ORDER Abhay M. Naik, J. 1. Short facts involved herein are that deceased Radheshyam was accompanying a Barat in a tractor bearing Registration No. 4135 MKA and trolly No. 4136 MKA on 22-6-1991 which was owned by respondent No. 2 and was being driven by respondent No. 1 at the relevant time in rash and negligent manner. The driver could not control the tractor with the result that the trolly turned turtle on right side. Radheshyam received severe injuries and ultimately succumbed to death due to them. 2. Tijauwa, widow aged about 30 years of Radheshyam with her four children aged about 7, 5, 3 and 1 respectively, submitted a claim petition under section 166 of M.V. Act, 1988 for compensation of Rs. 3,80,000/- . Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 after being served gave appearance through lawyer and sought time on 3-12-1991 for filing written statement. 3. On 3-12-1991, a compromise application was submitted mentioning therein that the tractor was not insured and the owner of the tractor, trolly was not in a position to contest the claim case. Two respectable persons of village Khera fixed the amount of compromise at Rs. 35,000/- . Out of the settled amount Rs. 20,000/- on 2-12-1991 and remaining amount was paid on 2-12-1991. Accordingly, prayer for dismissal of the claim case was made on the basis of said compromise. 4. It is pertinent to note here that the claimant/appellant No. 1 being illiterate put thumb impression on the compromise application whereas respondents No. 1 and 2 put their signatures. Presiding Officer of the Claims Tribunal, Rewa ignoring the minority of the claimants/appellants No. 2 to 5 found that the compromise was proper and accepted it. Accordingly, the claim petition was dismissed in fully satisfaction vide order dated 3-12-1991. 5. Thereafter an application under Order 47, Rule 1 and section 151 of Civil Procedure Code was submitted by the claimants/appellants with an allegation that the claimant/appellant No. 1 was an illiterate lady. She was not apprised of the factum of alleged compromise. No amount was paid to her in the compromise since no compromise was settled/agreed by her. The entire action of the alleged compromise was given effect to in a fraudulent manner by the counsel of the appellants namely Shri J.P. Dwivedi. She was not apprised of the factum of alleged compromise. No amount was paid to her in the compromise since no compromise was settled/agreed by her. The entire action of the alleged compromise was given effect to in a fraudulent manner by the counsel of the appellants namely Shri J.P. Dwivedi. This apart, claimants No. 2 to 5 were minor and no leave was obtained for entering into compromise on behalf of them under Order 32, Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly, it was prayed that the order dated 3-12-1991 passed in Claim Case No. 107/91 may be quashed and claim case may be decided on merits. Application for review was opposed by the respondents. Learned Claims Tribunal vide order dated 8-4-1993 held that the claimants shall have to institute a suit for setting aside the compromise. Review application was dismissed on the ground that no case for review was made out and minors would have the only recourse of instituting a separate suit for setting aside the compromise order. Aggrieved by the orders dated 3-12-1991 and 8-4-1993, the present appeal has been preferred for their quashment. 6. Shri U.K. Sharma, learned Sr. counsel and Shri S.K. Garg addressed this Court on merits of the appeal. 7. Considered the submissions and perused the record. 8. Claims Tribunal, Rewa has passed the pervious order dated 3-12-1991 on the basis of compromise and subsequent order on 8-4-1993 on the ground that the only remedy to the minors is to avoid the compromise by way of instituting a separate suit and that no case for review has been made out. Subsequent order seems to have been passed in the light of the provisions contained in Order 23, Rule 3-A of Civil Procedure Code which reads as under: 3.A. Bar to suit. -- No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. 9. Aforesaid provision does not create an absolute bar against institution of a suit to set aside the compromise decree. It merely puts an embargo on the parties to dispute compromise decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. Crucial question for the purpose of this provision is that whether a compromise may be called as not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3-A (supra). It merely puts an embargo on the parties to dispute compromise decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. Crucial question for the purpose of this provision is that whether a compromise may be called as not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3-A (supra). Compromise within the meaning of this provision would not be lawful if the consideration or the object of the agreement is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature that if permitted, it would defeat the provision of law. The word "lawful" cannot be construed as wide enough to include whether the promise is voidable or not. 10. Contention of claimants that the thumb impression of claimant/appellant No. 1 was obtained on the compromise application in fraudulent manner by their lawyer without apprising the claimant No. 1 of the compromise or terms and conditions thereof will not make the compromise ex facto unlawful unless the fraud played by the lawyer is established. For setting aside the compromise on this ground a separate suit could be instituted according to the decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of S.G. Thimmappa vs. T. Anantha and others, AIR 1986 Kar 1 . It has been observed: A contract or agreement may be lawful but can still be challenged on the ground that it was entered into or achieved by exercising fraud, undue influence or coercion and can be avoided. This aspect of the matter is not covered by the words 'not lawful' occurring in Rule 3A of Order 23, Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, to hold that the compromise decree cannot be challenged on the ground of fraud, undue influence or coercion under R. 3A would not be correct. In my opinion, the Court below has erred in holding to the contrary. Therefore, to hold that the compromise decree cannot be challenged on the ground of fraud, undue influence or coercion under R. 3A would not be correct. In my opinion, the Court below has erred in holding to the contrary. However, learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Thakur Prasad vs. Bhagwandas, 1985 MPLJ 149 : AIR 1985 MP 171 has observed: After the amendment of the Code by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976, Order 23, Rule 3 provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement in writing and signed by the parties in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall record such agreement or compromise and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it related to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement is the same as the subject-matter of the suit. Under the explanation an agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. Therefore, under the amended provision, it has to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court that there is a lawful compromise, i.e. it is neither void nor voidable. Consequently, the Court can embark upon an enquiry, whether or not the compromise is vitiated due to undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation. Now Rule 3-A has been added to Order 23, which provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. Therefore, now a suit cannot be filed to challenge a compromise even if it was not lawful. 11. In view of the aforesaid, there seems to be a conflict in the meaning of word "not lawful" occurring under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code between Karnataka High Court and this Court. I do not conclude this point here because the appeal is being decided on other points. 12. Admittedly, the claimant/appellant Nos. 2 to 5 were minor when compromise bearing thumb impression of claimant/appellant No. 1 was submitted and accepted. Order 32, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code read as under: 7. I do not conclude this point here because the appeal is being decided on other points. 12. Admittedly, the claimant/appellant Nos. 2 to 5 were minor when compromise bearing thumb impression of claimant/appellant No. 1 was submitted and accepted. Order 32, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code read as under: 7. Agreement or compromise by next friend or guardian for the suit. -- (1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian. [(1-A) An application for leave under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend or the guardian for the suit, as the case may be, and also, if the minor is represented by a pleader, by the certificate of the pleader, to the effect that the agreement or compromise proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor: Provided that the opinion so expressed, whether in the affidavit or in the certificate shall not preclude the Court from examining whether the agreement or compromise proposed is for the benefit of the minor.] (2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor. 13. Aforesaid provision has been construed as mandatory by various High Courts as has been described below: I.L.R. 1919 553, Badri Prasad and others vs. Gopal Bihari Lal and others. The compromise and the decree passed thereon in the former suit are not binding on the present plaintiffs inasmuch as the leave of the Court had not been obtained by the next friend to enter into the compromise on the minors' behalf. It has been laid down repeatedly by the highest tribunal that the provisions of law requiring the obtaining of such leave are of great importance for the purpose of protecting the interests of minors, and their non-observance renders the compromise invalid against the minors. AIR 1985 Pat 163 , Chandeshwar Sharma and another vs. Jaikishore Sharma and others. Two errors of law are apparent. Admittedly, Kameshwar Sharma, Mahesh Sharma and Umesh Sharma, Opposite Party Nos. 6 to 8, respectively are minors. They are also said to have compromised the dispute. AIR 1985 Pat 163 , Chandeshwar Sharma and another vs. Jaikishore Sharma and others. Two errors of law are apparent. Admittedly, Kameshwar Sharma, Mahesh Sharma and Umesh Sharma, Opposite Party Nos. 6 to 8, respectively are minors. They are also said to have compromised the dispute. O. XXXII, R. 7 of the Code says that no next friend or guardian of a minor can enter into any agreement or compromise on his behalf with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian without the leave of the Court. Application for leave to compromise is required to be filed accompanied with an affidavit by the next friend or the guardian in the suit and also, if the minor is represented by a pleader, by the certificate of the pleader to the effect that the agreement or compromise proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor. The said rule also says that the opinion, so expressed, whether in the affidavit or in the certificate shall not preclude the Court from examining whether the agreement of compromise proposed is for the benefit of the minor. It also says that any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor. There is no mention in the impugned order that any application for leave to enter into the compromise on behalf of the minors was filed in this case. Learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party has drawn my attention to Annexure-6 to the counter affidavit but it neither appears to be an application with a certificate of the counsel representing the minor nor an affidavit by the next friend or guardian for the minor. The impugned order does not even show that the learned Subordinate Judge was alive of this principle that for a minor to enter into a compromise, the leave of the Court is necessary. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhirendra Kumar Garg and others vs. Smt. Sugandhi Bai Jain and others, AIR 1989 SC 147 has clearly held that in view of provisions of Order 32, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code it is essential for the Court to grant permission to the guardian to enter into the compromise only after considering all the relevant circumstances. Decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case Thakur Prasad (supra) has been followed by High Court of Sikkim in the case of Palden Bhutia and others vs. Januka Chettri and others, AIR 2007 Sik 15. 14. In the case in hand, it is clearly revealed in the order dated 3-12-1991 that the Claims Tribunal did not take into consideration the provisions of Order 32, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code. It almost escaped from the notice of the presiding Judge of the Claims Tribunal that claimants No. 2 to 5 were/are minors and compromise on their behalf by their mother could not have been permitted without considering the beneficial interest of the minor claimants. Compromise petition is not shown to have been entered on behalf of the claimants. Thumb impression of claimant/appellant No. 1 alone is shown to have been affixed on the compromise application. Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 of Order 32, Civil Procedure Code, leave of the Court ought to have been asked for. Under Rule 1-A (supra), the application which was required to be accompanied by affidavit of the claimant/appellant No. 1 was not accompanied by certificate of advocate of the minor to the effect that the compromise proposed was, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor. No such process is shown to have been adopted while allowing the compromise, Claim petition was submitted for compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,80,000/- whereas the compromise was shown to have been affected merely for Rs. 35,000/- which was less than 10% of the amount claimed as compensation. Claimants/appellants No. 2 to 5 were aged about 7, 5, 3 and 1 years respectively and by no stretch of imagination, they can be said to have been benefited. On the contrary, the compromise accepted by the claims tribunal was not in the interest of the minors. The deceased was father of minor claimants who were deprived of monitory and family shelter. Learned claims tribunal while accepting the compromise application did not consider the factors relevant to the purpose under Order 32, Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code and further did not record satisfaction that the compromise application was for their benefits. The deceased was father of minor claimants who were deprived of monitory and family shelter. Learned claims tribunal while accepting the compromise application did not consider the factors relevant to the purpose under Order 32, Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code and further did not record satisfaction that the compromise application was for their benefits. Thus, the order dated 3-12-1991 is clearly in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Order 32, Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code and this could have been agitated by submitting the review application as held by the High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Ramkaran vs. Shrikishan and others, AIR 1976 Rajasthan 130 wherein it was held that proper course in such situation was to file either a review petition or to move an application under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the decision. 15. As regards scope of Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code it is almost settled that a judgment is open to be reviewed inter alia if there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. The error which is not self evident and has to be detected by process of reason can hardly be sought to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power for review under Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. In the instant case minority of Claimants Nos. 2 to 5 is on record and the absence of leave under Order 32, Rule 7 is also equally on record. It is further clear that the claims tribunal while passing the order on compromise application dated 3-12-1991 did not apply its mind to the interest of the minors who lost their father during tender age and the claim petition was brought to an end in contravention of procedure prescribed under sub-rule (1 and 2) of Rule 7 of Order 32, Civil Procedure Code. 16. Thus, the case for review was equally made out and the order dated 3-12-1991 is also not sustainable in law being opposed to the interest of the minor claimants. 17. In the result, the appeal is hereby allowed. Impugned orders dated 3-12-1991 and 8-4-1993 are hereby set aside. Learned Claims Tribunal is directed to decide the claim application on merits in accordance with law. Parties to appear before the Claims Tribunal on 4th of May, 2009. 17. In the result, the appeal is hereby allowed. Impugned orders dated 3-12-1991 and 8-4-1993 are hereby set aside. Learned Claims Tribunal is directed to decide the claim application on merits in accordance with law. Parties to appear before the Claims Tribunal on 4th of May, 2009. No order as to costs. Appeal allowed