Judgment ( 1. ) This order shall dispose of Writ Petition No. 7561 of 2008 (S) Rakesh Bairagi v. Vikram Cement and Writ Petition No. 7565 of 2008 (S) (Yogesh Bairagi v. Vikram Cement.) ( 2. ) Each of the petitioner had filed an application under Sections 31 (3), 61 and 62 of M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 with a submission that each of them had worked for more than 240 days in 12 months preceding the date of retrenchment and as the provisions contained in S. 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act were not observed and as the termination was absolutely Illegal, they were entitled to be reinstated with back wages. ( 3. ) The trial Court registered the cases. The case of Rakesh Bairagi v. Vikram Cement (supra) was registered as case No. 15/MPIR/03, while the case of Yogesh Bairagi was registered as case No. 16/MPIR/03. ( 4. ) Learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court came to the conclusion that each of the petitioner did not work for 240 days, the Labour Court, accordingly, rejected both the petitions, therefore, each of the petitioner filed appeals and in the appeals also filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for taking additional documents on record. The appeal at the instance of Yogesh Bairagi was registered as civil appeal No. 20/MPIR/08, while appeal of Rakesh Bairagi was registered as civil appeal No. 19/MPIR/08. The learned Industrial Court vide order dated September 2, 2008, rejected the application in each of the case observing that in accordance with the Rule 57 of MPIR Rules, 1961, the Industrial Court could not exercise power as are conferred upon a Civil Court under Rule 27 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After rejecting the application, the Industrial Court rejected both the appeals and, therefore, the petitioners are before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 5. ) Shri Moyal, learned counsel for the petitioner after taking us through the provisions contained in Sections 61, 62 and 73 of MPIR Act, 1960, submitted that the scheme of MPIR Act does not close the right of a party to produce additional evidence before the Appellate/Revisional Authority. ( 5. ) Shri Moyal, learned counsel for the petitioner after taking us through the provisions contained in Sections 61, 62 and 73 of MPIR Act, 1960, submitted that the scheme of MPIR Act does not close the right of a party to produce additional evidence before the Appellate/Revisional Authority. His submission is that the rules, if are read in juxta-position, with the main provisions of law it would clearly appear that the Appellate/Revisional Authority has sufficient Jurisdiction to take the additional evidence on record. ( 6. ) Shri Patwardhan, learned counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that in accordance with Rule 57 the Code of Civil Procedure apply to a limited extent and Section 73 of the MPIR Act does not permit the Industrial Court/Appellate Court/Revisional Court to take additional evidence on record. The Industrial Court was absolutely justified in rejecting the application. He also submitted that even if such evidence is taken on record, the findings recorded by the Court that each of the petitioner was a Badli worker, would not be adversely affected. ( 7. ) We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. ( 8. ) Section 61 of MPIR Act, 1960 refers to the powers of Labour Court. It provides that in addition to powers conferred under other provisions of this Act, a Labour Court shall have power to decide particular thing as provided in Clause (A) of Section 61. It also confers other powers in Clause (B), Clause (C) and Clause (D). Section 62 of the Act provides that how the proceedings would commence before the Labour Court. Section 73 of the Act provides that in an enquiry or proceedings under the Act, the Registrar, a Labour Court, the Industrial Court, a Board and a Court of Enquiry shall have the same powers as are vested in Civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of proof of facts by affidavit/s, summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; compelling the production of documents; issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; and such other matters as may be prescribed. ( 9. ( 9. ) Sub-Section (2) of Section 73 provides that for the purposes of obtaining the information necessary for compelling and maintaining the record under Chapter XV, the officer authorized under Section 95 shall have the power specified in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1). ( 10. ) Rule 57 of MPIR Rules 1961, provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, a Labour Court, the Industrial Court or a Board shall have the same powers as are vested in civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of granting adjournments, joinder and adding of parties, and amendment of pleadings. ( 11. ) A fair reading and understanding of Sections 61, 62 and 73 of the Act would make it clear that a Labour Court and the Industrial Court shall have the same powers as are vested in Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of proof of facts by affidavit, the authority /Tribunal shall have powers to summon and enforce the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. The Tribunals shall also have the powers compelling the production of documents and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. ( 12. ) Undisputedly an appeal is in continuation of the original proceedings. If the powers to take facts on record on an affidavit or to summon and enforce the attendance of any person to examine him on oath is with the Labour Court, then the Appellate Court can also exercise the very same power, because the law does nowhere say that the Appellate Court shall have limited powers than what the trial Court has. ( 13. ( 13. ) Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary in the Appellate Court, but, if the Appellate Court finds that the trial Court has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced, or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce the judgment, or for any other substantial cause, it can accept additional evidence on record. Though the opening words of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order 41 are in the negative, but the power to admit additional evidence is always with the Appellate Court provided the requirements of Order 41, Rule 27 in any of the clauses is satisfied. ( 14. ) Whenever the additional evidence is allowed to be produced by the Appellate Court, the said Court shall, however, would be obliged to record the reasons for admission of the additional evidence. If such are the powers of the Appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to accepting the additional evidence on record or to examine the witnesses, then such power can always be exercised by an Appellate Court exercising appellate jurisdiction under MPIR Act, 1960. Apart from the above, Section 64-A would authorize every Labour Court and Industrial Court to exercise its inherent powers to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. ( 15. ) In the present matter, the learned Industrial Court without appreciating the extent and limit of its jurisdiction simply after referring to Rule 57, in our considered opinion, was not justified in rejecting the application for taking additional evidence on record. ( 16. ) What would be the effect of such additional evidence is yet to be seen by the Industrial Court, if such documents are taken on record. ( 16. ) What would be the effect of such additional evidence is yet to be seen by the Industrial Court, if such documents are taken on record. The question that each of the petitioner was Badli worker, will have to be decided by the Industrial Court after hearing the parties afresh. ( 17. ) Both the petitions are allowed. The order dated September 2, 2008 and the final order dated September 5, 2008 passed in each of the case are hereby set aside and quashed. Parties present in the Court shall appear before the Industrial Court on April 30, 2009. It shall be the duty of the petitioner of each case to file a certified copy of this order before the Industrial Court to enable the Court to know what it is required to do in the matter. The Industrial Court shall dispose of the matter preferably within six months from the date of appearance of the parties. There shall be no orders as to costs.