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2009 DIGILAW 474 (RAJ)

Shanti Prasad v. State of Rajasthan

2009-02-12

GOPAL KRISHAN VYAS

body2009
Judgment Hon'ble VYAS, J.—In this writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the order of termination dated 09.10.1979 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and, so also, order dated 13.08.1998 passed by the appellate authority. 2. Brief facts of the case are that initially the petitioner was appointed as Sanitary Inspector in the Medical & Health Department, Government of Rajasthan. In the year 1970, when the petitioner was working under the C.M.H.O., Pali, he was charge-sheeted under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (in short, to be called the “CCA Rules” hereinafter) vide charge-sheet dated 02.03.1974. The following charges were levelled against the petitioner:- Charge No.I That the said Shri Shanti Prasad Vyas while functioning as Sanitary Inspector at Pali claimed false fare by bus while performed journey by Govt. Vehicle as is indicated in the enclosed statement of allegations. Charge No.II That the said Shri Shanti Prasad Vyas while functioning as Sanitary Inspector at Pali has claimed false T.A. By showing journey to Aburoad out of his Jurisdiction as is indicated in the enclosed statement of allegations. Charge No.III That the said Shri Shanti Prasad Vyas while functioning as Sanitary Inspector at Pali claimed false T.A. By cheating the Govt. as is indicated in the enclosed statement of allegations. Charge No.IV That the said Shri Shanti Prasad Vyas while functioning as Sanitary Inspector at Pali performed journey on 30.07.70 from Pali to Jaipur in the Govt. Vehicle but has decided the Govt. by drawing T.A. by private bus as is indicated in the enclosed statement of allegations. Charge No.V That the said Shri Shanti Prasad Vyas while functioning as Sanitary Inspector at Pali claimed T.A. and D.A. respectedly against standing orders and did not submit tour notes to the ADHE (Health kaner while asked for by him, as indicated in the enclosed statement of allegations. Charge No.VI That the said Shri Shanti Prasad Vyas while functioning as Sanitary Inspector at Pali is guilty of harassing class IV servants and throwing fruits and sweets from shops and collecting money to the D.R.O. Pali as is indicated in the enclosed statement of allegations.” 3. A reply to the charge-sheet was filed by the petitioner on 09.05.1974. Thereafter, on 14.03.1975, inquiry officer was appointed who conducted the inquiry and submitted inquiry report on 04.01.1978, which is placed on record as Annex.-3. A reply to the charge-sheet was filed by the petitioner on 09.05.1974. Thereafter, on 14.03.1975, inquiry officer was appointed who conducted the inquiry and submitted inquiry report on 04.01.1978, which is placed on record as Annex.-3. As per inquiry report out of six charges only charges No.1 to 4 were treated to be proved and charges No.5 and 6 were not proved by the department. 4. On receipt of the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority issued notice dated 05.12.1978 to the petitioner to make representation against proposed penalty. The petitioner submitted representation in pursuance of the said notice on 12.12.1978. After lapse of almost ten months, order impugned dated 09.10.1979 was passed by the Disciplinary Authority whereby penalty of termination of services was imposed against the petitioner. 5. The petitioner filed appeal against the penalty order on 07.11.1979; but, the petitioner's appeal was not decided for a long time, therefore, the petitioner filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.700/1983 before this Court seeking direction to the appellate authority to dispose of the petitioner's appeal. Since very short question was involved in the said writ petition, the same was decided on 20.04.1983 with direction that after hearing the parties, appeal dated 07.11.1979 may be disposed of within a period of four months. Thereafter, the petitioner's appeal was disposed of on 06.10.1983 while dismissing the same. 6. After disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority, the petitioner again preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.70/1984 before this Court. In that writ petition, the petitioner raised grievance that he has not been supplied copies of the documents including statements of witnesses recorded in the inquiry. Vide order dated 24.07.1984 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.70/1984, this Court directed the respondent department to supply copies of the documents to the petitioner. However, all the documents as directed by this Court were not supplied to the petitioner; and, ultimately, the writ petition filed by the petitioner was allowed on 09.09.1986 and following order was passed : “It has been laid down that when the livelihood of the person is taken away then at least the authorities should pass an order so as to show that they have applied their mind and the order passed by the Appellate Authority could be examined by the Courts. But the present order, which has been passed, does not show the application mind at all. But the present order, which has been passed, does not show the application mind at all. Petitioner has raised a number of grounds in his petition and it was, at least, expected of the authorities that while disposing of appeal, they should have considered the contention and then passed a detailed speaking order. But the present order is wholly a laconic and it does not show that the authorities have cared to consider the pea of the petitioner, as such this order deserves to be quashed. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part and the case is remanded back to the Appellate Authority. The appellate authority shall hear the petitioner and pass speaking order of the appeal within a period of two months' from today.” 7. In pursuance of the aforesaid order dated 09.09.1986, appeal filed by the petitioner was disposed of on 30.04.1987. The petitioner, however, again filed writ petition before this Court being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1722/1987 challenging the order passed by the appellate authority. The writ petition was heard and, again, the matter was remanded to the appellate authority to decide the appeal of the petitioner after reconstituting the record. Following order was passed vide Annex.-13 by this Court : “In the result, the appellate order passed by the respondent on 30.4.87 is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the appellate authority with a direction that the appeal of the appellant should be disposed of in accordance with law after perusing the record if available and if not available, then after its reconstruction without any further delay. The steps indicated above should be taken as expeditiously as possible.” Against the said order remanding the matter to the appellate authority dated 06.09.1996, the petitioner preferred special appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. The said special appeal was registered as D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.631/1996 and the same was decided by the Division Bench on 01.08.1997. The Division Bench directed the respondents to decide the appeal within six months from the date of filing certified copy of the order. 8. Contention of the petitioner is that he submitted copy of the judgment vide letter dated 19.08.1997 for compliance. The Division Bench directed the respondents to decide the appeal within six months from the date of filing certified copy of the order. 8. Contention of the petitioner is that he submitted copy of the judgment vide letter dated 19.08.1997 for compliance. However, nothing was done for four months, therefore, a reminder was given by the petitioner; but, when nothing was done for pretty long period, the petitioner preferred contempt petition before this Court being D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No.119/1998. Immediately after receipt of notices of contempt, the government machinery came into motion and, as ordered by this Court on 06.09.1996, passed impugned order on 13.08.1998, whereby, the appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected. 9. Contention of the petitioner in this writ petition is that upon perusal of order dated 13.08.1998, it is revealed that the file has been reconstituted comprising report of inquiry officer, suspension order, show cause notice given to the petitioner on the report of the inquiry officer, reply to the show cause notice and order of punishment only; meaning thereby, the appeal was decided by the appellate authority on the basis of above documents only, in which, all the documents were not before the appellate authority while deciding the petitioner's appeal. In the aforesaid circumstances, it is clear that all the documents of record of the inquiry were not included in the reconstituted file and, in casual manner, hastily the appeal was decided on the basis of incomplete record. 10. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, the appeal filed by the petitioner under Rule 23 of the CCA Rules was to be disposed of while following procedure laid down in Rule 30, in which, it is categorically provided that in the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 14, the appellate authority shall consider, - (a) Whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been complied with and if not whether such noncompliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. (b) Whether the facts on which the order was passed have been established. (b) Whether the facts on which the order was passed have been established. (c) Whether the facts established afford sufficient justification for making an order; and, (d) Whether the penalty imposed in excessive, adequate or inadequate; (and after giving a personal hearing to the Government servant to explain his case, if he desires so) and after consultation with the commission if such consultation is necessary in the case, pass order - (i) setting aside, reducing confirming or enhancing the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case provided that : (i) the appellate authority shall not impose any enhanced penalty which neither such authority nor the authority which made the order appealed against is competent in the case to impose; (ii) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be passed unless the appellant is given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty; and (iii) if the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 13 and inquiry under Rule 16 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall subject to the provisions of Rule 18 itself hold such inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held and thereafter on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry, pass such orders as it may deem fit. 11. Meaning thereby, complete procedure is laid down under sub-rule (2) of Rule 30, which is not complied with whereas the appellate authority was required to record finding that the inquiry was held in accordance with rules. Further, the finding of the inquiry officer as well as Disciplinary Authority is required to be based on the evidence produced in the inquiry; but, while deciding the appeal filed by the petitioner, the appellate authority has not only flouted the order passed by this Court for reconstitution of the record but has also failed to apply its mind and decided the appeal in violation of the procedure laid down in Rule 30 of the CCA Rules, therefore, the finding of the Disciplinary Authority as well as appellate authority deserves to be quashed. 12. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that first of all relevant documents and statements recorded in the inquiry were not supplied to the petitioner by the inquiry officer and, upon perusal of the inquiry report, it is clearly established that the same cannot be termed as inquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules and, without any cogent reasons, the petitioner has been penalized. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that that the Disciplinary Authority as well as appellate authority have not recorded any reasons for substantiating their orders. So also, the order impugned has been passed without application of mind and without giving any reasons for the finding arrived at by the authority, therefore, the orders suffer from the vice of being non-speaking orders. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the order of Disciplinary Authority is exclusively non-speaking order passed in flagrant violation of Rule 14 of the CCA Rules, therefore, the finding recorded by the appellate authority is illegal and the same is liable to be quashed. The appellate authority has committed error while affirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority because the order of the Disciplinary Authority is illegal for the reason that the Disciplinary Authority has passed order in violation of Rule 14 of the CCA Rules. According to Rule 16, the Disciplinary Authority, after receipt of the inquiry officer's report and reply to the show cause notice, is required to record its own finding on the charges levelled against the petitioner delinquent. In the present case, however, from perusal of the order impugned passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 09.10.1979, it is revealed that not a single word is said as to whether it accepted or rejected the reply filed by the petitioner, therefore, the order of the Disciplinary Autho-rity is illegal and in contravention of the procedure laid down under the rules. 15. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner while attacking upon the order of the Disciplinary Authority submitted that even excluding from view the provisions of the CCA Rules, the Disciplinary Authority was yet required to apply its mind to the report of the inquiry officer and record of the inquiry as well as reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice; but, the Disciplinary Authority has not applied its mind on any of the submissions raised by the petitioner which is evident from the order impugned itself. The Disciplinary Authority has passed order dated 09.10.1979 on the basis of the report of the inquiry officer only without any discussion, therefore, the order is illegal and passed in violation of the rules because all the grounds taken by the petitioner are ignored by the Disciplinary Authority, therefore, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, order passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as order of the appellate authority deserves to be quashed. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the inquiry officer's report is perverse and suffers from non-application of mind. The inquiry officer has not given any reason for accepting the evidence or rejecting the evidence. Likewise, he has committed error while not accepting the testimony of Sohan Singh driver of the vehicle No.RSL 7384 whereas the principal charge levelled against the petitioner turned round the entries in the log book of vehicle No.RSL 7384 and the only witness to depose in respect of the log book was Sohan Singh. More so, Dr. G.S. Gehlot with whom the petitioner is alleged to have travelled did not appear as witness in the inquiry as he had expired and except him only Sohan Singh was the witness to testify as to whether the petitioner travelled with Dr. G.S. Gehlot in the department jeep on the disputed date whereas the witness categorically stated that the petitioner did not travel with Dr. G.S. Gehlot on the said date in the government vehicle nor did the petitioner made over-writing in the log book. The Disciplinary Authority has ignored the statement of Sohan Singh on the ground that he has deposed in favour of the petitioner which could not be a ground for discarding the testimony of Sohan Singh, therefore, the inquiry officer has committed serious error while reaching the conclusion of guilt against the petitioner. 17. The Disciplinary Authority has ignored the statement of Sohan Singh on the ground that he has deposed in favour of the petitioner which could not be a ground for discarding the testimony of Sohan Singh, therefore, the inquiry officer has committed serious error while reaching the conclusion of guilt against the petitioner. 17. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that, in all, six charges were levelled against the petitioner and, out of those six charges, charges No.1 to 4 are interconnected and cumulatively suggest the principal charge against the petitioner that the petitioner undertook travel beyond his jurisdiction to Abu Road and claimed false fare although he travelled in government jeep with Dr. G.S. Gehlot. Charges No.5 and 6 were, however, not proved. In that connection, on behalf of the department, Sohan Singh who was driver of the jeep No.RSL 7384 in which the petitioner was alleged to have travelled to Abu Road has clearly deposed that the petitioner did not travel in the department jeep on the said date to Abu Road. Further, the petitioner produced on record the order issued by the competent authority directing him to undertake journey to Abu Road, therefore, there was no material available before the inquiry officer to hold the charge levelled against the petitioner proved. In this view of the matter, therefore, the finding of the inquiry officer is perverse and illegal and the inquiry officer reached conclusion on the basis of surmises and conjectures. 18. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the driver of the vehicle categorically stated in his statement that the petitioner did not make any interpolation in the log book and the hand-writing in which the alleged interpolations are made has not been subjected to test by the hand-writing expert, therefore, the finding against the petitioner is perverse and while ignoring the evidence on record illegally the inquiry officer reached conclusion against the evidence coming on record. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority committed grave error while not considering the reply of the petitioner in which the petitioner raised all these grounds. 19. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority committed grave error while not considering the reply of the petitioner in which the petitioner raised all these grounds. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the judgment reported in (1985) 3 SCC 378 , in the case of Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer & Others, in which, the apex Court has held that a reasoned report of the inquiry is essential and, so also, where the inquiry results in loss of livelihood or attach stigma, it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice and minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the inquiry officer without assigning reasons for holding the charge proved. 20. While inviting attention towards judgment of this Court in Jagdish Prasad Meena vs. Divisional Commissioner, Ajmer, reported in 1991(1) RLR 213 = RLW 1991(2) Raj. 319, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that opportunity of making representation is to be given to the delinquent and after receiving his reply, the Disciplinary Authority is under obligation to consider the same by a reasoned order. Further, inviting attention towards another judgment reported in 1998 WLR Raj. 618, it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority ought to have considered the relevant factors brought to its notice by the delinquent before imposing penalty. 21. Again, citing the judgment of the apex Court reported in (2001) 1 SCC 65 , rendered in the case of Union of India vs. K.A. Kittu & Others, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the inquiry officer is duty bound to consider statements of all the witnesses examined in the inquiry. 22. Lastly, referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Moni Shankar vs. Union of India & Another, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 484 , it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in the disciplinary inquiry, evidence is required to be appreciated in proper manner and the appellate authority is required to determine whether relevant evidence was taken into consideration, irrelevant evidence excluded and requisite standard of proof met or not; meaning thereby, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that inquiry itself was illegal and conducted without application of mind to the evidence coming on record. It is further contended that the petitioner was not supplied with copies of the evidence adduced against him and, so also, the order of the Disciplinary Authority is non-speaking order and appellate authority has flouted the order passed by this Court for deciding the appeal after reconstitution of the entire record. 23. Per contra, by way of filing reply, the respondents have refuted all the allegations levelled by the petitioner with regard to not conducting inquiry as per procedure laid down in the CCA Rules. The main contention in the reply filed by the respondents is that the petitioner claimed travelling allowance in the year 1970 which was falsely claimed by the petitioner, therefore, he was charge-sheeted on 02.03.1974; and, after conducting proper inquiry, on 04.01.1978 the inquiry officer submitted the inquiry report and, on that basis, after following the provisions for providing opportunity to make representation against the proposed penalty, the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 09.10.1979, whereby, penalty of termination from service was imposed. As per the respondents, the Disciplinary Authority considered all aspects of the matter and, while taking into account conclusion arrived at by the inquiry officer in the inquiry report dated 04.01.1978, order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority for termination from service. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent Department, while protecting the order impugned, submits that in the inquiry charges levelled against the petitioner were proved by the prosecution by adducing proper evidence. Thereafter, an appeal was preferred against the order of penalty; but, somehow, when the petitioner's appeal was not decided, then, the petitioner preferred writ petition before this Court and, upon direction issued by this Court, the appellate authority disposed of the matter while dismissing the appeal on 06.10.1983. After disposal of the appeal, the petitioner again preferred writ petition, being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.70/1984, in which, certain grounds were raised by the petitioner for not supplying him copies of documents including the statements of witnesses recorded in the inquiry. The said writ petition was finally decided and the appellate authority was directed to hear the petitioner and pass speaking order within a period of two months. The said order was made on 09.09.1986. 25. The said writ petition was finally decided and the appellate authority was directed to hear the petitioner and pass speaking order within a period of two months. The said order was made on 09.09.1986. 25. However, again, the appeal filed by the petitioner was disposed of by the appellate authority on 30.04.1987; but, the petitioner again challenged the order of dismissal as well as appellate authority's order before this Court by way of filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1722/1987 challenging the order impugned. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court, again, remitted the matter to the appellate authority to decide the appeal of the petitioner after reconstituting the record. Against the said order dated 06.09.1996 passed by the learned Single Judge, the petitioner preferred special appeal before the Division Bench, being D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.631/1996 and the Division Bench of this Court finally passed order on 01.08.1997, whereby, the respondents were directed to decide the appeal filed by the petitioner within six months from the date of producing certified copy of the order. 26. It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that although after remitting the matter, some time was consumed for reconstituting the record, therefore, order passed by the Division Bench was not complied with, then, the petitioner preferred contempt petition before the Division Bench of this Court and the said contempt petition (being D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No.119/1998) and after receiving the notices in the contempt petition, the impugned order dated 13.08.1998 was passed by the appellate authority and the petitioner's appeal was rejected; meaning thereby, thrice the case was remitted by this Court with direction to dispose of the petitioner's appeal by a speaking order; and, on the basis of the report of the inquiry officer, the appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected, in which, there is no illegality. 27. 27. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to be proved and those charges were serious in nature with regard to drawing travelling allowance illegally, therefore, looking to the seriousness of the matter, the order impugned was passed by the Disciplinary Authority after due inquiry, so also, the appellate authority finally passed order in appeal while considering all aspects of the facts and the fact that the prosecution proved the charges against the petitioner beyond any reasonable doubt, therefore, there is no force in this writ petition. 28. In the rejoinder, the petitioner refuted the allegations for claiming false or wrong travelling allowance and submits that the charge-sheet dated 02.03.1974 was ex facie arbitrary and baseless. It is also stated in the rejoinder that the respondents themselves admitted that the record was not reconstituted inspite of order dated 06.09.1996 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, as such impugned order dated 30.08.1998 passed by the appellate authority is ex facie illegal and against the direction issued by the learned Single Judge. It is further stated in the rejoinder that the contention of the respondents is totally unfounded that full opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend his case because, admittedly, the record was not reconstituted as directed by this Court, then, how it can be presumed that full opportunity was given by the appellate authority to the petitioner. 29. It is specifically stated in the rejoinder that in para 16 of the reply, it is admitted by the respondents that copies of the documents were tried to be collected and since after lapse of long time it was found that it is not possible to reconstitute the entire record, therefore, the petitioner was given full opportunity of hearing to plead his case. According to the petitioner, in this view of the matter, the respondents have not only flouted the direction issued by this Court for reconstitution of the record but have ignored the important aspect of the matter also that witness Sohan Singh, who was driver of the jeep in which the petitioner is alleged to have travelled, was very important and was only surviving witness who deposed in favour of the petitioner; but, the inquiry offricer disbelieved and dfiscarded the statement of witness Sohan Singh and, without assigning any reason as to why his statement was not trustworthy, gave finding against the petitioner. Therefore, the orders impugned are patently illegal and without any foundation. 30. I have considered the rival submissions made by both the parties. 31. In this case, by charge-memo dated 02.03.1974, in all, six charges were levelled against the petitioner. For the same, inquiry was conducted under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules against the petitioner. The inquiry officer conducted the inquiry and submitted report of the inquiry on 04.01.1978 which is placed on record as Annex.-3. As per the inquiry report, charges No.1 to 4 were found to be proved and charges No.5 and 6 were not established in the inquiry. Thereafter, a detailed notice was given to the petitioner while sending copy of the inquiry report. 32. Upon perusal of the representation friled by the petitioner against the show cause notice, it is revealed that a detailed representation was given by the petitioner but the Disciplinary Authority while passing the impugned order did not consider any of the grounds raised by the petitioner in his representation and inflicted the penalty straight away vide the impugned order of termination of service dated 09.10.1979. 33. Upon perusal of the above termination order, it is evident that none of the grounds taken by the petitioner in his representation was considered by the Disciplinary Authority. Further, there is no discussion and finding in the order of the Disciplinary Authority for inflicting penalty of termination from service. The Disciplinary Authority has completely given goodbye to the necessity of assigning reasons for imposing the penalty of termination from service against the petitioner. 34. The said order was challenged by the petitioner by way of filing appeal. Further, there is no discussion and finding in the order of the Disciplinary Authority for inflicting penalty of termination from service. The Disciplinary Authority has completely given goodbye to the necessity of assigning reasons for imposing the penalty of termination from service against the petitioner. 34. The said order was challenged by the petitioner by way of filing appeal. In the appeal, all the grounds were taken by the petitioner with regard to not considering his representation, so also, the fact that the prosecution has failed to prove its case for the charges levelled against him. In this case, the allegation against the petitioner is that he had drawn false travelling allowance by showing journey to Abu Road and, in fact, he had travelled in the official vehicle. For this purpose, in my opinion, cogent evidence was to be recorded by the inquiry officer; but, admittedly, only statement of one Sohan Singh, who was the driver of the vehicle RSL 7384, was recorded by the inquiry officer and this witness did not support the allegation levelled by the department against the petitioner, however, this aspect of the matter was not even incorporated in the inquiry report. The only assertion is made that statement of driver Sohan Singh is not satisfactory and, how the same is not satisfactory, this is only best known to the inquiry officer who did not even try to give any reasoning for his satisfaction. In the same manner, no reason has been incorporated in the order of the Disciplinary Authority. 35. In para 6 of the representation, the petitioner has specifically pointed out that Sohan Singh, driver of the office vehicle made statement but his statement has not been considered which is not proper. In this case, to prove the main charges against the petitioner, only two important witnesses were to be produced by the department, - (1) Driver of the vehicle and (2) Dr. G.S. Gehlot, D.H.O. who went in the said government vehicle with whom the petitioner is alleged to have travelled in the jeep. But, unfortunately, statement of Dr. G.S. Gehlot could not be recorded as he had expired and statement of driver Sohan Singh was recorded. The inquiry officer, however, did not take into consideration statement of driver Sohan Singh saying that his statement is not satisfactory. But, unfortunately, statement of Dr. G.S. Gehlot could not be recorded as he had expired and statement of driver Sohan Singh was recorded. The inquiry officer, however, did not take into consideration statement of driver Sohan Singh saying that his statement is not satisfactory. Meaning thereby, the inquiry officer as well as Disciplinary Authority have completely ignored the material evidence and illegally gave finding that charges No.1, 2, 3 and 4 levelled against the petitioner are proved by the prosecution. In fact, it is a case of no evidence which is evident from the perusal of the inquiry report. Upon perusal of the inquiry report it is revealed that the inquiry was conducted in a very casual manner and, so also, the findings are not based upon proper evidence. Likewise, when these points were raised before the Disciplinary Authority, the authority failed to consider this aspect of the matter. The appellate authority was under obligation to consider the fact that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the allegation against the petitioner; and, even upon the matter having been remanded to it for three times for deciding the appeal in proper manner; but, by the impugned order dated 13.08.1998, the appellate authority again upheld the order of punishment without any reasons. 36. Admittedly, as per para 16 of the reply filed by the respondents, the record was not available, therefore, upon the direction issued by this Court for reconstitution of the record, the matter was to be decided after reconstituting the record; but, in the reply, it is accepted in para 16 of the reply that after receiving the notice of the contempt petition filed by the petitioner, the appellate authority took up the matter and opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. Copies of the documents including report of the inquiry officer, show cause notice and reply filed by the petitioner were not available, therefore, copies of the same were collected and since after long lapse of time it was found that it is not possible to reconstitute the record, therefore, the petitioner was given full opportunity to plead his case and the impugned order has been passed. 37. It is very strange that the respondents are accepting in the reply that record was not available; meaning thereby, the respondents have flouted the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court. 37. It is very strange that the respondents are accepting in the reply that record was not available; meaning thereby, the respondents have flouted the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court. In this view of the matter, it is abundantly clear that the respondents have no regard for the order passed by this Court and, so also, on the basis of certain documents which have been collected after issuance of the direction by this Court, the appeal was decided. The whole discussion speaks that the order of the Disciplinary Authority is non-speaking order and material evidence of witness Sohan Singh was completely ignored and, in fact, the inquiry was not properly conducted. All these aspects were brought to the notice of the appellate authority and, despite the direction issued by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1722/1987, whereby, the appellate authority was directed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law after reconstitution of the record without further delay, the appellate authority did not care to show any reasons for upholding the finding and rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner. 38. Upon perusal of the appellate authority's order dated 13.08.1998, it is apparently clear that record of the case was only partially available and the appellate authority again passed order without considering the most important aspect of the matter that the driver of the vehicle Sohan Singh did not support the prosecution case. Likewise, the order of the appellate authority is not based upon proper evidence and, so also, it is totally without application of mind and passed in a very hasty manner only to give impression to the Court that the appellate authority has complied with the direction issued by this Court for deciding the appeal after reconstitution of the record. 39. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, in the departmental inquiry the department completely failed to prove its case against the petitioner with regard to drawing travelling allowance bill without any travel. So also, no cogent evidence is produced before the inquiry officer to prove the charges against the petitioner. Therefore, on the basis of the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the opinion that this writ petition deserves to be allowed and order impugned Annex.-6 dated 09.10.1979 and, so also, appellate authority's order dated 13.08.1998 deserve to be quashed. 40. Therefore, on the basis of the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the opinion that this writ petition deserves to be allowed and order impugned Annex.-6 dated 09.10.1979 and, so also, appellate authority's order dated 13.08.1998 deserve to be quashed. 40. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 , has held that the authority exercising quasi judicial function is under legal obligation at the time of passing an adverse order to record reasons; but, in this case, upon perusal of the report of the inquiry officer as well as order terminating the services of the petitioner dated 09.10.1979 and the final order of the appellate authority dated 13.08.1998 clearly speak that both the orders are totally non-speaking and unreasoned orders. Further, the order of the appellate authority dated 13.08.1998 is in contravention of the judgment dated 06.09.1996 passed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1722/1987 which was affirmed by the Division Bench in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.631/1996, decided on 01.08.1997. The co-ordinate Bench has specifically ordered that the appeal of the petitioner shall be decided after reconstituting the record; but, admittedly, appeal filed by the petitioner has been decided by the appellate authority without reconstituting the record. Para 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 of the aforesaid judgment in S.N. Mukherjee's case are as follows : “35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicated that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions just record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority, (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary Courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. 36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 37. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 37. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmoe Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that “there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise” and that “where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity”. (p.80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that “natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice.” (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th edn. p. 548.) In Siemens Engineering Co. case this Court has taken the same view when it observed that “the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process”. This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a judge in h is own cause, and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India wherein it has been held: (SCR pp. 468-69 : SCC p. 272, para 20) “The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram par-tem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice.” 38. A similar trend is discernible in the decisions of English Courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value (See : R. vs. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex p. More; Mahon vs. Air New Zealand Ltd.) 39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action”. As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reasons can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework where under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. And the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. 40. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.” 41. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is allowed and order impugned Annex.-6 dated 09.10.1979 and, so also, appellate authority's order dated 13.08.1998 are hereby quashed and set aside with all consequential benefits. The petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation, therefore, the respondents are directed to pay all the arrears to the petitioner from the date of termination of his service till the date of his retirement and, thereafter, pay entire benefits including pensionary benefits to the petitioner with effect from the date of superannuation within a period of three months, failing which the petitioner shall be entitled for interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. 42. There shall however be no order as to costs.