Asia Tech Engineering Associates v. Director General & Others
2009-11-09
D.MURUGESAN, S.NAGAMUTHU
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : S. Nagamuthu, J The third respondent/Superintending Engineer, National Highways issued a tender notice No.3 of 2009-10/Do, dated 19. 2009, for awarding contract to execute the work of special repairs to approach road for the major Bridge at KMs 604/4 of National Highways 47, Near Kuzhithurai. The last date for submission of the tender was 10. 2009 till 3.00 p.m. and opening of the tender was to take place at 3.15 p.m. on the same day. The appellant and three others submitted tenders in time. But, the tenders were not opened as scheduled. Instead, the third respondent, by his communication dated 10. 2009, informed the tenderers that due to administrative reasons, the tenders could not be opened as scheduled and the same would be opened on 10. 2009 at 4.30 p.m. Even on 10. 2009, the tenders were not opened, again citing administrative reasons. The third respondent, by yet another communication dated 10. 2009, informed the tenderers that the tenders would be opened on 110. 2009 at 11.00 a.m. 2. In the meanwhile, the three other tenderers have sent letters withdrawing their tenders, and thus, the appellant was the sole tenderer remaining for consideration on 110. 2009. Thereafter, the third respondent, by letter No.TRP 187/09-10/JDO-1, dated 110. 2009, returned the tender of the appellant unopened, since the same was the single tender available in the hands of the third respondent, which cannot be opened as per the instructions of the Central Government based on the guidelines of the Central Vigilance Commission. Thereafter, a fresh tender No.4 of 2009-10/DO, dated 110. 2009, was issued by the third respondent. In these circumstances, the appellant filed the writ petition, challenging the order of return of the tender passed by, the third respondent on 110. 2009 and for a further direction to the third respondent to open and evaluate the tender dated 10. 2009. 3. It was contended by the respondents in the writ petition that as per the circular dated 24. 2008 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, (Road Wing), New Delhi, single tenders can be accepted only with detailed justification in support of the acceptance with the approval of the competent authority including Associated Finance. In general, single tenders are not acceptable in the first instance.
2008 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, (Road Wing), New Delhi, single tenders can be accepted only with detailed justification in support of the acceptance with the approval of the competent authority including Associated Finance. In general, single tenders are not acceptable in the first instance. However, it has been observed that PWDs are accepting rates on the basis of single tenders without observing the prescribed procedure, which is a violation of CVC guidelines. It was further contended that as per the said CVC guidelines and based on the instructions issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways Department, Government of India, since the appellant’s was the single tender, it was returned unopened. It was also contended that as per Clause 3 of the tender notice, the Superintending Engineer or any competent authority has got right to reject any of the tenders without assigning any reason therefor. 4. Having considered the rival contentions, the learned single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition. It is the said Order, which is under challenge in this Writ Appeal. 5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India appearing for the first respondent, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondents 2 and 3 and perused the records carefully. .6. At the outset, we have to state that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters of contract is very limited. It is the settled law that unless it is shown to the Court that the decision of the authority is arbitrary, unfair, biased or actuated by mala fides, this Court would not normally interfere with the same. In the words of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tata cellular v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 11 : (1994) 6 SCC 651 . “The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not. Only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness including its other facts but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not. Only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness including its other facts but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.” Bearing the above settled law in mind, the facts of the present case are to be analyzed. 7. There is no controversy before us that as on 110. 2009, the appellant was the only tenderer available, since the other three tenderers had already withdrawn their offer. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that such a right to withdrawn the tender would have been available for the tenderers till 10. 2009 at 3.15 p.m., which was the original time stipulated for opening of the tenders. He would further submit that during the time, when the opening of the tender stood postponed, the tenderers had/no right to withdrawn their offer. In our considered opinion, the said contention is only to be rejected. Under Section 5 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the prosper, but not afterwards. In this case, the tenders submitted by the tenderers were never opened and they were never accepted, and therefore, the tenderers had right to withdraw the tenders, and thus, there is neither illegality nor irregularity in the matter of acceptance of the withdrawal of the tenders of the other three tenderers. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant would further contend that the instructions issued by the Government of India and the guidelines issued by the Central Vigilance Commission cannot have any overriding effect over the Tamil Nadu Transparency in tenders Act, 1998, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). But, in our considered opinion, the said Act has got no application to the facts of the present case, since it applies only in respect of procuring entities, as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act relating to the Government of Tamil Nadu. But, here, the work, for which the tender was called for, relates to National Highways Authority of India, which is a Central Government organization.
But, here, the work, for which the tender was called for, relates to National Highways Authority of India, which is a Central Government organization. So, the instructions of the Ministry and Central Vigilance Commission’s guidelines would bind the third respondent. Insofar as the circular dated 24. 2008, issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways Department, Government of India, it clearly spells out that if there is any single tender, the authority shall not accept the same on the first occasion unless there are detailed justifications in support of the acceptance of the single tender as per the Central Vigilance Commission’s guidelines. In the case on hand, since there was no detailed justification available, the third respondent had rightly returned the tender of the appellant unopened. In this regard, we do not find anything unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory, as it is alleged by the appellant. 9. It is also brought to our notice that in pursuance of the subsequent tender notice dated 110. 2009, already many tenderers have submitted their tenders in time. But, the appellant has not chosen to submit his tender. When the said tender process was going on, the appellant filed the Writ Petition and got an interim order also. The Writ Petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge on 11. 2009. On 11. 2009, the appellant approached this Court and filed the present Writ Appeal. This Court, by order dated 11. 2009, granted interim order directing the respondents not to open the tenders. In pursuance of the said interim order, the tenders have not been opened so far. .10. The learned Assistant Solicitor General of India appearing for the first respondent would submit that having not submitted his tender in pursuance of the subsequent notification, it is not at all open for the appellant to insist for opening of his earlier tender. In our considered opinion, we find every force in the said contention of the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India. If really the appellant is interested in competing in the tender process, nothing would have prevented him from submitting fresh tender as per the subsequent notification. His disinclination to participate in the subsequent tender process would only show that he is not interested in competing with other tenderers, but instead, he wants to take advantage of the fact that he was the sole tenderer during the earlier tender process.
His disinclination to participate in the subsequent tender process would only show that he is not interested in competing with other tenderers, but instead, he wants to take advantage of the fact that he was the sole tenderer during the earlier tender process. It is needless to say that as requested by the appellant, for any reason, if the tender submitted by him on the earlier occasion id opened, even then, there is no compulsion on the part of the respondents to accept the said offer made by the appellant and to award contract in his favour. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant would rely on Rule 18(5) (d) of the Tamil Nadu Transparency in Tenders Rules, 2000, to submit that postponement of the tender in this case was not in tune with the said Rule. As we have already stated, the said Rule cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. Further, the postponement of opening of the tender was made on administrative grounds. The appellant is not able to place any material before this Court to substantiate his contention that the postponement of opening of tender was done only to favour the other tenderers. 12. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, relying on the reply affidavit, that the tender of the appellant cannot be termed as “single tender” and it should be termed as “a tender” among “multiple tenders.” Though the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be very attractive, we cannot allow ourselves to be swayed by the same. In this matter, we have not been called upon to interpret the provisions of any law. What is meant by single tender as stated in the Central Vigilance Commission’s guidelines and the circular issued by the Central Government is to be understood, in such a way, to keep in mind the object behind the said circular. In our considered opinion, the term “single tender”, as stated in the guidelines, should be referable to a “lone tender” available for consideration at the time of opening of the tender. In the case on hand, though totally there were four tenders, since three tenders were withdrawn, the appellant’s was the sole tender, and therefore, the returning of the same cannot be in any manner found fault with. 13.
In the case on hand, though totally there were four tenders, since three tenders were withdrawn, the appellant’s was the sole tender, and therefore, the returning of the same cannot be in any manner found fault with. 13. The learned single Judge has placed reliance on the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the power of judicial review in matters relating to tenders or award of contract is very limited and unless special features are placed, the Writ Court shall not interfere with the same and the power of judicial review cannot be stretched to protect the private interest of a contractor. Applying the said principle, the learned single Judge has rightly held that the appellant had not shown any sufficient cause or reason to interfere with the impugned tender notice. We fully agree with the said conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge. 14. Thus, looking into all the aspects of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, we do not find any infirmity at all in the Order of the learned single Judge. 15. In the result, the writ appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. Appeal dismissed.