Judgment H.K. Rathod, J.— Heard learned Advocate Mr. K.N. Shastri for appellant and learned Advocate Mr. Mahesh B. Shah for respondent. 2. In this appeal, the appellant - Union of India has challenged award passed by Railway Claims Tribunal, Ahmedabad bench in case No. OA 0100024, dated 31.8.2007. The Railway Claims Tribunal has awarded Rs. 1,20,000/- with 6% running interest from date of petition till realization of awarded compensation. 3. Learned Advocate Mr. Shastri has raised contention before this Court that claimant has not made out any case of amount under provisions of Railways Act, 1989. He also raised contention before this Court that incident is not covered as an untoward incident as defined in Section 123(c)(2) of the Railways Act,1989. Learned Advocate Mr. Shastri also submitted it was a negligence on part of claimant and due to that, accident is occurred. For that, railway authority is not responsible at all. He also raised one contention before this Court that in respect to interest, one FA No. 4958 of 2007 is admitted by this Court on 25.10.2007 where submission made by learned advocate Mr. B.I. Mehta that Tribunal has committed error in awarding interest from date of application in view of judgment delivered in FA No. 24 of 2002 with CA No. 70 of 2002 in case between Union of India vs. Babulal Gangavat. Therefore, this appeal be also admitted. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. Shah submitted that Railway Claims Tribunal has rightly examined matter on basis of evidence on record. The appellant has not led any oral evidence before claims Tribunal and evidence of claimant remained unchallenged and no documentary evidence was produced on record by appellant. Therefore, he submitted that claims Tribunal has decided matter on basis of evidence on record and because of injury, claimant’s right foot was crushed and said foot was amputated from mid of the foot including toes. This has been proved by oral evidence supported by physical handicapped certificates as well as photographs of claimant. Therefore, he submitted that claims Tribunal has not committed any error which requires interference by this Court. He also submitted that question of interest has been rightly decided by claims Tribunal and appellant has not raised any contention before claims Tribunal in respect to interest that railway claims Tribunal is not competent or having jurisdiction to award interest in favour of claimant. He also submitted that question of interest has been rightly decided by claims Tribunal and appellant has not raised any contention before claims Tribunal in respect to interest that railway claims Tribunal is not competent or having jurisdiction to award interest in favour of claimant. Therefore, claims Tribunal has decided matter according to law and no interference is required by this Court. 5. I have considered submissions made by both learned Advocates and also perused award passed by claims Tribunal. The accident occurred on 11.6.2000. The claimant purchased railway tickets bearing No. 34039650 from Ahmedabad railway station for Palanpur. The application was filed under Section 124(A) of Railway Claims Tribunal Act. As soon as claimant tried to get into Memu train, due to jerk of train and push of other passengers, he fell down between train and platform and sustained serious injury on his foot and various part of his body. According to claimant, there was crush injury on both feet and other part of body and, therefore, total claim of compensation of Rs. 2 lacs was made from railway authority. The railway authority has filed reply against claim petition filed by claimant. Merely raising a contention that accident is not covered by untoward incident under Section 123(c)(2) of the Railways Act,1989. Thereafter, issues have been framed by claims Tribunal and matter has been considered on basis of evidence by claims Tribunal. The claimant filed claim petition for injury to his right foot as well as various parts of body on account of falling down from train. The claimant also filed affidavit in evidence along with certain documents including ticket, police papers, panchnama, photographs etc. The respondent means present appellant has not adduced any evidence to support resistance in form of written statement. Thereafter, claims Tribunal has examined claim petition filed by claimant. 6. The case of claimant is that on 11.6.2000 he had purchased railway ticket bearing No. 340039650 from Ahmedabad railway station for transit from Ahmedabad to Palanpur. As soon as he tried to get into Memu train, due to jerk of train and push of other passengers, he fell down between train and platform and sustained injuries on various parts of body. According to claimant, said injury was crush injury on both feet and other parts of body. The appellant has filed reply. As soon as he tried to get into Memu train, due to jerk of train and push of other passengers, he fell down between train and platform and sustained injuries on various parts of body. According to claimant, said injury was crush injury on both feet and other parts of body. The appellant has filed reply. The claimant also filed affidavit in evidence wherein same facts have been narrated by claimant. According to claimant, he was travelling by train namely Memu leaving from Ahmedabad to Palanpur along with his uncle named Dineshbhai A. Patni and due to heavy rush and push from passengers, he fell down from train and sustained grievous injury resulting into amputation of right foot. In his cross-examination, appellant has stated that when train arrived at railway station when it was slow he entered thereafter he received push from passengers and he fell down between platform and railway track. He also denied that he tried to board running train and thereof he feel down. In support of his affidavit, he has produced medical certificate from Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation as Exh.A-1. The certificate shows injury on right foot and said injury was crushed wound on right foot. Exh.A-2 is railway ticket. The ticket bears number shown in petition as well as mentioned in affidavit and ticket is from Ahmedabad to Palanpur dated 11.6.2000 of Rs. 50/- for two adults. The said ticket corroborates statement of petitioner in affidavit. The said affidavit of claimant remained uncontroverted so far holding of ticket is concerned by claimant. Exh.A-3 is Panchnama of place of incident. In Panchnama, it is mentioned that dried blood stains were found on the border of Platform No. 7. This Panchnama is prepared on basis of alleged incident. Exh.A-4 is Panchnama of physical condition of claimant in which it is shown that there was bandage on right foot of claimant. Exh.A-5 is physical handicapped certificate in which mid foot amputation of right leg is shown. Exh.A-6 is photograph of claimant showing amputation of foot of right leg. Exh.A-7 is telephone vardi. The said Vardi speaks about happening of incident of claimant on 11.6.2000 at 15.00 hRs. while boarding Memu train by falling down. The aforesaid evidence is adduced by claimant but, no evidence has been adduced by respondent - present appellant before claims Tribunal. Exh.A-6 is photograph of claimant showing amputation of foot of right leg. Exh.A-7 is telephone vardi. The said Vardi speaks about happening of incident of claimant on 11.6.2000 at 15.00 hRs. while boarding Memu train by falling down. The aforesaid evidence is adduced by claimant but, no evidence has been adduced by respondent - present appellant before claims Tribunal. Therefore, on basis of aforesaid evidence, claims Tribunal has rightly come to conclusion that respondent could not succeed to prove that claimant was not a bona fide passenger in said Memu train and accident is considered to be untoward incident covered under Section 123(c)(2) of the Act, therefore, Issue No. 1 has been decided in affirmative. Thereafter, considering clause 24 of Part III of schedule under Rule 3 of Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990, claims Tribunal has awarded Rs. 1,20,000/- in favour of claimant with 6% interest from date of petition till realization of awarded compensation. 7. The reasoning given by claims Tribunal is based on evidence on record. There is no rebuttal evidence produced by appellant before claims Tribunal. It is clear from reasoning given by claims Tribunal that no contention is raised by appellant in respect to interest before claims Tribunal and now to raise contention before this Court for first time. 8. The Apex Court in case of Union of India vs. Prabhakaran Vijay Kumar and others, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 527 has made following observations in Paras.10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 44 to 51 which are quoted as under : “10. We are of the opinion that it will not legally make any difference whether the deceased was actually inside the train when she fell down or whether she was only trying to get into the train when she fell down. In our opinion in either case it amounts to an ‘accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers’. Hence, it is an “untoward incident” as defined in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act. 11. In our opinion in either case it amounts to an ‘accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers’. Hence, it is an “untoward incident” as defined in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act. 11. No doubt, it is possible that two interpretations can be given to the expression ‘accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers’, the first being that it only applies when a person has actually got inside the train and thereafter falls down from the train, while the second being that it includes a situation where a person is trying to board the train and falls down while trying to do so. Since the provision for compensation in the Railways Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, in our opinion, it should receive a liberal and wider interpretation and not a narrow and technical one. Hence in our opinion the latter of the abovementioned two interpretations i.e. the one which advances the object of the statute and serves its purpose should be preferred vide Kunal Singh vs. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524 (Para 9), B. D. Shetty vs. CEAT Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 193 (Para 12), Transport Corporation of India vs. ESI Corporation. 12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or welfare statute are capable of two constructions, the one which is more in consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit of the person for whom the Act was made should be preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen, AIR (Para 11), Lalappa Lingappa and others vs. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd, 852 (Para 13), S. M. Nilajkar vs. Telecom Distt. Manager, (2003) 4 SCC 27 (Para 12) etc. 14. In our opinion, if we adopt a restrictive meaning to the expression ‘accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers’ in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act, we will be depriving a large number of railway passengers from getting compensation in railway accidents. It is well known that in our country there are crores of people who travel by railway trains since everybody cannot afford traveling by or in a private car. It is well known that in our country there are crores of people who travel by railway trains since everybody cannot afford traveling by or in a private car. By giving a restrictive and narrow meaning to the expression we will be depriving a large number of victims of train accidents (particularly poor and middle class people) from getting compensation under the Railways Act. Hence, in our opinion, the expression ‘accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers’ includes accidents when a bona fide passenger i.e. a passenger traveling with a valid ticket or pass is trying to enter into a railway train and falls down during the process. In other words, a purposive, and not literal, interpretation should be given to the expression. 17. Section 124A lays down strict liability or no fault liability in case of railway accidents. Hence, if a case comes within the purview of Section 124A it is wholly irrelevant as to who was at fault. 44. In India, Article 38(1) of the Constitution states “the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life”. 45. Thus, it is the duty of the State under our Constitution to function as a Welfare State, and look after the welfare of all its citizens. 46. In various social welfare statutes the principle of strict liability has been provided to give insurance to people against death and injuries, irrespective of fault. 47. Thus, Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1923 provides for compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, and this compensation is not for negligence on the part of the employer but is a sort of insurance to workmen against certain risks of accidents. 48. Similarly, Section 124A of the Railways Act 1989, Sections 140 and 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 etc. incorporate the principle of strict liability. 49. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in Section 124A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability de hors statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta’s case (Supra). incorporate the principle of strict liability. 49. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in Section 124A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability de hors statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta’s case (Supra). In our opinion, we have to develop new principles for fixing liability in cases like the present one. 50. It is recognized that the Law of Torts is not stagnant but is growing. As stated by the American Restatement of Torts, Art 1; vide D. L. Lloyd: Jurisprudence: “The entire history of the development of the tort law shows a continuous tendency, which is naturally not uniform in all common law countries, to recognize as worthy of legal protection, interests which were previously not protected at all or were infrequently protected and it is unlikely that this tendency has ceased or is going to cease in future.” 51. There are dicta both ancient and modern that the known categories of tort are not closed, and that novelty of a claim is not an absolute defence. Thus, in Jay Laxmi Salt works (P) Ltd. vs. The State of Gujarat, JT 1994 (3) Learned advocate Mr. Joshi has filed sick note. Therefore, the matter is adjourned to 9.5.2008. 492 (vide Para 7), the Supreme Court observed: “Law of torts being a developing law its frontiers are incapable of being strictly barricaded”. 52. In Ashby vs. White, (1703) 2 Ld. Raym 938, it was observed (vide Pratt C.J.): “Torts are infinitely various, not limited or confined”. 53. In Donoghue vs. Stevenson (1932) AC 562 (619) (HL), it was observed by the House of Lords (per Macmillan, L.J.): “The conception of legal responsibility may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life.” 54. The above view was followed in Rookes vs. Barnard (1964) AC 1129 (1169) (HL) and Home Officer vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL).” 9. The question of interest, whether Railway Claims Tribunal is competent to grant interest pendente lite or future interest without any specific provisions regarding payment of interest either in Railways Act or in Railways Claims Tribunal Act ? Ltd (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL).” 9. The question of interest, whether Railway Claims Tribunal is competent to grant interest pendente lite or future interest without any specific provisions regarding payment of interest either in Railways Act or in Railways Claims Tribunal Act ? The aforesaid question raised before the Orissa High Court in case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Trilochan Nayak & Ors, reported in AIR 2009 ORISSA 91. Relevant observations of aforesaid decision are in Para.11 to 16 and 21 are quoted as under : “11. The learned Counsel for the appellant railway further submitted that the Tribunal can award interest only if the Act authorized the Tribunal to award interest on the amount of compensation. As the Railways Act and Rules are silent regarding payment of interest on the awarded compensation, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award interest and it has illegally awarded the interest from the date of filing of the application. The Tribunal could have awarded interest only after the compensation was determined by it and as per Section 127 of the Act the railway authorities are liable to pay the amount to the claimants. Therefore, interest is to be awarded from the date of the award and not from the date of the application. In support of his contention he has cited the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mahadeo Laxman Kumare and another vs. Union of India, reported in 2005 (1) TAC 5 507 (Bombay) (DB) where it was held that interest is payable only from the date of the award. He also cited a decision of this Court in the case of Union of India vs. Kasinath Behera & Others, reported in 2006 (III) CLR 309 (FAO Nos.331 of 2005) wherein this Court allowed the interest from the date of the award till the date of payment and not from the date of the application. 12. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents - claimants, however, cited a decision of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Union of India vs. Brigeet Chacko, reported in 2007 (4) TAC 518 (Ker.) : AIR 2007 Ker 268 wherein it was held that the interest is payable from the date of application at such rate at the discretion of the Tribunal. The Tribunal can consider bank rate also. The Tribunal can consider bank rate also. It may take into consideration the other statutory provisions from the said purpose. 13. From the above rival submissions of the parties and from the provisions of the statute, it is clear the Railways Act and Rules do not contain any provision to award interest on the amount of compensation. 14. The Tribunal awarded the compensation as per the Schedule of the Railways Act in exercise of its judicial discretion and can award interest on the compensation amount taking into consideration the provisions under Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Civil Procedure Code lays down the procedure to be adopted in civil Courts and its principles may be applicable to other Courts. It provides for a fair procedure for redressal of disputes in accordance with law. Law determines the legal rights of the individuals and it contains provisions either to be enforced, applied for restraining from doing certain acts. Justice is administered in Courts, keeping in mind the law applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Court has a right to decide a case which fall within its jurisdiction. 15. As per Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code interest may be awarded to the plaintiff in the suit mainly dividing into three heads : (1) interest approved prior to the institution of the suit, (2) additional interest on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree; (3) further interest on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of the payment. Interest prior to the date of suit is not a matter of procedure, but the law on the subject may be considered under the following two heads i.e. (i) where there is a stipulation for payment of interest at a fixed rate and (ii) where there is no stipulation For payment of interest. As there is no provision under the Railways Act or the Railway Tribunals Act to award interest, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal will come under the head of ‘there is no express stipulation for payment of interest’. If there is no express stipulation for payment of interest, a person is entitled to interest only where a right to it or an authority for its allowances or payment, is conferred by the Statute. If there is no express stipulation for payment of interest, a person is entitled to interest only where a right to it or an authority for its allowances or payment, is conferred by the Statute. Since Section 124 of the Railways Act authorizes a right of compensation in the even of injury or death in a railway accident which is known as untoward incident. Therefor, the Tribunal can grant interest on the compensation amount from the date of the application. 16. The provisions if Interest Act, 1978 are also clear that in any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already is made, the Court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the persons entitled to the debt or damages or to the person making such claim, as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, for the whole or part of the following period that is to say; (a) if the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of written statement at a certain time then from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings; (b) if the proceedings do not relate to any such debt then from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest will be claimed to the date of institution of the proceedings. 21. As there is no prohibition either in the Railways Act or Railways Claims Tribunal Act to award interest on the compensation for the injury or death in an untoward incident, the Tribunal has not committed any error in awarding interest in view of the above mentioned provisions of the Interest Act and the Civil Procedure Code. The question formulated at paragraph-3(b) is answered accordingly. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the Railways Claims Tribunal, Bhubneshwar Bench, Bhubneshwar.” 10. The Apex Court in case of Tahazhathe Purayil Sarabi & Ors. vs. Union of India, reported in JT 2009 (8) 525 has made following observations in Para.17 to 23 which are quoted as under : “17. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the Railways Claims Tribunal, Bhubneshwar Bench, Bhubneshwar.” 10. The Apex Court in case of Tahazhathe Purayil Sarabi & Ors. vs. Union of India, reported in JT 2009 (8) 525 has made following observations in Para.17 to 23 which are quoted as under : “17. The Courts are consistent in their view that normally when a money decree is passed, it is most essential that interest be granted for the period during which the money was due, but could not be utilized by the person in whose favour an order of recovery of money was passed. As has been frequently explained by this Court and various High Courts, interest is essentially a compensation payable on account of denial of the right to utilise the money due, which has been, in fact, utilized by the person withholding the same. Accordingly, payment of interest follows as a matter of course when a money decree is passed. The only question to be decided is since when is such interest payable on such a decree. Though, there are two divergent views, one indicating that interest is payable from the date when claim for the principal sum is made, namely, the date of institution of the proceedings in the recovery of the amount, the other view is that such interest is payable only when a determination is made and order is passed for recovery of the dues. However, the more consistent view has been the former and in rare cases interest has been awarded for periods even prior to the institution of proceedings for recovery of the dues, where the same is provided for by the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties or where the same is permissible by statute. 18. Accordingly, we are unable to sustain the order of the Railway Claims Tribunal directing payment of interest on default of the payment of the principal sum within a period of 45 days. As we have indicated hereinbefore, when there is no specific provision for grant of interest on any amount due, the Court and even Tribunals have been held to be entitled to award interest in their discretion, under the provisions of Section 3 of the Interest Act and Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. 19. As we have indicated hereinbefore, when there is no specific provision for grant of interest on any amount due, the Court and even Tribunals have been held to be entitled to award interest in their discretion, under the provisions of Section 3 of the Interest Act and Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. 19. In Jagdish Rai & Brothers vs. Union of India, (1999) 3 SCC 257 this Court, while considering grant of interest in respect of an amount awarded in an arbitration proceeding under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 read with Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, observed that there are four stages of grant of interest. Firstly, from the stage of accrual of cause of action till the filing of the arbitration proceedings; secondly, during pendency of the proceedings before the arbitrator; thirdly, future interest arising between the date of the award and the date of the decree; and fourthly, interest arising from the date of the decree till realization of the award. This Court held that although the claim for interest had been made before the Court in which proceedings for making the Award the Rule of the Court were pending, the High Court ought to have further examined whether the appellant was entitled to any interest after the decree was made in terms of the award. This Court went on to observe that the Courts have taken a view that the award on interest under Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code is a matter of procedure and ought to be granted in all cases where there is a decree for money unless there are strong reasons to decline the same. In the said case, this Court modified the decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge by including a direction for payment of interest @12% per annum 21 from the date when the award was made the Decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, till realization. 20. A similar view was expressed by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1992) 4 SCC 217 21. 20. A similar view was expressed by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1992) 4 SCC 217 21. Though, both the two aforesaid cases were in relation to Awards having been made under the Arbitration Act, a principle has been enunciated that in cases where a money award is made, the principles of Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 3 of the Interest Act could be invoked to award interest from the date of the Award till the realisation thereof. 22. In the instant case, the claim for compensation accrued on 13th November, 1998, when Kunhi Moosa, the husband of the Appellant No. 1, died on account of being thrown out of the moving 22 train. The claim before the Railway Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, (O.A.No. 68/1999) was filed immediately thereafter in 1999. There was no delay on the part of the claimants/appellants in making the claim, which was ultimately granted for the maximum amount of Rs. 4 lakhs on 26th March, 2007. Even if, the appellants may not be entitled to claim interest from the date of the accident, we are of the view that the claim to interest on the awarded sum has to be allowed from the date of the application till the date of recovery, since the appellant cannot be faulted for the delay of approximately 8 years in the making of the Award by the Railway Claims Tribunal. Had the Tribunal not delayed the matter for so long, the appellants would have been entitled to the beneficial interest of the amount awarded from a much earlier date and we see no reason why they should be deprived of such benefit. As we have indicated earlier, payment of interest is basically compensation for being denied the use of the money during the period 23 which the same could have been made available to the claimants. 23. In our view, both the Tribunal, as also the High Court, were wrong in not granting any interest whatsoever to the appellants, except by way of a default clause, which is contrary to the established principles relating to payment of interest on money claims.” 11. In view of the aforesaid observations made by Supreme Court, contentions raised by learned advocate Mr. Shastri in respect to interest cannot be accepted and same are rejected. In view of the aforesaid observations made by Supreme Court, contentions raised by learned advocate Mr. Shastri in respect to interest cannot be accepted and same are rejected. Accordingly, claims Tribunal has properly dealt with matter on basis of evidence. For that, claims Tribunal has not committed any error which requires interference by this Court. Therefore, there is no substance in present first appeal. Accordingly, first appeal is dismissed. 12. In view of order passed in main first appeal, no order is required to be made in civil application for stay. Accordingly, civil application for stay is dismissed.