, while the same is un-irrigated. No regular source of irrigation was available. It was also contended that the land in possession of Adhivasi has wrongly been clubbed with the land of the petitioner no. 1. It was also alleged that the tenure holder sold certain land on different dates through registered sale deeds on fair market rate. The land was sold on account of repayment of loan and purchase of agriculture implement. The tenure holder also gave 15-50 acres of land to her son Sri Karan Chandra Raj Singh. According to the petitioners, in respect of the land in question, notice under Section 10(2) of the Act read with Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the said Act was also issued to large number of other persons and they also filed objections on various grounds in support of their case. The objectors based their claims on lease deed executed by the petitioner no. 1, the sale deed executed by the petitioner no. 1, the gift deed executed by the petitioner no.1 and claim based on Adhivasi right/adverse possession. Petitioner no. The objectors based their claims on lease deed executed by the petitioner no. 1, the sale deed executed by the petitioner no. 1, the gift deed executed by the petitioner no.1 and claim based on Adhivasi right/adverse possession. Petitioner no. 1 executed lease deed in respect of 12.50 acres each in favour of Chandra Bhan Singh and Subedar Virendra Singh on 28.7.1971 and 30.7.1971 respectively besides Sri Mukhtar Ahmad in respect of 12.01 acres of land on 30.7.1971. Petitioner no. 1 also executed lease deed in favour of Sri Sarosh Gandhi, son of Sri P. Gandhi on 28.7.1971 in respect of 7.5 acres of land, Sri Ram Singh on 30.7.1971 in respect of 11.39 acres, Rajendra Singh on 30.7.1971 in respect of 12.44 acres of land, Sheru Ram, Kesho Ram and Om Prakash on 15.7.1971 in respect of 5 acres of land. It is alleged that these persons were in actual physical possession of the land even before execution of lease deed. 3. In Writ Petition 4774 of 2001 (M/S) the controversy is with regard to the validity of sale deeds executed by petitioner no. 1. In paragraph no. 4A of the petition, the names of the persons in whose favour sale deeds were executed on 25.1.1972 as well as on some other dates and the area of the land have been mentioned. According to the petitioners, the petitioner no. 1 intended to take action against the persons who had been in possession of the specific portion of land, but they expressed their willingness to purchase the said land in their possession. Hence sale deeds were executed by the petitioner no. 1 through her registered power of attorney holder Sri Karan Chand Raj Singh in good faith and for adequate sale consideration and the purchasers are alleged to be continuing in actual physical possession and on the basis of the sale deeds their names have also been mutated in the revenue records. 4. Along with the petitioner no. 1, the persons to whom the part of land had been transferred were also issued notice under Section 10(2) of the Act, who filed their respective objections. 4. Along with the petitioner no. 1, the persons to whom the part of land had been transferred were also issued notice under Section 10(2) of the Act, who filed their respective objections. The alleged bona fide purchasers Chet Ram, Smt. Kaushaliya Devi, Sri Radhey Shyam, Sri Sada Singh and others, Major Bhup Samsher Singh, Sri Bhando Ram, Sri Pooran Bahadur, Ram Bahadur, Smt. Malai Baje, Sri Badrinath, Smt. Devi Bai, Sri Chandra Samsher Chand, Smt. Murli, Sri Algu Aheer, Km. Queeni Devi have stated in their objection that they purchased their respective land for adequate sale consideration. 5. Before the Prescribed Authority, the petitioner no. 1 in support of her objections filed documentary evidence comprising copy of order of Sub Divisional Officer Kashipur dated 10.4.1974, copy of Khatauni 1383 Fasli of village Wailjiri, Tehsil Kashipur, copy of Khasara 1383 Fasli, copy of Khasra 1382 Fasli of village Maheshpura, Khatauni of village Maheshpura. Form Khasra village Bhagwantpur 1365 Fasli, 1366 Fasli, 1367 to 1374 Fasli, Account slip of State Bank of Kashipur, Bank Accounts issued by the bank concerned. Market loan account, Bank note relating to agricultural loan and pertaining to purchase of agricultural implements. Other objectors referred to above have also filed original sale deeds, wherein the amounts of sale consideration of each of the sale deeds have been specifically mentioned, copy of Khatauni and copy of Khasra and other documents. It appears that the sale deeds filed before the Prescribed Authority have been duly proved by the witnesses concerned. 6. In support of her contention, the petitioner No. 1 (since deceased) have examined as many as 56 persons before the Prescribed Authority. 7. The learned Prescribed Authority, after hearing both the parties and on consideration of the evidence before it, has observed that the names of the persons who were in occupation of the land for about 18 years belonging to petitioner no. 1 have already been recorded in the revenue records continuously from 1364 Fasli onwards, therefore, their adhivasi rights had been perfected. The Prescribed Authority found that land to the tune of 293.66 acre land is liable to be excluded from the holding of the petitioner no. 1. 1 have already been recorded in the revenue records continuously from 1364 Fasli onwards, therefore, their adhivasi rights had been perfected. The Prescribed Authority found that land to the tune of 293.66 acre land is liable to be excluded from the holding of the petitioner no. 1. So far as the transfer of land worth 200-02 acres by way of registered sale deeds executed after 24.1.1971 is concerned, the Prescribed Authority has observed that whether the seller has transferred the land on fair market price and whether the transactions were bona fide. Ultimately, it was found that the sale deeds were made on proper market price of the land and the sale deeds are legal; but the Prescribed Authority at page no. 14 of its judgment has held that the transfer of land within a period of one year was made to defeat the provisions of the Act. However it was held that the petitioner no. 1 was in the need of money but it could not be said that the sale deeds were executed in good faith. Accordingly, the claim of the petitioner no. 1 with regard to exclusion of land through sale deeds was declined. The claim of the petitioner no. 1 in respect of the land given on lease after 24.1.1971 has also been denied holding that the lease deeds were not made in good faith. Ultimately, the Prescribed Authority passed the order declaring 23 Acres of land in irrigated terms of the petitioner No. 1 within ceiling limit and out of the proposed surplus land to the tune of 523-04 acres, land worth 293-66 acres was ordered to be excluded as held by persons having Adhivasi rights. Accordingly, land measuring 224-38 acres in irrigated terms was declared surplus by judgment and order dated 23.11.1976. 8. Accordingly, land measuring 224-38 acres in irrigated terms was declared surplus by judgment and order dated 23.11.1976. 8. Aggrieved by the said order dated 23.11.1976, Ceiling Appeals No. 1334 of 1976, 1332 of 1976, 1310 of 1976, 1262 of 1976, 1311 of 1976, 1314 of 1976, 1315 of 1976, 1318 of 1976, 1330 of 1976, 1325 of 1976, 1316 of 1976, 1317 of 1976, 1323 of 1976, 1331 of 1976, 1324 of 1976, 326 of 1976, 1333 of 1976, 1339 of 1976, 1328 of 1976, 1327 of 1976, 1320 of 1976, 1322 of 1976, 1321 of 1976 and 1319 of 1976 were preferred by Smt. Rani Padma Devi, Sri Karan Chand Raj Singh, Pooran Bahadur, Khando Ram, Major Bhu Samsher Singh, Sada Singh, Radhey Shyam, Smt. Kaushalya Devi, Shera Ram, Chandra Bhan Singh, Chet Ram, Shekh Mukhtayar Ahmad, Rajendra Singh, Subedar Birendra Singh, Smt. Sarosh Gandhi, Ram Singh, Km. Queeni Devi, Algu Aheer, Smt. Murli Devi, Chandra Samsher Chand, Ram Bahadur, Smt. Devi Bair, Badrinath and Smt. Malai Baje respectively before the District Judge, Nainital, which were ultimately heard and decided by the III Additional District Judge, Nainital by a common judgment and order dated 5.5.1977. The appellate court did not find favour with the appellants except that of Ceiling Appeal No. 1334 of 1976, Smt. Rani Padma Devi Vs. State of U.P. and dismissed rest 23 appeals. While the appeal preferred by petitioner no. 1- Rani Padma Devi was partly allowed and benefit of grove over 8-80 acres of land was given to her and the impugned judgment passed by the Prescribed Authority was modified to the extent that the tenure holder Smt. Rani Padma Devi possesses 215-23 acres of land as surplus vide judgment and order dated 5.5.1977. 9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 5.5.1977, all the appellants filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1886 of 1977 before the Allahabad High Court. Before the writ court, the petitioners contended that the ceiling authorities had committed patent error by ignoring various sale deeds executed by the petitioner no. 1 in favour of different persons referred to above after 24.1.1971 but before 8.6.1973 and the ceiling authorities failed to appreciate the provisions of Section 5(6) of the Act. Before the writ court, the petitioners contended that the ceiling authorities had committed patent error by ignoring various sale deeds executed by the petitioner no. 1 in favour of different persons referred to above after 24.1.1971 but before 8.6.1973 and the ceiling authorities failed to appreciate the provisions of Section 5(6) of the Act. The Allahabad High Court was of the opinion that the ceiling authorities had not examined the petitioners’ claim of excluding the sold land through various sale deeds between 24.1.1971 and 8.6.1973 and ceiling authorities had emphasized that the petitioner no. 1 had not indicated in the various transactions that her need was pressing. It was observed by the Allahabad High Court that the approach of the ceiling authorities was neither correct nor in consonance with the dictim of law laid down in the ruling mentioned supra (Smt. Mewa Devi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [1978, A.L.R. Page 698]. In the circumstances of the case, it was held that the judgment of the appellate authority should be quashed and the appellate authority should be asked to redetermine the petitioner’s claim based on sale deeds executed by her before 8.6.1973 and thereafter it should fix the ceiling limit and surplus area of the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed in part vide judgment and order dated 16.11.1978. 10. One of the writ petitioners Sada Singh approached the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition. The Apex Court in Civil appeal No. 2833 of 1980, Sada Singh Vs. The State of U.P. partly allowed the appeal vide order dated 12.11.1980 and modified the order of the High Court to the extent that the appellate authority in addition to the other transactions indicated in the High Court’s order dated 16.11.1978 shall also examine with reference to the Ceiling Act the validity of the sales dated 24th April 1974 of the two parcels of land measuring 2 acres and 13 acres respectively. 11. After remand of the matters to the appellate Court the appeals were heard afresh. The appellate court after hearing the parties has decided the appeals by separate orders. 11. After remand of the matters to the appellate Court the appeals were heard afresh. The appellate court after hearing the parties has decided the appeals by separate orders. The appeal preferred by petitioner Chet Ram (originally numbered as Ceiling Appeal No. 1316 of 1976) was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Prescribed Authority by order dated 30.11.1990 on the ground that the Prescribed Authority was directed to address itself on the two points – (1) whether the sale consideration is adequate and (2) whether after effecting the transfer, the transferor completely diverted herself of her right and interest in the land, as detailed in the impugned order. Similarly, the appeal preferred by Badrinath (originally numbered as Ceiling Appeal No. 1321 of 1976), the appeal preferred by Radhe Shyam (originally numbered as Ceiling Appeal No. 1315 of 1976) and the appeal preferred by Devi Bai (originally numbered as Ceiling Appeal No. 1322 of 1976) were allowed and the matter was remanded to the Prescribed Authority for recording its findings on two points mentioned above and then to decide the ceiling cases afresh. 12. The learned appellate Court by another order dated 29.1.1991 has decided as many as ten ceiling appeals by a common order, i.e. Ceiling Appeal No. 1328/78/39 (87-88) (89-90) Smt. Murli Devi Vs. State, C.A. No. 1333/76/37 (89-90) Queeni Devi Vs. State, C.A. No. 1318/67/28 (89-90) Kaushalya Devi Vs. State, C.A. No. 1329/77/38 (89-90) Algu Aheer Vs. State, C.A. No. 1320/80/41 (89-90) Ram Bahadur Vs. State, C.A. No. 1310/52/23 (89-90) Puran Bahadur Vs. State, C.A. No. 1319/83/44 (89-90) Smt. Maielee Baje Vs. State, C.A. No. 1332/61/22 (89-90) Karan Chand Raj Singh Vs. State, C.A. No. 1314/65/26 (89-90) Sada Singh Vs. State and C.A. No. 1327/79/40 (89-90) Chandra Shamsher Singh Vs. State. 13. Out of these ten appeals, Ceiling Appeal No. 1327/79/40 (89-90) Chandra Shamsher Singh Vs. State alone was allowed, while rest nine appeals were dismissed by the appellate Court. The petitioner no. 1 Smt. Rani Padma Devi W/o Raja Hari Chandra Raj Singh (since deceased) has challenged the order dated 23.11.1976 passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the order dated 29.1.1991 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Administration) Kumaun Division Nainital, while the other writ petitioners have challenged the order dated 30.11.1990 passed by him thereby remanding the matter to the Prescribed Authority. 14. 14. A perusal of record shows that during the pendency of the writ petition (No. 4774 of 2001), petitioner No. 1 Smt. Rani Padma Devi had died on 1.1.12004, hence she has been substituted by her son Karan Chandra Raj Singh along with one Dhananjay Singh (applicant no. 2 to the substitution application), who had also become legal heir of the deceased petitioner no. 1 on the strength of a will dated 3.6.1998 executed in his favour. Accordingly, petitioner no. 1 Rani Padma Devi was substituted by her legal heirs. Since petitioner nos. 6 Algu Aheer and 11 Smt. Maielee Baje and respondent no. 4 Khandu Ram had died during the pendency of the writ petitions, they have been substituted by their legal heirs. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners at length and perused the impugned orders passed by the courts below as well as the pleadings of the parties. 16. At the outset it may be mentioned that the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is limited. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or reevaluated the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the court concerned. It has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others [(2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases, 675] that “On the other hand, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not have or the jurisdiction though available in being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.” In the case “Ranjeet Sigh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” Quite recently, the Apex Court in the case of Radhey Shyam and another Vs. Chhabi Nath and others [(2009) 5 Supreme Court Cases, 616] has held that “Article 227 of the Constitution vests the High Court with a power of superintendence which is to be very sparingly exercised to keep tribunals and courts within the bounds of their authority. Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and law.” 17. it is not disputed that the petitioner no. 1 Rani Padma Devi through her son and holder of registered power of attorney dated 17.3.1971 had by registered sale deed transferred land measuring 12-5 acres each in the names of Chet Ram, Badrinath, Radhey Shyam, Devi Bai, Ram Bahadur, Puran Bahadur, Murli Devi and Queeni Devi on 8.10.1971, 8.10.1971 8.10.1971, 8.10.1971 25.1.1972, 25.1.1972, 25.1.1972 and 25.1.1972 respectively. Land measuring 12-17 acres was sold in favour of Kaushalya Devi, land measuring 12-50 Acres in favour of Algu Aheer, land measuring 9-35 Acres in favour of Major Bhup Shamsher Singh Chand, land measuring 12-50 Acres in favour of Chandra Shamsher Chand and land measuring 12-50 Acres in favour of Maielee Baje on 25.1.1972. Land measuring 6-50 Acres was sold in favour of Sada Singh, Mukhtyar Singh, Avtar Singh and Sukhwant Singh on 3.3.1972 and also land worth 3-00 Acres was sold in their favour on 20.4.1974. Land measuring 6-50 Acres was sold in favour of Sada Singh, Mukhtyar Singh, Avtar Singh and Sukhwant Singh on 3.3.1972 and also land worth 3-00 Acres was sold in their favour on 20.4.1974. Besides, land worth 13-00 Acres was sold in favour of Khandu Ram, Ram Prakash and Chandrabhan on 20.4.1974. It is also not disputed that the amount of sale consideration was mentioned in each of the sale deeds and the same was received by the vendor. 18. It is also pertinent to mention here that the learned Additional Commissioner by his order dated 30.11.1990 has allowed the appeal preferred by Radhe Shyam (originally numbered as Ceiling Appeal No. 1315 of 1976) and remanded the matter to the Prescribed Authority. In the Ceiling Appeal No. 1322 of 1976 preferred by Smt. Devi Bai, the matter was remanded to the Prescribed Authority for decision afresh. The Ceiling Appeal No. 1322 of 1976 preferred by Major Bhup Shamsher Singh was however allowed by order dated 30.11.1990 and benefit of provision of Section 5(6)(b) of the Act was extended. The Ceiling Appeal No. 1262 of 1976 preferred by Khandu Ram was dismissed by order dated 30.11.1990. It may be noted here that Khandu Ram and six others preferred Writ Petition No. 4702 of 2001 (M/S) (old No. 9480 of 1991) before this Court, which was dismissed by order dated 12.8.2005. Aggrieved, Khand Ram preferred Special Leave to Appeal before the Apex Court, which was granted vide order dated 5.9.2007 and the appeal is still pending. 19. The short controversy involved in these writ petitions is whether the benefit of proviso (b) appended to sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act could have been extended to the original petitioner no. 1 Rani Padma Devi and the land transferred by way of registered sale-deeds ought to have been excluded from her holdings, i.e. from the holding of the original tenure holder. To resolve the controversy, it is incumbent upon the Prescribed Authority to have recorded that the following conditions were satisfied in the matter :- 1. The transfer is not effected to circumvent or avoid the provisions of the Act; 2. The transfer is effected through a written document; 3. The transfer is not gratuitous but is for consideration; 4. The consideration is adequate not low. 5. The transfer is not effected to circumvent or avoid the provisions of the Act; 2. The transfer is effected through a written document; 3. The transfer is not gratuitous but is for consideration; 4. The consideration is adequate not low. 5. After effecting the transfer the transferor completely divests himself of his interest in the land, including cultivatory possession. 6. The transfer is not designed in such a manner that the actual or substantial beneficiary thereunder is the transferor himself or the members of his family, whether immediately or at a future date; 7. The transfer is not effected solely for the purpose of converting land into cash. The pressing necessity is not a necessary ingredient of good faith. Even if there is no pressing necessity but the transfer is effected in the course of prudent management of affairs, such transfer will also qualify for the protection afforded by proviso (b) of Section 5(6) of the Act. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that there was plethora of evidence before the Prescribed Authority to show that the transfers of land made through sale-deeds in the name of different vendees well all in good faith and the sale consideration had also been passed over to the transferor. The sale deeds were not made to defeat the provisions of the Act. It was also contended that the Prescribed Authority had also recorded a finding that the tenure holder was in need of money on account of which the land was transferred, but the Prescribed Authority had recorded a contrary finding that it could not be said that the transfers were made in good faith. The finding of the Prescribed Authority that the transfers were made to defeat the provisions of the Act is perverse and cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Appellate Court has also lost sight of the evidence led by the parties before the Prescribed Authority. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance on the following case-law. 1. Brijendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others [AIR 1981 Supreme Court, Page 636]. 2. Smt. Mewa Devi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [1978, Allahabad Law Reports, Page 698 (Allahabad H.C.)]. 3. Nawal Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others [1995 Supp. (1) Supreme Court Cases 204]. 4. Yadunath Vs. 1. Brijendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others [AIR 1981 Supreme Court, Page 636]. 2. Smt. Mewa Devi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [1978, Allahabad Law Reports, Page 698 (Allahabad H.C.)]. 3. Nawal Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others [1995 Supp. (1) Supreme Court Cases 204]. 4. Yadunath Vs. State [1979, A.W.C., Page 187 (Allahabad High Court)]. 5. Om Prakash Agarwal Vs. First Additional District and Sessions judge and others [1981, A.W.C., Page 775 (Lucknow Bench)]. 21. The ratio of the aforesaid case-law cannot be disputed. I have given my anxious thought to the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners and have also gone through the impugned judgment and orders passed by the two courts below. As already mentioned above, the petitioners have produced the sale-deeds before the Prescribed Authority in evidence. The appellate authority on perusal of the evidence on record has come to the conclusion that the Prescribed Authority had not recorded its satisfaction whether the sale consideration for which the transfer of land took place was adequate and not low and that after effecting the transfer the transferor completely divested herself of her interest in the land, including cultivatory possession, therefore, on that ground the appellate authority had remanded some of the appeals to the Prescribed Authority, but from a bare perusal of the order dated 29.9.1991 impugned in Writ Petition No. 4774 of 2001 (M/S), the Appellate Court had observed in the last paragraph of the judgment just before the operative portion that the evidence produced by the tenure holder and the appellants is not sufficient to hold that the possession of the land had actually been delivered to the vendees, hence benefit of proviso (b) appended to Section 5(6) of the Act cannot be given. I fail to understand as to how the appellate court had recorded such a finding without discussing the relevant evidence in its judgment and order, particularly when in some other similar matters the matter was remanded to the Prescribed Authority. To my mind, in order to extend the benefit of proviso (b) appended to sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act, it is the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority as to the seven conditions referred to above. To my mind, in order to extend the benefit of proviso (b) appended to sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act, it is the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority as to the seven conditions referred to above. From a bare perusal of the order dated 23.11.1976 passed by the Prescribed Authority, it does not appear at a glance that the Prescribed Authority while discussing the sale-deeds had recorded anywhere in the order that after effecting the transfer the transferor completely divested herself of her interest in the land, including cultivatory possession. Undoubtedly, such a finding could have been recorded by the Prescribed Authority after appraisal of the entire evidence led by the parties and this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot record a finding of fact, which has to be arrived at by the Prescribed Authority alone. The appellate authority in a slip shod manner has given a finding that the appellants and tenure holder are not entitled to the benefit of aforesaid proviso (b) of Section 5(6) of the Act particularly when on some other similar appeals the matter was remanded to the Prescribed Authority. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that on the basis of the material placed before this Court, this Court can held that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as appellate court is perverse and illegal. As I have already observed in the preceding paragraph that there is no specific finding by the Prescribed Authority that after effecting the transfer the transferor completely divested herself of her interest in the land, including cultivatory possession, therefore, under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court must refrain from recording of fact. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that the phrases “satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority” implies an element of discretion, but this discretion is not arbitrary. Learned counsel in support of his argument has placed reliance upon the case of Fakir Chand Vs. Bhana Ram reported in AIR 1957 Punjab, Page 303. The matter before the Punjab High Court related to a proceeding under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This case law does not help the petitioners in the present writ petitions. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the case of Prem Manjari Devi Vs. State of Bihar [AIR 1956, Patna, page 104]. The matter before the Punjab High Court related to a proceeding under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This case law does not help the petitioners in the present writ petitions. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the case of Prem Manjari Devi Vs. State of Bihar [AIR 1956, Patna, page 104]. The ratio of the judgments cannot be disputed, but the controversy involved in these writ petitions is distinguishable. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that where sufficient material exists on record, the High Court instead of remanding the matter can decide the writ petition finally. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the following case-law : 1. Ashwin Kumar K. Patel Vs. Upendra J. Patel and others [(1999) 3 SCC, Page 161]. 2. Patel Sureshbhai jashbhai Vs. Patel Satabhai Mathurbhai [(1983) 3 Supreme Court Cases, 294]. 3. Sumer Chand Vs. Mewa Ram and others [2009 (106) RD, 588) (Supreme Court). 4. K. Krishna Reddy and others Vs. Special Deputy Collector, land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karim Nagar, Andhra Pradesh [(1988) 4 S.C.C., Page 163]. 5. S.P. Builders and others Vs. Chairman, Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others [2007 (1) AWC, Page 14 (Allahabad High Court)]. 25. The ratio of the case-law, referred to above, cannot be disputed. I am of the considered view that while exercising writ jurisdiction, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction of court of appeal as envisaged by Order 41, Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly when a finding of fact to be recorded by the Prescribed Authority is lacking in the matter, as indicated earlier. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners lastly contended that the impugned order passed by the appellate court cannot be sustained, because the appellate court on the other appeals involving identical points has allowed the appeal of Chand Shamsher Singh (numbered as Ceiling Appeal No. 1327/79/40 (89-90), hence on the same evidence other nine appeals should not have been dismissed outright by the order dated 29.1.1991, therefore, the order of the appellate court is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the verdict of the Apex Court in the case of Bir Bajrang Kumar Vs. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the verdict of the Apex Court in the case of Bir Bajrang Kumar Vs. State of Bihar and others [AIR 1987 Supreme Court, Page 1345] wherein it has been observed that “after going through the record of the case it appears that one of the cases involving an identical point has already been admitted by the High Court but another identical petition was dismissed by the same High Court. This, therefore, creates a very anomalous position and there is a clear possibility of two contradictory judgments being rendered in the same case by the High Court.” The Apex Court ultimately set aside the impugned order and remanded the appeal to the High Court. 27. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners has force. As indicated earlier, the learned appellate court on perusal of the same evidence brought on record has remanded some of the matters for decision afresh to the Prescribed Authority, but in the case at hand i.e. Writ Petition No. 4774 of 2001 (M/S), the appellate court had taken a different view thereby dismissed as many as nine appeals and has allowed one appeal. Moreover, the appellate court has already remanded some of the appeals involving the identical issue to the Prescribed Authority, therefore, in such peculiar circumstances, in view of the verdict of the Apex Court in the case of Bajrang Kumar (supra), I am of the view that the ends of justice would be served if the impugned order dated 29.1.1991 passed by the Appellate Court as well as the judgment and order dated 23.11.1976 passed by the Prescribed Authority (copy Annexure Nos. 61 and 51 respectively to the writ petition) giving rise to Writ Petition No. 4774 of 2001 (M/S) are set aside and the matter be remanded to the Prescribed Authority for decision afresh. 28. Since the Writ Petition No. 2908 of 2001 (M/S) Badri Nath and two others Vs. Additional Commissioner and two others as well as Writ Petition No. 4769 of 2001 (M/S) Chet Ram Vs. Additional Commissioner and two others, the writ petitioners have come before this Court against the remand order passed by the appellate court, therefore, in view of the discussion made in the preceding paragraphs, these two writ petitions are devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. 29. Additional Commissioner and two others, the writ petitioners have come before this Court against the remand order passed by the appellate court, therefore, in view of the discussion made in the preceding paragraphs, these two writ petitions are devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. 29. Accordingly, the Writ Petition No. 4774 of 2001 (M/S) is allowed. The impugned order dated 29.1.1991 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Administration) Kumaun Division, Nainital, as well as the impugned judgment and order dated 23.11.1976 passed by the Prescribed Authority (copy Annexure Nos. 61 and 51 respectively to the writ petition) are set aside. The matter is remanded to the Prescribed Authority concerned for decision afresh after hearing both the parties with a direction to record its finding in the light of the observations made in the body of this judgment as well as in the remand order passed by the appellate court in the remand order dated 30.11.1990 impugned in Writ Petition No. 2908 of 2001 (M/S) Badri Nath and two others Vs. Additional Commissioner and two others as well as Writ Petition No. 4769 of 2001 (M/S) Chet Ram Vs. Additional Commissioner and two others. The ceiling matters are very very old. The Prescribed Authority shall decide the matters on merits expeditiously, without any further delay. Costs easy. 30. Writ Petition No. 2908 of 2001 (M/S) Badri Nath and two others Vs. Additional Commissioner and two others as well as Writ Petition No. 4769 of 2001 (M/S) Chet Ram Vs. Additional Commissioner and two others are accordingly dismissed. Costs easy.