JUDGMENT : Jayant Patel, J. The applicant has preferred the present application to direct the Official Liquidator to disbursement amount under Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 to the applicant, considering the claim of the applicant of Rs. 11,76,663/-. 2. Heard Mr. Thakker, learned Counsel for the applicant and Mr. Modi, learned Counsel for the OL. 3. It is an admitted position that the applicant was appointed as a full-time Consulting Physician for a consolidated salary of Rs. 7,000/- per month and the said aspect is apparent from the appointment letter and the terms and conditions. Therefore, the only question, which may be required to be examined in the present case is, whether the applicant can maintain the claim under Section 529A of the Companies Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') or not ?. 4. As per Section 529A, the workman's claim is to be included and as per the provisions of Section 529(3), for the purpose of Section 529A and 530, the workman is to be considered as the same as defined within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as 'I.D. Act'). Therefore, if the applicant is treated as workman within the meaning of I.D. Act, then only his claim can be considered under Section 529A of the Act. Therefore, if the applicant is treated as workman within the meaning of I.D. Act, then only his claim can be considered under Section 529A of the Act. Section 2(S) of I.D. Act, which may have relevance, reads as under:- ["workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is being employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.] 5. The aforesaid section shows that the one, who is employed in supervisory capacity and draws wages exceeding Rs. 1,600/- per month or either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature would not be included. Therefore, if the employment is relating to supervisory capacity and the wages are drawn exceeding the prescribed limit of Rs. 1,600/-, the person would not fall within the definition of workman. 6. The learned Counsel for the applicant submitted that the employment of the applicant was a full time Physician, which would fall in the category of technician and not in supervisory capacity and he further submitted that if it was an employment as a technician, the salary would be irrelevant and it is only if he is engaged in supervisory capacity and his salary is exceeding Rs. 1,600/-, he shall be outside the scope of the workman. 1,600/-, he shall be outside the scope of the workman. In support of his submission, he has relied upon certain decision of this Court as well as of Calcutta and Kerala High Courts, which shall be referred to hereinafter at appropriate stage. The contention, therefore, is that the doctor can be termed as workman within the meaning of I.D. Act and, therefore, the claim of the applicant can be considered under Section 529A of the Act and, therefore, the OL should be directed to consider the claim accordingly and the disbursement at par with the other workmen. 7. More or less similar question came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Management of Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, reported in 1996 (11) SCC 236 . The Apex Court, inter alia, observed at paragraphs 9,10,11, and 12 as under:- "9. Reliance was placed on behalf of the respondent on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Dr. Surendra Kumar Shukla v. Union of India and Ors. (1986 Lab. I.C. 1516). The question which arose for consideration in that case was whether the Assistant Medical Officer Class-II appointed in the Railways could be regarded as workman to whom the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act would be applicable. In that case the duties of the Assistant Medical Officer were not only to treat railway patients but, according to the Indian Railway Manual, he was also to "meet other administrative requirements where he is in-charge of hospital or a health unit or any other institution" and he was also responsible for its establishment and administration. The High Court held that the primary purpose of employing the Assistant Medical Officer was to treat the patients and that the duties of the doctor were technical and that any supervisory function which such doctor exercised was only incidental to the discharge of his duties and, therefore, it could not be said that he was employed in a supervisory capacity within the meaning of Section 2(S) of the Act. In our opinion the conclusion so arrived at by the High Court was not correct. The duties of a doctor required that he should perform supervisory function in addition to his treating the patients would mean that he had been employed in a supervisory capacity. In our opinion the conclusion so arrived at by the High Court was not correct. The duties of a doctor required that he should perform supervisory function in addition to his treating the patients would mean that he had been employed in a supervisory capacity. The Railway Manual clearly stipulated that the Assistant Divisional Medical Officer would be responsible for the establishment and administration of the hospital or the health unit. This would obviously mean that the Assistant Divisional Medical Officer was employed in a supervisory capacity. 10. The decision in the case of The Bengal United Tea Co. Ltd. v. Ram Labhaya, Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Assam and Ors. (AIR 1961 Assam 30) is also of no assistance to respondent No. 2 because in that case the only question which was considered was whether the functions discharged by the medical officer were of technical nature or not. The Court came to the conclusion that the medical officer discharged technical duties and, therefore, was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(S) of the Act. The Court did not have an occasion to consider the question as to whether the medical officer, in that case, was employed in a supervisory capacity or not. This decision, therefore, has no relevance to the controversy in the present case. 11. In the presence case respondent No. 2 had appeared as a witness before the Labour Court. He had inter alia, stated that he had been appointed along with other doctors and had joined duties on 18th May, 1978. He was posted at the first aid post and along with him one dresser was working and the main duty of respondent No. 2 was to give first aid to the workers on duty. While he did state that he never sanctioned the casual leave of the dresser, who was working with him, but in the latter part of his statement it is recorded that "in the year 1978 and 1979 I had countersigned on the casual leave register". It was also stated by him that "the dresser used to work with him, his name was J. Dadel, along with these dressers and two labourers." He of course categorically stated that he was not doing supervisory work. It was also stated by him that "the dresser used to work with him, his name was J. Dadel, along with these dressers and two labourers." He of course categorically stated that he was not doing supervisory work. One of the witnesses who appeared on behalf of the management stated that the in-charge of the first aid post is the doctor on duty and the male nurse, nursing attendant, sweeper and ambulance driver are subordinate to this in charge. 12. The aforesaid facts, in our opinion, clearly go to show that respondents No. 2 could not be regarded as a workman under Section 2 (S) of the Act as he was working in a supervisory capacity. While it is no doubt true that respondent No. 2, along with the other doctors, used to work in shifts nevertheless during the time when he was in the shift he was the sole person in-charge of the firs t aid post. He had, under him male nurse, nursing attendant, sweeper and ambulance driver who would naturally be taking directions an d orders from the in-charge of the first aid post. These persons obviously could not act on their own and had to function in the manner a s directed by respondent No. 2, whenever he was no duty. They were, in other words, under the control and supervision of the respondent. When a doctor, like the respondent, discharges his duties of attending to the patient s and, in addition thereto supervises the work of the persons subordinate to him, the only possible conclusion which can be arrived at is that the respondent cannot be held to be regarded as workman under Section 2(s) of the Act. (Emphasis supplied)" 8. The aforesaid decision clearly goes to show that when a doctor is working as a person In-charge of the treatment, he has to supervise the working of nurses, nursing assistance, ambulance, driver, etc., who are to work under his direction and, therefore, such function of a doctor can be termed as for controlling and supervising the treatment and such function would fall in the category of supervisory employment and would not fall as workman under Section 2(S) of I.D. Act. 9. 9. Attempt was made by the learned Counsel for the applicant to distinguish the judgment of the Apex Court on the ground that in the said matter, the doctor was working in shift and in the facts of that case, it was found by the Apex Court that he was in supervisory capacity and, therefore, the said decision cannot be read to lay down any proposition that all doctors, irrespective of their nature of work, would not fall as workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) of I.D. Act. 10. It is true that such proposition may not apply in absolute, but even if it is to be considered in the facts of the present case, the applicant was appointed as full-time Consulting Physician in a hospital. Therefore, the duty would not end after just consultation, but would also continue for supervising the treatment to a patient, who is hospitalized or may be hospitalized. The doctor is supposed to supervise the functioning of the nurses and other staff, who are helping the doctor in the treatment to be given to the patient. The command or the final decision in the matter of treatment is to be taken by the doctor and such functions by necessary implications, more particularly when he is a full-timer for hospital can be termed as in supervisory capacity. Therefore, distinction as sought to be canvassed cannot be countenanced. 11. The learned Counsel for the applicant did rely upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Arun Mills Limited v. Chandraprasad C. Trivedi decided on 17.3.1975, copy whereof is produced on page 50 and he has also relied upon the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Mar Basellus Medical Mission Hospital v. Joseph Babu, reported in 2007 LLR, 411 and another decision of this Court in the case of Gayatri Gram Arogya Mandal v. Nayanaben Jashbhai Patel, (SCA No. 1923/1997 dated 22.4.1997) reported in 1997(2) GCD, 578. However, he fairly submitted that in none of the decisions, the above referred decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Management of Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (supra) has been considered. However, he fairly submitted that in none of the decisions, the above referred decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Management of Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (supra) has been considered. Therefore, as such in view of the above referred decision of the Apex Court in the case of Management of Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (Supra), the only observation deserves to be made is that it cannot be termed as a good law in view of the later decision of the Apex Court in the case of Management of Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (supra). In the case of Arun Mills Limited (supra), it was a case of part-time engagement of a doctor on daily basis, which as such cannot be equated with the facts of the present case, but as observed earlier, later on, in view of the above referred decision of the Apex Court in the case of Management of Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (supra), even otherwise also cannot be said as good law. In the case of Gayatri Gram Arogya Mandal (supra), the attention of the Hon'ble Court was not drawn to the decision of the Apex Court. Therefore, when the Apex Court had expressly ruled for such purpose, holding the capacity of the doctor as in supervisory, the decision can be said as per incuriam. 12. The reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the applicant upon the decision of Kerala High Court reported in 2007 LLR, 411 and the decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in 1978 2 LLJ, 1676, cannot be of any help to the applicant, since in view of the above referred decision of the Apex Court in the case of Management of Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (Supra), I cannot agree with the view of both the High Courts, even if it is considered. 13. Under the above circumstances, as the applicant would not fall in the category of workman under Section 2(S) of I.D. Act, his claim towards unpaid salary would not fall in the category of Section 529A of the Act. Consequently the direction as prayed for in the application cannot be granted. 14. Hence, the application is dismissed. Petition dismissed.