JUDGMENT DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 1. ORDER No. 72, dated September 18, 2008, passed by the Judge, 2nd Industrial Tribunal, is called in Question in the present petition. By the said order, the petitioner (hereafter the employer) has been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 13,500 to the third respondent (hereafter the workman) within three months from date. It is noticed from the impugned order that the Tribunal overruled the objection raised by the employer that the reference is not maintainable. 2. WHILE arguing that the impugned order is illegal and hence unsustainable in law, Sri Bhanja Chowdhury, learned counsel for the employer contended that the workman did not raise any dispute with the employer and, therefore, the Government erred in making the reference vide Order, dated March 31, 2004. Reliance was placed on the decision in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat AIR 1968 SC 529 : 1968-I-LLJ-834, wherein the Apex Court held as follows: "... If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as defined/must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen and workmen. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute...." The order of reference, dated March 31, 2004, was next questioned. According to him, the workman had on his own left the service of the employer without taking any permission after defalcating an amount of Rs. 5,000. Since the workman had voluntarily left service, the reference made by the Government ought to be interdicted by the Court of writ. 3. LEARNED counsel for the employer and the workman have been heard at length. Two questions fall for a decision of this Court, viz. (i) assuming that the workman did not raise any dispute with the employer, was the Government justified in making the reference? (ii) whether the order of reference is bad in law and hence liable to be set aside? 4. IT appears from Paras 5 and 7 of the petition that the workman had raised dispute before the Labour Directorate pursuant whereto the employer received notice from the Conciliation Officer. (ii) whether the order of reference is bad in law and hence liable to be set aside? 4. IT appears from Paras 5 and 7 of the petition that the workman had raised dispute before the Labour Directorate pursuant whereto the employer received notice from the Conciliation Officer. Conciliation proceeding was initiated, which ultimately culminated in a failure report being submitted. IT was thereafter that the Government made an order referring the industrial dispute between the employer and the workman to the Second Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.? The very fact that the workman insisted for reinstatement in service through the Conciliation Officer and the employer did not agree to take him back, in course of conciliation proceeding, is sufficient proof of a demand being raised which resulted in its refusal. The parties, were at logger-heads and, therefore, an industrial dispute did exist which could be referred. 5. THE decision in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat (supra), apparently supports the contention raised by Sri Bhanja Choudhury but in Avon (Services) Production Agencies (Private) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and Others AIR 1979 SC 170 : (1979) 1 SCC 1 : 1979-I-LLJ-l, the Apex Court ruled that the decision turns purely on the facts of the case. 6. IN Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, Jullundur AIR 1978 SC 1088 : (1978) 2 CCC 353 : 1978-I-LL.I-484 : (1978) 1 LLN 340, the Apex-Court after considering Sindhu Resettlement Corporation, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat (supra), ruled that the question whether an industrial dispute exists at the date of reference is a question of fact to be determined on the material placed before the Tribunal with the cautions enunciated in State of Madras v. CP. Sarathy, AIR 1953 SC 53 . While interfering with the award of the Tribunal holding the reference to be incompetent, the Apex Court noticed the further fact that when the union had approached the Conciliation Officer, the management had appeared before him and contested the claim for reinstatement. In view of the aforesaid decisions and the finding or fact reached by this Court that on the date reference was made an industrial dispute did exist between the employer and the workman, the first question is answered in the affirmative. 7. In view of the aforesaid decisions and the finding or fact reached by this Court that on the date reference was made an industrial dispute did exist between the employer and the workman, the first question is answered in the affirmative. 7. TO appreciate the submission of Sri Bhanja Chowdhury in relation to the second question, it would be appropriate to notice the issue that was referred to the Tribunal for adjudication by the Government, The issue, ignoring the spelling mistakes, reads as follows: (1) Whether the termination of service of Sri Jamuna Rai by way of refusal of employment by the management of Jagadamba Motors with effect from March 1, 2000 is justified? (2) What relief, if any, is the workman entitled to? 8. THE sheet anchor of the employer's claim that the order of reference is bad in law is a decision, dated February 16, 2007, of a learned Judge of this Court on W.P. No. 1557 (W) of 2003 (Hindustan Engineering and Industries Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Others). THE terms of reference appear to be similar and that was also a case argued by Sri Bhanja Chowdhury for the employer. Since the same submissions have been repeated before this Court, it would be appropriate to note his submissions as precisely recorded by His Lordship: "Sri Bhanja Chowdhury, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, submitted that termination of service and the refusal by the employer to continue to employ a workman employed under the employer, are two different concepts which are diametrically opposite to each other. According to Sri Chowdhury, termination of service means cessation of employment permanently, but refusal of employment by the management means suspension of work amounting to lockout within the meaning of Section 21): of the said Act. Lockout does not mean termination of service as the employees remain in service during the period of lockout. Thus, placing an employee under lockout does not amount to termination of service. Sri, Chowdhury, further submitted' that while referring the said dispute to the Tribunal for its resolution, the appropriate Government acted illegally by clubbing the said two diametrically opposite disputes in . one issue and thereby made the said reference ineffective and useless. Thus, placing an employee under lockout does not amount to termination of service. Sri, Chowdhury, further submitted' that while referring the said dispute to the Tribunal for its resolution, the appropriate Government acted illegally by clubbing the said two diametrically opposite disputes in . one issue and thereby made the said reference ineffective and useless. Under such circumstances, Sri Chowdhury invited this Court to reframe the issues appropriately, so that the dispute between the parties can be resolved once for all by the Tribunal." Having considered such submission, His Lordship proceeded to rule as follows: "It is no doubt true that termination of service means cessation of employment permanently. Termination of service amounts to severance of relationship between the employer and the employee, permanently. Refusal to give employment to an employee by the employer amounts to lockout within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the said Act. Lockout has been defined under Section 2(1) of the said Act in the following manner: 'Section 2(1) lockout means the temporary closing of a place of employment, or the suspension or work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him;' Thus, lockout cannot be equated with termination of service at par, as those two concepts are diametrically opposite to each other. Under such circumstances, this Court holds that those two disputed (sic disputes) cannot be clubbed together in one issue, as clubbing of those two diametrically opposite disputes in one issue will create confusion resulting failure of justice." 9. THE decision having been rendered by a Bench of co-ordinate strength, Sri Bhanja Chowdhury urged this Court to follow the same. 10. HAVING considered the decision of His Lordship, dated February 16,2007, this Court is unable to hold that it constitutes a binding precedent. It has not been disputed by Sri Bhanja Chowdhury that the provisions contained in Section 2 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter the Act) (as amended by West Bengal Act 33 of 1989 being the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1989) had not been placed for His Lordship's consideration. It has not been disputed by Sri Bhanja Chowdhury that the provisions contained in Section 2 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter the Act) (as amended by West Bengal Act 33 of 1989 being the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1989) had not been placed for His Lordship's consideration. Section 2-A, as it applies to the State of West Bengal, reads as under: "2-A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.- Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches, refuses employment or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, refusal of employment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute." (words in bold font are incorporated by amendment) 11. THOUGH the words "refusal by an employer to continue to employ" have been used in Section 2(1) of the said Act to connote "lockout," the words "refuses employment" and "refusal of employment" in Section 2-A of the Act in the context of the purpose for which they were incorporated therein by the Amendment Act of West Bengal have an entirely different meaning. Section 2A broadly deals with the right of an individual workman to raise an industrial dispute concerning his discharge/ dismissal/ retrenchment from service or if the employer refuses him employment or otherwise terminates his service irrespective of the fact that no other workman or union of workmen are party to the dispute. To understand what the words "refuses employment" and "refusal of employment" in Section 2-A connote, the doctrine noscitur a sociis provides true and proper guidance. The words discharge, dismiss, retrench are modes by which service of an employee may be terminated. Section 2-A also uses the expression 'otherwise terminates'. When the words "refuses employment" and "refusal of 'employment" have been grouped together with discharge, dismiss, retrench and termination in Section 2-A, each word draws colour from the other words therein. This is this principle of noscitur a sociis. Section 2-A also uses the expression 'otherwise terminates'. When the words "refuses employment" and "refusal of 'employment" have been grouped together with discharge, dismiss, retrench and termination in Section 2-A, each word draws colour from the other words therein. This is this principle of noscitur a sociis. This Court, accordingly, holds that the said words in Section 2-A of the Act ought not to be understood in the light of Section 2(1) thereof, for, 'the context does not require it to be so understood and it would be inconsistent, with the object of the statute. In Raghubans Narain Singh v. Uttar Pradesh Government AIR 1967 SC 465 , it was held as follows: "... It is a well-settled rule, of construction that where the Legislature uses the same expression in the same statute at two places or more then the same interpretation should be given to that expression unless the context requires otherwise. (emphasis supplied) 12. THE decisions cited by Sri Bhanja Chowdhury in P. VajraveluMudaliarv. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition AIR 1965 SC \ 0\7,F.S. Gandhi v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Allahabad (1990) 3 SCC 624 and Municipal Board, Kanpur v. Janki Prasad AIR 1963 All. 433 , are not directly on the point and hence would have no application in the facts of the present case. The decisions in Feroz Din and Others v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 363 : 1960-I-LLJ-244 and Sabitri Motor Service (Private), Ltd. v. State of West Bengal 1976 (33) FLR 14 relied on by Sri Bhanja Chowdhury do not come to the rescue of the employer. Section 2-A of the Act was not in existence at the time Feroz Din and Others v. State of West Bengal (supra) and Sabitri Motor Service (Private) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (supra), were decided. Hence, the authorities cited are not material for a decision here. 13. IN the present case it is the claim of the workman that the employer has refused to employ him after he returned whereas the employer's stand is different, as noticed above. Between the two which version is correct would require adjudication by the Tribunal upon reception of evidence. At this stage it can safely be concluded that the Government crystallized the dispute and what has been referred is indeed an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. Between the two which version is correct would require adjudication by the Tribunal upon reception of evidence. At this stage it can safely be concluded that the Government crystallized the dispute and what has been referred is indeed an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. The reference is unexceptionable and no interference therewith is warranted. 14. THE contentions raised by Sri Bhanja Chowdhury have not impressed this Court and for reasons discussed above, the employer is not at all entitled to grant of discretionary relief. The writ petition is dismissed: The workman shall be entitled to costs assessed at Rs. 3,400. 15. URGENT photostat certified copy of this judgment and order shall be furnished to the applicant as early as possible but positively within four days from putting in requisites therefor.