JUDGMENT:- These Appeals can be conveniently disposed off by a common judgment. They have been filed by the Complainant, a Provident Fund Inspector, against the Judgment/Order dated 31-1-2007 of the learned J.M.F.C., Vasco-da-Gama, by which the accused have been acquitted for offences punishable under Sections 14(1-B) r/w. Section 14-A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (Act, for short). 2. I have heard Shri. R. Rao, learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondents/Accused. 3. Respondent No.1 -Company along with its Managing Director, Respondent No.2, and so also the other Directors were prosecuted by the said Complainant for having committed the aforesaid offences. However, leave to appeal was restricted only to Respondent No.1 Company and its Managing Director Respondent No.2. 4. The case of the Complainant as can be seen from paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of each of the complaints was that the accused were required to pay the Employees Deposit Linked Insurance Contributions and Administrative Charges for every month within fifteen days of the close of that month in respect of the employees of the said establishment and that in spite of several requests, the accused failed to pay the same in the manner required for the following periods :- Month and E.D.I. Administrative Year Contributions Charges 09/02 1465/- 29/- 10/02 146)/- 29/- 11/02 1441/- 29/- 12/02 1445/- 29/- 01/03 1506/- 30/- 02/03 1504/- 30/- 03/03 1514/- 30/- TOTAL: 10340/- 206/- It was also the case of the Complainant that the accused therefore had committed offences punishable under Section 6-C of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 rtw. paras 7 and 8 of the Employees' Deposit Linked Insurance Scheme, 1976 on the dates shown therein. A perusal of records shows that by Order dated 26-6-2003, and in terms of Section 7 -A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 a sum of Rs.5,29,644/- was determined to be payable by the Respondent Company towards Provident Fund, Employees Pension Fund and Administrative charges for a period from 09/2002 to 03/2003 in accordance with the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The said Order was not challenged by the Respondent-Company. The said Order was not challenged by the Respondent-Company. The learned J.M.F.C., as can be seen from para 19 of the Order proceeded to acquit the accused on a specious ground that there was no material to show that during the said period the accused had employed 20 workers or more and a bald allegation in the complaint to the effect that accused No.1 is an establishment, to which the provisions of the Act applied without disclosing as to how and why it applied would not satisfy the requirements of law. The said finding came to be given by the learned Magistrate inspite of the fact that the said Order dated 26-3-2003 was passed after a notice to show cause was given to the establishment of the Respondent Company, and which order they had chosen not to challenge. On the face of that order, payments having been made after that order and in the absence of any cross-examination the finding given has got to be considered as perverse. It was not expected of the Complainant to narrate in a parrot like fashion that the provisions of law was applicable to the Respondent-Company because it had employed 20 workers or more. On that ground, the acquittal could not at all be justified. However, there are other formidable grounds, why acquittal cannot be reversed. 5. With the assistance of learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondent-Accused the record has been perused, and it shows that after the said Order dated 26-6-2003 sanction was obtained by the Complainant on 10-12- 2009 ALL MR (Cri) . June 2003, and the complaints were filed on 30-12-2003. All payments were made by the establishment of accused on 29-10-2003 and this fact was recorded by this Court on 2-8-2007 in the presence of parties in the following words :- "It is seen from the records that Cr.M.A. No.94/2007 (now Criminal Appeal No.45/2007) pertains to three monthly periods from September to November, 2002. Cr.M.A. No.95/2007 (now Criminal Appeal No.46/ 2007) pertains to three monthly periods from December to February, 2003 and Cr.M.A. No.96/2007(now Criminal Appeal No.47/2007) pertains to three monthly periods from March to May, 2003, for which contribution! administrative charges were not paid. Cr.M.A. No.95/2007 (now Criminal Appeal No.46/ 2007) pertains to three monthly periods from December to February, 2003 and Cr.M.A. No.96/2007(now Criminal Appeal No.47/2007) pertains to three monthly periods from March to May, 2003, for which contribution! administrative charges were not paid. There appears to be no dispute that earlier for the months of January to August, 2002 such payments were made by the Company and not only that for the three monthly periods involved in these three cases payments were also made by the Company but subsequently on 29-10-2003. Special leave to appeal granted as against Respondent Nos.1 and 2 only. Appeal be registered. Upon registration action as against Respondent No.2 be taken in terms of Section 390, CLP.C. by the learned J.M.F.C., Vasco-da-Gama." 6. The facts recorded on 2-8-2007 have not been disputed, on behalf of the Complainant, and when they are considered in juxtaposition they show that the payments were made after the said Order dated 26-6-2003 and before sanction was given on 10-12-2003 and complaints were filed on 30-12-2003. 7. Shri. R. Rao, learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondents/Accused has firstly submitted that there is variance between the sanction order and the complaints. In other words, learned Counsel submits that the sanction order is in respect of non payment of contribution and administrative charges under the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, while the complaints filed are for non-payment of contributions and administrative charges under the Employees Deposit Linked Insurance Scheme. Secondly, learned Counsel submits that the Respondent! Accused had already paid all the contributions even before the sanction order was issued and therefore it follows therefrom that the sanction order was issued without application of mind. In support of this second submission, learned Counsel has placed reliance On a Division Bench Judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Pranati Textiles and others Vs. State of W.B. and another (1989 Cri.L.J. 1804). 8. Learned Counsel has also placed reliance on two other decisions in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Pankaj A. Gupta (1995(1) Born C.R. 353) but this case is of no assistance to the case of the Respondents for in this case, sanction order itself was not filed while in the present case there is a sanction order. 8. Learned Counsel has also placed reliance on two other decisions in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Pankaj A. Gupta (1995(1) Born C.R. 353) but this case is of no assistance to the case of the Respondents for in this case, sanction order itself was not filed while in the present case there is a sanction order. The other is in the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs, ESI Corporation ( AIR 2008 SC 1449 : [2008 ALL SCR 1204]) wherein the Apex Court stated as follows :- "In Food Corporation of India Vs. Provident Fund Commissioner and Ors. [ (1990)1 SCC 68 ], this Court while considering the provisions of Section 7 -A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 held: "It will be seen from the above provisions that the Commissioner is authorised to enforce attendance in person and also to examine any person On oath. He has the power requiring the discovery and production of documents. This power was given to the Commissioner to decide not abstract questions of law, but only to determine actual concrete differences in payment of contribution and other dues by identifying the workmen. The Commissioner should exercise all his powers to collect all evidence and collate all material before coming to proper conclusion. That is the legal duty of the Commissioner. It would be failure to exercise the jurisdiction particularly when a party to the proceedings requests for summoning evidence from a particular person." The Division Bench' of the High Court distinguished the said decision holding that the provisions of Section 7-A of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 are not in pari materia with the provisions of the Act stating: "An inquiry under sub-section (I) of Section 7-A can be initiated to decide the dispute regarding the applicability of the Act to an establishment and to determine the amount due from any employer under any provisions of the Act, the Scheme or the Pension or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be. For the purposes of such inquiry, the authorities under the Act are vested with the same powers as are vested in a civil court for trying a suit though such powers are restricted to certain specified matters, viz. For the purposes of such inquiry, the authorities under the Act are vested with the same powers as are vested in a civil court for trying a suit though such powers are restricted to certain specified matters, viz. to enforce the attendance of any person or examining him On oath, requiring the discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence On affidavit, issuing commission for the examination of witnesses. A fiction is created under Section 7-A that an inquiry thereunder is deemed to be a Judicial proceeding. The observance of principles of natural justice is also mandated vide sub-section (3) which says that no order under sub-section (I) shall be made unless the employer concerned is given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case. Thus, it is obvious that such specific powers are given to the authorities concerned to decide not abstract question of law, but to determine actual concrete differences in payment of contribution and other dues by identifying the workmen and the authorities should exercise all their powers to collect all evidence and collate all material before coming to proper conclusion and as such an inquiry under Section 7-A is more or the less a trial of a suit before a civil court and Judicial in nature. The powers so conferred on the authorities concerned are being statutory powers, a legal duty is cast on such authorities to exercise the same when situation arises and failure to exercise the jurisdiction, especially when a party to the proceedings requests for such exercise, would lead to nullification of the order passed in the inquiry." We, with respect to the learned Judges, fail to notice any significant difference in the purport and object of both the provisions. The purport and object of both the statutes, for all intent and purport, in our opinion, is the same. In the proceedings initiated under Section 45-A of the Act, an immediate employer or principal employer may also show that they are not liable to deposit any contribution on behalf of the employees as the establishment in question did not come within the purview thereof. The purpose of the proceedings, both under the Act as also the Employees' Provident Funds Act, is to determine the amount due from any employer in respect of the employees under the statutory schemes. Both the Acts envisage compliance of principles of natural justice. The purpose of the proceedings, both under the Act as also the Employees' Provident Funds Act, is to determine the amount due from any employer in respect of the employees under the statutory schemes. Both the Acts envisage compliance of principles of natural justice. The proviso appended to Section 45-A of the Act provides for a statutory mandate of giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard." 9. As far as the first submission is concerned, I am not inclined to accept the same since the fact remains that the accused had not paid the contributions under one scheme or the other, in time. Moreover, along with Order dated 26-6-2003 (Exh.35) the Complainant had produced other documents including sanction order dated 10-12-2003 (Exh.37 colly.) for prosecution under Section 6-C read with Section l4(l)(A) of the Act and which relates to all the complaints and contains the particulars tabulated in para (A) herein above. It also records that the accused were not convicted earlier in similar offences and therefore are liable to be punished under Section 14-AA of the Act. It also notes that the sanctioning authority was satisfied that it was proper and expedient and in public interest to prosecute the employer for the offence. There is absolutely no cross-examination on that subject inasmuch as the Respondents have also not demonstrated as to what prejudice has been caused to them when the Order dated 26-6-2003 shows that contributions were payable in the sum of Rs.5,29,644/- towards all the said three schemes. In this context, reference could be made to para 8 of the judgment of the learned Division Bench in the case of Pranati Textiles and others Vs. State of W.B. and another (supra) wherein the Court stated as follows :- "We are not, as we cannot, be unmindful of the provisions of S.465, Cri.P.C. 1973 where under, as it now stands, "no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on account of any error or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of the Court a failure of justice as in fact been occasioned thereby"." 10. However, the second submission made, deserves consideration. However, the second submission made, deserves consideration. All the contributions payable as per Order dated 26-62003 under one or the other schemes were in fact paid by the Respondent on 29-10-2003 as recorded by this Court on 2-8-2007, a statement which has not been disputed till date, and which shows that all the contributions were paid by the Respondents! Accused even before the sanction was granted to prosecute the accused. In this context, reference could be made to the said Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court. The learned Division Bench took note of a decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Hoogh1y Docking and Engineering Co. Vs, Inspector Employees' Provident Fund (1980)1 Cal. HN 280) and observed that the said decision could not be treated as any authority for the proposition that an offence for "failure to pay in time" stands wiped off, and the prosecution therefore cannot be instituted, if the amount payable is paid at any time before the initiation of the prosecutions. Such a view would encourage evasion of a law like the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 avowedly enacted for the benefit and protection of the weaker Section of the community and would encourage the employers to indulge in not paying the dues in time. Apparently, in the case at hand, the Respondent-Company was going through a lean period inasmuch as even the salaries of the employees were not paid in time and in fact it was admitted by the Complainant that the deduction of contribution could be made only in case the salary was paid for the respective month. He had also admitted that in the reply it was mentioned that salary was not paid to the employees. The Division Bench has considered that under the Act and the Schemes, failure to pay in time is an offence but they had doubts as to whether a sanction to prosecute for "failure to pay" and not for "failure to pay in time" could sustain a prosecution for failure to pay in time. The Division Bench took note of the fact that the Respondents had already paid all that was payable, like the case in hand, before the prosecution were launched, and, even before the sanctions were accorded and, therefore the offences were obviously "failure to pay in time" and not failure to pay altogether, for which sanctions have been accorded. The Division Bench took note of the fact that the Respondents had already paid all that was payable, like the case in hand, before the prosecution were launched, and, even before the sanctions were accorded and, therefore the offences were obviously "failure to pay in time" and not failure to pay altogether, for which sanctions have been accorded. The learned Division Bench stated as follows :- "But as we have already indicated, it is not a case of any error or irregularity in the sanctions, but a case where though the sanctions only authorise prosecutions for "failure to pay" the petitioners are sought to be prosecuted, not for failure to pay, but for payment beyond the time prescribed for which there is no sanction at all. It is not so much a case of any error or irregularity in the sanction, but a case of want of any sanction for prosecution for the offence of delayed payment, thus affecting, according to the ratio in H. N. Rishbud (1955 Cri.LJ. 526 (SC) (supra), the competency and the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. To quote again from the Supreme Court in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 677 at p,679: (1979 CriL.J. 633 at p.635), "it is well-settled that any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio"." 11. In the case at hand, the fact that the accused had paid the contributions was not placed before the sanctioning authority and has also not been considered by the sanctioning authority. Admittedly the Company was going through lean period, had not paid salaries of employees in time, had paid the contributions no sooner it had paid the salaries and otherwise was a first offender. If these facts were placed before the sanctioning authority, would it sanction the prosecution being expedient and in public interest? Probably not. The learned Division Bench therefore proceeded to hold that "all the dues having already been paid before the sanctions were granted for prosecutions for "failure to pay", and there being nothing to suggest that the sanctioning authority could advert to the facts of these payments already made, the sanctions, in our view, may be assailed as to have suffered from infirmity resulting from non-application of mind to pertinent and relevant facts". 12. 12. In my view, the ratio of that decision could he extended in favour of the Respondents/Accused in this case considering that there was delay in payment not for any particular reason but because the Company itself was going through hard times and eventually had made the payment and that too before the sanction was given. 13. In the above view of the matter, in my opinion, the appeals are required to be dismissed, Order accordingly. Ordered accordingly.