Judgment :- Petitioner in these petitions has sought for quashing the order dated 19th May 2009, passed by the second respondent, which is produced hereto as Annexure A. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, petitioner claims that it is in Hotel Business and is the Managing Partner of a chain of Hotels/Restaurants collectively called “Hotel Empire’. Hotel Empire’ has under it a chain of Restaurants/Hotels in all ten in number, located at various parts of Bangalore City. ‘Hotel Empire’ has a rich experience of about 45 years in the said business and during this period it has earned good reputation of serving tasty and hygienic food to its customers to their satisfaction in class I category. Petitioner having rich experience over a period of nearly four and a half decades in serving vegetarian and non vegetarian food in a hygienic manner has obtained necessary trade licence from B.B.M.P. vide licence No.860/93-94 and other licences in respect of other nine Hotels and Restaurants to carry on the trade of lodging and Restaurants and also has obtained necessary licence as contemplated under the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1961. The management of the petitioner “Hotel Empire” in view of its excellency in administration has been rendering its service effectively and sincerely and to the satisfaction of its customers, majority of whom are NRIs and has not violated any terms or Rules of trade as stipulated under the applicable laws and that, petitioner does not serve liquor and does not permit smoking in its premises. 3. It is the case of petitioner that, the only Act that permits certain conditions to be imposed on the working hours of an establishment is, the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). The specific provision which deals with the imposition of restriction on the working hours is Section 11 of the said Act read with Rule 7 of the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Rules, 1963 (“Rules” for short). It is the further case of petitioner that, the State Government, by exercising the power conferred under the aforementioned provision, has issued the Notification dated 28th July 1987 bearing No.SWL.8.LSC.87 to regulate the opening and closing hours of establishments. It is the further case of petitioner that, the State Government, by exercising the power conferred under the aforementioned provision, has issued the Notification dated 28th July 1987 bearing No.SWL.8.LSC.87 to regulate the opening and closing hours of establishments. While restriction was imposed on various establishments, there was an exemption under clause (4) of the said Notification in so far as the Hotels supplying meals and some other establishments were concerned. The State Government in its wisdom has thought it fit not to impose any restriction on Hotels supplying meals as per the aforesaid Notification dated 28th July 1987 which still holds the field. 4. Be that as it may, petitioner was shocked and surprised when it came to know that the second respondent – Commissioner of Police, Bangalore City, has passed the impugned order regarding Controlling of places of public entertainment, by exercising the powers conferred under the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 and has imposed the restriction on the opening and closing timing of the places of public entertainment including the chain of Hotels of petitioner. The second respondent has ordered that all the places of public entertainment as defined under Section 2 Sub-Section (15) of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 shall remain open from 06:00 to 24:00 hours only (i.e. from 6 A.M. to 12 midnight) and all the places of public entertainment shall remain closed from 00:00 to 06:00 hours every day (i.e. from midnight to 6 A.M.). It is the case of petitioner that, the imposition of said restriction in the opening and closing time contrary to the aforementioned Notification is one without jurisdiction and the same is not applicable and the only power for imposing the restriction is under the provisions of the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act and not under the Karnataka Police Act, 1963. Therefore, the impugned order passed by second respondent is liable to be quashed as the same is passed in total violation of Articles 14, 16, and 19 (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, being aggrieved by the impugned order passed by second respondent vide Annexure A, petitioner herein felt necessitated to present these petitions seeking appropriate reliefs as stated supra. 5. The principal ground urged by learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner is three-fold. Firstly, the order impugned passed by second respondent is one without jurisdiction. Therefore, being aggrieved by the impugned order passed by second respondent vide Annexure A, petitioner herein felt necessitated to present these petitions seeking appropriate reliefs as stated supra. 5. The principal ground urged by learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner is three-fold. Firstly, the order impugned passed by second respondent is one without jurisdiction. Secondly, fixing of opening and closing hours under Section 11 of the Act read with Rule 7 of the Rules can only be done by the Government as per the Notification dated 28th July 1987 which still holds the field. If at all, the second respondent wanted to exercise power and impose the restriction on opening and closing timings, the said authority ought to have exercised the power as envisaged under Section 11 of the Act read with Rule 7 of the Rules. Thirdly, in the Notification date 28th July 1987 vide Annexure D issued exercising the power under the aforesaid Act, there is no restriction as such imposed upon the Hotels/Restaurants supplying meals and the said Notification is still in force. Therefore, the impugned order passed by second respondent cannot be sustained and it is liable be set aside at the threshold. To substantiate the said submission, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 15th April 2005 passed in Writ Petition No.1612/2002 and submitted that, the judgment in the said writ petition is clearly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case of petitioner. Therefore, on this ground also, the order impugned is liable to be set aside. 6. Per contra, learned Advocate General appearing for respondents inter alia, contended and substantiated that, the impugned order passed by second respondent is well within the parameter of the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963. He submitted that, the second respondent has got power to regulate the opening and closing timings of places of public entertainment. 6. Per contra, learned Advocate General appearing for respondents inter alia, contended and substantiated that, the impugned order passed by second respondent is well within the parameter of the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963. He submitted that, the second respondent has got power to regulate the opening and closing timings of places of public entertainment. Further, he pointed out that, in the impugned order passed by second respondent, it is categorically stated that, if any person owning or having an interest and managing a place of public entertainment is desirous of keeping any particular place of public entertain open during the restricted period from 00:00 hrs to 06:00 hrs or part thereof, he shall apply in writing to the undersigned duly stating the reasons as to why he would like to keep open any particular place of public entertainment and the period during which he would like to keep the said place open and obtain written permission from the undersigned. The petitioner has not utilized the said opportunity and proceeded to question the correctness of the order impugned on the sole ground that, the order impugned which is passed under the Karnataka Police Act is not applicable in respect of Hotels/Restaurants run by petitioner and the only Act and Rules they are bound is under the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1961 and its Rules, 1963. Learned Advocate General submitted that, the said specific ground taken by learned senior counsel cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside on the ground that, the said Act is applicable only in so far as it relates to the employees working in the Establishments and not in respect of public in general. To substantiate the said submission, learned Advocate General has taken me through the Notification dated 28th July 1987 bearing No.SWL 8 LSC 87 vide Annexure D and drew my specific attention to clause (4) of the same wherein, it is stated in a crystal clear manner that, the restriction made in the said Notification shall not apply to Medical Shops. Clubs, Hotels supplying meals, Loading and Unloading Lorry Transport Organizations, Petrol Bunks and Cinema Theatres and therefore the reliance placed by learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner cannot be sustained. Clubs, Hotels supplying meals, Loading and Unloading Lorry Transport Organizations, Petrol Bunks and Cinema Theatres and therefore the reliance placed by learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner cannot be sustained. Further, he pointed out that the reliance placed by learned senior counsel for petitioner on the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 15th April 2005 in Writ Petition No.1612/2002 cannot be made applicable to the facts of the case of petitioner for the reason that, the facts of the said case are entirely different from the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. Further he specifically pointed out that, “It would be impermissible by means of an administrative circular to issue directions which would run contrary to the opening and closing hours as they exist in pursuance of the exemption granted in the Second Schedule with reference to the premises of an establishment listed therein. That apart, from the order of the Court it is clear that the issue as to whether an exemption granted under the Second Schedule to the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948 could be overridden by an administrative circular which did not purport to alter the terms of the statutory exemption did not arise for consideration.” Therefore, he submitted that, the said reliance placed by learned senior counsel for petitioner has no substance not it is applicable. 7. Learned Advocate General appearing for respondents placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases P 268 in case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Vs. Sanatan Dharam Girls Secondary School and Others wherein the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the meaning of word “control” in greater detail and observed that, “the word ‘Control’ is synonymous with superintendence, management or authority to direct, restrict or regulate. The word ‘Control’ suggests check, restraint or influence. Control is intended to regulate and hold in check and restrain from action.” Therefore, he submitted that, the second respondent has got every right to control, restrict and regulate and issue direction regarding restriction in the opening and closing timings of the Places of Public entertainment. The word ‘Control’ suggests check, restraint or influence. Control is intended to regulate and hold in check and restrain from action.” Therefore, he submitted that, the second respondent has got every right to control, restrict and regulate and issue direction regarding restriction in the opening and closing timings of the Places of Public entertainment. Further it is stated in the statement of objections filed on behalf of second respondent that, in view of the authorities and State Government receiving the representations that certain places of public entertainment are open beyond midnight in certain parts of the city and giving scope for disorderly conduct, public nuisance and disturbances of public tranquility, the second respondent has rightly thought it fit to pass the impugned order, restricting the opening and closing hours. Along with the objections statement, learned counsel for respondents has produced the list of cases reported near the petitioner’s premises, representations from the jurisdictional police stations vide Annexures R1 to R3. In the said Annexures, the details have been set out as to the number of offences committed by the persons, place and time of the said offences. The recent untoward incidents that took place between 1st January 2009 to 15th June 2009 near the premises of the petitioner Hotel are set out vide Annexure R4. Therefore, keeping in view the incidents that took place in and around the Hotel, and the cases registered by the jurisdictional police, particularly, during odd hours, wherein the petitioner’s Hotel was serving food beyond 12:00 midnight, which would encourage the unlawful activities beyond the hours prescribed by running hotel and create law and order problem and several anti social elements utilizing the petitioner’s hotel during late hours for their criminal activities, the impugned restriction is imposed. Therefore, he submitted that, the second respondent has thought it fit to impose the restriction and passed the impugned order, which the petitioner is now challenging in these petitioners. 8. Therefore, he submitted that, the second respondent has thought it fit to impose the restriction and passed the impugned order, which the petitioner is now challenging in these petitioners. 8. Further, it is specifically pointed out that the impugned order is issued in the interest of public and to maintain public peace and tranquility and also having regard to the fact that, where most of the Hotels are run beyond 12:00 midnight, the number of cases registered by the police are more and most of the Hotels run by petitioner are situated at sensitive areas and some of the petitioner’s Hotels are near H.A.L. and in fact, the jurisdictional police have by their communication dated 15th May 2008 requested the jurisdictional inspector of Police to beef up the security around HAL and HAL is a strategic defence public sector undertaking under Department of Defence production, Ministry of Defence, Government of India and the Corporate Office of HAL located at 15/1 Cubbon Road, Bangalore-1 is within the vicinity of the petitioner Hotel. Therefore, taking all these relevant factors into consideration, the second respondent has taken a uniform decision to impose the restriction in opening and closing hours and not targeted the petitioner alone. Moreover, it is specifically stated that, if any public establishment wants to open during the restricted hours, it is open for them to do so after taking written permission from the second respondent. Therefore, it was always open for the petitioner to have approached the second respondent if they wanted to run the Hotels during the restricted hours, i.e. between 12:00 midnight and 06:00 A.M. and obtain written permission. Further, learned Advocate General relied upon another judgment of the Apex Court reported in (1996) 10 Supreme Court cases 304 in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others and submitted that, “The tests of arbitrary action which apply to executive actions do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order that delegated legislation can be struck down such legislation must be manifestly arbitrary, a law which could not be reasonably expected to emanate from an authority delegated with the law making power. State of Karnataka and others and submitted that, “The tests of arbitrary action which apply to executive actions do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order that delegated legislation can be struck down such legislation must be manifestly arbitrary, a law which could not be reasonably expected to emanate from an authority delegated with the law making power. In the instant case, the second respondent being the competent authority to maintain law and order and to see that peace and tranquility prevails has in the best interest of public in general taken the uniform decision to impose restriction in opening and closing timings of all the places of public entertainment and has not targeted the petitioner nor the decision taken by the said respondent is biased. Therefore, he submitted that the writ petitions filed by petitioner are liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits. 9. I have heard learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner and learned Advocate General appearing for respondents. 10. After considering the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner and learned Advocate General appearing for respondents, as stated above the after careful perusal of the grounds urged by petitioner and the stand taken by respondents in their objections statement, the only question that arise for consideration in these petitions is as to: “WHETHER the order impugned passed by second respondent is in accordance with law?” After careful perusal of the order impugned passed under the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963, I do not find any error of law or material irregularity as such committed by the second respondent in passing the order impugned dated 19th May 2009, imposing the restriction in the opening and closing timings, which is applicable to the businessmen who are running their Hotels/Restaurants/Refreshments/Canteens etc. The said restriction imposed is uniformly applied to all the places of public entertainment as defined under sub-Section (15) of Section 2 of the Karnataka Police Act stating that, they shall remain open from 06:00 to 24:00 hours, i.e. from 6 A.M. to 12.00 midnight and all the places of public entertainment shall remain closed from 00:00 hours to 06:00 i.e. from 12 midnight to 6 A.M. Further it is clarified that, the said order would not apply to Bar and Restaurants Clubs and Hotels serving Indian made foreign liquor (CL-9, CL4 and CL7 etc.) who have obtained the licence from the Excise Department and these places will continue to operate as per the provisions of the Karnataka Excise Act, Rules, and Licence Conditions and shall close at 11.30 P.M. 11. The principal ground urged by learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner that the order impugned passed by second respondent is one without jurisdiction cannot be sustained as rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General appearing for respondents that the provisions of Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1961 to fix the opening and closing hours are applicable to the employees who are working in the Establishment of Hotels, Restaurants and refreshments. Further, learned Advocate General pointed out that the submission made by learned senior counsel for petitioner that as per Notification dated 12th August 1987 issued by the State of Karnataka, the shops and commercial establishments such as Medical Shops, Clubs, Hotels supplying meals, Loading and Unloading Lorry Transport Organizations, Petrol Banks and Cinema Theatres were exempted from the restriction imposed that they shall not be opened earlier than 6:00 A.M. or closed on any day later than 9.00 P.M. is not at all applicable to the petitioner’s establishment on the ground that what is important factor to be borne in mind is having regard to the activities carried on in and around the vicinity of the Hotels run by petitioner and other similarly situated licence holders who are running Hotel business. In order to have uniformity and taking into consideration that, no untoward incident takes place as rightly pointed out by respondents in their objections the second respondent has imposed the restriction in the opening and closing hours of the public entertainments. In order to have uniformity and taking into consideration that, no untoward incident takes place as rightly pointed out by respondents in their objections the second respondent has imposed the restriction in the opening and closing hours of the public entertainments. Further, it is not disputed that some of the Hotels of the petitioner come within the vicinity of H.A.L which is purely defence establishment and if some thing goes wrong at the odd hours, between 3 A.M. and 6 A.M. during which the customers come particularly, the NRIs, as submitted by the learned counsel for petitioner, it is not justifiable for this Court to prevent the jurisdictional competent authority from exercising the power and passing the impugned order imposing the timing restriction, holding that the restriction of opening and closing timings imposed is one without jurisdiction. Therefore, the said exercise of power is well within the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Police Act as referred above and the same is established from the preamble of the Notification issued for the purpose. In fact, the present restriction in timings imposed by second respondent is beneficial to petitioner only for the reason that, if any untoward incidents happen during the restricted hour in the vicinity of the Hotels run by petitioner, the petitioner will not be held responsible. In fact, from the Annexures produced along with the objections statement filed by respondents, it can be seen that, several incidents have taken place in the vicinity of the Hotels run by petitioner and the details of each incident, place, time of offence, etc are set out clearly in the said Annexures R1 to R4. However, the learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner pointed out that, the said Annexures produced and relied in the earlier round of litigation where petitioner had challenged the notice issued to it, the said writ petition was disposed of as having become infructuous in view of the notice being withdrawn by the competent authority. If once the competent authority has withdrawn the notice issued to petitioner, they cannot issue the impugned order exercising the power under the Karnataka Police Act when State Government alone has the power to fix the opening and closing hours exclusively under the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1961. If once the competent authority has withdrawn the notice issued to petitioner, they cannot issue the impugned order exercising the power under the Karnataka Police Act when State Government alone has the power to fix the opening and closing hours exclusively under the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1961. The said submission of learned senior counsel for petitioner cannot be accepted nor it is a ground to substantiate the defence taken by petitioner that the impugned order passed by second respondent is one without jurisdiction. It is significant to note that, the second respondent being the jurisdictional competent authority in order to restore peace and tranquility in the area, to the citizens of the cosmopolitan city like Bangalore, where different categories of people come and go and the manner in which the city is growing and the migration of the rural mass, has thought it fit to impose the timing restriction in the best interest of the public in general. More over, if any thing and if some untoward incident happen, they are ultimately held responsible. Further, it is relevant to note that, the impugned order is passed after obtaining previous sanction from the State Government. Therefore, in view of all these relevant factors, the second respondent has rightly taken the decision to control and regulate the timings by looking into the ground reality and all the incidents that took place in and around the Hotels run by the petitioner and other similarly situate persons. The said order passed is uniformly made applicable to all the public entertainment establishments including Hotels run by petitioner who are running within the city of Bangalore. 12. Further, one more aspect to be borne in mind is, in fact, the very same authority who has issued the order impugned has in a crystal clear manner stated that, if the petitioner or any one has any grievance it is very much open for them to redress their grievance by approaching the said authority and take the written permission regarding relaxation in the opening and closing timings. When that liberty was reserved to the petitioner the petitioner ought to have availed of the said opportunity before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, questioning the correctness of the order impugned. 13. When that liberty was reserved to the petitioner the petitioner ought to have availed of the said opportunity before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, questioning the correctness of the order impugned. 13. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, as stated above and having regard to the factual and legal aspects of the matter, I do not find any good grounds as such made out by petitioner to interfere in the order impugned passed by the second respondent not petitioner has made out any good grounds to entertain the relief sought in these petitions. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions filed by petitioner are dismissed as devoid of merits.