JUDGMENT J. N. PATEL, J. :- Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. Rule. 3. By consent of the parties heard forthwith. 4. The petitioner was required to approach this Court as she was not permitted to appear for Entrance Test which was to be conducted by the respondent No. 1 in respect of the candidates seeking admission to the first year courses of Management viz. MAR-MBA/MMS-CET -2009 for the academic session 2009-2010. At the time when this petition was taken up, this Court had granted interim relief in favour of the petitioner with a rider that though the petitioner is permitted to appear for the Entrance Examination, that by itself shall not create any equity in favour of the petitioner. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that she has acquired 44.59% of marks in the qualifying examination from the Institute of Science in the year 2008 having scored 602 marks out of 1350 whereas the basic qualification under the Rules which provide for eligibility criteria, particularly Rule 2.1 provides that the candidate should fulfil the following eligibility criteria in order to secure admission in the first year of two year full time MBAMMS/PGDBM/PGDM course i.e. passed with minimum of 45% marks in aggregate (40% in case of candidates of backward class categories belonging to Maharashtra State only) in any Bachelor's degree of minimum three years duration in any discipline recognised by the Association of Indian Universities. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U P. and another vs. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others, (2005) 2 SCC 10 wherein Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court president over by Chief Justice held that: "We do not find fault with any of the two reasoning's adopted by the High Court. The rule of rounding off based on logic and common sense is if part is one half or more, its value shall be increased to one and if part is less than half then its value shall be ignored. 46.50 should have been rounded off to 47 and not to 46 as has been done. If 47 candidates would have been considered for selection in general category, the respondent was sure to find a place in the list of selected meritorious candidates and hence entitled to appointment." 7. Mr. 46.50 should have been rounded off to 47 and not to 46 as has been done. If 47 candidates would have been considered for selection in general category, the respondent was sure to find a place in the list of selected meritorious candidates and hence entitled to appointment." 7. Mr. Sambre, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the petitioner did not possess eligibility criteria i.e. had secured less than 45% marks, which is contrary to the Rule which specifically requires that the candidate who want to secure admission should secure at least 45% marks (emphasis supplied) and submitted that the decision on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance pertains to service jurisprudence whereas there is a decision of the Rajasthan High Court directly on the issue of admission. In the case of Dr. Rajiv Mangal vs. Rajasthan University of Health Sciences and another, AIR 2007 Rajasthan 186 it has taken the view that in case the petitioner does not secure minimum percentage of marks he cannot be held eligible. In the said case, it was specifically stated that the learned Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of M P. and others vs. Gopal D. Tirthani and others, (2003) 7 SCC 83 and Three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mridul Dhar (minor) and another vs. Union of India and others, (2005) 2 SCC 65 and came to the conclusion that the expression "the minimum percentage of marks shall be 50% has to be read to mean atleast 50% of the total marks and by applying the process of rounding off, the eligibility cannot be provided which a candidate failed to achieve in the competitive examination. The rule of rounding off though founded on logic and common sense would not be attracted in the context of Regulation 7 framed by the Medical Council of India." 8. It is further submitted by Mr. Sambre that the decision in the case of State of U P. and others vs. Gopal D. Tirthani and others and Three Judge Bench decision in Mridul Dhar's case have been specifically dealt with by the Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court that the rule of rounding off founded on logic and common sense would not be attracted in such cases. Therefore, the decision in Pawan Kumar's case on which petitioner place reliance clearly stands distinguished. 9. In the re-joinder, Mr. Parchure, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn attention to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ku. Sheetal d/o Girish Puranik vs. Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University and another, Writ Petition No. 3698/2008 decided on September 17, 2008 where the High Court of Bombay has taken a view which is in consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Pawan Kumar Tiwari (supra). 10. In the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Raj Kumari (Smt.) and others, (2007) 12 SCC 768 in paras 12 and 13 the Supreme Court has spelt out the manner in which Courts are expected to consider the facts of each case for appreciation of precedent. Paras 12 and 13 reads as under: "12. "12.... ..Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it, is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is, important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates : (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows fro,;~ the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Union of India vs. Dhanwanti Devi). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Union of India vs. Dhanwanti Devi). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. In Quinn vs. Leathem the Earl of Hulsbury, L.C. observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be the exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides." "13. "19. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute (and that too taken out of their context). These observations must be read in the context in which they appear (to have been stated). Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. vs. Horton (AC at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D) 'The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge........ ' 20. In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. Lord Reid said (at All ER p. 297 g), '..... .Lord Atkin's speech........is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge........ ' 20. In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. Lord Reid said (at All ER p. 297 g), '..... .Lord Atkin's speech........is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. vs. Sandham (No.2) Observed: (All ER P. 1274d) 'One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament. And, in Herrington vs. British Railways Board Lord Morris said: (All ER p 761c) 'There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. 21. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 22. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus : Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you wills find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 11. Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you wills find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 11. Insofar as the case of Mridul Dhar (minor) and another vs. Union of India and others, (2005) 2 SCC 65 is concerned, it does not deal with the issue of rounding off marks though State of M P. and others vs. Gopal D. Tirthani and others disapproves such an approach on the premise that applying the process of rounding off, would not be attracted in the context of Regulation framed by the Medical Council of India which operates while preparing merit list on the basis of marks obtained in the competitive examination for seeking admission to P.G. Course in Pre P. G. Medical Examination. In our humble opinion, this can be clearly distinguished on facts for the reason that after a person is allowed to compete in the examination, thereafter the assessment of the candidate has to be strictly on merits. In medical faculty or any academic pursuit even a fraction of mark can make a world of difference and secure place in the merit list and, therefore, the process of rounding off may cause or amount to tinkering the merit list of all such candidates who score in between the fraction 5 plus and their marks are rounded and treated on par with the candidates having scored the whole mark of the increased value, but in order to enable a candidate to appear for competitive examination if this well known formula is adopted it does not affect the other candidates. Further, it will be inequitable and unjust to deprive a candidate to compete in entrance examination merely on the ground that he/she is not eligible having scored a fraction of mark less than 45% marks when it can be considered for rounding off as held in Pawan Kumar Tiwari's case. 12. Apart from the fact that the petitioner was provisionally permitted to appear in the Entrance' Examination, we called upon the learned Government Pleader to disclose the result of the petitioner. 12. Apart from the fact that the petitioner was provisionally permitted to appear in the Entrance' Examination, we called upon the learned Government Pleader to disclose the result of the petitioner. The learned Government Pleader has placed before us the result of the petitioner which was not declared by the respondent - The Director of Technical Education, Maharashtra State. On going through the result we find that the petitioner has scored 74 marks out of 200 i.e. 67.97 per cent. She qualifies as per the merit list and is likely to get admission. Therefore, we do not find any reason why this Court should not allow the petitioner to prosecute her studies if she is otherwise able to get admission in accordance with the merit list against the seat available for the course for which the CET was conducted. We are, therefore, of the view that the petition needs to be allowed. 13. We make the Rule absolute in terms of prayer clause (ii) and grant all the consequential benefits arising therefrom. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.