JUDGMENT :- (This Crl.RP filed U/S.397 Cr.P.C by the advocate for the petitioner praying that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to set aside the order dt. 4.3.2008 passed by the Iv Addl.CMM., Bangalore in C.C.No. 21298/2005.) 1. The petitioner has challenged the order discharging the respondent Nos.1 and 3 in respect of the charge for offences Punishable Under Sections 204, 409, 418 and 420 IPC by invoking the provisions of Section 239 Cr.P.C. 2. Sans unnecessary details the facts relevant for the purpose of this revision are as under: The third respondent issued a cheque in favour of the petitioner for an amount of Rs.3,40,000 /- on 02.07.2004 and on Presentation of the said cheque to the second respondent bank for encashment through the first respondent bank, the cheque was returned with an endorsement of insufficient funds and also on the ground that the cheque was staled. It is thereafter that the petitioner alleging that the cheque has been destroyed by the bank authorities filed the complaint before the Magistrate requesting to take action against the respondents for the aforesaid offences. 3. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence as against respondent Nos.1 and 3 herein and issued the process and dismissed the complaint as against the respondent No.2. After the appearance of respondent Nos.1 and 3, the learned Magistrate heard the counsel for the complainant and the respondent Nos.1 and 3 and under the impugned order has discharged them. Aggrieved by the said order, this revision has been preferred. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the respondents. 5. The points that arise for my consideration are: i) Whether the order of discharge of respondent Nos.1 and 3 herein respect of the charge for the offences punishable under Sections 204, 409, 418 and 420 IPC is illegal or perverse? ii) What order? 6. It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that as a private complaint was lodged against the respondents the Trial Court ought not to have discharged the accused invoking Section 239 Cr.P.C., as the said provision authorise the Magistrate to discharge the accused in case where a police report is submitted to the Court after investigation. It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that as a private complaint was lodged against the respondents the Trial Court ought not to have discharged the accused invoking Section 239 Cr.P.C., as the said provision authorise the Magistrate to discharge the accused in case where a police report is submitted to the Court after investigation. So also it is his contention that the mere observation made by the Karnataka State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in its judgment is itself not sufficient to discharge the accused as the observation was an advise to approach the Civil Court for the relief against the accused. Therefore he submits that the order of discharge is illegal and deserves to be set aside. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supported the order passed by the Trial Court. 7. I have perused the documents produced and the allegations made in the complaint. At the first instance, it is relevant to note that the provisions of section 239 Cr.P.C could be applicable only in a case where a police report is submitted under section 173 Cr.P.C authorising the Magistrate to examine the report submitted and also the documents produced and after giving opportunity to the parties, if he considers the charge against the accused as groundless can discharge the accused by recording the reasons. Admittedly, the said provision is not applicable to the facts on hand, as there is no police report after investigation under Section 173 Cr.P.C and the proceedings before the Magistrate was on the basis of a complaint filed by the petitioner under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and after taking cognizance and issuance of process to respondent Nos.1 and 3. In the circumstances, at least to the extent of the Magistrate exercising the power under Section 239 Cr.P.C the order is erroneous. 8. It is well established principle that a wrong mention of provision of law itself is not a ground to reject the request. If the Magistrate has the jurisdiction to drop the proceedings under any other provisions of law and even if the allegations against the accused are groundless, he need not continue with the proceedings and can drop the proceedings against the accused if he finds that there are no grounds to proceed against the accused. If the Magistrate has the jurisdiction to drop the proceedings under any other provisions of law and even if the allegations against the accused are groundless, he need not continue with the proceedings and can drop the proceedings against the accused if he finds that there are no grounds to proceed against the accused. On this aspect of the matter, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1992 SC 2206 , K.M Mathew V. State of Kerala. The perusal of the facts reveal that there was a private complaint under Sections 504 and 34 IPC, Process was issued and the Apex Court held that there is no bar to drop proceedings against any of the accused persons, if the complaint does not prima facie disclose any offence against the accused. It also further observed that the Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there was no offence for which the accused can be tried and that it is his judicial discretion and no specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop or rescind the proceedings. The decision of the Apex Court applies to the proceedings in summons case where there is no provision for discharge but anyhow there is a specific provision for discharge of the accused in the warrant trial. Though Section 239 applies to the cases where the report is submitted after investigation, the defects hereinafter referred to would compel the Court to apply the principle laid down by the Apex Court referred to supra to justify the discharge of accused. The perusal of the impugned order does not reveal the patent defects in the complaint which ought to have been referred by the learned Magistrate in his order to indicate and justify the order of discharge. 9. There is no dispute that the third respondent herein had issued a cheque in favour of the petitioner for an amount of Rs.3,40,000/-. At the time when the cheque was presented, it was in proper condition, it was not torned or staled and even as submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the third respondent herein was a formal party to the proceedings. So far as the first respondent herein is concerned it is “The Branch Manager, Bangalore City Co-operative Bank. Vijayanagar Branch. Bangalore 40”. So far as the first respondent herein is concerned it is “The Branch Manager, Bangalore City Co-operative Bank. Vijayanagar Branch. Bangalore 40”. The complainant has not given the name of the Branch Manager who was responsible for the commission of the offence. When it is the specific case of the complainant that the officials of the bank are responsible for tearing or destroying the signature portion of the cheque, an investigation in the matter was essential. It is necessary for the complainant to prima facie show as to the person who is really responsible and the cognizance for the offence can be taken only against the said individual or the person who was then the Manager and in the absence of the name the Branch Manager of the Bangalore City Co-operative Bank Limited Cannot be an accused. Nowhere in the Complaint, the name of the Manager has been mentioned by the complaint. In the circumstances, the learned Magistrate ought not to have even taken cognizance against the first respondent herein. Any how, though these reasons are not assigned by the learned Magistrate, the continuation of the proceedings against the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 herein would serve no purpose for the reasons stated above. Though the learned Magistrate has not assigned these reasons for discharging the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 herein, reasons assigned can be substituted to justifying the ultimate order of discharge of respondent Nos.1 and 3 herein. In that view of the matter, I do not find any justifiable grounds to warrant interference. Hence, I answer the point in negative and proceed to pass the following: Order: Revision petition is dismissed. If the petitioner has any other remedy in law to proceed against the accused, he is at liberty to have recourse to the said provisions.