Judgment :- Bilal Nazki, J. In all these writ petitions the orders of detention detaining the detenues have been challenged and the question relating to the maintainability of these writ petitions is common. Therefore, this question is being considered and in the opinion of this Court same question of maintainability will apply to all writ petitions. The orders of detention passed against the detenus have been challenged at a pre-detention stage as the orders are yet to be executed. In this judgment, we will confine ourselves to the question as to whether these petitions are maintainable or not. 2. In all these matters detention orders have been passed sometime back. The detention orders have not been executed and orders of detention have been challenged. The question which needs to be answered at the outset is whether this Court would be in a position to quash the order of detention prior to actual detention and if no in what circumstances. This question seems to have attracted the attention of the Courts including the Supreme Court of India on number of occasions. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners and also the learned Advocate General elaborately. To decide this question no facts relating to the cases in hand need to be mentioned. 3. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner that if the Court finds that the order of detention is bad on any count, it will serve no purpose to force the detenu to surrender and go to jail before his order of detention is quashed. He further submitted that the Court would be failing in its duty to ask a person to go to jail and knock at the door of the court although he could show to the court before the detention that the order of detention was bad. On the other hand, learned Advocate General contended that this question was considered on various occasions by the Supreme Court of India and this Court will have to go by the judgments of the Supreme Court and according to the learned Advocate General although there are different judgments of different benches of the High Courts but the opinion which will bind this Court is expressed in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Additional Secretary to the Government of India & Ors. V/s Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and Anr. V/s Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and Anr. Reported in (1992 Supp (1) SCC 496). After going through the case law which was shown to us, we believe that the Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) was the first case in which the question arose as to whether a petition can be entertained at a pre-detention stage challenging the order of detention. Thereafter there are dozens of judgments of various courts including many judgments from the Supreme Court. Therefore, what we are supposed to do is to find out what is the binding precedent for this Court as it may not be obviously necessary for this Court to frame its own opinion if there was a binding precedent of the Supreme Court. In Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) the Supreme Court considered this question in detail. This judgment was delivered by three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court. The question which was framed by the Supreme Court for consideration was mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Judgment in the following words: "The next question of law that falls for consideration is whether the detenu or anyone on his behalf is entitled to challenge the detention order without the detenu submitting or surrendering to it. As a corollary to this question, the incidental question that has to be answered is whether the detenu or the petitioner on his behalf, as the case may be, is entitled to the detention order and the grounds on which the detention order is made before the detenu submits to the order.” Thereafter, in paragraph 11, the Supreme Court discussed the nature of safeguards provided under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, vis-à-vis the personal liberty. But then in paragraph 12 it also expressed the opinion that the Supreme Court would not say that the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively has no role to play once the order of detention – punitive or preventive – is shown to have been made under the law so made for the purpose. The Supreme Court was of the view that the Constitution does not place any restriction on these powers, the judicial decisions have evolved certain restrictions over a period of years taking into consideration the nature of the right infringed or threatened to be infringed, the scope and object of the legislation or of the order or decision complained of. Certain limitations have been put by the courts themselves. Then it went on to say that in cases of quashing of detention orders at the pre-detention stage the Courts have necessary powers in appropriate cases to interfere with the detention order but the scope of interference was limited to the following exceptions: (i) That the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed; (ii) That it is sought to be executed against a wrong person; (iii) That it is passed for a wrong purpose; (iv) That it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds; or (v) That the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. So the law laid down in Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) that the order can be quashed at a pre-detention stage provided the order of detention falls in any one of the categories mentioned above. After this case, the question again arose as to whether these exceptions were exhaustive or only illustrative. Some of the Benches held that these exceptions were exhaustive and the order of detention could not be quashed at a pre-detention stage unless it fell under these exceptions. Whereas some of the Benches held that these exceptions were only illustrative and therefore the courts should intervene at a pre-detention stage even if the detention order does not fall under any of these exceptions. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) is interpreted by the different benches of the Supreme Court in different way. Some of the judgments which have been placed before us are being referred presently. 4. We have been taken to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajinder Arora v/s Union of India & Others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 796 ). In this case the Supreme Court while referrering to Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) held that a pre-detention order can be quashed only on a limited ground. 4. We have been taken to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajinder Arora v/s Union of India & Others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 796 ). In this case the Supreme Court while referrering to Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) held that a pre-detention order can be quashed only on a limited ground. Thereafter in the case of Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v/s L. Himingliana & Anr., reported in (1994) 6 SCC 14 ), the Supreme Court while referring to the Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) in paragraph 11 said, “Bound as we are by the above judgments, we must hold that the other contingencies, if any, must be of the same species as of the five contingencies referred to therein”. The Supreme Court again considered this question in the case of Alpesh Navinchandra Shah v/s State of Maharashtra and others, reported in (2007) 2 SCC 777 ). But in this case the Supreme Court found the case before it covered by third exception laid down in Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra). It had no occasion to say whether the exception laid down in Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) were illustrative or exhaustive. Then comes the most important judgment of the Supreme Court on which reliance is placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner. This is a later judgment passed in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 77 of 2008 (Deepak Bajaj v/s State of Maharashtra & Anr.) on 12th November, 2008. This judgment is by a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court. It took note of the judgment in Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) and then it also took note of some other judgments of the court. In paragraphs 16 and 17, this Bench noted as under: “16. Shri Shekhar Nafade, learned senior counsel for the State of Maharashtra submitted that the five conditions mentioned in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) were exhaustive and not illustrative. We cannot agree. As already stated above, a judgment is not a statute, and hence cannot be construed as such. In Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) this Court only wanted to lay down the principle that entertaining a petition against a preventive detention order at a pre-execution stage should be an exception and not the general rule. We entirely agree with that proposition. In Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) this Court only wanted to lay down the principle that entertaining a petition against a preventive detention order at a pre-execution stage should be an exception and not the general rule. We entirely agree with that proposition. However, it would be an altogether different thing to say that the five grounds for entertaining such a petition at a pre-execution stage mentioned in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) are exhaustive. In our opinion they are illustrative and not exhaustive. 17. If a person against whom a preventive detention order has been passed can show to the Court that the said detention order is clearly illegal why should he be compelled to go to jail? To tell such a person that although such a detention order is illegal he must yet go to jail though he will be released later is a meaningless and futile exercise.” Then in paragraph 28 the Supreme Court said as under: "Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that a writ of habeas corpus lies only when there is illegal detention, and in the present case since the petitioner has not yet been arrested, no writ of habeas corpus can be issued. We regret we cannot agree, and that for two reasons. Firstly, Article 226 and Article 32 of the Constitution permit the High Court and the Supreme Court to not only issue the writs which were traditionally issued by British Courts but these Articles give much wider powers to this Court and the High Court. This is because Article 32 and Article 226 state that the Supreme Court and High Court can issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, etc. and they can also issue orders and directions apart from issuing writs. The words `in the nature of' imply that the powers of this Court or the High Court are not subject to the traditional restrictions on the powers of the British Courts to issue writs. Thus the powers of this Court and the High Court are much wider than those of the British Courts.” We feel that our personal opinions are close to the opinion of the Supreme Court and we would have readily followed this judgment in entertaining the writ petitions. But the difficulty is that there are other judgments taking contrary view. Thus the powers of this Court and the High Court are much wider than those of the British Courts.” We feel that our personal opinions are close to the opinion of the Supreme Court and we would have readily followed this judgment in entertaining the writ petitions. But the difficulty is that there are other judgments taking contrary view. In Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v/s L. Himingliana, reported in (1994 AIR SCW 4975), a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while considering this question said: "10. Having given our anxious consideration to the above contention of Mr. Jethmalani, we are unable to accept the same. In the passage, earlier quoted from Alka Subhash Gadia (1992 Suppl (1) SCC 496), this Court has expressly laid down that the interference with detention orders at pre-execution stage has to be limited in scope and number as mentioned therein. The Court has reiterated the same view as will be evident from the following further observations made in that case: ".in the rare cases where the detenue, before being served with them, learns of the detention order and the grounds on which it is made, and satisfied the Court of their existence by proper affirmation, the Court does not decline to entertain the writ petition even at the pre-execution stage, of course, on the very limited grounds stated above.” 11. The above principles laid down in Alka Subhash Gadia (1992 Suppl (1) SCC 496) have been quoted with approval by another three Judge Bench in N. K. Bapna v/s Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 512 . Bound as we are by the above judgments, we must hold that the other contingencies, if any, must be of the same species as of the five contingencies referred to therein. Coming now to Mr. Jethmalani's submission that the detention order was passed `for a wrong purpose', namely, to harass and humiliate the appellant by concocting a false case of smuggling, based primarily on a confession obtained from him after subjecting to him to assault, illegal detention and extortion we find that the detaining authority has denied the allegations of assault and extortion. Needless to say these are disputed questions of fact, which we cannot entertain much less delve into or decide upon in any case, the said fact, even if true cannot vitiate the order of detention. Needless to say these are disputed questions of fact, which we cannot entertain much less delve into or decide upon in any case, the said fact, even if true cannot vitiate the order of detention. As regards the allegation of illegal detention, the respondents have drawn our attention to the following lines in paragraph 10 of their affidavit-in-reply: ".........the petitioner was allowed to stay in the Air Intelligence Office as the investigation had to be done to find out the whereabouts of the receiver of the contraband gold, the information of which was given by the petitioner to me and other investigating officers during the course of interrogation. The petitioner was interrogated only and not arrested as alleged by him. The petitioner was arrested only on 24590 and produced before Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 25590.” to contend that there was no breach of constitutional or legal provision as the petitioner was produced before a competent Court within 24 hours of his formal arrest. In our considered view, even if it is held that the above explanation offered by the respondents for delayed production is not a satisfactory one and that the Customs Officers have failed to comply with constitutional and statutory requirements, the order of detention which has been made by the detaining authority on the basis of its satisfaction that the petitioner was smuggling gold, would not be bad on that score. The appellant, however, would be certainly entitled to seek appropriate relief by way of compensation or otherwise in case he succeeds in proving that he was wrongfully and illegally detained. For the foregoing discussion, we are unable to hold that the order of detention is made for a purpose extraneous to the provisions of COFEPOSA.” In Administration of the Natinoal Capital of Delhi, Raj Niwas, Delhi v/s Prem Singh, reported in 1996 SCC (Cri.) 54, is again a two Judge Bench Judgment. In paragraph 6 the Supreme Court held: "6. Unless and until anyone of the grounds has been established, the court is powerless to interfere. In other words no interference at the pre-detention stage is permitted on any other grounds; otherwise the very object to preventive detention is thwarted. In this connection we also note a stay of detention also had been granted. Unless and until anyone of the grounds has been established, the court is powerless to interfere. In other words no interference at the pre-detention stage is permitted on any other grounds; otherwise the very object to preventive detention is thwarted. In this connection we also note a stay of detention also had been granted. On a proper occasion we may have to consider the correctness of such orders granting stay.” A reference to the grounds in this observation was to the grounds mentioned in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra). In Union of India v/s Munesh Suneja, reported in JT 2001 (2) SC 416, which again is a judgment by two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. In paragraph 7 the same view was expressed. Then a reference is made by the learned Advocate General to a Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N. K. Bapna v/s Union of India, reported in (1992) 3 SCC 512 . This Judgment was by the three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court. This was a writ petition filed by a person against whom an order of detention had been passed, but he had not been detained. In paragraph 3 the Supreme Court mentioned the fact that in September, 1991, the Customs Officials discovered a shortage of 93,975 metric tons of P.V.C. Resin and a similar shortage also in the stock of EHA kept in the warehouse. Certain enquiries and proceedings ensued and the petitioner came to the court saying that he came to know that the order of detention had been passed against him under the law relating to the detention. The Supreme Court in paragraph 4 stated thus: "4. It is now well settled that, even in a case of preventive detention, it is not necessary the proposed detenu to wait till a detention order is served upon him before challenging the detention order. It is true that the Constitution of India, which permits preventive detention requires the detaining authorities to serve the grounds of detention within a prescribed period after the detention order is served on the detenu. It does not envisage any disclosure of the grounds of detention prior to the service of the detention order on the detenu. To apprise the detenu in advance of the grounds on which he is proposed to be detained may well frustrate the very purpose of the law. It does not envisage any disclosure of the grounds of detention prior to the service of the detention order on the detenu. To apprise the detenu in advance of the grounds on which he is proposed to be detained may well frustrate the very purpose of the law. On the other hand, to insist that no order of detention can be challenged until actual detention in pursuance thereof takes place might irretrievably prejudice the rights of proposed detenus in certain situations. Thus, the conflicting claims of the State and the fundamental right of a citizen need to be reconciled and the limitations, if any, precisely enunciated. This has been done by the recent decision of this Court in The Additional Secretary to the Government of India & Ors. V/s Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and Ors. 1991 (1) J.T. (S.C.) 549. The real question of law that fell for consideration before the court in that case was whether the detenu or anyone on his behalf is entitled to challenge the detention order without the detenu submitting or surrendering to it and if so in what type of cases. As a corollary to this question, the incidental question that had to be answered was whether the detenu or the petitioner on his behalf, is entitled to the detention order and the grounds on which the detention order is made before the detenu submits to the order The first question was answered by saying that the courts have power to interfere even before the detention order is served or the detention is effected but that such power will be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases of the type enunciated therein.” In the said paragraph 4 the Court further observed: “In view of the discussion aforesaid, the answer to this question has to be firmly in negative for various reasons. In the first instance, as stated earlier, the Constitution and the valid law made thereunder do not make any provision for the same. On the other hand, they permit the arrest and detention of a person without furnishing to the detenu the order and the grounds thereof in advance. In the first instance, as stated earlier, the Constitution and the valid law made thereunder do not make any provision for the same. On the other hand, they permit the arrest and detention of a person without furnishing to the detenu the order and the grounds thereof in advance. Secondly, when the order and the grounds are served and the detenu is in a position to make out prima facie the limited grounds on which they can be successfully challenged, the courts, as pointed out earlier, have power even to grant bail to the detenu pending the final hearing of his petition. Alternatively, as stated earlier, the Court can and does hear such petition expeditiously to give the necessary relief to the detenu. Thirdly, in the rare cases where the detenu, before being served with them, learns of the detention order and the grounds on which it is made and satisfies the Court of their existence by proper affirmation, the Court does not decline to entertain the writ petition even at the pre-execution stage of course, on the very limited grounds stated above. The Court no doubt even in such cases is not obliged to interfere with the impugned order at that stage and may insist that the detenu should first submit to it. It will, however, depend on the facts of each case. The decisions and the orders cited above show that in some genuine cases, the Courts have exercised their powers at the pre-execution stage, though such cases have been rare. This only emphasizes the fact that the courts have power to interfere with the detention orders even at the pre-execution stage but they are not obliged to do so nor will it be proper for them to do so save in exceptional cases. Much less can a detenu claim such exercise of power as a matter of right. The discretion is of the Court and it has to be exercised judicially on well-settled principles.” Though it appears that this judgment approves the view that the exceptions laid down in Smt. Alka Subhas Gadia's case (supra) were exhaustive but it did not expressly interpret the judgment like that. But a later Judgment in the case of Sayed Taher Bawamiya v/s Joint Secretary to the Government of India and Ors., reported in (2000) 9 SCC 630. But a later Judgment in the case of Sayed Taher Bawamiya v/s Joint Secretary to the Government of India and Ors., reported in (2000) 9 SCC 630. Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the matter and in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment held as under: "6. This Court in Alka Subhash Gadia case was also concerned with a matter where the detention order had not been served but the High Court had entertained the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court held that equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 32 which is discretionary in nature would not be exercised in a case where the proposed detenu successfully evades the service of the order. The Court, however, noted that the courts have the necessary power in appropriate cases to interfere with the detention order at the pre-execution stage but the scope for interference is very limited. It was held that the courts will interfere at the pre-execution stage with the detention orders only after they are prima facie satisfied (i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed, (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person, (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose, (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds, or (v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. 7. As we see it, the present case does not fall under any of the aforesaid five exceptions for the court to interfere. It was contended that these exceptions are not exhaustive. We are unable to agree with this submission. Alka Subhash Gadia case shows that it is only in these five types of instances that the court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 at the pre-execution stage. The petitioner had sought to contend that the order which was passed was vague, extraneous and on irrelevant grounds but there is no material for making such an averment for simple reason that the order of detention and the grounds on which the said order passed has not been placed on record in as much as the order has not yet been executed. The petitioner does not have a copy of the same and therefore it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the nonexistent order was passed on vague, extraneous or on irrelevant grounds.” The three Judge Bench was categorical while interpreting the judgment in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra) that the exceptions laid down were exhaustive. Where the two Judge Bench in Deepak Bajaj's case (supra) was of the opinion that they were not exhaustive. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has also relied on another unreported judgment of the Supreme Court passed in the case of Maqsood Yusuf Merchant v/s Union of India & Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. ___ of 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Cri.) No. 5000 of 2008) decided on 22nd August, 2008. This was a case in altogether different circumstances and it may not serve any of our purposes since the order of detention passed in the year 2002 had not been executed till the year 2008. However, the Court gave liberty to the Union of India to pass fresh order if the appellant indulged in any such activities in future. He has also relied on unreported judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Smt. Gopa Manish Vora v/s Union of India & Anr. (Writ Petition (Cri.) No. 2444 of 2006). The Delhi High Court has also taken note of the judgment of the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court mentioned herein above. 5. The question now would be whether this Court is bound by the three Judge Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court or two Judge Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court. Though we have said that the opinion of the three Judge Bench is close to our opinion, but we feel that we are bound to follow the three Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court. This we say on the strength of the judgment of the Supreme Court itself. We may refer to the judgment in the case of Official Liquidator v/s Dayanand and Ors., reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1 . We may also refer to certain paras of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Pradip Chandra Parija v/s Pramod Chandra Patnaik, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 1 , which are as under: "3. We may point out, at the outset, that in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. We may also refer to certain paras of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Pradip Chandra Parija v/s Pramod Chandra Patnaik, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 1 , which are as under: "3. We may point out, at the outset, that in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha a Bench of five Judges considered a somewhat similar question. Two learned Judges in that case doubted the correctness of the scope attributed to a certain provision in an earlier Constitution Bench Judgment and, accordingly, referred the matter before them directly to a Constitution bench. The constitution Bench that then head the matter took the view that the decision of a constitution Bench binds a Bench of two learned Judges and that judicial discipline obliges them to follow it, regardless of their doubts about its correctness. At the most, the Bench of two learned Judges could have ordered that the matter be heard by a Bench of three learned Judges. 5. The learnedAttorney General submitted that a constitution Bench judgment of this Court was binding on smaller Benches and a judgment of three learned Judges was binding on Benches of two learned Judges – a proposition that learned counsel for the appellants did not dispute. The learned Attorney General drew our attention to the judgment of a Constitution Bench in Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability v. Union of India where it has been said that `Ino coordinate Bench of this Court can even comment upon, let alone sit in judgment over, the discretion exercised or judgment rendered in a cause or matter before another coordinate Bench' (SCC p.98 para 5). The learned Attorney General submitted that the appropriate course for the Bench of two learned Judges to have adopted, if it felt so strongly that the judgment in Nityananda Kar was incorrect, was to make a reference to a Bench of three learned Judges. That Bench of three learned Judges, if it also took the same view of Nityananda Kar, could have referred the case to a Bench of five learned Judges. 6. In the present case the Bench of two learned Judges has, in terms, doubted the correctness of a decision of Bench of three learned Judges. They have, therefore, referred the matter directly to a Bench of five Judges. 6. In the present case the Bench of two learned Judges has, in terms, doubted the correctness of a decision of Bench of three learned Judges. They have, therefore, referred the matter directly to a Bench of five Judges. In our view, judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of Bench of three learned Judges. But if a Bench of two learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is to refer the matter before it to a Bench of three learned Judges setting out, as has been done here, the reason why it could not; agree with the earlier judgment. If, then the Bench of three learned Judges also comes to the conclusion that the earlier judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges is incorrect, reference to a Bench of five learned Judges is justified.” So law is well settled that even smaller Benches of the Supreme Court are bound by the Judgments of the larger Benches. Which means that a Bench of two Judges has to follow the law laid down by the three Judge Bench and in case two Judges do not agree with the law laid down by three Judge Bench they can refer it to a three Judge Bench which may agree with earlier or refer to larger Bench. We may point out that the three Judge Bench judgment in Sayed Taher Bawamiya (supra) was not at all brought to the notice of the three Judge Bench which decided the case of Deepak Bajaj (supra) and for the reasons given by us hereinabove, we find we are bound by the law laid down in the case of Sayed Taher Bawamiya (supra). 6. In the result, we hold that the writ petition can be entertained at pre-detention stage only if the detention is questioned on any of the grounds mentioned in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra). 7. We are not deciding these writ petitions on merits. After deciding the question of maintainability let the writ petitions be listed so that individually they are taken to examine whether they can be entertained applying the test laid down in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra). 8. 7. We are not deciding these writ petitions on merits. After deciding the question of maintainability let the writ petitions be listed so that individually they are taken to examine whether they can be entertained applying the test laid down in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case (supra). 8. Thewrit petitions be, accordingly, separately listed for further hearing before the appropriate Bench.