JUDGMENT Hon’ble Devi Prasad Singh, J.—Present appeal has been preferred against the impugned award dated 24.7.2006, passed by Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal/ Additional District Judge (Court No.1), Barabanki. 2. In brief, the facts of the case are that on 12th September, 2004, at about 11.45 p.m., when claimant Uma Kant Dwivedi alongwith his wife Smt. Maya Dwivedi, on his motor-cycle were going to their parental house at village Nawabpur Kodri, Police Station Jaidpur, District Barabanki, Truck No. U.P. 32 78 T-6293 coming from the reverse direction with high speed dashed with the motor-cycle. It has been stated that the truck was being driven by one Lallan Yadav son of Ram Suchit Yadav rashly and negligently. The truck hit the motor-cycle from front side and Smt. Maya Dwivedi fell under the truck between two tyres and succumbed to the injuries. Claimant Uma Kant Dwivedi was seriously injured and the motor-cycle was also badly damaged. The truck driver ran away leaving the truck as well as injured and deceased at the spot. Injured Uma Kant Dwivedi was admitted in the district hospital, Barabanki and thereafter shifted to Jain Nursing Home, Barabanki on 12th September, 2004. Later on, he was again shifted to Jagrani Hospital for orthopaedic treatment. However, he pursued long treatment in Jagrani Hospital, Lucknow up to November, 2004. F.I.R. of the incident was also lodged at Police Station Kotwali, Barabanki as Crime No. 1109 of 2004, under Sections 279, 337, 338, 304-A, 427, I.P.C. Smt. Maya Dwivedi was brought dead in the district hospital, Barabanki. At the time of death, the age of Smt. Maya Dwivedi was 46 years and she was a teacher working under the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Barabanki with a monthly salary of Rs. 8,745/-. The income of the injured-claimant Uma Kant Dwivedi has been shown to Rs. 2,000/- per month from the profession of law. 3. The claim petition was filed by Sri Uma Kant Dwivedi along with his son and daughter before the Tribunal for payment of compensation to the tune of Rs. 10,97,500 on account of death of Smt. Maya Dwivedi. The Tribunal on the basis of oral and documentary evidence arrived at the conclusion that the claimant Uma Kant Dwivedi incurred expenses to the tune of Rs. 37,522/- for medical treatment, Rs. 10,000/- for other expenses including mental pain and agony and Rs. 9,000 for professional loss (total Rs. 56,522). 4. 10,97,500 on account of death of Smt. Maya Dwivedi. The Tribunal on the basis of oral and documentary evidence arrived at the conclusion that the claimant Uma Kant Dwivedi incurred expenses to the tune of Rs. 37,522/- for medical treatment, Rs. 10,000/- for other expenses including mental pain and agony and Rs. 9,000 for professional loss (total Rs. 56,522). 4. It has not been disputed that regular monthly income of Smt. Maya Dwivedi was Rs. 9,240/- and after deducting house rent allowance, the monthly income in lieu of salary as Assistant Teacher comes to Rs. 8,745/-. The Tribunal has deducted 50% of the salary i.e. Rs. 4,372/- as expenses incurred for herself. However, the Tribunal recorded a finding that for the purpose of compensation instead of looking to the age of the deceased, the age and source of income of the claimant Uma Kant Dwivedi is to be seen. The Tribunal further observed that the claimant’s daughter Kumari Archana Dwivedi was aged about 19 years and his son Shaurabh Dwivedi was 16 years of age. After deducting 50% as expenses, the total annual income comes to Rs. 52,464/- and in consequence thereof, the Tribunal proceeded to use multiplier of 10 and awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,24,640/-. Rs. 2,000/- has been awarded by the Tribunal as funeral expenses and Rs. 5,000/- for loss of matrimonial life. Thus the total compensation assessed by the Tribunal comes to Rs. 5,31,640/-. An amount of Rs. 56,522/- has been allowed as compensation to Sri Uma Kant Dwivedi in separate claim petition. Feeling aggrieved, present appeal has been filed for enhancement of the compensation. 5. While assailing the impugned award, Sri R.P. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the deceased Smt. Maya Dwivedi was aged about 46 years at the time of accident and even if her monthly income is treated as Rs. 8,745, the deduction of half of the amount in lieu of expenses is not permissible. It has been stated that the income of Sri Uma Kant Dwivedi (husband of the deceased) was Rs. 2,000/- per month and keeping in view the 46 years’ age of the deceased, the multiplier of 13 instead of 10 should have been used by the Tribunal keeping in view the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short ‘Act’). 2,000/- per month and keeping in view the 46 years’ age of the deceased, the multiplier of 13 instead of 10 should have been used by the Tribunal keeping in view the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short ‘Act’). It has been submitted that though the claim petition was filed under Section 166 of the Act but the guideline provided under the Second Schedule of the Act should have been used by the Tribunal by deducting one-third of the income as expenses with multiplier of 13. It has also been submitted that Second Schedule provided under Section 163-A of the Act may be used as guideline to evaluate the justness of the compensation under Section 168 of the Act. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgments reported in AIR 2008 SC 3244 , Mg. Dir., Bangalore Metropolitan Tpt. Corpn. v. Sarojamma and another; 2002 (3) TAC 378 (SC), Supe Dei and others v. National Insurance Co. Limited and another; 2005 (1) TAC 609 (SC), Manju Devi and another v. Musafir Paswan and another; 2005 (1) TAC 2004, Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India and another. 7. On the other hand, Sri Dinesh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that multiplier provided under Second Schedule in pursuance of the provision contained under Section 163-A of the Act on the basis of structured formula is not applicable in case claim petition is filed under Section 166 of the Act. It has also been submitted that deduction of one-third income as provided under Section 163-A of the Act (under Second Schedule) suffer from various defects and may not be applied in case the claim petition has been filed under Section 166 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied upon the judgments reported in 2004 (2) TAC 289, Deepal Girish Bhai Soni and others v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Baroda; 2005 (2) TAC 305 (SC), Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd. v. S. Rajapriya and others; 2006 (1) TAC 1 (SC), Managing Director, Tamilnadu State Road Transport Corporation Ltd. v. K.S. Bindu and others and 2007 (1) TAC 795 (SC), New India Assurance Company Limited v. Smt. Kalpana and others. 8. To decide the present controversy, it is necessary to take into account various statutory provisions contained in the Act. 9. 8. To decide the present controversy, it is necessary to take into account various statutory provisions contained in the Act. 9. Chapter X of the said Act provides for liability without fault in certain cases. Section 140 provides for liability upon the owner of the vehicle to pay compensation on the principle of no fault. The said provision reads thus : “140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.—(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifty thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees. (3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) regarding death or bodily injury to any person, for which the owner of the vehicle is liable to give compensation for relief, he is also liable to pay compensation under any other law for the time being in force : Provided that the amount of such compensation to be given under any other law shall be reduced from the amount of compensation payable under this section or under Section 163-A.” 10. Sections 141 and 142 of the said Act read as under : “141. Provisions as to other right to claim compensation for death or permanent disablement.—(1) The right to claim compensation under Section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to any other right, except the right to claim under the scheme referred to in Section 163-A (such other right hereafter in this section referred to as the right on the principle of fault) to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. (2) A claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under Section 140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, the person liable to pay compensation under Section 140 is also liable to pay compensation in accordance with the right on the principle of fault, the person so liable shall pay the first-mentioned compensation and— (a) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is less than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation, he shall be liable to pay (in addition to the first-mentioned compensation) only so much of the second-mentioned compensation as is equal to the amount by which it exceeds the first-mentioned compensation; (b) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is equal to or more than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation, he shall not be liable to pay the second-mentioned compensation. 142. 142. Permanent disablement.—For the purposes of this Chapter, permanent disablement of a person shall be deemed to have resulted from an accident of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 140 if such person has suffered by reason of the accident, any injury or injuries involving— (a) permanent privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of either ear, or privation of any member or joint; or (b) destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; or (c) permanent disfiguration of the head or face.” 11. Section 144 provides for a non-obstante clause. 12. Section 163-A was inserted by Act 54 of 1994 which came into force from 14.11.1994. The said provision has been inserted to provide for a new pre-determined structured formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income of the deceased or the person suffering permanent disablement. 13. Sections 163-A and 163-B read thus : "163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured-formula basis.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, ‘permanent disability’ shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. 163-B. Option to file claim in certain cases.—Where a person is entitled to claim compensation under Section 140 and Section 163-A, he shall file the claim under either of the said sections and not under both.” 14. 163-B. Option to file claim in certain cases.—Where a person is entitled to claim compensation under Section 140 and Section 163-A, he shall file the claim under either of the said sections and not under both.” 14. The Second Schedule referred to in Section 140 of the Act provides for a structured formula for the purpose of grant of compensation to a third party involved in fatal accident/injury. By reason thereof a multiplier system is introduced pursuant whereto and in furtherance whereof the amount of compensation is required to be calculated having regard to the age of the victim and his annual income. However, in terms of the note appended to the said Schedule the amount of compensation so arrived at in the case of fatal accident, the claim is to be reduced by one­third, in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself, had he been alive. 15. Clause (2) of the said Second Schedule provides that the amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It also provides for grant of compensation under several heads, namely, (3) General Damages in case of death, (4) General Damages in case of injuries and disabilities, (5) Disability in non-fatal accidents and (6) notional income for compensation to those who had no income prior to accident. However, the maximum amount which is to be paid under the different heads had also been specified. 16. Chapter XII deals with constitution of claims tribunals, application for compensation, option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases, award of the claims tribunal etc. Sections 166, 167 and 168 read thus : “166. However, the maximum amount which is to be paid under the different heads had also been specified. 16. Chapter XII deals with constitution of claims tribunals, application for compensation, option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases, award of the claims tribunal etc. Sections 166, 167 and 168 read thus : “166. Application for compensation.—(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made— (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be : Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed : Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant. (3) .............. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act. 167. (3) .............. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act. 167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both. 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.—On receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be : Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award. (3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct.” 17. (3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct.” 17. Section 163-A of the Act has been introduced by way of amendment in the year 1994 to provide payment of compensation in motor accident cases in accordance with the Second Schedule by providing structured formula which may be amended by the Central Government from time to time. Section 140 of the Act deals with interim compensation but by inserting Section 163-A, the Parliament intended to provide payment of compensation on the basis of pre-determined sum without insisting on a long-drawn trial or without proof of negligence in causing the accident. The power conferred by Section 163-A through amendment of the Act is a deviation from the common law liability under the Law of Torts and is also in derogation of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. Thus, the heirs of the deceased or the victim in terms of the said provisions have been assured by the legislature of speedy and effective remedy which may not be available to the claimants under Section 166 of the Act. Thus, Section 163-A has got overriding effect with regard to payment of compensation on structured formula basis. Sub-section (1) of Section 163-A contains non-obstante clause in terms whereof, the owner of the motor vehicle or the insurer is liable to pay compensation in the event of death or permanent disablement because of accident on the basis of structured formula. Sub-section (2) of Section 163-A is in pari materia with sub-section (3) of Section 140 of the Act. 18. It may be noted that Section 163-A does not contain any provision identical to sub-section (5) of Section 140 with regard to reduction of an amount of compensation payable under the said section or Section 163-A in case the claimant approaches elsewhere. On the other hand, Section 166 is a broader remedy for a victim of an accident to claim compensation keeping in view the injuries caused. While awarding compensation under Section 166 of the Act, the Tribunal may award compensation keeping in view the provision contained under Section 168 of the Act. On the other hand, Section 166 is a broader remedy for a victim of an accident to claim compensation keeping in view the injuries caused. While awarding compensation under Section 166 of the Act, the Tribunal may award compensation keeping in view the provision contained under Section 168 of the Act. While rendering the award of compensation under Section 168 of the Act in pursuance of the proceedings under Section 166 of the Act, the Tribunal has to see justness of the compensation for which the claimant is entitled on specified ground. It is not necessary for the Tribunal to rely upon the structured formula provided in Second Schedule of the Act for payment of higher compensation. 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girish Bhai Soni (supra) has proceeded to observe as under : “52. It may be true that Section 163-A provides for an option to a claimant to either go for a claim under Section 140 or Section 163-A of the Act, as the case may be, but the same was inserted ‘ex­abundanti cautela’ so as to remove any misconception in the mind of the parties to the lis having regard to the fact that both relate to the claim on the basis of no fault liability. Having regard to the fact that Section 166 of the Act provides for a complete machinery for laying a claim on fault liability, the question of giving an option to the claimant to pursue their claims either under Section 163-A or Section 166 does not arise. If the submission of the learned Counsel is accepted the same would lead to an incongruity. 53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby. (See Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 278). 57. (See Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 278). 57. We, therefore, are of the opinion that remedy for payment of compensation both under Sections 163-A and 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant cannot pursue his remedies thereunder simultaneously. One thus, must opt/elect to go either for a proceeding under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Act, but not under both.” 20. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that power conferred under Sections 163-A and 166 are independent to each other as statutorily provided and the claimant does not have got right to pursue both remedy simultaneously. 21. In the case of Deepal Girish Bhai Soni (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the annual income of Rs. 40,000/- provided under the Second Schedule, keeping in view the provision contained under Section 163-A of the Act cannot be treated as cap. The Tribunal has got power to award more compensation in case necessary, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. For convenience, para 67 of the judgment is reproduced as under : “67. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala (supra) has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala (supra) that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163-A, the annual income of Rs. 40,000/- shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is upto Rs. 40,000/- can take the benefit thereof. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act.” 22. The provisions with regard to no fault liability have been provided by the legislature to meet out the contingency where it is found that rash or negligent driving causing death or injury to the person cannot be proved. Whereas in terms of Section 140 of the Act, a statutory liability has been cast upon the owner in case of death or permanent disablement; both under Section 163-A as also Section 166 of the Act, the insurer has been made responsible. The payment of amount in terms of Section 140 of the Act is ad hoc in nature. Whereas in terms of Section 140 of the Act, a statutory liability has been cast upon the owner in case of death or permanent disablement; both under Section 163-A as also Section 166 of the Act, the insurer has been made responsible. The payment of amount in terms of Section 140 of the Act is ad hoc in nature. A claim made thereunder, is in addition to any other claim which may be made under any other law for the time being in force. Section 140 of the Act imposes a liability on the owner of the vehicle to pay compensation where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle and accordingly, a fixed amount may be provided as compensation. 23. Now the question which cropped up for consideration is as to whether while awarding compensation, the structured formula given in the Second Schedule may be relied upon to award compensation by applying multiplier in a case under Section 166 of the Act. 24. Section 168 of the Act provides that while awarding compensation, it shall be incumbent upon the Tribunal to award just and proper compensation. The Tribunal has to ascertain the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself or herself and his dependants, and to deduct therefrom such part of his/her income which the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself/herself. As regards both self-maintenance and pleasure, the Tribunal has also to ascertain as to what part of his net income, the deceased would have spent for the benefit of his dependants. The number of years of the dependency of dependants as well as the number of years by which the life of the deceased was cut-short may also be necessary factor for calculating the compensation. 25. While considering the question of just compensation payable in a case, all relevant factors should be kept in mind. Section 168 contemplates for payment of just and fair compensation. It shall include the expectancy of life and family status, the status of dependants and liabilities left over by the deceased, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 26. The case of Managing Director, Bangalore Metropolitan Tpt. Corpn. (supra) relates to a situation where compensation was payable under Section 163-A of the Act. Accordingly, Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that multiplier should be applied. 27. 26. The case of Managing Director, Bangalore Metropolitan Tpt. Corpn. (supra) relates to a situation where compensation was payable under Section 163-A of the Act. Accordingly, Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that multiplier should be applied. 27. However, judgment in the case of Supe Dei and others (supra) relates to a situation where the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act has taken place. In Supe Dei and others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the multiplier under Second Schedule is meant for proceedings under Section 163-A of the Act. The Courts may take the multiplier provided under Second Schedule as guide-line to determine the compensation under Section 166 of the Act. The judgment in the case of Supe Dei and others (supra) has been delivered by the Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of Supreme Court. For convenience, paras 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment are reproduced as under : “6. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, Insurance Company fairly stated that according to the age of the deceased as found by the Tribunal, the multiplier of 17 is to be applied as provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. It is not disputed that though the Second Schedule to the Act in terms does not apply in the case since the claim is not made under Section 163-A of the Act, it serves as a guideline for the purpose of determination of compensation under Section 166 of the Act. 7. On consideration of the submission made by the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the judgment of the Tribunal and the High Court, we find ample substance in the contention raised by Ms. Suri that no reason has been stated by the Tribunal or the High Court for fixing 15 as the multiplier. 8. While considering the question of just compensation payable in a case all relevant factors including the appropriate multiplier are to be kept in mind. The position is well settled that the Second Schedule under Section 163-A to the Act which gives the amount of compensation to be determined for the purpose of claim under the section can be taken as a guideline while determining the compensation under Section 166 of the Act. In that view of the matter, there is no reason why multiplier of 17 should not be taken as the appropriate multiplier in this case. 9. In that view of the matter, there is no reason why multiplier of 17 should not be taken as the appropriate multiplier in this case. 9. Coming to the question of interest this Court in the case of Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2001 ACJ 428 : 1999 (3) TAC 649 (i) (SC), observed that 9 per cent is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded and that rate is being applied in motor accident compensation cases.” 28. In the case of Manju Devi (supra), Honble Supreme Court ruled that the multiplier method must be accepted method for determining and ensuring payment of just compensation as it is the method which brings uniformity and certainty to awards made all over the country. 29. In the case of Abati Bezbaruah (supra), again Honble Supreme Court ruled that the provision for payment of compensation on the basis of structured formula as provided under the Second Schedule should ordinarily not be deviated while exercising power under Section 168 of the Act and the structured formula as provided under the Second Schedule may be applied by the Courts while granting compensation. The relevant para 11 of the judgment in the case of Abati Bezbaruah (supra) is reproduced as under : "11. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the payment of compensation on the basis of structured formula as provided for under the Second Schedule should not ordinarily be deviated from. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act lays down the guidelines for determination of the amount of compensation in terms of Section 166 thereof. Deviation of the structured formula, however, as has been held by this Court, may be restored to in exceptional cases. Furthermore, the amount of compensation should be just and fair in the facts and circumstances of the each case.” 30. Much emphasis has been made by the learned counsel for the respondents on the judgment in the case of Deepal Girish Bhai Soni and others (supra). The case of Deepal Girish Bhai Sone (supra) relates to a different issue of law with regard to extent of compensation payable under Section 163-A of the Act and the relationship between Section 163-A and Section 166 of the Act. The case of Deepal Girish Bhai Sone (supra) relates to a different issue of law with regard to extent of compensation payable under Section 163-A of the Act and the relationship between Section 163-A and Section 166 of the Act. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be a cap of 40,000/- while granting compensation under Section 163-A of the Act and the provisions contained under Sections 163­A and 166 are distinct provisions and both cannot be invoked by the claimant simultaneously. 31. In the case of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court (Bench of two Hon’ble Judges) while interpreting Section 168 of the Act has applied multiplier provided under Second Schedule with regard to the payment of compensation. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that for the purpose of Section 168, the Second Schedule is to serve as a guideline but cannot be said to be ready reckoner. It has also been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Second Schedule suffers from many defects. 32. Needless to say that cases of Deepal Girish Bhai Soni and others (supra) and Supe Dei and others (supra) decided by the Bench of three Hon’ble Judges, the applicability of multiplier provided under Second Schedule for awarding compensation under Section 166 read with Section 168 has been upheld with rider that it should not be applied mechanically but in special case even higher compensation may be awarded keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. 33. The case of Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Road Transport Corporation Ltd. v. K.I. Bindu and others (supra) also relates for grant of compensation under Section 168 of the Act and aforesaid proposition of law has been upheld by the Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court consisting of two Hon’ble Judges. Though Hon’ble Supreme Court has not approved the multiplier used by the High Court but simultaneously observed that multiplier may be increased. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under, to reproduce relevant portion : “18. Though Hon’ble Supreme Court has not approved the multiplier used by the High Court but simultaneously observed that multiplier may be increased. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under, to reproduce relevant portion : “18. In both General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and others, 1994 (2) SCC 176 : 1994(1) TAC 323 (SC) and U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others v. Trilok Chandra and others, 1996 (4) SCC 362 : 1996 (2) TAC 286 (SC) the multiplier appears to have been adopted by this Court taking note of the prevalent banking rate of interest. 19. In fact in Trilok Chandra’s case (supra), after reference to Second Schedule to the Act, it was noticed that the same suffers from any defects. It was pointed out that the same is to serve as a guide, but cannot be said to be invariable ready reckoner. However, the appropriate highest multiplier was held to be 18. The highest multiplier has to be for the age group of 21 years to 25 years when an ordinary Indian Citizen starts independently earning and the lowest would be in respect of a person in the age group of 60 to 70, which is the normal retirement age.” 34. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by the Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Kalpana and others (supra). 35. Learned counsel for the respondents has tried to rely upon the Division Bench case of this Court, reported in (2003) ACC 242 (DB), Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Sanjiv Jain and another. The Division Bench of this Court has held that in view of the provision contained under Section 168 of the Act, the use of multiplier shall not be justified. The Courts are required to award just and fair compensation and accordingly, 50% amount was held to be rightly deducted in lieu of house hold expenditure. However, Division Bench’s judgment in the case of Sanjiv Jain (supra) seems to be per incurium in view of the fact that the subsequent and earlier pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to in the preceding paras have not been considered. However, Division Bench’s judgment in the case of Sanjiv Jain (supra) seems to be per incurium in view of the fact that the subsequent and earlier pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to in the preceding paras have not been considered. The law declared by Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and while deciding the controversy, the Courts have to follow the law of land pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 36. Their Lordships (three Hon’ble Judges) of Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported in 2002(3) TAC 378 (SC), Supe Dei and others v. National Insurance Co. Limited and another (paras 6, 8 and 9) held that in a proceeding under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the multiplier may be used as guideline and may be applied keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and granted interest at the rate of 9%. In 2005(1) TAC 609 (SC), Manju Devi and another v. Musafir Paswan and another (supra) and 2005(1) TAC 2004, Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India and another (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that multiplier may be accepted for payment of compensation even in a proceeding under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act to evaluate the justness of compensation as provided under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act which is a guideline. The letter and spirit of the judgment of Supe Dei (supra) and other cases decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court is that while assessing the justness of compensation under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the purpose of uniformity, multiplier provided under Second Schedule work as a guideline. Accordingly, in appropriate case, the tribunal possess jurisdiction to award higher compensation than what is provided in the multiplier. It is reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the subsequent judgment reported in 2008 (2) TAC 394 (SC), Laxmi Devi and others v. Mohammad Tabbar and another. In the case of Laxmi Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that the multiplier provided under Second Schedule is of year 1994. Much inflation has been taken place and even unskilled labours are paid Rs. 100/- per day. Accordingly, the minimum income even on notional basis should be assessed on the basis of Rs. 3,000/- per month. In the case of Laxmi Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that the multiplier provided under Second Schedule is of year 1994. Much inflation has been taken place and even unskilled labours are paid Rs. 100/- per day. Accordingly, the minimum income even on notional basis should be assessed on the basis of Rs. 3,000/- per month. For convenience, relevant portion of the judgment of Laxmi Devi (supra) is reproduced as under : "7..............It was nobodys case that the deceased was not working at all. His wife has entered in the witness box and had asserted that he earned Rs.140 per day. Even if we ignore the exaggeration, the figure arrived at by the High Court at Rs. 100/- per day and Rs. 3,000/- per month appears to be correct. However, considering that the claimant would get only 6% interest, we would choose to grant the multiplier of 14 instead of 12. Accordingly, the notional income as applied would be Rs. 24,000 x 14 = Rs. 3,36,000/- and to this will be added the other compensation like Rs. 2,000/­ as funeral expenses, Rs. 5,000/- for the loss of consortium to the widow and Rs. 2,000/- for the loss of estate. The claimants would, therefore, be entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,45,000/-. The said sum shall carry the interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition.” 37. In view of above, while deciding the case under Section 166 read with Section 168 of the Act, the Tribunal may award compensation taking assistance from the structured formula provided under Second Schedule of the Act. However, it shall always be open for the Tribunal to award higher compensation under Section 166 read with Section 168 of the Act keeping in mind the justness and fairness of the compensation with reasoned order. Even the notional income should not be less than Rs. 3,000/- per month. 38. In the present case, the deceased was aged about 46 years at the time of accident. In case she would have been in service, she would have continued to serve family with higher pay-scale or promotion for about 14 more years keeping in view the age of superannuation as 60 years. Income of the husband was only Rs. 2,000/-. Accordingly, unmarried daughter and son were dependant on the income of the deceased Smt. Maya Dwivedi. In case she would have been in service, she would have continued to serve family with higher pay-scale or promotion for about 14 more years keeping in view the age of superannuation as 60 years. Income of the husband was only Rs. 2,000/-. Accordingly, unmarried daughter and son were dependant on the income of the deceased Smt. Maya Dwivedi. Since the husband was assisting her to join duty every day, the personal expenditure of the deceased must have been less than what has been assessed by the Tribunal. The deduction of 50% of the expenditure seems to be too excessive and unjust and unfair. Only one-third income as provided under the structured formula should be deducted in lieu of personal expenses from the annual income of the deceased Smt. Maya Dwivedi. 39. Under Second Schedule, keeping in view the age of the deceased, the multiplier of 13 should have been used. However, without any rhyme and reason, the Tribunal has used multiplier of 10. In case the Tribunal was of the opinion that the compensation should be awarded keeping the multiplier then that should have been done on the basis of the structured formula and multiplier provided under Second Schedule of the Act. 40. Under the above facts and circumstances, keeping in view the monthly salary of the deceased Smt. Maya Dwivedi as Rs. 8,745/- (excluding House Rent Allowance), the annual income of the deceased comes to Rs. 1,04,940/- . In case one-third of the amount i.e. Rs. 34,980/- is deducted in lieu of personal expenses, then annual income comes to Rs. 69,960/- and by applying multiplier of 13, the total compensation comes to Rs. 9,09,480/-. The compensation of Rs. 56,522/- has granted by the Tribunal to Sri Uma Kant Dwivedi including medical expenses in separate claim petition. The Tribunal has granted Rs. 2,000/- as funeral expenses and Rs. 5,000/- for loss of consortium, which also does not call for any interference. By adding these amounts, the compensation which the claimants are entitled comes to Rs. 9,16,480.00. 41. In view of the above, the appeal filed for enhancement of the compensation succeeds. The impugned award dated 24.7.2006 is modified awarding the compensation to the tune of Rs. 9,16,480/- to the claimants. Out of Rs. 9,16,480, an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- shall be paid to Km. Archana Dwivedi and Rs. 9,16,480.00. 41. In view of the above, the appeal filed for enhancement of the compensation succeeds. The impugned award dated 24.7.2006 is modified awarding the compensation to the tune of Rs. 9,16,480/- to the claimants. Out of Rs. 9,16,480, an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- shall be paid to Km. Archana Dwivedi and Rs. 2,00,000/- to Sri Shaurabh Dwivedi and the rest of the amount shall be paid to the claimant Sri Uma Kant Dwivedi. The amount awarded by the Tribunal enhanced and stands modified accordingly. 42. The appeal is allowed accordingly. 43. Costs easy. ————