Judgment Challenge in this writ petition is to the Order dated 2. 2000 in Petition No.8 of 1998 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal, Chennai, whereby and whereunder, the application submitted by the petitioner for approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was rejected. The Relevant Facts:- .2. Petitioner is the State owned Transport Corporation. The first respondent joined the service of the petitioner as a driver on 310. 1980. Whileso, on 312. 1996, the bus driven by the first respondent met with an accident. The first respondent has driven the bus in a highly rash and negligent manner and dashed against a horse cart. Due to the accident, the horse died on the spot and the cart rider died subsequently. The accident was solely on account of the negligence of the first respondent and as such, the petitioner initiated departmental proceedings. 3. The first respondent was suspended as per Order dated 1. 1996. It was followed by charge memo dated 21. 1997. The first respondent memo dated 21. 1997. The first respondent was called upon to explain as to why action should not be taken against him on account of his misconduct. The first respondent submitted his explanation. Since the explanation was not satisfactory, petitioner decided to conduct enquiry. Accordingly, Enquiry Officer was appointed. Enquiry Officer submitted his report wherein it was stated that the charges framed against the petitioner was proved. The past record of the first respondent was also not satisfactory. The petitioner after the receipt of the enquiry report, considered the same and issued second Show Cause Notice on 12. 1997. The said notice was accompanied by a copy of the enquiry proceedings with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. The first respondent submitted his reply. Since there was no merit in the explanation submitted by the first respondent, the petitioner passed an Order on 2. 1998 dismissing him from service w.e.f. 2. 1998. The said Order was communicated to the first respondent along with a demand draft containing one month salary. Copy of the approval petition was also sent along with the said Order. 4. The petitioner filed an application before the second respondent to approve the action taken against the first respondent. The first respondent contested the matter on various grounds, including the delay in filing the application of approval. Copy of the approval petition was also sent along with the said Order. 4. The petitioner filed an application before the second respondent to approve the action taken against the first respondent. The first respondent contested the matter on various grounds, including the delay in filing the application of approval. It was his further contention that the Order was not accompanied by one month salary in total. 5. The Industrial Tribunal was of the view that there was no legal evidence in support of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. The Tribunal further rendered a factual finding that one month wages have not been paid to the first respondent and as such, there was violation of Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act and the approval application was dismissed. Accordingly, the management is before this Court. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the enquiry was conducted in a fair manner with due participation of the first respondent. The Assistant Engineer of the Corporation was examined as a witness and the rough sketch, first information report and other relevant materials were marked to substantiate the contention that the first respondent was highly negligent and the accident was solely on account of his reckless driving. According to the learned counsel, the principle of res ipsa loquitur applies and as such, in a matter like this where there was no direct evidence of the negligence of the first respondent, the matter has to be decided on the basis of the available evidence. The learned counsel would further contend that one month salary was in fact sent along with the Order of termination. The contention of the first respondent was on the basis that dearness allowance was enhanced subsequently and as such, it cannot be said that one month salary has not been paid. In short, the learned counsel attacked the findings rendered by the Industrial Tribunal, as according to him, the finding is nothing but perverse. .7. The learned counsel for the first respondent justified the award of the Industrial Tribunal. According to the learned counsel, there was no evidence much less acceptable legal evidence to substantiate the contention that the accident was only on account of the reckless driving by the first respondent. The learned counsel would further contend that no eye witness was examined to prove the negligence of the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, there was no evidence much less acceptable legal evidence to substantiate the contention that the accident was only on account of the reckless driving by the first respondent. The learned counsel would further contend that no eye witness was examined to prove the negligence of the petitioner. The learned counsel also supported the finding with regard to non-payment of the entire wages for the month in question. According to the learned counsel, as per the salary bill for the month of January 1998, the salary was a sum of Rs.4,887.07. However, the first respondent was paid only a sum of Rs.4,607.25 and as such, it cannot be stated to be the full wages for one month. .Analysis:- 8. The proceeding before the second respondent was an approval application filed by the Management under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. .9. The accident in question was at about 9.15 p.m. On 312. 1996. The first respondent was driving the bus and it hit against a horse cart which was proceeding ahead of the bus. Mahazar and photographs produced would show that the left side of the bus hit against the right side of the horse cart, meaning thereby the bus was attempting to overtake the horse cart with the very same speed at which it came from behind. Explanation of the first respondent was to the effect that another vehicle came from the opposite side and on account of its light, he was not in a position to see the front side, and the accident has happened accordingly. Assistant Engineer of the petitioner Corporation inspected the spot and prepared an accident report and it was duly submitted to the Management. The said Engineer was examined as a witness on the side of the Management. 10. The enquiry was conducted by a retired Tahsildar. The explanation of the first respondent to the Show Cause Notice was to the effect that on account of the flash light of the vehicle which came from the opposite direction, he was not in a position to see the horse cart which was proceeding in front of the bus and the accident has happened accordingly. However, the witnesses examined on his side was having a different story. The first respondent has examined Tmt. However, the witnesses examined on his side was having a different story. The first respondent has examined Tmt. Saraswathi, working in the Social Welfare Department to substantiate his contention that the vehicle was not driven in a rash and negligent manner. Tmt. Saraswathi deposed before the Enquiry Officer that there was no proper light in the road and the bus was proceeding very slowly and at times, it was stopped. However Exhibit M-5 sketch prepared by MW-1 indicates the manner in which the accident has happened. .11. The Enquiry Officer, on the basis of the evidence adduced on the side of the respective parties, arrived at a categorical finding that the accident was solely on account of the negligence of the first respondent. Accordingly, the Enquiry Officer concluded that the charges were proved. The Industrial Tribunal concurred with the submissions made by the first respondent that there was no legal evidence adduced on the side of the management. According to the Tribunal, no eye witnesses were examined on the side of the petitioner. The first respondent was also acquitted by the criminal Court in respect of the very same accident. The charges framed against him was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that was the reason for the acquittal in C.C.No.166 of 1997. The Tribunal also found that the entire wages for the month of January 1998 was not paid and as such, there was no compliance of the mandatory provisions. The contention raised by the first respondent with regard to the delay in filing the application for approval was negatived. The award does not indicate that the Tribunal has considered the merits of the matter. The Tribunal was mainly recording the submissions of the counsel for the first respondent and the decision relied on in support of his contention that eye witnesses were not examined to prove the accident. There was no effort taken by the Industrial Tribunal to consider the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer and to come to a finding that the report was made without evidence. The Tribunal has very mechanically considered the matter and abruptly arrived at a conclusion that there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry Officer to arrive at a conclusion that the accident was solely on account of the rash and negligent driving by the first respondent. 12. The Tribunal has very mechanically considered the matter and abruptly arrived at a conclusion that there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry Officer to arrive at a conclusion that the accident was solely on account of the rash and negligent driving by the first respondent. 12. The first respondent has submitted his explanation to the Show Cause Notice issued by the management. In the said Show Cause Notice, it was his contention that because of bright light from a lorry which came in the opposite direction and as the cart was not painted with red at the rear side, the bus dashed against the cart in spite of his best efforts to stop the vehicle. However, the so called eye witness to the incident by name Tmt. Saraswati, who was examined on the side of the first respondent gave a totally different version. The said aspect has not been considered by the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal proceeded as if the accident occurred during broad day light in the presence of eye witnesses. The accident occurred at about 9.15 p.m. and even according to the first respondent, the place of accident was a remote place where there was no light at all. Therefore, the question of getting eye witness to prove the negligence of the first respondent was but of question. .13. The Industrial Tribunal dismissed the approval application also on the ground that one month salary was not paid along with the Order of dismissal. In order to arrive at such conclusion, the Tribunal placed reliance on a salary bill for the month of January, 1998 which according to the Tribunal shows that the salary was a sum of Rs.4,8870. However, the first respondent was paid only Rs.4,607.25 by way of demand draft dated 21. 1998. The said fact was taken as the material to arrive at the conclusion that there was violation of mandatory provision. However, the fact remains that no such document was marked in the proceeding. The so called salary slip for the month of January 1998 was not even produced before the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, there was no admissible material before the Industrial Tribunal to arrive at a decision that what was paid to the first respondent by way of Demand Draft dated 21. 1998 was not the actual salary payable to him. The so called salary slip for the month of January 1998 was not even produced before the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, there was no admissible material before the Industrial Tribunal to arrive at a decision that what was paid to the first respondent by way of Demand Draft dated 21. 1998 was not the actual salary payable to him. In the rejoinder submitted by the writ petitioner, they have explained the so called shortage, as according to them, arrears of Dearness Allowance for the month of January 1998 was to be paid along with the salary for the month of February 1998. Therefore, the first respondent was not entitled to the Dearness Allowance of Rs.94.50 for the month of January 1998. In fact, the said Dearness Allowance was sent to the first respondent on 38. 1998. Those contentions were not taken into consideration by the Industrial Tribunal. .14. The application before the Tribunal being a proceeding for approval, the Tribunal was expected to consider as to whether the employer has satisfied the ingredients of the said provision. The second respondent was exercising a quasi judicial function. Therefore, the Tribunal was expected to consider the matter in detail and to arrive at a finding as to whether the petitioner has made out a case for approval. There should be reasons indicated in the Order. The Tribunal was expected to consider the contentions raised by the respective parties threadbare. The award should speak for itself. .Legal position:- 15. The scope and ambit of the jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act was considered by the Supreme Court in the light of the earlier decisions in Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, AIR 2005 SC 570 : (2005) 3 SCC 241 : 2005-I-LLJ-569, wherein it was stated thus at p. 573 of LLJ: 17. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal while considering an application for grant of approval has succinctly been stated by this Court in Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee AIR 1958 SC 79 : 1958-I-LLJ-247. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal while considering an application for grant of approval has succinctly been stated by this Court in Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee AIR 1958 SC 79 : 1958-I-LLJ-247. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see as to whether a prima facie case has been made out as regards the validity or otherwise of the domestic enquiry held against the delinquent, keeping in view the fact that if the permission or approval is granted, the order of discharge or dismissal which may be passed against the delinquent employee would be liable to be challenged in an appropriate proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. In Martin Burn case this Court stated: Submissions:-“A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the Tribunal considering this question may itself have arrived at a different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its own judgment for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider whether the view taken is a possible view on the evidence on the record. (See Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. V. Workers of the Company 1951-II-LLJ-314)” 19. The Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was required to bear in mind the aforementioned legal principles. Furthermore, in a case of this nature the probative value of the evidence showing the extensive damages caused to the entire left side of the bus; the fact that the bus first hit the branches of a tamarind tree and then stopped at a distance of 81 ft therefore even after colliding with another bus coming from the front deserved serious consideration at the hands of the Tribunal. The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently. 16. The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently. 16. In State of Haryana and Another v. Rattan Singh AIR 1977 SC 1512 : (1977) 2 SCC 491 , the Supreme Court observed that sophisticated rules of the Evidence Act may not have any application in a departmental proceeding. The relevant paragraph would read thus:- “4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic Tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the Courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the Tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence – not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic Tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. 17. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic Tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. 17. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam (supra), the bus driven by the respondent met with an accident resulting in death of seven passengers. The Corporation initiated disciplinary proceedings as according to them, the bus was driven in a rash and negligent manner. Subsequently, enquiry was conducted against the respondents and the Enquiry Officer found that the allegations of misconduct was proved. Accordingly, the employee was dismissed from service. Since an industrial dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, management filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act for approval. However, the Tribunal rejected the application. The matter was taken to the High Court and the writ petition was dismissed and an intra-Court appeal was taken before the Division Bench and the said appeal was also dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the delinquent driver contended that only because an accident had taken place, the same by itself in the absence of strict proof thereof and having regard to the fact that he was acquitted in the criminal trial, cannot be held to be a ground to infer that the misconduct stood proved. The said contention was negatived by the Supreme Court, The Supreme Court observed that in such cases, the principle of res ipsa loquitur would be applicable and once it was found that the said principle had application, the burden of proof would shift to the delinquent. The following paragraphs would make the position clear:- “19. It is further trite that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry vis-à-vis a criminal trial is absolutely different. Whereas in the former “preponderance of probability” would suffice; in the latter, “proof beyond all reasonable doubt” is imperative. 20. The Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was required to bear in mind the aforementioned legal principles. Whereas in the former “preponderance of probability” would suffice; in the latter, “proof beyond all reasonable doubt” is imperative. 20. The Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was required to bear in mind the aforementioned legal principles. Furthermore, in a case of this nature the probative value of the evidence showing the extensive damages caused to the entire left side of the bus; the fact that the bus first hit the branches of a tamarind tree and then stopped at a distance of 81 ft therefrom even after colliding with another bus coming from the front deserved serious consideration at the hands of the Tribunal. The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently. 21. Res ipsa loquitur is a well-known principle which is applicable in the instant case. Once the said doctrine is found to be applicable the burden of proof would shift on the delinquent. As noticed hereinabove, the enquiry officer has categorically rejected the defence of the respondent that the bus was being driven at a slow speed. 22. In Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. this Court observed: “6. The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident ‘speaks for itself or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence”. 23. The said principle was applied in Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav. 24. In A.T. Mane this Bench observed: “5. …. Learned counsel relied on a judgment of this Court in support of this contention of his in the case of Karnataka SRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti. 23. The said principle was applied in Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav. 24. In A.T. Mane this Bench observed: “5. …. Learned counsel relied on a judgment of this Court in support of this contention of his in the case of Karnataka SRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti. That was also a case where a conductor concerned had committed similar misconduct 36 times prior to the time he was found guilty and bearing that fact in mind this Court held thus: ‘Be that as it may, the principle of res ipsa loquitur, namely, the facts speak for themselves, is clearly applicable in the instant case. Charging 50 paise per ticket more from as many as 35 passengers could only be to get financial benefit, by the conductor. This act was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent was not fit to be retained as a conductor because such action or inaction of his is bound to result in financial loss to the appellant Corporation’. 6. On the above basis, the Court came to the conclusion that the order of dismissal should have been set aside. In our opinion, the facts of the above case and the law laid down therein apply to the facts of the present case also”. .25. In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab this Court observed: .“4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into canal. In such a situation the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and the burden shifts on to the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part”. 26. The burden of proof was, therefore, on the respondent to prove that the vehicle was not being driven by him rashly or negligently. .27. Furthermore, in a case involving accident it is not essential to examine the passengers of the bus. In State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (supra) this Court observed: .“5. Reliance was placed, as earlier stated, on the non-compliance with the departmental instruction that statements of passengers should be recorded by inspectors. .27. Furthermore, in a case involving accident it is not essential to examine the passengers of the bus. In State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (supra) this Court observed: .“5. Reliance was placed, as earlier stated, on the non-compliance with the departmental instruction that statements of passengers should be recorded by inspectors. These are instructions of prudence, not rules that bind or vitiate in the violation. In this case, the inspector tried to get the statements but the passengers declined, the psychology of the latter in such circumstances being understandable, although may not be approved. We cannot hold that merely because statements of passengers were not recorded the order that followed was invalid. Likewise, the re-evaluation of the evidence on the strength of co-conductor’s testimony is a matter not for the Court but for the Administrative Tribunal. In conclusion, we do not think the Courts below were right in overturning the finding of the domestic Tribunal”. 28. Yet again, this Court in, A.T. Mane referring to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana and Another v. Rattan Singh (Supra) held: “5. ….In such circumstances, it was not necessary or possible for the appellant Corporation to have examined the passengers to establish the guilt of the respondent. He also submitted that the finding of the Labour Court and the learned single Judge that the punishment is disproportionate to the misconduct is wholly misconceived”. 18. The necessity to furnish reasons in support of conclusion was indicated by the Supreme Court in LIC of India v. R. Dhandapani AIR 2006 SC 615 : (2006) 13 SCC 613 : (2006) 1 MLJ 100 : 2006-I-LLJ-329, thus at p. 104 of MLJ:- 9. “In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well-meant but wholly unsustainable, tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the Courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability. 19. In Lalla Ram v. D.C.M. Chemical Works Ltd., AIR 1978 SC 1004 : (1978) 3 SCC 1 : 1978-I-LLJ-507, the Supreme Court indicated the manner of disposal of a proceeding under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act thus:- “The position that emerges from the above quoted decisions of this Court may be stated thus: In proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is confined to the enquiry as to .(i) whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the relevant rules/Standing Orders and principles of natural justice has been held; .(ii) whether a prima facie case for dismissal based on legal evidence adduced before the domestic Tribunal is made out; .(iii) whether the employer had come to a bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty and the dismissal did not amount to unfair labour practice and was not intended to victimize the employee regard being had to the position settled by the decisions of this Court in Bengal Bhatdee Coal Co. v. Ram Prabesh Singh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Kumar, Hind Construction & Engineering Col. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. v. Management and Eastern Electric & Trading Co. v. Ram Prabesh Singh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Kumar, Hind Construction & Engineering Col. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. v. Management and Eastern Electric & Trading Co. v. Baldev Lal that though generally speaking the award of punishment for misconduct under the Standing Orders is a matter for the management to decide and the Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe yet an inference of mala fides may in certain cases be drawn from the imposition of unduly harsh, severe, unconscionable or shockingly disproportionate punishment; .(iv) whether the employer has paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and .(v) whether the employer has simultaneously or within such reasonably short time as to form part of the same transaction applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him. If these conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal would grant the approval which would relate back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal. If however, the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or infirmity, the labour authority will have to find out on its own assessment of the evidence adduced before it whether there was justification for dismissal and if it so finds it will grant approval of the order of dismissal which would also relate back to the date when the order was passed provided the employer had paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and the employer had within the time indicated above applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him”. 20. In the case on hand, there was no attempt made by the Industrial Tribunal to ascertain as to whether the petitioner has made out a case for approval. There was no discussion of the materials produced by the petitioner. Though the Tribunal has arrived at a conclusion that no legal evidence was produced to substantiate the charges framed against the second respondent, there was no indication of any reason in the award in support of the finding. There was no discussion of the materials produced by the petitioner. Though the Tribunal has arrived at a conclusion that no legal evidence was produced to substantiate the charges framed against the second respondent, there was no indication of any reason in the award in support of the finding. The Tribunal has only extracted the submissions made by the counsel as well as the judgment relied on in support of such submissions. There was no effort taken by the learned Tribunal to substantiate the finding that there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry Officer. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act was not at all considered by the Industrial Tribunal. Similarly, the complaint raised by the respondent that the entire one month salary was not paid was decided on the basis of a certificate, which was not marked. In short, none of the findings rendered by the Industrial Tribunal were supported by reasons. In such circumstances, I am of the view that the matter requires to be re-considered by the Industrial Tribunal. 21. In the result, the award dated 2. 2000 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Industrial Tribunal for fresh consideration. 22. The writ petition is allowed with the above direction. No costs.