JUDGMENT K.N. Keshavanarayana, J : This appeal, filed under Section 96 read with Order 41, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28. 02.1997 passed by the then Civil Judge, Bailhongal in O.S. No.39/1993 decreeing the suit filed by the respondent herein and directing the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 2,56,412/- to the plaintiff together with current interest at 18% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of the decree and future interest at 12% per annum from the date of decree till the date of realization. 2. The respondent herein was the sole plaintiff and the appellant herein was the sole defendant in the Trial Court. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer the parties herein with reference to their ranking in the Trial Court. 3. The plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of Rs. 4,84,771/-. together, with current and future interest at 18% per annum from the defendant by way of contribution on the ground that he has discharged the entire decreetal amount due to the decree-holders pursuant to the decree passed in Arbitration Case No. 1/1987 ort the file of the Additional Civil Judge, Bailhongal, whereunder he and the defendant along with two other persons were jointly and severally held liable to pay the decreetal amount to the decree-holders and since the defendant failed to pay his share of the amount due under the decree, he discharged the entire decreetal claim and, therefore, he is entitled to recover the amount due by the defendant under the said decree by way of contnbution. J n the said suit, though the defendant admitted the material facts stated by the plaintiff, disputed the entitlement of the plaintiff to recover the amount by way of contribution. After trial, the Court below, by the judgment and decree under appeal, held that the plaintiff is entitled, to recover asum of Rs. 256,4121/- from the defendant together with current and future interest, as noted earlier. 4. In the of the undisputed and admitted facts, the question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is, "whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover any amount from the defendant by way of contribution, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and whether the Court below is justified in decreeing the suit." 5. 4. In the of the undisputed and admitted facts, the question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is, "whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover any amount from the defendant by way of contribution, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and whether the Court below is justified in decreeing the suit." 5. The facts relevant for the purpose of adjudication of above Print and, which are admitted and have remained undisputed are as under: The plaintiff and the defendant ale cousins. The plaintiff and the defendant along with 12 others started a partnership business under the name and style of "M/s. Lakshmi Cotton Pressing Factory" at Bailhongal as per the partnership deed dated 01.11.1978: During the early part of 1985, certain differences arose between the partners and six, out of the 14 Partners, expressed their desire to retire from the firm and to get their accounts settled. As they could not amicably settle the dispute among themselves, the dispute was referred to a Board of Arbitrators comprising of four Arbitrators. The Arbitrator passed an award dated 20.10.1985 fixing the value of the share of the retiring partners in the assets and the good-will of the firm and also their capital investment in the firm and indicated as to which of the continuing partners should pay the amount so determined payable to the retiring partners. According to the terms of the said award, the plaintiff, defendant and two other partners were fastened with the liability of paying the amount so determined as payable to the six retiring partners and they were required to pay the said amount in to equal half-yearly installments i.e.. on 30.01.1986 and 30.07.1986 with further stipulation that if the amount is not paid in two installments it shall carry interest at 18% per annum componnded quarterly. As a security for payment of this amount a charge was created on the assets as well as the plant and machinery of the partnership firm. The Arbitrators field the said award into the civil Court to make in the 'Rule of the Court' and upon filing of the arbitration award, Arbitration came to be registered and after hearing the parties, the award passed by the Arbitrator was made the decree of the Court as none of the parties objected to the terms of the award. The Arbitrators field the said award into the civil Court to make in the 'Rule of the Court' and upon filing of the arbitration award, Arbitration came to be registered and after hearing the parties, the award passed by the Arbitrator was made the decree of the Court as none of the parties objected to the terms of the award. After the six partners retired from the partnership, partnership was reconstituted and continued by the remaining partners. As the amount determined by the Arbitrators, which culminated into the decree of the Civil Court, was not paid by the judgment-debtors within the time allowed, the decree holders sued out Execution No. 101/1987 and sought for attachment and sale of the properties of the partnership for the realization of the decreetal amount. Pursuant to the order of the Executing Court, the properties of the partnership firm were attached and were brought for sale. At that juncture, the plaintiff who was also one of the judgment debtors, paid the entire decreetal amount and satisfied the decree. Upon payment of the entire decreetal amount, the execution was closed as fully satisfied. Thereafter, the plaintiff issued a notice to the defendant calling upon him to pay his share of the decreetal amount and since the defendant did not comply with the same, the plaintiff filed the present suit. According to the plaintiff, the other two judgment debtors who were also jointly made liable to pay the decreetal amount, subsequently transferred their right and interest in the partnership firm in his favour towards their share of the amount due. The defendant, in his written statement, took up a contention that the plaintiff did not pay the decreetal amount from out of his own money, but, on the other hand, he satisfied the decree from out of the income derived from the partnership assets, the income derived from the joint family properties which are in the management of the plaintiff and his father and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled for recovery of the amount claimed in the suit by way of contribution from the defendant. In the light of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues: "1) Whether the Plaintiff proves that Defendant owes to him a sum of Rs. 4,84,771/- arising out of E.P.No. 1001/1989 on the file of this Court? In the light of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues: "1) Whether the Plaintiff proves that Defendant owes to him a sum of Rs. 4,84,771/- arising out of E.P.No. 1001/1989 on the file of this Court? 2) Whether the rate of interest claimed by the Plaintiff is proper? 3) What decree or order?" In support of his claim, the plaintiff got himself examined as P.W. 1 and marked Exs.P. 1 to P.24. On the other hand, the defendant got himself examined as D.W. 1 and examined one Dundappa Gurulingappa Morabad as D.W.2 and got marked Ex,.,D1 to D3. The Trial Court, after hearing both sides and on appreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence answered issued no. 1 partly in the affirmative holding that the plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 2,56,412/- inclusive of interest up to the date of the suit being the 1/4th share of the amount paid by the plaintiff to satisfy the decree and on issue no.2, held that the plaintiff is entitled to current interest at 18% per annum and future interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the decree till the date of realization, For holding so, the Trial Court observed that the defendant has failed to prove that the plaintiff and his father have been in possession and management of any joint family properties; that the defendant has failed to prove that the plaintiff was in possession of any money due to defendant and mere fact that the defendant has a share in the assets and the business of the partnership firm, cannot be a ground to withhold the liability due under the decree to which he along with the plaintiff was jointly and severally liable to satisfy the decree and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled 'for recovery of the 1/4th share from the defendant by way of contribution, Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the appeal, the defendant has preferred this appeal. 6. Upon service of the notice of this appeal, the plaintiff has appeared through his Counsel. 7. 6. Upon service of the notice of this appeal, the plaintiff has appeared through his Counsel. 7. Shri K.O. Channabasappa, learned senior Counsel appearing for the defendant-appellant contended that, admittedly, the plaintiff and the defendant along with two other partners were jointly and severally made liable to pay the decreetal amount in Arbitration Case No. 1/1987 in the capacity as the continuing partners of the partnership firm and since the decreetal amount was payable to the decree-holders towards their capital in-vestment and also their share in the assets and good-will of the partnership firm upon their retirement from the partnership firm, the plaintiff, even though had satisfied the decree, is not entitled to seek contribution from the defendant either by invoking the provisions of Section 69 or 70 of the Indian Contract Act (for short 'the Contract Act) and, therefore, the suit as brought was not maintainable and the Court below without adverting its attention to this legal aspect of the matter has erroneously decreed the suit. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the provisions of Sections 69 and 70 of the Contract Act are not applicable to the facts of the case. He further submitted that, as admittedly, the defendant continues to be the partner of the partnership firm which owned several I valuable properties worth couple of crores of rupees, has a share in the assets, plant and machinery of the firm which are being enjoyed by the plaintiff and since charge on the assets, plant and machinery of the firm had been created as security for the payment of the decreetal amount, there was no compelling reason for the plaintiff to have paid the amount on behalf of he defendant and upon non-payment of the amount, the property, on which charge had been created, ought to have been sold to the extent of the share of the defendant, if any, for realisation of the decreetal amount. He further contended that the plaintiff having not placed any acceptable evidence to show that as on the date of satisfying the decree, no amount belonging to the firm was available, the Court below ought to have held that the plaintiff is not entitled for seeking contribution from the defendant as his remedy is only to file a suit for settlement of accounts of the firm. In support of his contentions, the learned senior Counsel placed reliance on the following decisions: 1) Mahindra Chandra nandy Vs. Jamahir Kumari reported in Vol.XXXII Calcutta Series 643. 2) Sree Rajah V. V.S.Jagapatirajh Bahadur Garu Vs. Sree Rajah reported in ILR Vol.XXXIX Madras Series 795. 3) Jinnat Ali Vs. Fateh Ali Matbar reported in Vol XV Calcutta Weekly notes 332. 4) Muhammad Habibul Rahman Vs. Sheonandan Singh and Others reported in 111 I.C. 1928 (Patna High Court) 243 5) State of West Bengal Vs. M/s. B.K.Mondal and Sons reported in [1962] Supp. 876 S.C.R. 8. On the other hand, Shri Bharatesh. B.Alasandi, sought to support the judgment of the Court below and contended that as the liability of the plaintiff as well as the defendant along with two others was individual, joint and several, and it was not the liability of the partnership firm and, since a charge on the right and interest of the plaintiff, defendant and two others in the assets of partnership firm was created, the plaintiff was entitled under law to file a suit for contribution from the defendant as the plaintiff alone had satisfied the entire decree. He contended that the Court below has rightly held that the suit of the plaintiff is well founded and that he is entitled for 1/4th share from out of the amount paid to satisfy the decree from the defendant, as such, there is no error committed by the Court below and, therefore, the decree under appeal do not warrant any interference by this Court. He also invited our attention to the fact that, t he executing Court while closing Ex. No. 101/1987 as fully satisfied, by Order dated 17.07.1992 has reserved liberty to the plaintiff to initiate separate proceedings against other JDRs for recovery of amount aid by plaintiff in excess of his share of liability. With these submission he sought for dismissal of the appeal. 9. As noticed earlier, the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of money from the defendant by way of contribution. However, in the plaint, the plaintiff has not, in so many words, spelled out as to under what substantive law he is claiming the contribution from the defendant. With these submission he sought for dismissal of the appeal. 9. As noticed earlier, the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of money from the defendant by way of contribution. However, in the plaint, the plaintiff has not, in so many words, spelled out as to under what substantive law he is claiming the contribution from the defendant. However, in substance, his case was that there was a money decree against him and the defendant along with two others pursuant to arbitration award making all the debtors jointly and severally liable to pay the said decreetal amount and since charge, in respect of the right and interest of all the four persons in the assets of the partnership firm, had been created and since for the recovery of the said decreetal amount, the properties of the partnership firm, over which a charge had been created, were brought for sale, in order to save the properties, he paid the entire decreetal amount though he was liable to pay only to the extent of his share viz., 1/4th share, he is entitled for reimbursement of amount paid in excess of his share of liability. A reading of the judgment under appeal also indicate that the Trial Court has not referred to any substantive law under which the claim of the plaintiff is tenable. The Trial Court seems to have proceeded on the principles of justice, equity and good conscious on the ground that the plaintiff, though was liable to pay only 1/4th of the decreetal amount, has paid the entire decreetal amount to satisfy the decree and, therefore, he is entitled to be reimbursed with the excess amount paid by him to the extent of share of the defendant viz., 1/4th share. According to the Trial Court, if the defendant is not directed to pay his share of the decreetal amount it would amount to 'unjust enrichment'. 10. Before the Trial Court, the defendant has not taken a stand that the suit filed by the plaintiff for contribution is not maintainable. His defence was that the plaintiff did not satisfy the decree from out of his own funds, but he discharged the decreetal debt from out of the income derived from the assets of the partnership firm and also from out of the income derived from the joint family assets. His defence was that the plaintiff did not satisfy the decree from out of his own funds, but he discharged the decreetal debt from out of the income derived from the assets of the partnership firm and also from out of the income derived from the joint family assets. The Trial Court has recorded a finding that the defendant has failed to establish his defence. 11. It is only before this Court, a contention was urged by the learned senior Counsel appearing for the defendant that the claim of the plaintiff was based either on Section 69 or Section 70 of the Contract Act and none of these sections were applicable to the claim made by the plaintiff, as such, the suit is not maintainable. [t is to substantiate this contention that a claim of this nature do not fall either under Section 69 or 70 of the Contract Act., the learned senior Counsel placed reliapce on the decisions noted earlier. 12. Sections 69 and 70 of the Contract Act reads as under: "69. Reimbursement of person paying money due by another, in payment of which he is interested.-A person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound to pay, and who therefore pays it, is entitled to be reimbursed by the other 70. Obligation of person enjoying benefit of nongratuitous Act.-Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered." Reading of Sections 69 and 70 of the Contract Act makes it clear that these sections do not refer to contribution. What is provided under Section 69 is reimbursement. To attract Section 69, the person who claims reimbursement should not be a co-debtor. In other words, he should have no liability to pay the money along with others. Section 69 is attracted only when a person who is not under any obligation to pay the money, but is only interested in payment at of money which another person is bound by law to pay, makes the payment of money on behalf of another, who is hound by law to pay. Section 69 is attracted only when a person who is not under any obligation to pay the money, but is only interested in payment at of money which another person is bound by law to pay, makes the payment of money on behalf of another, who is hound by law to pay. Such a person so making the payment is entitled to be reimbursed by other on whose behalf the money has been paid. Section 70 deals with compensation for a non-gratuitous act done by a person the benefit of which is being enjoyed by another person. According to this section, when a person lawfully does anything for or delivers anything to another person, non-gratuitous and by such non-gratuitous act, the other person enjoys the benefit, the other person is bound to make compensation to the person so doing or to restore him the thing which he has delivered. Even to attract Section 70, the person so doing should do without there being any obligation or liability on his pan in all the decisions relied upon by the learned senior Counsel for the defendant, it has been consistently held that Sections 69 and 70 are hot attracted in case of the payment made by a person who is jointly and severally liable to pay the amount. There is no quarrel as to the legal position in this regard. In the case on hand, the decree passed pursuant to the arbitration award was joint and a claim of this nature do not fall either under Section 69 or 70 of the Contract Act., the learned senior Counsel placed reliance on the decisions noted earlier. 12. Sections 69 and 70 of the Contract Act reads as under: "69. Reimbursement of person paying money due by another, in payment of which he is interested.-A person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound to pay, and who therefore pays it, is entitled to be reimbursed by the other 70. 12. Sections 69 and 70 of the Contract Act reads as under: "69. Reimbursement of person paying money due by another, in payment of which he is interested.-A person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound to pay, and who therefore pays it, is entitled to be reimbursed by the other 70. Obligation of person enjoying benefit of nongratuitous Act.-Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered." Reading of Sections 69 and 70 of the Contract Act makes it clear that these sections do not refer to contribution. What is provided under Section 69 is reimbursement. To attract Section 69, the person who claims reimbursement should not be a co-debtor. In other words, he should have no liability to pay the money along with others. Section 69 is attracted only when a person who is not under any obligation to pay the money, but is only interested in payment at of money which another person is bound by law to pay, makes the payment of money on behalf of another, who is hound by law to pay. Such a person so making the payment is entitled to be reimbursed by other on whose behalf the money has been paid. Section 70 deals with compensation for a non-gratuitous act done by a person the benefit of which is being enjoyed by another person. According to this section, when a person lawfully does anything for or delivers anything to another person, non-gratuitous and by such non-gratuitous act, the other person enjoys the benefit, the other person is bound to make compensation to the person so doing or to restore him the thing which he has delivered. Even to attract Section 70, the person so doing should do without there being any obligation or liability on his pan in all the decisions relied upon by the learned senior Counsel for the defendant, it has been consistently held that Sections 69 and 70 are hot attracted in case of the payment made by a person who is jointly and severally liable to pay the amount. There is no quarrel as to the legal position in this regard. There is no quarrel as to the legal position in this regard. In the case on hand, the decree passed pursuant to the arbitration award was joint and several against the plaintiff, the defendant and two others. Therefore, the plaintiff, the in the present case, was under an obligation to discharge the decreetal debt. Under these circumstances, Sections 69 & 70 of the Contract Act cannot be pressed into service. As noticed earlier, the plaintiff has not invoked the provisions of Section 69 & 70 of the Contract Act. 13. Section 43 of the Contract Act may have some relevance to the facts of, this case. The said section reads thus: "43. Anyone of joint promisors may be compelled to perform.-When two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel anyone or more of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise. Each promisor may compel contribution.-Each of two or more joint promisors may compel every other joint promisor to contribute equally with himself to the performance of the promise, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. Sharing of loss by default in contribution.-If anyone of two or more joint promisors makes default in such contribution, the remaining joint promisors must bear the loss arising from such default in equal shares." From the above section it is clear that when more than two persons make a joint promise, the promisee, of course, in the absence of express agreement to the Contrary, may compel anyone or more of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise. Clause (2) of Section 43, further, makes it clear that each of the joint promisors is empowered to compel the other joint promisor to contribute equally with himself to the performance of the promise, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. However, the question as to whether the above section is applicable to the present case on hand is required to be considered. 14. It is an undisputed fact that the plaintiff as well as the defendant along with others were partners of the firm run under the name and style of "M/s. Lakshmi Cotton Pressing Factory". When some of the partners of the partnership firm expressed their desire to go out of the firm, the dispute was referred to the Arbitrators. 14. It is an undisputed fact that the plaintiff as well as the defendant along with others were partners of the firm run under the name and style of "M/s. Lakshmi Cotton Pressing Factory". When some of the partners of the partnership firm expressed their desire to go out of the firm, the dispute was referred to the Arbitrators. The Arbitrators passed an award determining the amount payable to each of the out going six partners towards their investment and their share in the assets, good will, plant and machinery of the firm and made it clear that whole of the amount should be paid jointly and severally by--only four partners viz, the plaintiff, the defendant and two others. It is also pertinent to note that as per the award of the Arbitrators, as security for the payment of the amount so payable to the out going partners, a charge was created in respect of the right and interest, of these four persons in the assets of the partnership firm. The award of the Arbitrators was made the decree of the Civil Court. Thus, by virtue of the award of the Arbitrators and the decree of the Civil Court., a charge was created over the properties of the partnership firm. 15. Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short the TP Act, defines the 'Charges', and the said section reads thus: "100. Charges.- Where immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property; and all the provisions hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge. Nothing in this section applies to the charge of a trustee on the trust-property for expenses properly incurred in the execution of his trust, and, save as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, no charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands of a person to whom such property has been transferred for consideration and without notice of the charge." Reading of the aforesaid section makes it clear that when a charge over immoveable property is created by act of parties and such immovable property is made as security for the payment of money to another though the transaction would not amount to a mortgage, all the provisions contained in the TP Act as applicable to the simple mortgage would apply in respect of such a charge. In other words, when a charge is created on an immovable property as security for payment of the money, all the provisions of the TP Act which are applicable to simple mortgage would apply and the parties therein would have the rights and obligations of a mortgagor or a mortgagee under a simple mortgage. In the case of M.L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib Vs. M. V. Venkata Sastri and Sons and Others reported in 1969(1) SCC 573 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a charge can be made without any writing and there is no provision of law which requires that an instrument relating a charge must be attested by witness. In the case on hand, the arbitration award specifically state that till the amount determined and payable to the out going partners is paid fully, there shall be a charge on the property of the partnership firm. As the said arbitration award was made the decree of the civil Court, even under the decree a charge was created in respect of the property of the partnership firm. Therefore, there was no need for a separate document in writing evidencing the charge. The parties accepted the arbitration award and the decree passed thereon and, thus, by act of parties, there was a creation of charge. Therefore, there was no need for a separate document in writing evidencing the charge. The parties accepted the arbitration award and the decree passed thereon and, thus, by act of parties, there was a creation of charge. In view of the fact that in the present case, charge on the immoveable property owned by the partnership firm, of which the plaintiff and the defendant were partners, had been created in favour of the out going partners as security for the amount payable to them, the provisions which are applicable to the simple mortgage are made applicable to the case on hand. 16. Section 82 of the TP Act deals with contribution to mortgage-debt. The said section reads thus: "82. Contribution to mortgage-debt.-Where property subject to a mortgage belongs to two or more persons having distinct and separate rights of ownership therein, the different shares in or parts of such property owned by such persons are, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, liable to contribute rateably to the debt secured by the mortgage, and, for the purpose of determining the rate at which each such share or part shall contribute, the value thereof shall be deemed to be its value at the date of the mortgage after deduction of the amount of any other mortgage or charge to which it may have been subject on that date. Where, of two properties belonging to the same owner, one is mortgaged to secure one debt and then both are mortgaged to secure another debt, and the former debt is paid out of the former property, each property is, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, liable to contribute rateably to the latter debt after deducting the amount of the former debt from the value of the property out of which it has been paid. Nothing in this section applies to a property liable under Section 81 to the claim of the subsequent mortgagee." Reading of the aforesaid Section makes it clear that when a property owned by two or more person having distinct and separate ownership, each of them are liable to contribute rateably to the debt secured by the mortgage. Of course, the parties could enter into a contract to the contrary. 17. Section 92 of the TP Act deals with subrogation and it reads thus: "92. Of course, the parties could enter into a contract to the contrary. 17. Section 92 of the TP Act deals with subrogation and it reads thus: "92. Subrogation.- Any of the persons referred to in Section 91 (other than the mortgagor) and any co-mortgagor shall, on redeeming property subject to the mortgage, have, so far as regards redemption, foreclosure or sale of such property, the same rights as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems may have against the mortgagor or any other mortgagee. The right conferred by this Section is called the right, of subrogation, and a person acquiring the same is said to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems" Reading of Section 92 makes it clear that whenever a co-mortgagor redeems the property subject to mortgage, he would get the same rights as a mortgagee so far as regards the redemption or foreclosure or sale of mortgaged property. 18. Section 95 of the TP Act, which deals with the right of co-mortgagor to the expenses, reuds thus: "95. Right of redeeming co-mortgagor to expenses. Where one of several mortgagors redeems the mortgaged property, he shall, in enforcing his right of subrogation under Section 92 against his co-mortgagors, be entitled to add to the mortgage money recoverable from the such proportion of the expenses properly incurred in such redemption as is attributable to their share in the property." From Section 95, it is clear that when one of the mortgagor redeems the mortgaged property while enforcing his right of subrogation under Section 92 as against other co-mortgagors, he shall be entitled to add to the mortgage money recoverable from other co-mortgagors such proportion of the expenses properly incurred by him while redeeming to the extent of the share of other co-mortgagors in the property. Sections 82, 92 and 95 of the TP Act are also applicable to a case of charge created in terms of Section 100 of the TP Act. In view of the fact that in the case on hand, a charge had been created in respect of the immoveable property of the partnership firm, in which the plaintiff, the defendant and two others had definite shares as security for the payment of decrceetal amount due to the out going partners, the aforesaid provisions of the TP Act are applicable to the facts of the case. 19. 19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Kedar Lal Seal Vs. Hari Lal Seal, reported in 1952 SCR 179, had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 43 of the Contract Act to a case governed by the provisions of Sections 82 and 92 of the TP Act. After referring to Section 43 of the Contract Act and Sections 82 and 92 of the TP Act, their Lordships have observed thus in paragraphs 34 to 37 as under: "34. Now these provisions at once raise a competition between ,'" Sections 82 and 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, Section 43 of the Contract Act and what 1 might term the principle of beneficial, as opposed to proportionate or equal, distribution of liability. 35. I am of opinion that the second solution adumbrated earlier in this judgment, based on equities, must be ruled out at once. These matters have been dealt with by statute and we are now only concerned with statutory rights and cannot in the face of the statutory provisions have recourse to equitable principles however fair they may appear to be at first sight. 36. The Privy Council pointed out in Rani Chhatra Kumari v, Mohan Bikram that the doctrine of the equitable estate has no application in India. So also referring to the right of redemption. Their Lordships held in Mohammad Sher Khan v, Seth Swami Daya12 that the right is now governed by statute, namely, Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. Sulaiman, C.J. (later a Judge. of the Federal Court) ruled out equitable considerations in the Allahabad High Court in matters of subrogation under Sections 91, 92, 101 and 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, in Hira Singh v. Jai Singh3 and so did Stone, C.J. and I in the Nagpur High Court in Taibai v. Wasudeorac In the case of Section 82 the Privy Council held in Ganesh Lal v. Charan Singh that that section prescribes the conditions in which contribution is payable and that it is not proper to introduce into the matter any extrinsic principle to modify the statutory provisions. So, both on authority and principle the decision must rest solely on whatever Section 15 held to apply. 37. So, both on authority and principle the decision must rest solely on whatever Section 15 held to apply. 37. So far as Section 43 is concerned, I am not prepared Lo apply it unless Sections 82 and 92 can be excluded Both Sections 43 and 82 deal with the question of contribution. Section 43 is a provision of the Contract Act dealing with contracts generally. Section 82 applies to mortgages. As the right to contribution here arises out of a mortgage, I am clear that Section 82 must exclude Section 43 because when there is a general law and a special law dealing with a particular matter, the special excludes the general. In my opinion, the whole law of mortgage in India., including the law of contribution arising out of a transaction of mortgage, is now statutory and is embodied in the Transfer of Property Act read with the Civil Procedure Code. I am clear we cannot travel beyond these statutory provisions." In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the above decision and since the case on hand is governed by Sections 82 and 92 of the TP Act, Section 43 of the Contract Act is excluded from application to the facts of this case. There is no dispute that the plaintiff discharged the entire decreetal amount due to the decree holders in Arbitration Case No, 1/1987 and thereby saved the immoveable property over which charge had been created from being sold for satisfaction of the decreetal amount. The plaintiff was one of the joint debtors along with the defendant and two others. As the plaintiff discharged the entire debt and got the property released from the charge, in our considered opinion, this is a case to which Section 92 of the T.P. Act is applicable and the plaintiff, in terms of Section 92 of the T. P. Act. Is entitled to seek contribution from the other co-debtors. 20. The scope of Section 92 of the TP Act and the extent of rights and powers of subrogee have come up for interpretation before the Apex Court in several decisions namely Ganeshi Lal Vs. Joti Pershad reported in AIR 1953 SCR 243 , Variavan Saraswathi Vs. Eachampi Thevi, reported in 1993 Supp(2) SCC 201, and Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair Vs Padmanabha Pillai reported in (2004) 12 SCC 754 . Joti Pershad reported in AIR 1953 SCR 243 , Variavan Saraswathi Vs. Eachampi Thevi, reported in 1993 Supp(2) SCC 201, and Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair Vs Padmanabha Pillai reported in (2004) 12 SCC 754 . In the first two decisions, the Apex Court has considered as to the controversy about the extent of rights of a subrogee under Section 92 of TP Act, in Krishna Pillai's case referred to supra, the Supreme Court has summarised the principles laid down in Ganeshi Lal's case as under". 11. Having examined the issue from all- possible angles and having referred to Sir Rashbehary Ghose on Law of Mortgage in India, Harris on Subrogation, Sheldon on Subrogation, Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence and a few English and Indian authorities available on the point, what Their Lordships conclusion in Ganeshi Lal case may be summed up as under: 1. When the co-debtor or co-mortgagor pays more than his share to the creditor for the purpose of redeeming a mortgage, the redeeming mortgagor is principal debtor to the extent of his share of the debt and a surety to the extent of the share in the debt of other co-mortgagors. The redeeming co-mortgagor being only a surety for the other co-mortgagors, his right is, strictly speaking, a right of reimbursement or contribution. 2. The substitution of the redeeming co-mortgagor in place of the mortgagee does not precisely place the new creditor (i.e. the redeeming co-mortgagor) in place of the original mortgagee for all purposes. If, therefore, one of the several mortgagors satisfies the entire mortgage debt, though upon redemption he is subrogated to the rights and remedies of the creditor, the principle has to be so administered as to attain the ends of substantial justice regardless of form; in other words, the fictitious cession in favour of the person who effects the redemption, operates only to the extent to which it is necessary to apply it for his indemnity and protection. (Digambar Das V. Harendra Narayan Pandey.) 3. The doctrine of subrogation must be applied along with other rules of equity so that the person who discharges the mortgage is amply protected and at the same time there is no injustice done to the other joint debtors. He who seeks equity must do equity. 4. There is a distinction between a third party who claims subrogation and a co-mortgagor who claims the right. He who seeks equity must do equity. 4. There is a distinction between a third party who claims subrogation and a co-mortgagor who claims the right. The comortgagors stand in a fiduciary relationship qua each other. The redeeming co-mortgagor can only claim the price which he has actually paid together with incidental expenses. Strictly speaking, therefore, when one of several mortgagors redeems a mortgage, he is entitled to be treated as an assignee on the security which he may enforce in the usual way for the purpose of reimbursing himself. The subrogation to the rights of the mortgagee by the redeeming co-mortgagor is confined only to the extent necessary for his own equitable protection. The redeeming co-mortgagor can, just as the surety would, ask to indemnify for his loss and he can invoke the doctrine of subrogation as an aid to the right of contribution. 12. Undoubtedly, Their Lordships have made it clear in their judgment that they were dealing with a case where Sections 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property Act were ~applicable and the question was to be decided on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, However, the judgment also makes it clear that even the applicability of Section 92 would not make any substantial difference inasmuch as the redeeming co-mortgagor who claims to be substituted in the mortgagee's place is only on the strength of general principles of equity and justice, and therefore, it is equally equitable that the other co-mortgagors should not be called upon to pay more than what the redeeming co-mortgagor paid in discharge of the encumbrance." Referring to Variauan Saraswathi's case, the following observations were made at paragraphs 17 & 18. "17. In Variavan Saraswathi case3 the law has been set out with precision and clarity and both the earlier decisions dealt with hereinabove have been referred to. Their Lordships (vide para 6) have dealt with the contrast between two situations: (i) where a mortgagee assigns his interest in favour of another person (i.e. a stranger); and, (ii) where a co-mortgagor or anyone on behalf of the mortgagor and authorised under law pays the amount and brings to an end the interest which the mortgagee had. It has been held that in the first case the assignee becomes holder of the same interest which the mortgagee had i.e. he steps into the shoes of the mortgagee. It has been held that in the first case the assignee becomes holder of the same interest which the mortgagee had i.e. he steps into the shoes of the mortgagee. In the latter case, once the mortgage debt is discharged by a person beneficially interested in the equity of redemption, the mortgage comes to an end by operation of law. Consequently, the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee cannot subsist, A person paying off a debt to secure the Property either with the consent of others or on his own volition becomes, in law, the owner entitled to hold and possess the property. But in equity the right is to hold the property till he is reimbursed. Such right in equity either in favour of the person who discharges the debt or the person whose debt has been discharged, does not result in resumption of relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee. 18. Dealing with Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act it has been held in Variavan Saraswathi case that the rights created in favour of a redeeming co-mortgagor as a result of discharge of debt are "so far as regards redemption, foreclosure or salt' of such property the same rights as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems". Posing a question - does a person who, in equity, gets subrogated become a mortgagee? Their Lord ships have held: (SCC p.207 para 7)" Ultimately, at para 20, their Lord ships have observed thus: "20. Subrogation rests upon the doctrine of equity and the principles of natural justice and not on the privity of contract, One of the principles is that a person, paying money which another is bound by law to pay, is entitled to be reimbursed by the other. This principle is enacted in Section 69 of the Contract Act, 1872. Another principle is found in equity: he who seeks equity must do equity". (See Rashbehary Ghose on Law of Mortgage in India, 7th Edn" 1997 at. p.461.)" 21. This principle is enacted in Section 69 of the Contract Act, 1872. Another principle is found in equity: he who seeks equity must do equity". (See Rashbehary Ghose on Law of Mortgage in India, 7th Edn" 1997 at. p.461.)" 21. From the aforesaid decisions it is clear that whenever a co-debtor or co-mortgagor discharges the entire debt thereby redeems the debt and pays more than his share to the creditor, he becomes the principal debtor to the extent of his share of the debt and surety to the extent of the share in the debt of the other co-mortgagor and since he is only a surety for other co-mortgagors, his right will be of reimbursement or contribution. It is further clear that till he is reimbursed of the excess amount paid by him from the other co-debtors, in equity, he will have a right to hold the property. As held by the Apex Court in the last referred case, viz., the Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair's case. Subrogation rests upon the doctrine of equity and the principles of natural justice and not on the privity of the contract and, it is further based on the principle that a person paying money which another is bound by law to pay is entitled to be reimbursed by others. The principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions squarely apply to the facts of the case on hand. The plaintiff being one of the co-debtors along with the defendant and two others, and having discharged the entire debt and thereby got the immoveable property, over which a charge had been created, released from the said charge, became a subrogee in respect of the liability of the other co-debtors and in terms of Section 92 of the TP Act, is entitled to seek contribution from other co-debtors to the extent of their share and to hold the property as security till he is reimbursed with the excess amount paid by him. Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the provisions of the TP Act referred to above are not applicable to the facts of the case, Section 43 of the Contract Act would be a complete answer to the contentions raised by the learned senior Counsel for the defendant appellant. The plaintiff along with the defendant and two others were joint promisors to the but going partners to pay the amounts determined by the Arbitrators. The plaintiff along with the defendant and two others were joint promisors to the but going partners to pay the amounts determined by the Arbitrators. Therefore, each of the joint promisors were under an obligation to pay the amount promised. The promisees had a right to proceed against anyone of the joint promisors, as per the first paragraph of Section 43. As per the second paragraph of Section 43 each of the joint promisors is entitled to compel every other joint promisor to contribute equally with himself to the performance of the promise, unless a contrary intention appears from tire contract, in this case, there is absolutely no material on record to show that there was art contrary intention to the effect that the other joint promisors are not liable to contribute equally. Therefore, the plaintiff, being one of the joint promisors, having satisfied the entire debt payable to the promisees, under law, is entitled to demand contribution from the other joint promisors viz., the defendant. The defendant, being one of the joint promisors, is under an obligation to contribute his share. Therefore, looking from any angle, the defendant cannot escape his lability. 22. The liability under the decree passed in arbitration case was not that of the partnership firm. The terms of the award and the decree makes it clear that only the plaintiff, the defendant and two others were made liable to pay the out going partners the amount to which they were entitled. Therefore, it was not a liability of the partnership firm but it was an individual and joint liability on the part of the plaintiff, the defendant and two others and all of them were jointly and severally made liable to pay the amount. As security for this amount, charge had been created over the assets of the partnership firm. Therefore, upon payment of the entire debt, the plaintiff stepped into the shoes of the decree holders to the extent of the liability of the other co-judgment debtors. The plaintiff is entitled to hold the charge over the property to the extent of his share and the other co-debtors as security till he is reimbursed with the excess amount which he had paid. The plaintiff is entitled to hold the charge over the property to the extent of his share and the other co-debtors as security till he is reimbursed with the excess amount which he had paid. As the debt, which the plaintiff discharged, was not a debt liable to be discharged by the partnership firm, it is not open to the defendant to contend that the debt should have been discharged by the income of the partnership firm or by sale of the assets of the partnership firm in respect of which charge had been created. During the course of his evidence, the defendant has admitted that from the year 1985 the partnership business has come to be closed. Therefore, there is no income derived from the partnership firm out of its business from 1985. No doubt, the evidence on record indicate that the partnership firm owned immoveable properties. However, there is no convincing evidence to indicate that the said properties were capable of generating income and that the plaintiff was in possession of sufficient money derived from out of the assets of the partnership firm and the same was available to the credit of the defendant to meet the extent of his liability under the decree in Arbitration case. As noticed earlier, the Court below has recorded a finding that there are no joint family properties at the hands of the plaintiff and the plaintiff is not holding any amount due to the defendant in that regard. If, according to the defendant there was income derived from the assets of the partnership finn, it is open to him to demand the accounts of the partnership firm and it would not come in the way of the plaintiff enforcing his right of contribution on the defendant. According to plaintiff, subsequently, the other two joint, debtors have discharged their share of liability by transferring their share, right and interest in the partnership firm as well as its assets in favour of plaintiff, and only defendant had not paid his share of liability. In the light of the discussions made above, we are of the opinion that the Court below was justified in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to recover 1/4th of the amount paid by him to satisfy the decree, from the defendant. In the light of the discussions made above, we are of the opinion that the Court below was justified in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to recover 1/4th of the amount paid by him to satisfy the decree, from the defendant. No doubt, the award of the Arbitrators and the decree of the Civil Court provide for payment of interest at 18% p.a. on the amount payable to the out going partners in the event of the amount not .being paid within the specified period. However, moment the entire decreetal amount was paid, liability to pay interest ceased. There was no contract between plaintiff and defendant regarding payment of interest. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim the interest at the rate mentioned in the Award of Arbitrators. However, the plaintiff having paid amount in excess of his liability is entitled for payment of interest but not at the rate provided under the Award and decree. The award of interest at 18% p.a. compounded quarterly by the Court below from the date of suit upto the date of decree and award of future interest at 12% p.a. from the date of decree is not proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, and it is excessive and unreasonable. Regard being had to the circumstances under which plaintiff paid the amount being one of the joint debtors, we are of the opinion that award off simple interest at 6% p.a. on Rs.2,24,692/- being the of amount paid by plaintiff to satisfy' the decree, from the date of payment by plaintiff upto the date of realisation, would be just and equitable, and it would meet the ends of justice. As admittedly, the defendant has a definite share in the assets of partnership firm and since by discharging the entire decreetal amount & became the surety insofar as the liability of defendant and holding the interest of defendant in the assets of partnership fine as security, it is necessary to make it clear that, in the event of defendant failing to pay the amount within the period to be granted by this Court, the plaintiff should first proceed to realise the amount by sale of interest of defendant in the assets of partnership firm and if the amount so realised is insufficient, then only he shall proceed against the defendant personally. To the extent indicated above, the decree of the Court below require to be modified. 23. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. In modification of the decree under appeal, the suit of plaintiff is decree for Rs. 2,24,692/- together with simple interest thereon at 6% p.a. from 13.07.1992 upto the date of payment. The appellant is granted six months time from today to pay the aforesaid amount with interest. In the event of defendant's (appellant's) failure to pay the amount within six months, the plaintiff shall first proceed against the interest of appellant in the assets of partnership firm of M/s. Lakshmi Cotton Pressing Factory, Bailhongal, and if the amount falls short, to proceed against the defendant personally. Parties are directed to bear their respective cost in this appeal.