Judgment : This appeal calls in question the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Fast Track Court-I, Belgaum, by which the two accused namely the husband and the mother-in-law of deceased Sunanda, were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In respect of the first offence, six months rigorous imprisonment was imposed and with regard to latter offence under Section 306 of the IPC, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. 2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and sentence, the accused have come up before this Court. It has to be said at the outset that out of the two appellants, the 2nd appellant being the mother-in-law of the deceased, died during the pendency of this appeal and therefore appeal stood abated against her, leaving only the husband who is concerned with this appeal. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that the deceased Sunanda was given in marriage to the 1st appellant-Dundayya and it was three years earlier to the death of Sunanda. According to the prosecution, the accused persons used to harass the deceased and were telling her that she was not doing the work properly and the accused also demanded Rs. 20,000/-from her and they also threatened the deceased by saying that accused 1 would give her divorce. Unable to bear all these mental harassment and the demand made by the accused, the deceased poured kerosene and set fire to herself on 16-4-1997 and she was taken to the hospital for treatment and she died on the very same day at 10.15 p.m. Based on the complaint said to have been recorded by P.W. 4, a case was registered leading to the Taluka Magistrate coming to the hospital and recording the dying declaration of the deceased on 16-4-1997 between 3.10 p.m. and 3.30 p.m. as per Ex. P.5 and on completion of investigation which included recording of the statement of the parents of the deceased and other witnesses and collecting the death certificate as well as the post-mortem report (Ex. P.14) and the FSL Report, finally the charge-sheet was submitted. 4. The accused pleaded not guilty and the prosecution led the evidence by examining P.Ws. 1 to 17 and 17 documents were also marked in evidence apart from three material objects. P.14) and the FSL Report, finally the charge-sheet was submitted. 4. The accused pleaded not guilty and the prosecution led the evidence by examining P.Ws. 1 to 17 and 17 documents were also marked in evidence apart from three material objects. The accused denied the case of the prosecution when questioned under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and led no defence evidence except marking three documents-Exs. D.1 to D.3. 5. After appreciating the evidence on record, the learned Judge of the Trial Court took the view that the prosecution had brought home the guilt of the accused through the testimony of P.Ws. 1 to 3 coupled with the dying declaration-Ex. P.5 and therefore the accused were convicted as aforesaid. Following the death of the 2nd accused, we are concerned only with the husband of the deceased. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel Sri Bahubali A. Danawade for the appellants and learned Government Pleader for the State and carefully perused the entire material on record. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant argued at length and submitted that the entire case of the prosecution is full of doubt and therefore the Trial Court could not have convicted the accused. For this proposition, learned Counsel pointed out that the dying declaration said to have been recorded by the Tahsildar itself cannot be believed, because a careful scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. 4-the Tahsildar and P.W. 5-the Doctor would go to show that the dying declaration is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. It is pointed out that the Doctor who has certified the dying declaration-Ex. P.5 was not present when the alleged declaration was recorded by the Tahsildar. 8. Secondly, the dying declaration is in cyclostyled form which itself is indicative of the dying declaration being not a truthful one. 9. Thirdly, the right hand thumb impression of the deceased is said to have been taken on the dying declaration, whereas according to the version of the complainant, i.e., P.W. 4, the right hand thumb of the deceased was fully burnt and therefore in the complaint left hand thumb impression was taken. This itself shows that the prosecution case is not free from doubt. 10. This itself shows that the prosecution case is not free from doubt. 10. The next point urged by the learned Counsel is that the deceased was burnt upto 95% and therefore it is rather impossible to expect a person with 95% burn injuries to respond to the questions put to her by the Tahsildar as well as the scribe who recorded the complaint. Referring to the time of recording the dying declaration, it is contended that it is impossible to record the complaint as well as the dying declaration at one and the same time. This also gives rise to doubt the prosecution case. Therefore, the entire evidence regarding dying declaration ought to have been discarded by the Trial Court in view of the above defects and infirmities. 11. It is then argued that the very case of the prosecution is that the accused demanded Rs. 20,000/-from the deceased, whereas neither in the complaint-Ex. P.3 nor in the dying declaration-Ex. P.5 is there any mention about demand of money of the accused. This also goes to show that the case of the prosecution is not a very convincing one. 12. As far as the cause of death is concerned, learned Counsel argued that, as per the Doctor Certificate, when the patient was admitted to the hospital, the history was given as accidental burn, whereas, the complaint mentions that the deceased herself had set fire to her unable to bear the harassment given to her. Therefore, it is a case of suicide and not death due to accidental burns. 13. The next defect in the prosecution case pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that there is no proximity between the death of Sunanda and alleged harassment given by the accused persons. Yet, another point put forward by the learned Counsel is that a careful reading of the evidence on record would also reveal that in the family of the accused, mother and brother of the accused were blind by birth and therefore they were not in a position to do anything and needed assistance from others. 14. In the face of such evidence given by the prosecution witnesses themselves, it is quite probable that the deceased might have got dejected in life because her husband used to go for work and she had to take care of two blind persons who were in the house. 14. In the face of such evidence given by the prosecution witnesses themselves, it is quite probable that the deceased might have got dejected in life because her husband used to go for work and she had to take care of two blind persons who were in the house. Under these circumstances, the deceased herself wanted to go to her parents house and this is clear from the evidence of P.W. 1, father of the deceased. As such, the reason for the deceased setting fire to herself could be the dejection in life for the above said reasons rather than any harassment by the accused and any demand of money by the accused. 15. In order to fortify the above submissions, learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decisions in Adevappa Nagappa Anagolkar v State of Karnataka 1997 (3) Kar. L.J. 561 (DB) : 1998 Cri. L.J. 584 (Kar.) (DB) ; State of Orissa v Parasurain Naik AIR 1997 SC 3569 : (1997)11 SCC 15 : 1997 SCC (Cri.) 1177 : 1997 Cri. L.J. 4404 (SC) and Sanjay v State of Maharashtra AIR 2007 SC 1368 : 2007 Cri. L.J. 1801 (SC) : (2007)9 SCC 148 : (2007)3 SCC (Cri.) 91; and contended that in the light of the law laid down in the aforementioned cases, in the instant case the Trial Court ought to have given the benefit of doubt to the accused because of the prosecution case being not free from reasonable doubt. Once the dying declaration is discarded on account of various infirmities, there remains nothing to convict the accused persons and as such interference is called in this appeal. 16. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate for the State supported the judgment of the Courts below and argued that the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 coupled with dying declaration-Ex. P.5 and the complaint-Ex. P.3 are sufficient to convict the accused persons and moreover, the complaint is lodged by a person who is totally independent and therefore the question of doubting the prosecution case does not arise. 17. As far as the defects pointed out are concerned, submission made is that the defects are very minor in nature and do not affect the prosecution case in substance. 17. As far as the defects pointed out are concerned, submission made is that the defects are very minor in nature and do not affect the prosecution case in substance. Therefore, learned Government Advocate argued that the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court is proper requiring no interference at the hands of this Court. 18. Yet, another submission made was that the death took place within three years of marriage and therefore Section 113-A comes into application and as such for this reason also, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed requires to be upheld by this Court. 19. In the light of the contentions put forward as above, the point for consideration is, whether the prosecution can be said to have proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt so as to uphold the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. 20. The Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2004 SC 4662 : (2004)13 SCC 257 : 2004 Cri. L.J. 4881 (SC) : 2005 SCC (Cri.) 178 has laid down following law. "The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convicting materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 21. Keeping the above principles in view, it has to be examined as to whether the judgment of the Trial Court can be held to be sustainable in law in the light of the evidence on record. The prosecution has mainly banked upon the dying declaration said to have been given by the deceased as per Ex. P.5. In view of the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant as regards the dying declaration and its trustworthiness, it is necessary to bear in mind the Apex Court decision referred to in this regard. 22. In the case of State of Orissa, it has been laid down that the absence of certificate showing deceased to be medically fit to make statement would render the dying declaration not reliable. 22. In the case of State of Orissa, it has been laid down that the absence of certificate showing deceased to be medically fit to make statement would render the dying declaration not reliable. In the case of Adevappa Nagappa Anagolkar, a Division Bench of this Court has held that the mental and physical condition of declarant has to be proved by a positive evidence and certificate of Doctor stating condition of declarant must be substantiated. In the very same decision it has been held that dying declaration should be short, concise and to the point and it is not desirable to have dying declaration in cyclostyled form. 23. In the case on hand, it is not in controversy between the parties that dying declaration-Ex. P. 5 is in cyclostyled form and the columns have been filled up by the Tahsildar. Therefore, the dying declaration does not fulfill the requirement of law as laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the aforementioned case of Adevappa. 24. Secondly, it is the case of the prosecution that dying declaration was recorded in the presence of the Doctor. But, the very evidence of the Doctor examined as P.W. 6-Dr. Suchetha is that, after giving the mental and physical condition of the patient to the Tahsildar, she went away. The witness has further deposed that after the Tahsildar started recording dying declaration, she went away. She has also admitted in her evidence that in Ex. P. 5 she has not written that the patient was in a fit case to make statement. This evidence of the Doctor therefore has to be examined in the light of the evidence of the Tahsildar himself. The Tahsildar has stated in his evidence that he took the right hand thumb impression of the patient and recorded and dying declaration between 3.10 p.m. and 3.30 p.m. in the presence of the Doctor. Thus, evidence of Tahsildar-P.W. 5 fully contradicts the evidence of the Doctor and as such, which of the two is telling the truth cannot be made out. 25. Nextly, the Tahsildar has deposed in his evidence that left hand was burnt when compared to right hand and therefore he obtained the right hand thumb impression. Again the witness has deposed that the entire body was burnt. 25. Nextly, the Tahsildar has deposed in his evidence that left hand was burnt when compared to right hand and therefore he obtained the right hand thumb impression. Again the witness has deposed that the entire body was burnt. If we look at the evidence of the complainant, he tells a different story as regards the capability of the deceased of putting her right hand thumb mark because P.W. 4 has deposed that he wrote the complaint and after it was read over, the victim put her left hand thumb impression. 26. Furthermore, it is in the evidence of the witness-P.W. 4 that the complaint was written in full till 4.00 p.m. and that nobody told him to have the complaint recorded nor even the police and he even enquired with the lady as to what treatment was given to her and does not remember whether her face was burnt and did not enquire from her as to whether she sustained the burn injuries. 27. Therefore, a close scrutiny of the evidence of this witness along with the evidence of the above witnesses gives rise to several conclusions being drawn and one of them is, whether it is possible for the victim to narrate the contents of the complaint till it was fully recorded by about 4.00 p.m and whether at the very same time she could have given the dying declaration between 3.10 p.m. and 3.30 p.m. 28. P.W. 4 does not whisper about the presence of the Doctor or the Tahsildar. Therefore, the above evidence of this witness gives rise to doubt the very origin of the dying declaration. 29. According to P.W. 5-Tahsildar, the entire body was burnt and if it is so, how the complainant would have given her complaint before P.W. 4 remains a mystery. Moreover, it is the evidence of the Doctor that the patient had 95% burn injuries and the said burn injuries had covered the whole body except both the soles of the feet, the face of the evidence of the Doctor-P.W. 6, it is rather difficult to accept the prosecution case that the complainant was able to put her thumb mark either of the left thumb or right thumb to the complaint or to the dying declaration. In the face of above serious infirmities in the prosecution evidence concerning the dying declaration and also taking note of the above mentioned decisions, I am of the view that the evidence surrounding dying declaration is not very convincing and therefore the Trial Court was in error in not appreciating the evidence from proper angle and the dying declaration therefore will have to be discarded as not having been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. 30. Coming to the offence of cruelty, it is the prosecution case that the accused demanded a sum of Rs. 20,000/-from the deceased and in that connection the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the husband and the mother-in-law. P.W. 1Nagayya who is the father of the deceased has deposed in his evidence that the accused were demanding from the deceased Rs. 20,000/-. He has also deposed to the effect that his daughter came home and told him that unless the amount is paid, she will not go to the house of the accused. P.W. 2 who is the mother does not whisper in her evidence about the demand made by the accused in the form of cash of Rs. 20,000/-. The complaint which is at Ex. P. 3 never makes a mention of the demand by the accused of Rs. 20,000/-and in that connection accused harassed the deceased. Therefore, the complaint allegations are quite contrary to the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 and as such, it is rather difficult to accept the prosecution case that the deceased was harassed by the accused in connection with demand of Rs. 20,000/-. 31. Looked from another angle, it is the very evidence of the prosecution witnesses, that the deceased was living in the house of the accused where her husband used to go for work and the other two namely, mother-in-law and brother-in-law were blind by birth, and were not in a position to do anything and required help all the time. The deceased therefore was very much depressed on account of she being required to take care two blind persons all through her life and this was the reason which led to the deceased becoming depressed. The deceased therefore was very much depressed on account of she being required to take care two blind persons all through her life and this was the reason which led to the deceased becoming depressed. In the evidence of the father of the deceased, it has come out that accused 2 and her son were blind by birth and all the work was to be done by someone else and his daughter was often asking him that she should not be kept in the house of the accused. Therefore, this evidence of P.W. 1 also gives rise to take the view that the deceased was not happy in the house of the accused and this could be one of the reasons which led her to commit suicide. 32. P.W. 5-Tahsildar has also deposed in his evidence that the injured did not complain about her mother-in-law as regards harassment and ill-treatment are concerned. 33. In the face of the above evidence on record, it cannot be said that the only reason for the deceased committing suicide is on account of demand made by the accused to bring Rs. 20,000/-from the house of the parents of the deceased. Since complaint is totally silent on the demand aspect, it is rather difficult to accept the prosecution evidence to take the view that the death of deceased was on account of cruelty by the accused persons. When the evidence on record permits two views being possible, the law is that the view that is in favour of the accused will have to be accepted. 34. Applying the above yardstick to the case on hand, as there is a possible view from the evidence on record, indicating that there was no demand by the accused by Rs. 20,000/-and as the mother-in-law was not harassing the deceased and as the deceased herself wanted to go back to her parents house because accused 2 and 3 were blind by birth and they required help from the deceased all the time, it is therefore reasonable to draw the inference from the above evidence on record that the death of the deceased could be for the reasons other than the alleged cruel treatment given to her by the accused. 35. 35. Such being the conclusion that can be drawn possibly from the evidence on record, learned Trial Judge therefore could have extended the benefit of doubt to the accused and as such, the view taken by the Trial Court is contrary to the whole evidence on record and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned cases and as such, I am of the view that it is a case fit enough to grant the benefit of doubt to the accused. Since accused 2 is dead and accused 1 is the only person in respect of whom this appeal has survived, the said accused therefore will have to be acquitted and as such I pass the following order. The appeal is allowed. Judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court is set aside and the accused is acquitted of the offences with which he was charged. His bail bond shall stand cancelled.