JUDGMENT:- Heard learned Advocate Mr. K. R. Lambat for the appellant. Perused the record. None for the respondent, though served on merits. 2. It is seen that no Substantial Question of Law was framed in this case at the time of admission. However, a notice of appeal was issued on all grounds. 3. In view of the grounds raised in the Memo of Appeal, this Court has to find out which grounds do narrate Substantial Questions of Law. For this purpose, after analyzing the grounds, the Substantial Questions of Law were sorted out, which are formulated as follows:- [a] Are the Judgments based on improper and incorrect reading, interpretation and construction of a document? [b] Whether on proved facts, plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation? [c] If the findings of fact are shown to be unconscionable, and result in immense injustice and akin to being perverse, would the Judgments call for interference in Second Appeal? 4. These Substantial Questions of Law are emerging from questions framed in Appeal Memo. Facts 5. Plaintiff's suit for specific performance was dismissed by the Trial Court. This decree has been upheld by the First Appellate Court. The plaintiff is before this Court in Second Appeal. 6. The facts, in brief, as seen from the pleadings, can better be extracted, instead of re-spelling those, which are as follows:- [a] The defendant is owner of land bearing Gat. No.364/2, admeasuring 1.69 acras [0.68 hectare] of village Pathri, Tahsil Lakhandur, Distt. Bhandara. [b] On 22nd March, 1984, defendant had agreed to sell out 0.64 hectare land to plaintiff for Rs.9,000.00. [c] On that day he had accepted Rs.2001as earnest money and agreed to execute the sale-deed within eight days. [d] On 27th March, 1984, plaintiff paid R);.2000-00. [e] On 31st March, 1984, plaintiff paid Rs.6,000-00. [f] On 14th April, 1984, the plaintiff paid Rs.760-00 to the defendant in the presence of witnesses and obtained acknowledgment from defendant on the agreement itself, and possession of the suit land was delivered to the plaintiff. [g] Plaintiff issued notice to Defendant on 26th January, 1988, calling for specific performance, but he has refused that notice and avoided to perform his part of contract. [h] Thus, the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of the contract, with an alternative prayer for refund of earnest money along with interest at the rate of 12 1/2 per annum. 7. [h] Thus, the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of the contract, with an alternative prayer for refund of earnest money along with interest at the rate of 12 1/2 per annum. 7. Learned Trial Judge has dismissed plaintiffs suit, holding that:- "5 The date fixed for the performance in the present suit was 30-3-1984 i.e., within eight days from date of execution of the agreement. The present suit is filed on 29-3-1989. Hence, it is time barred by the period of limitation. Article 54 of the Limitation Act prescribed the limitation for filing of the suit for specific performance of the contract. The limitation is provided of 3 years and it begins to run from the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the Plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. In the present suit the date for performance is fixed and the suit is not filed within 3 years from the date of performance. Hence, it is time barred " [Quoted from page 15 of the Appeal Paper-book]. 8. Plaintiff carried appeal, which too has been dismissed, upholding the decree of Trial Court. In the First Appeal filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff before the District Court, it formulated following questions:- "1. Did the plaintiff prove that the Defendant has agreed to sell of 0.64 acres of land out of Gat No.364/2 to the plaintiff and executed an agreement of sale on 2203-1984 in her favour? 2. Did the plaintiff prove that she has paid entire amount of consideration of the contract to the Defendant? 3. Did the plaintiff prove that the possession of the suit land was given to her by the Defendant on 14-04-1984 as per performance of the contract dated 2203-1984 ? 4. Whether it is proved by the plaintiff that she was ready and wiling to perform her part of the contract? 5. Did the defendant prove that the entire land Gat No.36412 admeasuring 1.69 acres of land was given to the plaintiff for cultivation by the defendant since 1983 till 1989 as alleged? 6. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of specific performance of contract of male of the suit land? 8. In the alternative the plaintiff is entitled to refund of Rs.9,OOO-OO from the defendant? 9. What order?" [Quoted from page no.5 of the appeal paper-book]. 6. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of specific performance of contract of male of the suit land? 8. In the alternative the plaintiff is entitled to refund of Rs.9,OOO-OO from the defendant? 9. What order?" [Quoted from page no.5 of the appeal paper-book]. 9. Findings on Point Nos.1 and 6 to 8, which pertain to the decree prayed for by the plaintiff, were adjudicated against plaintiff. 10. The discussion on Point No.1 pertains to fact-findings crucial to the judgments. Discussion in paragraph no.14 of the Judgment of the First Appellate Court pertains to the point of limitation, i.e., Point No.6. Findings on Point Nos.? and 8 are a fallout of finding on Point No.6. 11. In so far as finding on Issue No.1 is concerned, both the Courts have concurrently held that in the Agreement of Sale, land was described as Survey No.364/3, however, the figure 3 has been altered to figure 2, and this would vitiate the contract. 12. On perusal of the pleadings, it is seen that the defendants stand is of total denial. It was not the case of the defendant that he admits that the Agreement of Sale was in relation to land Survey No.364/3, however, by alteration, now a decree is sought for Survey No.364/2. 13. On the other hand, in the Additional Written Statement, defendant admits having let out orally land admeasuring 1.69 acres. The subject-matter of lease is not shown to be different and distinct from the suit property. In these premises, it turns out to be a case of description of the property where parties are not at distinction, rather are concurrent thereon. 14. Admittedly, there was no issue framed as to alleged tampering, i.e. converting the figure 3 to figure 2. In the light of affirmative findings returned by the Trial Court on Issue Nos.2 and 3 as well as those recorded by the Appellate Court on Point Nos.1 to 4 in affirmative in favour of the plaintiff, the aspect of over writing turns out to be a point which is superfluous. 15. In this background, the alleged over-writing or connection in the figure 3 making it 2 turns out to be totally inconsequential and would not vitiate the contract. The plea in regard to said over writing raised by the defendant was out of sphere of consideration. 16. 15. In this background, the alleged over-writing or connection in the figure 3 making it 2 turns out to be totally inconsequential and would not vitiate the contract. The plea in regard to said over writing raised by the defendant was out of sphere of consideration. 16. Next finding, which has driven the First Appellate Court to dismiss the suit is seen in paragraph 14, which reads as follows:- " 14 . …………………………...In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to exercise her right of specific performance within three years from the date fixed for performance or from the date on which he has made last payment of the consideration, i.e., from 14-4-1984 as per article 54 of the Limitation Act. " [Quoted from page no.9 of the appeal paper-book]. 17. When this finding is tested. it is seen that the language used in the Agreement of Sale, when freely translated, reads as follows:- "Today, Le., on Wednesday 22-3-2004 I have received Rs.200/-. I shall receive balance consideration within one week, and shall execute registered sale-deed." 18. It has come in evidence that the Agreement of Sale is dated 22nd March, 1984. There are various endorsements on that document as to acknowledgment of further payments on different dates. The last payment is dated 14th April, 1984. Subsequent payments were made in installments and receipt thereof essentially connote that the motion of seven days as a condition for balance payment and performance was thereby waived by the vendor. 19. It is pertinent to note that the Courts are concurrent in their findings in favour of the plaintiff on the point that the defendant accepted total amount of consideration upto 14th April, 1984. 20. It is in these premises the finding of the First Appellate Court that the performance was liable to be done within three years from the date fixed for performance or from the date the last payment was made is contrary to the recitals contained in the document, and admitted conduct of the defendant. This finding of fact does not, by any manner, fit the case within bar of limitation. 21. Admittedly, though possession of suit property was given to the plaintiff, the defendant did not take any step, whatsoever, to seek cancellation of agreement and demand possession. Defendant neither filed a counterclaim in the plaintiff's suit for specific performance, nor had separately filed a suit for possession. 22. 21. Admittedly, though possession of suit property was given to the plaintiff, the defendant did not take any step, whatsoever, to seek cancellation of agreement and demand possession. Defendant neither filed a counterclaim in the plaintiff's suit for specific performance, nor had separately filed a suit for possession. 22. Admittedly, in relation to other parcel of the said survey number, plaintiffs other suit was simultaneously proceeded, and has been decreed. 23. The facts, as held proved by Courts below, do totally falsify the story brought forward by the defendant about denial of the Agreement of Sale. Plaintiffs case has been duly proved to be truthful. 24. Had this been a simple challenge to appreciation of evidence, this Court would have observed the restraint of entering into said gamut. Fact-finding, which is unsustainable, needs to be set right in exercise of powers under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. Once it is found that finding of fact is unsustainable, power under Sections 103 and 107 of Civil Procedure Code would empower and entitle this Court to set right the fact-finding. 25. What is being done by this Court is reversal of findings on the ground of findings being perverse and unconscionable and not because this Court does not agree with findings. 26. Findings recorded by the Courts below disbelieving the plaintiff's story are unreasonable and unconscionable. These findings are recorded by brushing aside crucial admissions and proved facts. Facts proved on record and findings are irreconcilable and hence findings are perverse and deserve reversal. 27. It is seen that this appeal is filed in 1994. It arises out of a Regular Civil Suit, which was filed in the year 1989. These five years were in first two Courts, and fifteen years before this Court. The respondent original defendant has shown extreme supineness and indifference to the proceedings, which is ex facie clear from the act and omission of the defendant in failing to:- "[1] offer to execute the sale-deed, as performance of obligation on the part of purchaser was already complete; [2] file a suit for possession if any part was not performed by purchaser and it may, according to the defendant, amount to breach on his part; [3] lodge a counter-claim seeking delivery of possession as one of the reliefs." 28. It is clear that according to defendant, plaintiff was put in possession of the property on the basis of lease. Agreement of Sale has been proved and passing of complete consideration is also proved. What had remained for perfecting the title of the plaintiff is to have the sale-deed executed, and what had remained in the hands of the defendant is a technical right of seeking re-conveyance without being able to assert any violation of right on the part of the plaintiff. Defendant's right to sue for possession has also extinguished by loss of limitation. 29. In the aforesaid premises, seeing the fact of failure to frame the Substantial Questions of Law at the time of admission of appeal, what was left to the choice of this Court is to formally re-write the question, styling those as formulated by this Court and send a fresh notice to the defendant. 30. This Court is fully conscious and alive to the duty fastened upon it by virtue of precedents of Apex Court that when by virtue of fact of failure to formulate Substantial Questions of Law at the time of admission of appeal, at final hearing, it would be incumbent upon this Court to formulate the question and give notice to other side. 31. Considering the time lag, i.e., over twenty-four years of pendency, if this Court follows the beaten and imperative way, Le., of issuing a fresh notice to the respondent, it would mean another spell of years, one does not know how many. 32. In this situation, considering the conduct of the defendant, this Court will have to strike a balance of justice. If on the face of it, on what is found by the courts below, the defendant has failed to elect to exercise his right of asserting possession, no injustice would be done to the defendant, since by virtue of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, plaintiff is entitled for protection of possession and defendant has already lost right to file a suit having failed to do so within twelve years, which event, i.e., of loss of limitation, is now older by another spell of twelve years. 33. 33. In order to strike the balance of justice, this Court, therefore, elects to decide the appeal without fresh notice to the respondent, particularly when the notice on appeal was given on all grounds as per the practice prevalent at the relevant time. 34. This Court records answers to the Substantial Questions of Law framed in favour of the appellant namely:- “[i] The plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation. [ii] The agreement is duly proved, and apparent and alleged over-writing in the figure 168/3 making it to 168/2 does not vitiate the agreement. [iii] Both the Courts had failed in construing the Agreement of Sale and that the findings on fact recorded by both the Courts below are unconscionable and akin to perverse." 35. In these circumstances, the appeal is allowed on Substantial Questions of Law answered in favour of appellant as mentioned in the foregoing paragraph of this Judgment. 36. Judgments and Decrees under appeal are set aside and reversed, and plaintiff's suit is decreed. In the circumstances, parties, are directed to bear own costs. Appeal allowed.