ORDER These two applications can be dealt with together and decided not merely because the parties to the dispute are the same, but because they arise out of common set of facts. 2. The applicant in both the cases is the contractor while the respondents are the Indian Railways and its officers. Two civil engineering works viz., "(1) Proposed high level platform on down loop at Nellore (2) Proposed remodeling of Station building, additions and alterations to sub-way at Nellore" have been awarded to the applicant. Consequently two separate agreements (1) Agreement No. 16/S/BZA/89, dated 28.3.1989 and (2) Agreement No. 68/S/BZAI 88, dated 15.6.1988 respectively concerning the above two works have been executed by and between the parties. According to the applicant, for reasons wholly attributable to the respondents such as not finalizing and furnishing the drawings and the necessary technical details and specifications, the execution of the works were got delayed considerably. The applicant further asserts that the final bill has not been prepared promptly and paid for. Hence, he has invoked the provision available in the contract for the purpose of resolution of disputes by seeking a reference to arbitration. The dispute was referred to a sole arbitrator, Sri B. Gopi Singh, Dy. CSTE/Projects on 15.3.2000. But, however, on 3.9.2002, the Chief General Engineer acting on behalf of the General Manager of the South Central Railway has constituted an Arbitral Tribunal comprising of Sri Arun Malik, Chief Engineer/ C-II/Secunderabad as Presiding Officer, Sri Y.T. Varma, Dy FA & CAO/HQ/SC as Joint Arbitrator and Sri B. Sambi Reddy, CSTE/Projects/SCS as a Joint Arbitrator and referred all the disputes arising out of the aforesaid two agreements for adjudication. On 16.3.2005, again the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal has been altered replacing Sri Y.T. Varma with Smt. Malabika G. Mohan, Sr. DFM/SC Division/Secunderabad. This Tribunal entered upon the reference and through their communication dated 17.8.2005 directed the Senior Divisional Engineer, South Central Railways, Vijayawada to submit the defence statement/counter claim statement immediately, to the statement of claim lodged by the applicant herein, without any further delay, else the case would be dealt with ex parte. DFM/SC Division/Secunderabad. This Tribunal entered upon the reference and through their communication dated 17.8.2005 directed the Senior Divisional Engineer, South Central Railways, Vijayawada to submit the defence statement/counter claim statement immediately, to the statement of claim lodged by the applicant herein, without any further delay, else the case would be dealt with ex parte. It is stated that, subsequently, Sri B. Sambi Reddy has since resigned from the service of the Indian Railways while Smt. Malabika G.Mohan has been posted as a Vigilance Officer and consequently preferred not to be a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal due to change of her duties and responsibilities brought about since then. The present application has, therefore been filed after putting the General Manager, South Central Railway on notice dated 26.3.2008, since the General Manager has not reconstituted the Tribunal. 3. The present arbitration application has been moved on 14.7.2008. Notice was ordered returnable in four weeks on the said application on 7.8.2008. The Railways have since filed their counter affidavit raising the following important objections: (1) The non joinder of Union of India as a party respondent to the arbitration application was fatal. [Realising the error committed, the applicant has with the permission of the Court, amended the cause title and impleaded the Union of India as the 1st respondent. Hence, this objection need not detain us any further]. (2) Application moved under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for appointment of an independent arbitrator, without following the procedure provided in the contract, by terminating the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal already constituted by the respondents is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on that ground (3) The applicant has to approach the civil court under Section 14 and must secure the termination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal first and later on only can seek appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal in terms of Section 11 and since this was not followed, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the above arbitration application. (4) The reasons for failure, if any, for the functioning of the Arbitral Tribunal has got to be apportioned and attributable to the conduct of the applicant also and hence he is disentitled from raising a dispute on that ground. (4) The reasons for failure, if any, for the functioning of the Arbitral Tribunal has got to be apportioned and attributable to the conduct of the applicant also and hence he is disentitled from raising a dispute on that ground. (5) As per Clause 64 of the General Conditions of the Contract, General Manager of the Railways is the competent authority for appointing railway officers as Arbitrators for securing resolution of the disputes and only railway officers have got to be appointed as arbitrators to adjudicate the disputes between the parties and no independent arbitrator other than the railway officers need be appointed at all. It was pleaded further that the Deputy Chief Engineer/Works acting on behalf of the General Manager had replied to the notice sent by the applicant on 26.3.2008 by communicating through his Letter No.W.148/B/ARB/TSR/Agt.16 & 68, dated 1.7.2008 nominating a panel of four officers as Arbitrators so as to enable the applicant to select minimum two names from the above panel so as to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal and since the applicant had not responded to the same, the above Arbitration Applications are not maintainable. 4. I have heard Sri A. Ramalingeswara Rao, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Rajeev Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 5. The crystallized facts that emerge on record are these: (1) Two separate agreements concerning certain civil works to be executed at Nellore Railway Station have been entered into by and between the parties with regard thereto. (2) The final bills have not yet been settled and the applicant has raised certain disputes with regard to payments due. (3) The General Manager of the South Central Railway is the competent authority for constituting an Arbitral Tribunal for resolution of the disputes that crop up amongst the parties. (4) Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal comprising of a solitary member Sri B. Gopi Singh has been constituted on 15.3.2000, initially. Subsequently, an Arbitral Tribunal comprising of three members and headed by Sri Arun Malik has been constituted and reconstituted on 16.3.2005. (5) The Arbitral Tribunal entered upon the reference and through its communication dated 17.8.2005 directed the Senior Divisional Manager (South), South Central Railway, Vijayawada, to file the defence statement/counter claim statement immediately failing which the Arbitral Tribunal preferred to deal with the claims made by the applicant ex parte. (5) The Arbitral Tribunal entered upon the reference and through its communication dated 17.8.2005 directed the Senior Divisional Manager (South), South Central Railway, Vijayawada, to file the defence statement/counter claim statement immediately failing which the Arbitral Tribunal preferred to deal with the claims made by the applicant ex parte. (6) The assertion of the applicant that Sri B. Sambi Reddy, Member of the Arbitral Tribunal has since resigned from the service of the Railways and that another member Smt. Malabika G. Mohan has come to be appointed as a Vigilance Officer and consequently preferred not to function as a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal has not been disputed or denied. (7) The applicant has put the General Manager as well as the Arbitral Tribunal on notice through his communication dated 26.3.2008, complaining of the failure to perform. (8) The notice dated 26.3.2008 sent by the applicant has been received by the respondents. Only through the communication dated 1.7.2008, the Dy Chief Engineer/Works acting on behalf of the General Manager had suggested four names of the railway officers to the applicant and asked him to choose two names for constituting the Arbitral Tribunal by the General Manager, thus confirming the fact that two of the three members constituting the Arbitral Tribunal needed to be replaced. (9) No material could be produced by the respondents in proof of receipt of this communication dated 1.7.2008 by the applicant herein any time prior to 14.7.2008, the date on which the above arbitration application has been instituted in this court by him. 6. The analysis of these undisputed facts, disclose that an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted and reconstituted latest as of 16.3.2005 and that it entered upon the reference and directed the Senior Divisional Engineer, Vijayawada to file its counter state men defence statement at the earliest failing which it preferred to proceed ex parte. There is no progress that has been achieved after 17.8.2005 by this Tribunal. Even when r the applicant has put the General Manager f as well as the Arbitral Tribunal on notice on c 26.3.2008, there was no response tl forthcoming in the matter for three months. c Hence, it emerges that the Arbitral Tribunal is has failed to discharge the functions for 0 which it has been constituted. 7. Even when r the applicant has put the General Manager f as well as the Arbitral Tribunal on notice on c 26.3.2008, there was no response tl forthcoming in the matter for three months. c Hence, it emerges that the Arbitral Tribunal is has failed to discharge the functions for 0 which it has been constituted. 7. Issues relating to appointment of the Ii Arbitral Tribunal and its jurisdiction to deal with the dispute referred to it and the termination of the mandate of the Tribunal are some of the important questions which were addressed to by the Legislature itself. Section 10 r/w sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (henceforth referred to as 'the Act') made it abundantly clear that a person of any nationality can be an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties. The parties are also free to determine the number of arbitrators so long as the number of arbitrators are not in even number, such a Tribunal is liable to be construed as a properly constituted tribunal. Freedom has been accorded to the parties to choose a procedure for securing the appointment of an Arbitrator or Arbitrators. Section 12 of the Act has also provided for challenge to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 casts an obligation on a person who has been approached by the parties with a possibility of his appointment as an arbitrator, to disclose in writing all or any of the circumstances which are likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality. Therefore, primacy is sought to be attached to two factors viz., (1) Independence and impartiality on the part of the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal is the essential requirement (2) Such an Arbitrator is also under an obligation to disclose to the parties in writing all factors and circumstances that are likely to give raise to justifiable doubts about his independence and impartiality. Some other factors which might cause hindrance for discharge of functions by the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal can possibly emerge, by the very nature of things, during the course of the pendency/ currency of the Arbitral proceedings. Some other factors which might cause hindrance for discharge of functions by the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal can possibly emerge, by the very nature of things, during the course of the pendency/ currency of the Arbitral proceedings. For instance, by virtue of subsequent acquisition of new commercial contracts or interests in new enterprises, an Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal, which did not suffer any impeding factor in discharge of its functions at the time of it's original constitution, may suffer the same later on. For instance, one of the parties can become closely related to the Arbitrator or any of the Member or Members of the Arbitral Tribunal by reason of marriage in his family with one of the parties to the disputes. Thus this contingent/impeding factor would have cropped up during the currency of the Arbitral proceedings. Similarly, if a new stake has been picked up in a commercial enterprise, concerning which the disputes are referred to the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal, all because of any scheme of arrangement or sanction of merger etc., the Arbitrator or any of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal may suffer the possibility of generating a doubt about their independence or impartiality in the minds of one of the parties or both of them. Being alive to these contingencies, the statute in Section 13 has provided for the scheme of challenge to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator/ Arbitral Tribunal. As a consequence of challenge to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator/ Arbitral Tribunal or even due to certain unforeseeable natural factors, the mandate of the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal can get terminated. It is not difficult to visualize the following, amongst the possibility of a host of others, as the factors that might determine the jurisdiction and mandate of the Arbitrator/ Arbitral Tribunal (1) unfortunate and untimely death of the sole Arbitrator or a member of the Arbitral Tribunal (2) when the jurisdiction has been challenged, the Arbitrator may sustain the objection and withdraw himself from being the Arbitrator/part of the Arbitral Tribunal. (3) During the currency of the Arbitral proceedings due to new relationships that have emerged the Arbitrator/Member of the Arbitral Tribunal may have suffered the disability to continue to be the Arbitrator/ Member of the Arbitral Tribunal. In the above circumstances, the mandate of the Tribunal gets terminated. 8. (3) During the currency of the Arbitral proceedings due to new relationships that have emerged the Arbitrator/Member of the Arbitral Tribunal may have suffered the disability to continue to be the Arbitrator/ Member of the Arbitral Tribunal. In the above circumstances, the mandate of the Tribunal gets terminated. 8. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the ~ Act, sets out that the mandate of an Arbitrator shall terminate if - (a) he becomes a de sure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay; (b) he withdraws from his office or the parties agreed to the termination of his mandate. The Legislature, therefore provided for the termination of the mandate of the arbitrator/arbitral tribunal for the reasons spelt out supra. The- failure to perform its functions and failure to perform such functions without undue delay are also recognized fatalities for the mandate of the Tribunal. The rational principle behind this salient feature being that the Arbitral Tribunal should act with the necessary expedition and promptitude and should not fail to function without there being any just or reasonable cause. As is noticed supra, no reasons have been spelt out anywhere as to why the Arbitral Tribunal had failed to discharge its functions in the post 17'h August 2005 period. Even after the applicant has put the General Manager and the Arbitral Tribunal on notice through his communication dated 26.3.2008, there was no immediate response from them. Therefore, this much is clear; that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal constituted by the General Manager in the instant case is terminated for the failure on its part to perform without there being any justifiable cause or reason and for failure to act with the necessary promptness and urgency. 9. However, the objection raised on behalf of the respondents by Sri Rajeev Reddy, that this court has no jurisdiction to deal with the present situation and that under sub-section (2) of Section 14, the applicant is required to apply to the 'court' to decide on the termination of the mandate before he can invoke the jurisdiction of the designate of the Chief Justice under Section 11 of the Act, requires to be dealt with. It is contended that Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines the expression "court' as meaning the 'Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration, if the same had been the subject matter of a Civil Suit and such a court it should alone should deal with the issue relating to the termination of the mandate of the arbitrator/ arbitral tribunal. Since the High Court of Andhra Pradesh does not have civil original jurisdiction, it cannot answer the description of a 'court,' as set out in the Act and hence it cannot decide any issue relating to the termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator/ Arbitral Tribunal. This argument of the learned counsel for the railways, in the present context, ignores the following crucial expressions found in sub-section (2) of Section 14 ".... unless otherwise agreed by the parties," occurring before the necessity for a party to apply to the court to decide the issue of termination of the mandate. As is sought to be made out in the counter affidavit, by enclosing the communication dated 1.7.2008 sent up on behalf of the General Manager of the South Central Railways, there is no further dispute subsisting amongst the parties with regard to the issue relating to the termination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal already constituted. Therefore, the agreement af the parties on the crucial question of termination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal as reconstituted on 16.3.2005 in the instant cases, is liable to be inferred. When there is an agreement between the parties on this issue, there was no further necessity for a party to approach the civil court for securing a decision on that very issue relating to the termination of the mandate. In other words, such an issue would have become available for a decision by a civil court in the absence of an agreement by the parties in that regard. But, where the agreement between the parties can either be inferred or secured, there was no further necessity for a decision to be rendered on that question. Simply put it, where there is no disagreement/controversy, the further necessity of resolution of a nonexistent dispute or controversy does not arise. But, where the agreement between the parties can either be inferred or secured, there was no further necessity for a decision to be rendered on that question. Simply put it, where there is no disagreement/controversy, the further necessity of resolution of a nonexistent dispute or controversy does not arise. Hence, if the parties to a dispute agree to terminate the mandate of an arbitrator/arbitral tribunal, there was no further occasion, for one of them to approach the civil court seeking a decision on such an issue relating to the termination of the mandate. By consent of the parties, the mandate of the arbitrator/arbitral tribunal can be effectively terminated. This measure has been obviously contemplated by the legislature to prevent or to avoid or to cut short all unnecessary and unwarranted litigation between the parties. Such measures will enhance the efficacy of the main thrust of the statute itself, which is intended to secure speedy resolution of all disputes amongst the parties. Hence, I have no hesitation to reject the contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondents and hold that the applicant is not required, in view of the agreement by the respondents themselves, to approach the civil court for securing the termination of the mandate of the arbitrators, who have failed to discharge their functions for more than three years after they were reconstituted. 10. Section 11 of the Act enables a party to seek the jurisdiction of the designate of the Chief Justice for securing' the appointment of an Arbitrator, where the opposite party had failed to act as required under the procedure contemplated by the agreement. In the instant case, it is the General Manager of the South Central Railway who is the competent authority to constitute an Arbitral Tribunal, but, however, he had failed to act within the time limit of 30 days after receipt of the notice issued by the applicant on 26.3.2008. It is not disputed that the General Manager, South Central Railways has received this notice and he has failed to act thereon within the 30 days time limit prescribed. It is not disputed that the General Manager, South Central Railways has received this notice and he has failed to act thereon within the 30 days time limit prescribed. Even though an attempt is sought to be made to demonstrate that prior to invocation of the jurisdiction of this court, the General Manager did act by communicating his letter dated 1.7.2008, but the respondents have failed to demonstrate that the said communication has been received by the applicant any time prior to 14.7.2008, the date on which the above arbitration application has been moved. If only the General Manager had taken steps for constituting the arbitral tribunal in time, prior to the date on which the applicant has approached this court by instituting the above arbitration applications, the applicant, perhaps, would not be justified to move the designate of the Chief Justice for constitution of an arbitral tribunal. When once notice has been ordered by this court in the above arbitration applications, the General Manager has no power remaining with him thereafter for constituting the Arbitral Tribunal. For the sheer failure to act within the 30 days time limit after receipt of the notice dated 26.3.2008 sent by the applicant, the General Manager, South Central Railway has forfeited his right to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal. 11. It is apt here, to notice what the Supreme Court has pointed out in Northern Railway Administration v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd.1. (37) ................ Sub-section (4) deals with the existence of an appointment procedure and the failure of a party to appoint the arbitrator within 30 days from the receipt of a request to do so from the other party or when the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the presiding arbitrator within 30 days of their appointment. Sub-section (5) deals with the parties failing to agree in nominating a sole arbitrator within 30 days of the request in that behalf made by one of the parties to the arbitration agreement and subsection (6) deals with the Chief Justice appointing an arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal when the party or the two arbitrators or a person including an institution entrusted with the function, fails to perform the same. The finality, at first blush, could be said to be only on the decision on these matters. The finality, at first blush, could be said to be only on the decision on these matters. But the basic requirement for exercising his power under Section 11 (6), is the existence of an arbitration agreement in terms of Section 7 of the Act and the applicant before the Chief Justice being shown to be a party to such an agreement. It would also include the question of the existence of jurisdiction in him to entertain the request and an enquiry whether at least a part of the cause of action has arisen within the concerned State. Therefore, a decision on jurisdiction and on the existence of the arbitration agreement and of the person making the request being a party to that agreement and the subsistence of an arbitrable dispute require to be decided and the decision on these aspects is a prelude to the chief Justice considering whether the requirements of sub-section (4), subsection (5) or sub-section (6) of Sec.11 are satisfied when approached with the request for appointment of an arbitrator. It is difficult to understand the finality referred to in Section 11 (7) as excluding the decision on his competence and the locus standi of the party who seeks to invoke his jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator. Viewed from that angle the decision on all these aspects rendered by the Chief Justice would attain finality and it is obvious that the decision on these aspects could be taken only after notice to the parties and after hearing them. (38) xxxxxxx " 12. In the instant case, all the questions which are required to be carefully examined as a prelude to exercise of power under Section 11 of the Act, have been examined and the answers have been set out supra. 13. (38) xxxxxxx " 12. In the instant case, all the questions which are required to be carefully examined as a prelude to exercise of power under Section 11 of the Act, have been examined and the answers have been set out supra. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents Sri C.V. Rajeev Reddy has placed reliance upon the judgments in Superintending Engineer v. Kehar Singfi2, M. Venkata Rao v. Union of India P, Judgment of the Division Bench in CMA No. 907 of 1999 + CRP No. 1211 of 1999, dated 4.7.20083'A, Judgment rendered by me in AA No. 62 of 2008, dated 21.11.20083'S, State of J & K v. Dev Dutt Pandif in support of his contention that the above arbitration applications should be thrown out and submits that the claims which are remote in nature and which are not liable to be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal cannot be referred for decision to the Arbitral Tribunal. In Dev Dutt Pundit's case4, it has been clearly pointed out by the Supreme Court that inflated claims if entertained by the Arbitral Tribunals become subject matter of criticism which ultimately brings bad name to the very institution of arbitrations. 14. I am afraid that this contention cannot be pressed into service at this stage of the proceedings. The claims made by the applicant have already been referred to adjudication by the Arbitral Tribunal. The applicant is not making any fresh claims today. Therefore, the tenability or otherwise of the claims made by the applicant has got to be canvassed before the Arbitral Tribunal and not before this court at this stage. 15. He also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Haryana Telecom Ltd. v. Union of India and K. Narayana Raju, Contractor v. Union of India6 in support of his contention that the application of Section 11 is not the proper remedy, without an application under Section 14 of the Act having been taken out. 16. It is very true that wherever there is a controversy between the parties as to whether the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal is terminated or not then the proper course to be adopted is to have that issue determined by the competent civil court first and then seek the intervention of the designate of the Chief Justice for constituting afresh the Arbitral Tribunal. But, as already noticed supra, where the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal has been terminated and there is no dispute or controversy concerning the same, the question of approaching the civil court concerned for such a determination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal does not arise. As noticed supra, for illustration purposes, the Arbitral Tribunal comprises of a sole member and the factum of his unfortunate death during the currency of the Arbitral proceedings, if can be taken judicial notice of, then the question of one of the parties to the Arbitral proceedings approaching the civil court for determination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal is a redundant exercise, which is intended by the statute to be avoided for securing speedy redressal of the grievances of the parties. Similarly, if an arbitrator resigns or withdraws from the Arbitral Tribunal by giving notice thereof in writing to both the parties of the Arbitral proceedings, then the question of taking out necessary steps under sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act does not simply arise. Similarly, if both parties have agreed in principle for terminating the mandate of the Arbitrator/ Arbitral Tribunal, then also the question of getting the mandate terminated through the process of the civil court would be an 5. 2003 (1) Raj. 63 (Delhi). 6. 2006 (1) AL T 756. unwarranted exercise. Only in the absence of any such agreement or controversy still subsisting as to whether the mandate is terminated de facto or de jure, then such a controversy requires resolution by the competent civil court. For these reasons, the above cited decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents will not be of any assistance to him. 17: Learned counsel for the respondents has placed strong reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. case (1 supra) wherein it has been held as under: "10. The crucial expression in subsection (6) is "a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary measure" (underlined for emphasis). Ltd. case (1 supra) wherein it has been held as under: "10. The crucial expression in subsection (6) is "a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary measure" (underlined for emphasis). The expression has to be read along with requirement in subsection (8) that the Chief Justice or the person or an institution designated by him in appointing an arbitrator shall have "due regard" to the two cumulative conditions relating to qualifications and other considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator. 11. A bare reading of the scheme of Section 11 shows that the emphasis is on the terms of the agreement being adhered to and/or given effect as closely as possible. In other words, the court may ask to do what has not been done. The court must first ensure that the remedies provided for are exhausted. It is true, as contended by Mr. Desai, that it is not mandatory for the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to appoint the named arbitrator or arbitrators. But at the same time, due regard has to be given to the qualifications required by the agreement and other considerations." 18. Learned counsel contends therefore that only railway officials need to be appointed as Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal and the claim of the applicant for appointment of an independent arbitrator should not be entertained. As can be noticed supra, the Chief Justice or his designate should ensure that the terms of the agreement are complied with even in the matter of appointment of an Arbitrator. For instance, if the contract has provided for a specified and named arbitrator or institution known for its expertise or the contracts have provided for certain essential qualifications to be possessed by the arbitrator/arbitral tribunal to enable accuracy and efficacy in the matter of appreciation of the issues that fall for consideration, regard must be had to such terms and the Chief Justice or his designate should seek to adhere to the same as nearly as is possible. 19. In the instant case, the contract has not provided for any special qualifications to be possessed by the Arbitrators except stating that the Arbitral Tribunal shall comprise of three members of the Indian Railway to be chosen by the parties. 19. In the instant case, the contract has not provided for any special qualifications to be possessed by the Arbitrators except stating that the Arbitral Tribunal shall comprise of three members of the Indian Railway to be chosen by the parties. In the absence of any specific qualifications or any of the claims requiring such specific knowledge on the part of the Arbitrator/ Arbitral Tribunal, for it to comprehend the controversy at issue, I do not consider that it should invariably result in appointment of only railway officials as the Arbitrators. In peculiar fact situation prevailing in the instant case where the Arbitral Tribunal comprising of railway officials, which is constituted from the year 2000 onwards, has not made any headway in the matter of resolution of the disputes, I do not consider that it is appropriate to confine the choice of constituting the Arbitral Tribunal only to the members of the Indian Railways. The claimant has for valid reasons has lost his confidence that he will be securing complete justice at the hands of such men who constitute the Tribunal, particularly weighed in the backdrop of their conduct in the instant case. I am satisfied that no expert knowledge which is peculiarly available only to the officers of Indian Railways alone is needed for purpose of resolution of the disputes amongst the parties in the instant case. 20. The facts that have emerged on record would undoubtedly disclose lack of any urgency felt by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted by the General Manager for resolving the disputes between the parties. The reasons are not far to seek. I therefore consider it appropriate to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal and for that purpose I appoint Sri M. Ranga Reddy, a Retired Judge of this court to act as the Arbitral Tribunal. Since this is a case of reconstituting the Arbitral Tribunal, it is only appropriate for the Tribunal to start off from where the earlier tribunal left off. Therefore, the General Manager, South Central Railway will collect the entire case record from the Arbitral Tribunal headed by Sri Malik and transmit the same within 30 days from today to the newly constituted Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, the General Manager, South Central Railway will collect the entire case record from the Arbitral Tribunal headed by Sri Malik and transmit the same within 30 days from today to the newly constituted Arbitral Tribunal. If the General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad fails to transmit the case record, it is open to the applicant to furnish a set of the claim statements submitted by him to the previous Arbitral Tribunal and if the previous Arbitral Tribunal has also been submitted with any defence statement/counter claim statement by the respondent railways, the same may also be submitted, so that the arbitral tribunal now constituted can start acting on the basis of such set of pleadings. Arbitration Applications are therefore allowed. No costs.