Judgment M.D.Shah, J.—These appeals arise out of a common award made by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux-I), (for short, “the Tribunal”) Kachchh at Bhuj in Motor Accident Claims Petition No. 791 of 1996 and 90 of 1997. It is pertinent to note that these two claim petitions are arising out of one and the same motor vehicular accident occurred on 23.9.1996 and therefore, both the petitions were consolidated and by order dated 16.4.2003 they were disposed of by the Tribunal as aforesaid. 2. The present appeals are preferred by the appellants-original owner of the vehicle in question, Appellant No. 1 and New India Assurance Company Appellant No. 2, against the judgment and award passed in MACP No. 791/96 and MACP No. 90 of 1997 by the Tribunal. The brief facts of the case are as under: 3. On 23.9.1996, deceased Sureshbhai Shantilal Pandya was going from Bhachau to Anjar on Scooter No. GJ-12-E-709. Deceased Hiranibhai was pillion rider. Around 16.00 hours, when they have reached near Varsana Petrol pump near ‘T’ junction of Anjar Road on Ahmedabad-Kandala National High Way No. 8-A, one tanker No. GJ-12-T-7763 was coming from the opposite direction and collided with the scooter of the deceased on account of rash, reckless and negligent driving and thus the accident took place. The scooter was dragged upto 50 feet and deceased Suresh Pandya had sustained serious injuries and died on the spot. The pillion reader Hiranibhai was thrown out from the scooter and had also sustained serious injuries. Hiranibhai was admitted in the G.K. General Hospital and during the treatment he also died on 24.09.1996. 4. The legal heirs of both the deceased had filed the above referred claim petitions. The claimants of MACP No. 791/96 have claimed compensation of Rs. 50,00,000/-. After recording the evidence, the Tribunal partly allowed the petition and awarded Rs. 18,65,000/- as compensation jointly and severally with 9% interest per annum from the date of the claim petition till the deposit or realisation with proportionate costs, against the driver, owner and Insurance Company (insurer of the Tanker) of Tanker No. GJ-12-T-7763. 4.1. So far as claimants of MACP No. 90/97 is concerned, the petition was partly allowed by the Tribunal against opponents No. 1, 2 and 3. An amount of Rs. 4.1. So far as claimants of MACP No. 90/97 is concerned, the petition was partly allowed by the Tribunal against opponents No. 1, 2 and 3. An amount of Rs. 8,452,000/- by way of compensation was awarded by the Tribunal with 9% interest from the date of the claim petition will the deposit or realisation with proportionate costs thereon. 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Tribunal, the present appellants have filed these appeals wherein they have challenged the impugned judgment and award on various grounds. By consent of the parties, these two appeals are heard together and disposed of finally by way of this common judgment. 6. We have heard learned Advocate, Mr. Biju Joshi for Mr. H.M. Bhagat for Appellants No. 1 and 2 and Mr. Mehul S. Shah, learned Advocate for the respondents-original claimants (Except Respondents No. 3 & 7) in both the appeals. The learned Advocate for the appellants has argued the appeals on the ground of wider defence. 6.1. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the appellant, Mr. Mehul Shah, that before this Court, owner of the vehicle is also Appellant No. 1 and hence also they should be permitted to argue the appeal and the appeal should be decided only on merits. 7. On hearing the learned Advocates for the parties, the question arises before this Court is as to whether the appellant-Insurance Company can be permitted to take wider defence though they have admittedly not obtained written permission from the Tribunal. It is to be noted that the Insurance Company had not submitted any application under Section 170 of the Act before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has not passed any order in this respect. 8. This issue is squarely covered by a decision in an identical case, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Shankarayya & Anr. vs. United India Isurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. (1998) 3 SCC 140 in Para 4 held as under: “4. It clearly shows that the Insurance Company when impleaded as a party by the Court can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits only if the conditions precedent mentioned in the Section are found to be satisfied and for that purpose the Insurance Company has to obtain order in writing from the Tribunal and which should be a reasoned order by the Tribunal. Unless that procedure is followed, the Insurance Company cannot have a wider defence on merits than what is available to it by way of statutory defence. It is true that the claimants themselves had joined respondent 1, Insurance Company in the claim petition but that was done with a view to thrust the statutory liability on the Insurance Company on account of the contract of the insurance. That was not an order of the Court itself permitting the Insurance Co. which was impleaded to avail of a larger defence on merits on being satisfied on the aforesaid two conditions mentioned in Section 170. Consequently, it must be held that on the facts of the present case, respondent 1, Insurance Company was not entitled to file an appeal on merits of the claim which was awarded by the Tribunal.” 9. The Court has gone through the R & P of the case. It is undisputed fact that the Insurance company has not filed any application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act for taking wider defence and hence no reasoned order is passed by the Tribunal for taking wider defence by the Insurance Company. Nothing has come on record which shows that the claimant, in collusion with the driver and the owner of the vehicle in question, filed the claim petition and with ulterior motive, the driver and owner of the vehicle with a view to help the claimant, did not come before the Tribunal and not opposed the claim petition as alleged. As narrated above, when the Insurance Company has not filed any application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act for getting permission of the Court for deciding the proceedings on merits, merely because the Tribunal has permitted the Insurance Company to cross-examine the claimants’ witnesses on all points, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has made any implied reasoned order permitting the Insurance company to avail of a larger defence on merits of the case. 10. As far as the second submission i.e., the owner of the vehicle has also filed appeal and he is Appellant No. 1 and so also the appeal should be decided on merits is concerned, it is submitted by Mr. M.S. Shah that merely because the insurer, by joining the owner as co-appellant, wider defence is not available to the appellant. In support of his case, Learned Advocate, Mr. M.S. Shah that merely because the insurer, by joining the owner as co-appellant, wider defence is not available to the appellant. In support of his case, Learned Advocate, Mr. M.S. Shah has relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chinnamma George vs. N.K. Raju ( AIR 2000 SC 1565 ) wherein in Paras 10 and 11, the Apex Court held as under: “10. There is no dispute with the proposition so laid by this Court. But the insurer cannot maintain a joint appeal along with the owner or the driver if defence on any ground under Section 149(2) is not available to it. In that situation joint appeal will be incompetent. It is not enough if the insurer is struck out from the array of the appellants. The appellate Court must also be satisfied that a defence which is permitted to be taken by the insurer under the Act was taken in the pleadings and was pressed before the Tribunal. On the appellate Court being so satisfied the appeal may be entertained for examination of the correctness or otherwise of the judgment of the tribunal on the question arising from/relating to such defence taken by the insurer. If the appellate Court is not satisfied that any such question was raised by the insurer in the pleadings and/or was pressed before the Tribunal the appeal filed by the insurer has to be dismissed as not maintainable. The Court should take care to ascertain this position on proper consideration so that the statutory bar against the insurer in a proceeding of claim of compensation is not rendered irrelevant by the subterfuge of the insurance company joining the insured as a co-appellant in the appeal filed by it. This position is clear on a harmonious reading of the statutory provisions in Sections 147, 149 and 173 of the Act. Any other interpretation will defeat the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act and throw, the legal representatives of the deceased or the injured in the accident to unnecessary prolonged litigation at the instance of the insurer. (11) In the present case, we do not find any argument addressed on behalf of the owner of the offending vehicle and the only argument, which the High Court noticed was that of the counsel for the insurer. (11) In the present case, we do not find any argument addressed on behalf of the owner of the offending vehicle and the only argument, which the High Court noticed was that of the counsel for the insurer. That argument was on the quantum of compensation granted to the appellants. That ground is certainly not available tot he insurer for the purpose of filing the appeal. We, therefore, hold that the present appeal by the insurer by joining the owner was not competent, as there was no ground available to the insurer to defend the claim petition.” 11. As can be seen from the ratio of the decision cited above, the present appeal which is also by the insurer by joining the owner, is not competent, as there is no ground available to the insurer to defend the claim petition. 12. In view of the above ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Shankarayya & Anr.’s case (Supra), and the decision in the case of Chinnamma George (Supra), and as discussed above, this Court is of the opinion that the facts of the present case is identical to the case which is decided by the Apex Court and thus, the present appeals are required to be dismissed. So the present appeals filed by the insurer/owner of the vehicle in question as appellant/s, is not competent, as there was no ground available to the insurer to defend the claim petitions. For the foregoing reasons, these appeals are required to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 13. In view of the order passed in these appeals, the Civil Applications No. 7445 and 7446 of 2007 for stay of the impugned award, do not survive and are accordingly disposed of.