Judgment H.K. Rathod, J.—Heard learned Advocate Mr. Anal S. Shah for appellant - Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and learned Advocate Mr. Paresh M. Darji for respondent No. 1 claimant. 2. By filing this appeal, appellant insurance company is challenging award passed by Mact, Ahmedabad in MAC Petition No. 766 of 2001 Exh.59 dated 8.9.2008, awarded Rs. 4,38,904.00 with 9 per cent interest being compensation in favour of respondent claimant. 3. Learned Advocate Mr. Shah for appellant has raised contention before this Court that claimant was traveling in trolley which was not insured with appellant insurance company and tractor was insured for agricultural purpose having Kisan Package Policy Exh. 46, therefore, if tractor has been used by owner for any purpose other than agricultural purpose, then, it amounts to breach of condition of policy of insurance and, therefore, insurance company is not liable to pay compensation. He also submitted that on date of accident, claimant was taking iron rolls which was not agricultural product and thus tractor was being used for purpose other than agriculture which was not permitted as per policy, therefore, insurance company is not liable to pay compensation to claimants. He also raised contention that trolley has been attached with tractor, therefore, owner has altered vehicle. He also raised contention that driver of tractor was not having legal and valid licence. He relied upon definition of ‘motor vehicle’ or ‘vehicle’ under Section 2 sub Section (28). He also referred to definition of ‘tractor’ under Section 2(44) and definition of ‘trailer’ under Section 2(46). He relied upon decision of Apex Court in case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Brij Mohan & Others, (2007) 7 SCC 56 where laborer was travelling on trolley of tractor carrying earth to brick kiln, he being merely a passenger, it was held that his claim was not maintainable. He relied upon Head Note (B) which is relating to Section 147 of Act. Deviation from purpose for which vehicle was insured was considered and effect thereof was also considered. Claim petitioner being labourer injured while travelling in trolley attached to tractor carrying earth to brick kiln. But neither was tractor trolley insured in addition to tractor nor was tractor being used for ‘agricultural works’, only purpose for which tractor was insured when appellant received injuries. Therefore, it was held that claim was not maintainable. Learned Advocate Mr. Claim petitioner being labourer injured while travelling in trolley attached to tractor carrying earth to brick kiln. But neither was tractor trolley insured in addition to tractor nor was tractor being used for ‘agricultural works’, only purpose for which tractor was insured when appellant received injuries. Therefore, it was held that claim was not maintainable. Learned Advocate Mr. Anal Shah submitted that trolley was not insured and claimant was travelling in trolley and, therefore, insurance company is not liable. He relied upon second decision in case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Cholleti Bharatamma and Others, (2008) 1 SCC 423 wherein Apex Court considered Section 147 of MV Act, goods carriage, liability in respect of owner of goods or his authorized representative. Apex Court also considered person(s) who can be covered as ‘owner or his authorized representative’ and necessity of determination of mode of travel and number of person(s) so covered. Owner, if must travel only in cabin of vehicle and not with goods so as to be covered under Section 147. It was held that it is necessary to show that deceased was traveling in lorry along with driver or cleaner as owner of goods. It was also held that traveling with goods itself does not entitle anyone to protection under Section 147. He also relied upon observations made by Apex Court relating to Paras 8 to 11 and also observations made by Apex Court in Para 17, 19 and 20. Head note in aforesaid decision has been elaborately discussed by apex Court. He relied upon decision in case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. V. Chinnamma and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 697 . Section 147(1)(b) before its amendment in 1994 and Section 2(14) & (44) were considered. Liability of insurer to pay compensation under Section 147 in cases of death of, or bodily injury to, owner of goods or his authorized representative carried in a goods vehicle was considered. Deceased was travelling in trailer of tractor which was carrying goods belonging to him, en route to purchase further goods. Deceased being injured and dying therefore, due to rash and negligent driving of driver of tractor - Whether said tractor fitted with trailer if ‘goods vehicle’ under Section 2(14), held, may or may not answer said definition. Deceased was travelling in trailer of tractor which was carrying goods belonging to him, en route to purchase further goods. Deceased being injured and dying therefore, due to rash and negligent driving of driver of tractor - Whether said tractor fitted with trailer if ‘goods vehicle’ under Section 2(14), held, may or may not answer said definition. Considering that accident had taken place before 14.11.1994, date of coming into effect of 1994 amendment to Section 147, following Asha Rani case, (2003) 2 SCC 223 , it was held that insurance company was not liable. Accident occurred on 24.11.1991, therefore, observations made by Apex Court considered Section 147 prior to its amendment on 14.11.1994. This aspect has been clarified by Apex Court in Para 16 of judgment which is quoted as under: “16. A tractor fitted with a trailer may or may not answer the definition of goods carriage contained in Section 2(14) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The tractor was meant to be used for agricultural purposes. The trailer attached to the tractor, thus, necessarily is required to be used for agricultural purposes, unless registered otherwise. It may be, as has been contended by Mrs. K. Sharda Devi, that carriage of vegetables being agricultural produce would lead to an inference that the tractor was being used for agricultural purposes but the same by itself would not be construed to mean that the tractor and trailer can be used for carriage of goods by another person for his business activities. The deceased was a businessman. He used to deal in vegetables. After he purchased the vegetables, he was to transport the same to market for the purpose of sale thereof and not for any agricultural purpose. The tractor and trailer, therefore, were not being used for agricultural purposes. However, even if it be assumed that the trailer would answer the description of the “goods carriage” as contained in Section 2(14) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the case would be covered by the decisions of this Court in Asha Rani (Supra) and other decisions following the same, as the accident had taken place on 24.11.1991, i.e., much prior to coming into force of 1994 amendment.” 4. Except that, no other decision has been cited by learned Advocate Mr. Anal Shah before this Court. Except that, no other decision has been cited by learned Advocate Mr. Anal Shah before this Court. He also argued before this Court in respect of merits while referring to page 9 where Tribunal has considered income Exh. 35, wage slip. He submitted that wage slip of October was produced on record at Exh. 35 where claimant worked only for four days and he was not a permanent employee but he was daily wager and, therefore, assessment made by claims Tribunal at Rs. 2500.00 is without any cogent evidence and, therefore, this finding is required to be set aside by this Court. He also raised contention before this Court that contention was raised by appellant in its written statement at Exh. 17 that trolley was not insured but that aspect has not been considered by claims Tribunal while deciding matter. Except that, no other submission has been made by learned Advocate Mr. Shah before this Court. 5. Learned Advocate Mr. Paresh M. Darji appearing for respondent claimant submitted that these submissions made by learned Advocate Mr. Anal Shah before this Court in this appeal were not made by advocate for insurance company before claims Tribunal. Therefore, such contentions should not have to be entertained by this Court. He further submitted that mere contention raised in written statement is part of pleading and such contention is required to be pressed into service by party when matter is argued before claims Tribunal. He submits that no such contentions were pressed into service by advocate for appellant insurance company before claims Tribunal while arguing matter, therefore, that contention should not have tobe considered by this Court. He also submitted that before claims Tribunal, consent was given by advocate for appellant insurance company accepting disability percentage and on that basis, to work out compensation and, therefore, in view of such content given by advocate for insurance company before claims Tribunal, contentions raised by appellant in this appeal before this Court are meaningless and, therefore, same cannot be considered by this Court in view of consent given by advocate for insurance company before claims Tribunal. He relied upon page 9 where specific observations have been made by claims Tribunal as under: “For the purpose of calculating future loss of income, the applicant has produced on record disability certificate at exhibit 38 issued by Purohit Hospital. Dr. He relied upon page 9 where specific observations have been made by claims Tribunal as under: “For the purpose of calculating future loss of income, the applicant has produced on record disability certificate at exhibit 38 issued by Purohit Hospital. Dr. Has assessed the disability at 80% of right lower limb because right lower limb is totally removed. But the applicant has filed a purshis at exhibit 37 reducing the disability to 45 % body as a whole and the opponent has no objection if disability at the rate of 45 % is considered for assessing the future loss of income.” 6. Relying upon aforesaid observations made by claims Tribunal in respect of purshis filed by claimant at Exh. 37 and consent given thereon by advocate for insurance company before claims Tribunal, he submitted that when advocate for insurance company has given consent for assessing future loss of income on basis of 45 per cent disability, then, it amounts to an award based on consent and, therefore, such submissions made by learned Advocate Mr. Anal Shah ignoring consent given by advocate for insurance company before claims Tribunal should not have to be entertained by this Court. He also submitted that in entire award, except in written statement at Exh. 17, nowhere learned Advocate for insurance company has argued matter before claims Tribunal. So, he submitted that when advocate for insurance company has purposefully remained silent and raised no contention before claims Tribunal, therefore, advocate for insurance company cannot raise all type of contentions which are contrary to consent given by its advocate before claims Tribunal and, therefore, contentions raised by learned Advocate Mr. Anal Shah in this appeal should not have tobe entertained by this Court and this Court should not encourage such type of practice adopted by insurance company by filing such appeal challenging award by raising all type of contentions which were not pressed into service by its advocate before claims Tribunal. Anal Shah in this appeal should not have tobe entertained by this Court and this Court should not encourage such type of practice adopted by insurance company by filing such appeal challenging award by raising all type of contentions which were not pressed into service by its advocate before claims Tribunal. He also submitted that matter was examined by claims Tribunal on basis of evidence on record and before claims Tribunal, insurance company has not led any oral evidence and not produced any document before claims Tribunal and, therefore, in absence of evidence from insurance company rebutting evidence of claimant or disproving facts alleged by claimant before claims Tribunal, appellant is not justified to raise such contentions before this Court and, therefore, according to him, arguments made by learned Advocate Mr. Shah for appellant should not have to be entertained by this Court. He also submitted that claimant was traveling in trolley in capacity of owner of goods and two iron rolls with him for repairing which were found on place of accident and that is how claimant received injury in accident. He submitted that as driver of tractor took turn all of a sudden, as a result, rolls loaded in trolley came on one side and trolley turned turtle wherein claimant fell with trolley on road on right side and said rolls fell on right leg of claimant wherein claimant sustained serious injuries and spent huge amount on medicines, treatment and one leg was amputated and he totally became incapable to work in company where he was working as daily wager prior to accident and, therefore, according to him, claims Tribunal has rightly examined matter on basis of evidence and no interference of this Court is necessary. 7. I have considered submissions made by both learned advocates. I have also perused impugned award made by claims Tribunal. On 26.10.2000, at about 10.30 p.m., claimant was going from his factory to Odhav GIDC in Tractor No. GJ-9E-2045 with trolley No. GJ-9U-1219 with two iron rolls for repairing. Tractor was being driven by opponent No. 1 who all of a sudden took a turn as a result, rolls loaded in trolley came on one side and trolley turned turtle. Applicant fell with trolley on road on right side and said rolls fell on right leg of applicant. Tractor was being driven by opponent No. 1 who all of a sudden took a turn as a result, rolls loaded in trolley came on one side and trolley turned turtle. Applicant fell with trolley on road on right side and said rolls fell on right leg of applicant. Claimant sustained open wound of 12 cm x 8 cm below upper third leg, skin, muscles, tendons, blood vessels, nerves all cut all around, partial loss of circumference of tibia, tibia fibula both comminuted badly, anterior tibial vessels and nerves completely cut - bleeding and claimant had no movement of toes, ankle, no pulsation in toes, circulation absent in toes, sensation absent in foot and toes. Claimant was removed to Purohit Hospital in Naranpura, Ahmedabad and was admitted as an indoor patient. Therefore, on basis of aforesaid facts, claim petition was filed by claimant before claims Tribunal. Before claims Tribunal, opponent No. 1 was not examined by owner or insurance company. Only claimant was examined at Exh. 24. Issues have been framed by claims Tribunal at Exh. 19. Written statement was filed by present appellant insurance company before claims Tribunal at Exh. 17 denying averments made by claimant in his claim petition. Issue No. 1 has been examined by claims Tribunal after considering evidence of claimant, FIR Exh. 26 lodged by Pannesinh Pujjrajsinh Rajput who was sitting near driver seat in said tractor. Claims Tribunal also considered certified copy of panchanama and charge sheet filed at Exh. 27 and 28. Thereafer, considering one fact that no evidence was led by opponents, and relying upon evidence of claimant and panchanama as well as FIR and charge sheet served to opponents, claims Tribunal came to conclusion that accident has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of opponent No. 1. According to my opinion, while coming to such finding, claims Tribunal has not committed any error which would require interference of this Court. Claims Tribunal has considered injury suffered by claimant on right leg and body as a whole. Claims Tribunal has also considered injuries received by claimant on right leg and body as a whole several days, treatment to save limb, when limb became black foulsmelling, secondary amputation below knee carried out on 4.11.2000. Claims Tribunal also considered that due to amputation of right leg, life of applicant is almost ruined for rest of his life. Therefore, claims Tribunal awarded Rs. Claims Tribunal also considered that due to amputation of right leg, life of applicant is almost ruined for rest of his life. Therefore, claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 35000.00 to applicant under head ofp ain, shock and suffering for loss of other amenities of life. Claims Tribunal also awarded Rs. 45,000.00 for medical bills produced on record by claimant at Exh. 31, 32, 33 and 34. Claims Tribunal considered that one limb is removed and in future, applicant will have to incur expenses of Rs. 15000.00 to Rs. 20,000.00 to fix artificial limb and, therefore claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 20,000.00 to claimant for expenses to be incurred in future for fixing artificial limb. Thereafter, considering wage slip of applicant at Exh. 35 showing daily wage of Rs. 82.00, claims Tribunal considered that monthly salary of claimant would be Rs. 2460.00 i.e. Rs. 2500.00 and due to serious injuries and amputation of right limb, claimant may not be able to attend his job at least for six months and, therefore, claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 15000.00 to applicant claimant for loss of actual income. According to my opinion, considering injuries suffered by claimant and amputation wherein claimant has lost one of his limb and his life has been ruined as considered by claims Tribunal, claims Tribunal has rightly awarded aforesaid amounts on different heads as discussed above. I have considered contention raised by learned Advocate Mr. Anal Shah for appellant insurance company that in October, 2000, applicant worked only for four days and, therefore, he was not a permanent workman and, therefore, claims Tribunal should not have accepted monthly wages because for that, there was no any evidence produced by claimant. Wage slip is given to employee who was working with company. Question was not asked to claimant by advocate for appellant before claims Tribunal that he worked only for four days and prior to that, he was not in service at all. No such suggestion was made to claimant, otherwise, it would have been reflected from impugned award. Therefore, genuineness of document namely wage slip Exh. 35 was not challenged by advocate for appellant before claims Tribunal in cross examination of claimant. No such suggestion was made to claimant, otherwise, it would have been reflected from impugned award. Therefore, genuineness of document namely wage slip Exh. 35 was not challenged by advocate for appellant before claims Tribunal in cross examination of claimant. Salary slip of October produced on record was produced for giving correct wage picture to claims Tribunal being last salary received by claimant when accident had taken place but that does not mean that earlier claimant was not at all working. What could be inferred from wage slip produced by claimant was that claimant was earning and on that basis, such negative inference could not be drawn that for rest of period, he was not working at all and that aspect has been rightly considered by claims Tribunal. So, it is merely making of logical argument and not legal argument, this Court has not to consider such logical argument which is contrary to record because there is no evidence produced by insurance company before claims Tribunal while examining employer before claims Tribunal for period prior to October, 2000 and no question was asked to claimant during his cross examination that he was not working prior to accident. Therefore, such contention raised by learned Advocate Mr. Shah for appellant cannot be accepted. Same is, therefore, rejected. 8. Thereafter, considering Rs. 2500.00 being monthly salary and consent of claimant as per purshis Exh. 37 which was not objected by appellant insurance company’s advocate but on the contrary, specific stand was taken by appellant advocate to assess future loss of income considering 45% permanent disability of claimant, claims Tribunal considered prospective income of claimant and then claims Tribunal came to conclusion that monthly figure would come to Rs. 1687.00 and annually it would come to Rs. 20244.00. Considering age of claimant 19 years, claims Tribunal applied multiplier of 16 and held that future loss of income of claimant would come to Rs. 3,23,904.00 and accordingly claims Tribunal awarded total compensation of Rs. 4,38,904.00 with 9 per cent interest thereon. 9. Certain decisions were cited by learned Advocate for insurance company Mr. D.K. Shah before claims Tribunal only on ground that passenger was travelling as fare paying passenger or gratuitous passenger and, therefore, insurance company is not liable to pay compensation. Submissions made by learned Advocate Mr. D.K. Shah for insurance company have been considered by claims Tribunal in Para 13 of award. D.K. Shah before claims Tribunal only on ground that passenger was travelling as fare paying passenger or gratuitous passenger and, therefore, insurance company is not liable to pay compensation. Submissions made by learned Advocate Mr. D.K. Shah for insurance company have been considered by claims Tribunal in Para 13 of award. In these submissions, contention was not raised by learned Advocate for insurance company that trolley was not insured with insurance company. Only one contention was raised that passenger was traveling in tractor as fare paying passenger or gratuitous passenger and so insurance company is not liable while citing certain decisions on that issue and after considering such submission, it was held by claims Tribunal that there was no evidence adduced by either party to show that claimant was traveling in tractor as fare paying passenger. It was also held that claimant was traveling in tractor hired by owner of factory wherein he was working and, therefore, decision cited by advocate for insurance company are not applicable to present case on hand. Claims Tribunal has rightly considered submissions and decisions cited by learned Advocate Mr. D.K. Shah before it. Claims Tribunal has rightly come to conclusion that no evidence is produced by either party to show that applicant claimant was traveling as fare paying passenger. Therefore, it is clear that except submissions recorded in Para 13, no submission is made by advocate for insurance company before claims Tribunal because if it would have been made, then, it would have been certainly examined and considered by claims Tribunal and, therefore, it is clear that contentions raised by insurance company in its written statement were not pressed into service by its advocate during course of arguments and, therefore, appellant is making such submissions for first time before this Court without pressing them into service before claims Tribunal during course of arguments. Fact remains that on date of accident, claimant was traveling in tractor attached to trolley with two iron rolls and due to rash and negligent driving of tractor by its driver, trolley has turned turtle wherein claimant received serious injuries due to which right limb has been amputated and that is how claims Tribunal considered merits of matter and awarded compensation. Before claims Tribunal, contention was not at all raised that trolley was not insured with insurance company. Before claims Tribunal, contention was not at all raised that trolley was not insured with insurance company. Question is that accident occurred after amendment made in Section 147 on 14th November, 1994, therefore, decision which has been relied in second case, Para 16 of which has been referred to by this Court earlier where accident was occurred prior to amendment made in Section 147 of MV Act, 1988 on 24.11.1991, so, whatever observations made by Apex Court keeping in mind date of accident but subsequent amendment made in Section 147, if it is applied to facts of this case, when tractor attached with trolley may be used for other purpose, then, for third party as owner of goods travelling, insurance company is liable to pay compensation if there is breach, then, it is dispute between owner of vehicle and insurance company but for that, third party cannot be made to suffer and third party have to be paid compensation and in case, they are able to justify breach of conditions of policy, then they may take recourse for recovering such amount from owner of vehicle in accordance with law. This aspect has also been considered by Apex Court considering fact that respondent No. 1 is poor labourer, he had suffered grievous injuries, he had become disable to a great extent, therefore, Apex Court has directed insurance company to satisfy award first and then to recover same amount from owner of vehicle - tractor and trolley as discussed in Para 13 and 14 in case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Brij Mohan & Others, (2007) 7 SCC 56 , therefore, in this case also, considering facts, daily wager receiving Rs. 82.00 per day received injury in accident while traveling in tractor attached with trolley as owner of goods and right leg has been amputated because of which he has been unable to work with company which he was doing prior to accident, therefore, considering condition of claimant and serious injuries caused to him, in facts of this case also, no interference is necessary and, therefore, contentions raised by learned Advocate Mr. Shah cannot be accepted by this Court. 10. I fail to understand submissions made by learned Advocate for appellant before this Court. Shah cannot be accepted by this Court. 10. I fail to understand submissions made by learned Advocate for appellant before this Court. It is right of advocate to make submission before Court on behalf of party represented by him but while making such submissions, advocate should know consent given by advocate for insurance company before claims Tribunal. SO, before making submissions, lawyer must keep in mind stand taken by advocate for company before claims Tribunal. It is very easy for an advocate to argue matter on legal aspects without responsibility but it is also responsibility of lawyer not to waste time of Court when he is aware that from award itself, it is mentioned which fact has not been denied by filing affidavit of advocate Mr. D.K. Shah who was appearing for appellant insurance company before claims Tribunal. Therefore, appellant is not justified in raising contentions before this Court ignoring consent and, therefore, this Court has deprecated such practice of making such submissions contrary to consent given by advocate for insurance company. It is necessary to note that when liability issue challenged by company, then, why consent was given for disability percentage. That impliedly means that challenge of appellant before Claims Tribunal was waived and clear consent given by Advocate of appellant to the effect that as per 45% disability, future loss may be calculated. 11. Contention raised by learned Advocate Mr. Anal Shah is suggesting that contention in respect of trolley is not insured and driver is not having legal and valid licence was not raised before claims Tribunal by advocate of insurance company, eventhough, knowing fully well, such contention is raised before this Court for first time. Whatever contention raised in written statement are not much relevant because unless and until particular contention is pressed into service, claims Tribunal is not duty bound to decide all contentions which are raised in written statement unless same are also pressed into service. It is duty of Court to consider contentions which are specifically raised before him, otherwise, number of contentions are raised in written statement but some of are not pressed into service, then, it amounts to waiving of such contention. It is duty of Court to consider contentions which are specifically raised before him, otherwise, number of contentions are raised in written statement but some of are not pressed into service, then, it amounts to waiving of such contention. When before this Court, contention that insurance company is not at all liable and similarly in paragraph 13 of award also, raised same contention that insurance company is not liable, then, why No Objection was given by advocate for appellant insurance company before claims Tribunal on purshis Exh. 37 whereby claimant reduced disability percentage to 45% for body as a whole and to assess future loss of income accordingly as against disability certified by Doctor to 80%? Accordingly, presumption is that appellant insurance company has foregone earlier contentions in respect of liability raised by it in its written statement and that is why, same were not pressed into service by insurance company before claims Tribunal at the time of hearing. This consent to accept Exh. 37 purshis and to work out compensation accordingly suggests that insurance company is agreeing to pay compensation to claimant on basis of 45% permanent disability. Relevant discussion made by claims Tribunal in Para 9 of award is reproduced as under: “For the purpose of calculating future loss of income, the applicant has produced on record disability certificate at exhibit 38 issued by Purohit Hospital. Dr. Has assessed the disability at 80% of right lower limb because right lower limb is totally removed. But the applicant has filed a purshis at exhibit 37 reducing the disability to 45 % body as a whole and the opponent has no objection if disability at the rate of 45 % is considered for assessing the future loss of income. Consideirng the prospective income of the applicant at Rs. 3750.00 for the purpose of calculating future loss of income, the per month loss at 45% (disability) comes to Rs. 1687/- which in a full year comes to Rs. 20244/= The applicant was 19 years old at the time of the accident. Hence, it would be just and proper to apply multiplier of 16. Hence, future loss of income of the applicant would come to Rs. 3,23,904/-. Hence, the applicant is entitled to get total compensation of Rs. 4,38,904/- from the opponents with 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its realization with proportionate costs.” 12. Hence, it would be just and proper to apply multiplier of 16. Hence, future loss of income of the applicant would come to Rs. 3,23,904/-. Hence, the applicant is entitled to get total compensation of Rs. 4,38,904/- from the opponents with 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its realization with proportionate costs.” 12. In Para 13 of award, claims Tribunal considered decisions cited by advocates for parties. Therefore, Para 13 of award is also reproduced as under: “13. Learned Advocate Mr. Agrawal for the applicant has relied upon 2008 ACJ page 268 and 2008 ACJ page 1388 2007 ACJ 1909, 2006(1) GLR page 1, 2004 ACJ 1881 , 1992 ACJ page 1102 on the point of non joinder of party as a driver, 2007 ACJ 613 , and l.a. Mr. D.K. Shah for the insurance company has cited judgments reported in 2001 ACJ 515 2005 ACJ 1167 , 2006 ACJ 1334, 2007(1) ACJ 484, 2007 ACJ 536 on the point that the passenger was travelling in tractor as fare paying passenger or a gratuitous passenger. I have gone through the authorities cited by learned Advocate for both sides. No evidence is adduced by either party to show that the applicant was travelling in the tractor as fare passenger. The applicant was travelling in the tractor hired by the owner of the factory wherein he was working. Therefore, the principle laid down in the case cited by learned Advocate Mr. Shah are not applicable to the facts of the present case on hand.” 13. In view of aforesaid observations made by Apex Court in case of State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Another, AIR 1982 SC 1249 , being relevant, therefore, Paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are reproduced as under: “2. Shah are not applicable to the facts of the present case on hand.” 13. In view of aforesaid observations made by Apex Court in case of State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Another, AIR 1982 SC 1249 , being relevant, therefore, Paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are reproduced as under: “2. Gadgil, J. referred to the concession in the following words : “However, I may observe at this juncture itself that at one stage it was expressly submitted by the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent that in a case if it is felt that bias is well apparently inherent in the proposed action of the concerned Ministry, then in such a case situation notwithstanding the other Ministers not being joined in the arena of the prospective accused, it would be a justified ground for the Governor on his own, independently and without any reference to any Ministry, to decide that question.” 3. Kotwal, J. put it even more explicitly and said : “. . . . . . . .At one stage it was unequivocally submitted by the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents in no uncertain terms that even in this case notwithstanding there being no accusation against the Law Minister as such if the Court feels that in the nature of things a bias in favour of the respondent and against a complainant would be manifestly inherent, apparent and implied in the mind of the Law Minister, then in that event, he would not be entitled to consider complainant’s application and on the equal footing even the other Ministers may not be qualified to do so and the learned Counsel further expressly submitted that in such an event, it would be only the Governor, who on his own, independently, will be entitled to consider that question.” 4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A.K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submission made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public Policy bars us Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of Judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation”. (Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran vs. Subramanian, AIR 1926 PC 136). We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in Court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still, fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to ‘the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error (Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhusudan vs. Chandrabati, AIR 1917 PC 30). That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an Appellate Court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment. 4-A. In R. vs. Mellor (1858) 7 Cox CC 454 Martin B was reported to have said : “We must consider the statement of the learned judge as absolute verity and we ought to take. 4-A. In R. vs. Mellor (1858) 7 Cox CC 454 Martin B was reported to have said : “We must consider the statement of the learned judge as absolute verity and we ought to take. his statement precisely as a record and act on it in the same manner as on a record of Court which of itself implies an absolute verity.” 5. In King. Emperor vs. Barendra Kumar Ghose, (1924) 28 Cal WN 170 : (AIR 1924 Cal 257) (FB), Page, J. said. “. . . . . . . . . . these proceedings emphasise the importance of rigidly maintaining the rule that a statement by a learned Judge as to what took place during the course of a trial before him is final and decisive; it is not to be criticised or circumvented; much less is it to be exposed to animad version.” 6. In Sarat Chandra vs. Bibhabati Debi, (1921) 34 Cal LJ 302 = (AIR 1921 Cal 584), Sir Asutosh Mookherjee explained what had to be done : “It is plain that in cases of this character where a litigant feels aggrieved by the statement in a judgment that an admission has been made, the most convenient and satisfactory course to follow, wherever practicable, is to apply to the Judge, without delay and ask for rectification or review of the judgment”. 7. So the Judges’ record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge, himself, but nowhere else.” 14. Similarly in AIR 1985 Supreme Court 973 “Daman Singh vs. State of Punjab”, larger Bench of Apex Court observed as under in Para 13 of judgment: “13. The final submission of Shri Ramamurthi was that several other questions were raised in the writ petition before the High Court but they were not considered. We attach no significance to this submission. It is not unusual for parties and Counsel to raise innumerable grounds in the petitions and memoranda of appeal etc., but, later, confine themselves, in the course of argument to a few only of those grounds, obviously because the rest of the grounds are considered even by them to be untenable, No party or Counsel is thereafter entitled to make a grievance that the grounds not argued were not considered. If indeed any ground which was argued was not considered it should be open to the party aggrieved to draw the attention of the Court making the order to it by filing a proper application for review or clarification. The time of the superior courts is not to be. wasted in enquiring into the question whether a certain ground to which no reference is found, in, the judgment of the subordinate Court was argued before that Court or not?’ 15. In case of Shankar K. Mandal and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2003) 9 SCC 519 , Apex Court held as under at page 520: “It is not open for the appellants to take such stand before the Supreme Court, as they are bound by the observations of the High Court. If there was any wrong recording of the stands or a different stand was taken, the only course open to the appellant was to move the High Court. Statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a partythinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in themind of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to contend before the Supreme Court to the contrary. It is also not open to contend that a plea raised was not considered.” 16. Similarly, recently also, this aspect has been examined by Apex Court in case of Mohd. Akram Ansari vs. Chief Election Officer & Ors., reported in 2008 AIR SCW 416. Paras 14 and 15 of said decision are reproduced as under: “14. In this connection we would like to say that there is a presumption in law that a Judge deals with all the points which have been pressed before him. It often happens that in a petition or appeal several points are taken in the memorandum of the petition or appeal, but at the time of arguments only some of these points are pressed. It often happens that in a petition or appeal several points are taken in the memorandum of the petition or appeal, but at the time of arguments only some of these points are pressed. Naturally a Judge will deal only with the points which are pressed before him in the arguments and it will be presumed that the appellant gave up the other points, otherwise he would have dealt with them also. If a point is not mentioned in the judgment of a Court, the presumption is that that point was never pressed before the learned Judge and it was given up. However, that is a rebuttable presumption. In case the petitioner contends that he had pressed that point also (which has not been dealt with in the impugned judgment), it is open to him to file an application before the same learned Judge (or Bench) which delivered the impugned judgment, and if he satisfies the Judge (or Bench) that the other points were in fact pressed, but were not dealt with in the impugned judgment, it is open to the concerned Court to pass appropriate orders, including an order of review. However, it is not ordinarily open to the party to file an appeal and seek to argue a point which even if taken in the petition or memorandum filed before the Court below, has not been dealt with in the judgment of the Court below. The party who has this grievance must approach the same Court which passed the judgment, and urge that the other points were pressed but not dealt with. 15. Since no other point except the point of office of profit has been dealt with in the impugned judgment of the High Court, the presumption is that no other point was pressed before the High Court even though the point may have been contained in the election petition. Hence, we do not allow these points to be raised here. “ 17. Hence, we do not allow these points to be raised here. “ 17. In case before hand, it is not grievance of appellant that particular contention though pressed into service was not recorded by claims Tribunal and from award, it is clear that contentions raised by appellant before this Court have not been raised or pressed into service by appellant and, therefore, presumption is that such points were not pressed into service by advocate for appellant before claims Tribunal but appellant is harping thereon as if it have been ignored though pressed into service. Such an approach on the part of appellant is required to be deprecated. Therefore, considering merits of matter, according to my opinion, claims Tribunal has rightly examined matter on basis of evidence on record considering consent given by advocate Shri D.K. Shah for insurance company before claims Tribunal, wherein consent was given for considering 45% disability for body as a whole and on that basis to work out loss of future income of claimant and, therefore, no interference is required by this Court and, therefore, there is no substance in this appeal and same is required to be dismissed with costs. Cost is quantified at Rs. 10,000.00 (Rupees ten thousand only) to be paid by appellant insurance company to claimant Shri Hiraram Devram Meghwar by way of an account payee cheque after proper verification within one month from date of receipt of copy of this order. 18. After completion of dictation, learned Advocate Mr. Shah submitted that contention raised by him that driver was not having valid licence may be considered. I fail to understand such mentioning again by learned Advocate Mr. Shah by submitting that this contention has not been dealt with by this Court. There is no such submission at all made before claims Tribunal that driver was not having legal and valid licence. Therefore, it is clear that this contention has been raised by appellant before this Court for first time and, therefore, same cannot be entertained by this Court. There is no such submission at all made before claims Tribunal that driver was not having legal and valid licence. Therefore, it is clear that this contention has been raised by appellant before this Court for first time and, therefore, same cannot be entertained by this Court. If appellant would have raised such contention before claims Tribunal, then, there would have been evidence on such contention in either way before claims Tribunal and claims Tribunal would have given finding on it in either way but since it has not been raised before claims Tribunal, there is no finding on such issue and, therefore, appellant cannot be permitted to raise such contention before this Court for first time and, therefore, such submission is rejected. Appeal stands dismissed accordingly with order as aforesaid. 19. Today, this Court has dismissed first appeal, therefore, civil application for stay is required to be disposed of accordingly. Hence civil application for stay stands disposed of accordingly. Amount, if any, deposited by appellant in this appeal in registry of this Court, be transmitted to claims Tribunal immediately. P P P P P