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2009 DIGILAW 496 (MP)

Bhagwan Singh v. State Of M. P.

2009-04-16

A.P.SHRIVASTAVA

body2009
Judgment SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1. ) This appeal is directed by the appellants against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 21.1.2000 passed by the Special Judge (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes), Guna(M.P.) in Special Case No.42/96, by which the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:-(I) Appellants have been convicted under Section 3(1)(xv) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months each with a fine of Rs. 100/- each. They have further been convicted under Section 426 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each.(II) Appellant Bhagwan Singh has been convicted under Sections 323 and 451 of IPC and sentenced to under gorigorous imprisonment for three months (on both counts) with afine of Rs. 100/-.(III) Appellant Kishore Singh and Indrapal Singh2 Cr. A. llo of 2000have been convicted under Section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months each.(IV). In default of payment of fine, they have also been directed to undergo imprisonment.(V) All the sentences are to be run concurrently. In brief, the case of the prosecution is that report was lodged by the complainant Jujla(P.W.1) on 23.4.96 at about 10:15at police station Chanderi that a day before occurrence, appellant Bhagwan Singh had come and told the complainant to work at his thresher. Complainant had refused to work at thresher. ( 2. ) The reafteron the date of incident, i.e. on 22.4.% at village Bhatija appellantscame to his house and abused him and also threatened to kill himin case he did not work at thresher and caused damage to thebricks of the roof of the house of the complainant. Appellant Bhagwan Singh has also beaten him causing injury to his hand. The complainant was sent to the hospital for medical examination. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the Special Court and the trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellants accordingly as stated above. Appellant Bhagwan Singh has also beaten him causing injury to his hand. The complainant was sent to the hospital for medical examination. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the Special Court and the trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellants accordingly as stated above. On 30.1.2007 arguments heard finally and onl7.1.2007, a reference was made by this Court and the matter was referred to the larger Bench to clarify the following points:- (I) Whether the compliance of Rule 7 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes(Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 ismandatory; (II) Whether due to non-compliance of the said rule the whole trial would vitiate or only those offences relating to the Scheduled3 Cr. A.110 of 2000Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (III) Whether this objection regarding non-compliance of the Rule 7 can be taken for the first time before the Appellate Court; and(iv) If it is found that Rule 7 ismandatory whether the Court can direct for reinvestigation in terms of Rule 7 and direct to file fresh charge-sheet before the Court. During the course of final submissions, counsel for the appellants raised the following points that in this case, there non-compliance of Rule 7 of SC andST (Prevention of Atrocities)Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") by the investigating agency. Further, the offences under Atrocities Act and Indian Penal Code are interlinked to each other. Therefore, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained and particularly. the charge-sheet was filed against the appellants directly before the Special Court. There is no committal proceeding. ( 3. ) Therefore,the judgment of trial Court is erroneous and illegal. Hence, the finding of sentence is not maintainabie. Regarding the non-compliance of Rule 7, what would be the consequence for that is considered in the case of Dhanraj Singh Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2006(1) M.P.J.R.70, in which it was held that the entire investigation is vitiated and the conviction cannot be maintained. Accused were acquitted in both the offences under Section 3(1) (10) of the Act and under Section 323 of IPC. Similar view has been expressed in the case of Bharat Singh Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2006 Cr. LJ. 4429.But, this Court has taken contradictory view in the case of Keshav Singh Vs. Accused were acquitted in both the offences under Section 3(1) (10) of the Act and under Section 323 of IPC. Similar view has been expressed in the case of Bharat Singh Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2006 Cr. LJ. 4429.But, this Court has taken contradictory view in the case of Keshav Singh Vs. State of M.P. in Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2000, judgment dated 21.09.2006.The Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 2000 answered the reference on 24th August, 2007 and the answer recorded by Division Bench is as under: - (I) That, the provisions of Rule 7 of the Rules are mandatory in nature; (II) That, non-compliance of Rule 7 of the Rules will not vitiate the entire trial but vitiate the trial relating to the offences under the Atrocities Act, unless and until the offence under the Indian Penal Code has nexus with4 Cr. A. 110 of 2000the offences under the Atrocities Act; (III) That, objection regarding noncompliance of the provision of Rule 7 of the Rules can be taken for the first time before the Appellate Court, but while doing so, the accused will have to satisfy the Appellate Court that due to non-compliance of the said provision, grave prejudice is caused to him which has resulted into miscarriage of justice and unless the accused satisfies the appellate Court that there was miscarriage of justice, hewill not get any benefit of the said provision;and (IV) If objection is raised at the earliest opportunity, the Court if satisfied, can direct for re-investigation and to file charge-sheet,but not at a belated stage of the proceedings. Now, with the answer of the reference given by Division Bench of this High Court, the matter has been finally settled and it was held by Division Bench of this Court that Rule 7of the Rules is mandatory in nature. ( 4. ) But non-compliance of Rule 7of the Rules will not vitiate the entire trial but vitiate the trial-relating to the offences under the Atrocities Act, unless and untilthe offence under the Indian Penal Code has nexus with the offences under the Atrocities Act. Whether in this case, the offences of atrocities are interlinked with the offences of Indian Penal Code, will be discussed later on. Learned counsel for the appellants raised new objection that in this case, due to non-committal proceedings, the trial would be vitiated. Whether in this case, the offences of atrocities are interlinked with the offences of Indian Penal Code, will be discussed later on. Learned counsel for the appellants raised new objection that in this case, due to non-committal proceedings, the trial would be vitiated. He submits that being a legal objection this can be raised at the appellate stage also. This is a crucial point whether due to non-committal proceeding, the trial would be vitiated. Counsel for the appellants mainly relied on Gangula Ashok and another Vs. State of A.P. (2000) 2 SCC 504 ; Vidyadharan Vs. State of Kerala (2004) 1 SCC 215 , and Molyand another Vs. State of Kerala (2004) 4 SCC 584.Case of State of M.P. Vs. Bhooraji and Others, 2001(7) SCC 679 also discussed. It is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that in view of the citations submitted by him,the principles of Bhooraji and Others (supra) case will not be 5 Cr. A. 110 of 2000applicable.I would like to discuss the relevant decisions on this point pronounced by this High Court as well as the Honble Apex Court. Since, the Act came into force in the State of Madhya Pradesh, this point was considered in the case of Meerabai Vs. Bhujbal Singh reported in 1995 Cr. L J. 2376 in which the Division Bench of this High Court held that the Special Court hasno jurisdiction to try the offences unless the case is committed toit in view of Section 193 of Cr. PC. But, subsequently, in the case of Anand Swaroop Tiwari Vs. Ram Ratan Jatav and others reported in 1996 MPLJ 141 , the Full Bench of this High Court held that a Special Court under Prevention of Atrocities Act is not to function as a Sessions Court but as a Court of original jurisdiction. It can take cognizance of any offence without committal order by the Magistrate. Thereafter, in the case of Gangula Ashok and another (supra), the Apex Court held that under the Prevention of Atrocities Act, Special Court is a Court of Session, It is specified for trial of offences as distinguished from "inquiry" as defineandinSection 2(g) of Cr.P.C ( 5. ) Therefore, it cannot take cognizancedirectiy as a Court of original jurisdiction without the case being committed to it by a Magistrate in view of Section 193 of Cr.P.C. Sections 4 and 5 of Cr. ) Therefore, it cannot take cognizancedirectiy as a Court of original jurisdiction without the case being committed to it by a Magistrate in view of Section 193 of Cr.P.C. Sections 4 and 5 of Cr. P.C. do not indicate any departure from this position. In the case of Vidyadharan (supra), the Apex Court considered the aspect whether Special Court under the Act is a Court of Session; whether "Special Court" under the Act being a Court of Session, excepted from interdict of Section 193 of Cr.P.C, 1973; whether there was any express provision in the Actor in Cr.P.C. excepting the Special Court and further whether acombined reading of Sections 4(2) and 5 of Cr. P.C. excepted the Special Court."The Apex Court has discussed this point. The relevant para 18 of its judgment contains that:- "Section 193 of the Code has to be understood in the aforesaid backdrop. The6 Cr.A. 110 of 2000Section imposes an interdict on all Courts of Session against taking cognizance of any offences Court of original jurisdiction. It can take cognizance only if " the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate." as provided in the Code. Two segments have been indicated in Section 193 as exceptions to the aforesaid interdict. One is, when the Code itself has provided differently in express language regarding taking of cognizance, and the secondis when any other law has provided differently in express language regarding taking cognizance of offences under such Saw. ( 6. ) The word "expressly" which is employed in Section 193 denoting those exceptions is indicative of the legislative mandate that a Court of Session can depart from the interdict contained in the Section only if it improvised differently in clear and unambiguous terms. In other words, unless it is positively and specifically provided differently, no Court of Session can take cognizance of any offence directly, without the case being committed to it by a Magistrate. "In the case of Holy and another (supra), it is held by the Apex Court that under the Prevention of Atrocities Act, under Sections 14 and 2(l) (d), Special Court is a Court of Session. It is specified for trial of offences as distinguished from inquiry. Cognizance can be taken by said Court directly as a result of Court of original jurisdiction without the case being committed toit by a Magistrate. It is specified for trial of offences as distinguished from inquiry. Cognizance can be taken by said Court directly as a result of Court of original jurisdiction without the case being committed toit by a Magistrate. It is not permissible in view of Section 193 of Cr.P.C. In the absence of any contrary provision in the 1989 Actor in Cr. P.C. in that regard, Section 5 of Cr. P.C. cannot be brought in aid for supporting the contrary view. The word "except-as otherwise expressly provided" used in Cr.P.C. that means except positively provided differently in clear and unambiguous language. The Apex Court in the case of Bhooraji and Others(supra) dealt with the matter elaborately and also distinguished the case which was decided by the Apex Court in the case of Gangula Ashok and another (supra). The factual position in the case of Bhooraji and others (supra) is mat police, after investigation, filed charge-sheet against eleven accused in respect of various offences including Section 302 read with Section 149 of IPC and7 Cr.A. 110 of 2000Section 3(2) of the Act. The case started in January 1992 before the Court of Additional. Sessions Judge, Dhar (M.P.) which was the specified Court as per Section 14 of the said Act ( 7. ) The charges were framed and the case was decided on 23.8.1995 by convicting all the eleven accused under Sections 148,323, 302 read with Section 149 of IPC and sentenced them to various punishments including imprisonment for life. All the eleven accused persons filed appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. It was during the pendency of the said appeal that the Honble Supreme Court decided the case in Gangula Ashok and another (supra) in which it was held that committal proceedings are necessary for as pacified Court under the SC and ST Act to take cognizance of the offences to be tried. But the legal position which held by the field in the State of Madhya Pradesh till then was the same on account of a judgment pronounced by a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Meerabai (supra)case. But the said legal position was changed. in the State when a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh overruled the aforesaid dictum by adjudgment pronounced in Anand Swaroop Tiwari (supra). But the said legal position was changed. in the State when a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh overruled the aforesaid dictum by adjudgment pronounced in Anand Swaroop Tiwari (supra). The Full Bench in para 20 of its judgment held that:-" Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to proceedings under the SC and ST Act and committal orders are not required "The Full Bench, in order to prevent repetition of trials already held or started,took the precautionary measure of directingthat;"where cognizance has already been taken on the basis of committal orders in police challan cases, it is not necessary for the Courts to retrace their steps or to take cognizance afresh". ( 8. ) The Apex Court also observed that when this Court pronounced the judgment in Gangula Ashok and another (supra)case, the legal position as was adopted by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in Meerabai (supra) case, got revived and the Full Bench decision got eclipsed. Taking advantage of this8 Cr. A. llo of 2000Court, all the convicted persons filed LA. No.288 of 2000 before the High Court seeking abashment of the trial proceedings on the ground that:-The trial was without jurisdiction inasmuch as the specified Court of Session did not acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try the case, in the absence of it being committed by a Magistrate."The entire trial held by the Court below shall stand quashed and the trial Court was directed to return the charge-sheet and the connected papers to the prosecution for resubmission to the Magistrate for further proceedings in accordance with law. "Against this order, the State of MP filed an appeal before the Apex Court. It is observed by the Apex Court that in the present case, where the accused did not raise any question when they were heard at the time of framing of the charge, that the Court cannot proceed without committal made by a Magistrate. Nor did they raise such a plea at any stage either before or afterthe evidence was recorded by the trial Court. The convicted persons thought of raising such a contention only when they found the decision of this Court in Gangula Ashok and another (supra)as useful to them. Nor did they raise such a plea at any stage either before or afterthe evidence was recorded by the trial Court. The convicted persons thought of raising such a contention only when they found the decision of this Court in Gangula Ashok and another (supra)as useful to them. Now, I will quote some important and relevant paras of the judgment in Bhooraji and Others (supra)case which are as follow :- The real question is whether the High Court necessarily should have quashed the trial proceedings to be repeated again only on account of the declaration of the legal position made by the Supreme Court concerning the procedural aspect about the cases involving offences under the SC andST Act. A de novo trial should be the last resort and that too only when such a course becomes desperately indispensable. It should be limited to the extreme exigency to avert "a failure of justice". ( 9. ) Cr. A. 110 of 2000Any omission or even the illegality in the procedure which does not affect the core of the case is not a ground for ordering a de novo trial. This is because the appellate Court has plenary powers for revaluating and reappraising the evidence and even to take additional evidence by the appellate Court itself or to direct such additional evidence to be collected by the trial Court. But to replay the whole laborious exercise after erasing the bulky records relating to the earlier proceedings, by bringing down all the persons to the Court once again for repeating the whole depositions would be a sheer waste of time,energy and costs unless there is miscarriage of justice otherwise. Hence, the said course can beresorted to when it becomes unpresentable for the purpose of averting "a failure of justice. "It is useful to refer to Section 462 of the Code which says that even proceedings conducted in a wrong sessions division are not liable to be set at naught merely on that ground. However, an exception is provided in that section that if the Court is satisfied that proceedings conducted erroneously in a wrong sessions division "has in fact occasioned a failure of justice", it is open to the Higher Court to interfere. However, an exception is provided in that section that if the Court is satisfied that proceedings conducted erroneously in a wrong sessions division "has in fact occasioned a failure of justice", it is open to the Higher Court to interfere. While it is provided that all the instances enumerated in Section 461 would render the proceedings void, no other proceedings would get vitiated ipso facto merelyon the ground that the proceedings were erroneous. The Court of appeal or revision has to examine specifically whether such erroneous steps had in fact occasioned a failure of justice. ( 10. ) Then alone the proceedings can be set aside. Thus the entire purport of the provisions subsumed in Chapter XXXV is to save the proceedings linked with such erroneous steps,unless the error is of such a nature that it had occasioned a failure of justice. We have to examine Section 465(1) of the Code in the above context, it is extracted below:- "465.(l)"Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal,confirmarjon or revision on account of any error,omission or irregularity in the complaint,summons,warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or inane enquiry or other proceedings under this 10 Cr. A. 110 of 2000Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby."A reading of the section makes it clear that the error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings held before or during the trial or inany enquiry were reckoned by the Legislature as-possible occurrences in criminal courts. Yet the Legislature disfavoured axing down the proceedings or to direct repetition of the whole proceedings afresh. Hence, the Legislature imposed a prohibition that unless such error,omission or irregularity has occasioned "a failure of justice" the superior court shall not quash the proceedings merely on the ground of such error,omission or irregularity."What is meant by " a failure of justice"occasioned on account of such error, omission or irregularity? This Court has observed in Shamn Saheb M. Multani Vs. State of Karnataka [(2001) 2SCC 577] thus:"We often hear about failure of justice and quite often the submission in a criminal court is accentuated with the said expression. This Court has observed in Shamn Saheb M. Multani Vs. State of Karnataka [(2001) 2SCC 577] thus:"We often hear about failure of justice and quite often the submission in a criminal court is accentuated with the said expression. Perhaps it is too pliable or facile an expression which could befitted in any situation of a case. ( 11. ) The expression failure of justice would appear, sometimes, as an etymological chameleon (the simile is borrowed from Lord Diplock in Town Investments Ltd. Vs. Deptt. of the Environment [1977 (1) All ER 813])The criminal Court, particularly the Superior Court, should make a close examination to ascertain whether there was really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage."It is an uphill task for the accused in this case to show that failure of justice had in fact occasioned merely because the specified Sessions Court took cognizance of the offences without the case being committed to it. The normal and correct procedure, of course, is that the case should have been committed to the Special Court because that court being essentially a Court of Session can take cognizance of any offence only then. But if specified Sessions Court, on the basis of the legal position then felt to be correct on account of a decision adopted by the High Court, had chosen to take cognizance without a committal order, what is the disadvantage of the accused in following the said course. Cr. A. 110 of 2000We conclude that the trial held by the Sessions Court reaching the judgment impugned fore the High Court in appeal was conducted by a court of competent jurisdiction and the same cannot be erased merely on account of a procedural lapse, particularly when the same happened at a time when the law which held the field in the State of Madhya Pradesh was governed the decision of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court(supra). ( 12. ) The High Court should have dealt with the appeal on merits and on the basis of the evidence already on record. To facilitate the said course, we set aside the judgment of the High Court impugned in this appeal. We remit the case back to the High Court for disposal of the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law and subject to the observations made above. To facilitate the said course, we set aside the judgment of the High Court impugned in this appeal. We remit the case back to the High Court for disposal of the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law and subject to the observations made above. The case of Meerabai (supra) was decided by the Division Bench of this High Court on 24.1.1994. The Full Bench of this High Court gave its decision in Anand Swaroop Tiwari(supra)case on 23.8.1995. The case of Gangula Ashok andanother(supra) was pronounced by the Apex Court on28.01.2000; the case of Bhooraji and Others (supra) was pronounced on 24.08.2001 while the cases of Vidyadharan(supra) and Moly and another (supra) decided by the Apex Court on 14.11.2003 and on 23.3.2004.K is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that four judgments on this point i.e. Gangula Ashok and another(supra), Vidyadharan(supra), Moly and another (supra) and Bhooraji and Others (supra) were decided by the Apex Court and submitted that if two decisions on the same point are given by Superior Court, the latter view could be prevailed. In this regard,he relied on Rajpur Ruda Meha and others Vs State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1707, in which it is held that about the precedent when certain question is neither raised nor argued a discussion by court after pondering over the issue in-depth would not be a binding precedent. ( 13. ) The basis of judgment on this "point of Gangula Ashok and another (supra) has been discussed by the Apex Courtl2 Cr. A. 110 of 2000in subsequent decisions specially in the case of Bhooraji and others (supra), the Apex Court also distinguished the applicability of Gangula Ashok and another (supra) case in itsjudgment and the reasons have been given elaborately by the Apex Court. About the precedent,in the case of Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit Vs State of Maharashtra reported in AIR1981 SC 765, the Apex Court observed that legal principles are not magic incantations and their importance lies more in the application to a given set of facts than in their recital in the judgment. Further, in the case Ambalal Manibhai Patel and others Vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in AIR 1987SC 1073 it is observed that the ratio of any decision must understood in the background of the facts of mat case. Further, in the case Ambalal Manibhai Patel and others Vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in AIR 1987SC 1073 it is observed that the ratio of any decision must understood in the background of the facts of mat case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what is actually decides, and not what logically follows from it From the perusal of record, it is found that the present case has been filed before the Special Court on 28.5.96against the appellants by police station Chanderi under Sections451, 323, 426 of IPC and under Section 3(1)(xv) of the Act and during the relevant time, the law pronounced by the Full Bench of this High Court in the case of Anand Swaroop Tiwari (supra) was prevailing and it was decided on 23.8.1995. The judgment of this case was delivered on 21.1.2000 and after passing the judgment and when the appeal was pending, the decision in Gangula Ashokand another (supra) case was pronounced by the Apex Court on28.1.2000. ( 14. ) Therefore, looking to the factual aspect of the case and ratio decided by the Apex Court in Bhooraji and Others(supra) case, the trial would not vitiate on the ground that committal proceeding has not been followed by the Court. From the record of the lower Court and the impugned judgment, itappears that no such objection has been taken by the appellants at the time of trial regarding the non-compliance of procedural lapse. Therefore, regarding the committal proceedings13 Cr. A. 110 of 2000before the Special Court in view of Gangula Ashok and another(supra) case and subsequent law on this point, it is clear that Special Courts under Section 14 of the Atrocities Act are Courts of Session and committal proceedings are necessary under Sectionl93 of Cr. P.C. But in the present case, the principle of Gangula Ashok and another (supra) case is not applicable as already discussed in detail earlier. Therefore, due to non-committal proceedings, the impugned judgment cannot be erased merely on the ground of procedural lapse in view of observations made in Bhooraji and Others (supra) case. P.C. But in the present case, the principle of Gangula Ashok and another (supra) case is not applicable as already discussed in detail earlier. Therefore, due to non-committal proceedings, the impugned judgment cannot be erased merely on the ground of procedural lapse in view of observations made in Bhooraji and Others (supra) case. In view of legal objection raised by learned counsel for the appellants and the discussions made in the aforesaid paras and the proposition of law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court as well as by the Apex Court, the position is now clear and settled:- (I) That, the provisions of Rule 7 of the Rules are mandatory in nature (II) That, non-compliance of Rule 7 of the Rules will not vitiate the entire trial but vitiate the trial relating to the offences under the Atrocities Act, unless and until the offence under the Indian Penal Code has nexus with the offences under the Atrocities Act (III) That, the objection regarding noncompliance of the provision of Rule 7 of the Rules can be taken for the first time before the appellate Court, but while doing so, the accused will have to satisfy the appellate Court that due to non-compliance of the said provision, grave prejudice is caused to him which has resulted into miscarriage of justice and unless the accused satisfies the appellate Court that there was miscarriage of justice, he will not get any benefit of the said provision; (IV) If the objection is raised at the earliest opportunity, the Court if satisfied, can direct for reinvestigation and to file charge-sheet, but not at a belated stage of the proceedings. (V) In view of the decision in the case of Gangula Ashok and another (supra), the committal proceedings before the Special Courtl4 Or. A. 110 of 2000are mandatory in view of Section 193 of Cr.P.C. But, those cases which were filed directly before the Special Court without committal proceedings in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Anand Swaroop Tiwari(supra) case prevailing at that time, the proceedings cannot be quashed due to procedural lapse as mentioned unless occasioned failure of justice as lays down by the Apex Court in Bhooraji and Others (supra) case. Now, I will consider the factual aspect of the case. Now, I will consider the factual aspect of the case. All the appellants were convicted by the trial Court under Section 3(1)(xv) of the Act and under Section 426 of IPC Appellant Bhagwan Singh in addition to above convictjon,convicted under Sections 451 and 323 of IPC while the remaining appellants in addition to above conviction convicted under Secrjon323 of IPC with the aid of Section 34 of IPC. The allegation against the appellants is that they tried to dispossess the complainant Jujla (P.W.I) knowing that he is the member of Scheduled Caste. ( 15. ) All the appellants entered into the house of the complainant. Appellant Bhagwan Singh entered into the house off he complainant by damaging his Khapra and thereby committed the act of mischief. Regarding the dispossession, in examination in-chief, the complainant deposed that the quarrel took place due to refusal of work as a labourer without charges. The appellants came to the house of the complainant with the appellant Bhagwan Singh; and they all entered into the house of the complainant and brought the complainant outside of the house. In this regard, the complainant Jujla (P.W.I) stated that appellant Bhagwan Singhtold him to work in his house. When he refused, then filthy language was used by the appellant Bhagwan Singh. It is further alleged that appellant Bhagwan Singh was taken the complainant outside of the house and threatened him that he would dispelled him from the village. Thereafter, appellant Bhagwan Singh inflicted farsa blow on his right hand, appellant Indrapal Singhgave a lathi blow on his right hand and appellant Kishore Singhgave blow by shoe on his face. The wife of the complainant Smt Kunwar Bai (P.W.2), Brijbhan (P.W.5) were present on the spot at the time of incident. In para 7 of his cross-examination, the15 Cr. A. 110 of 2000witness admits that two bigha of land has been forcibly taken by the appellant Bhagwan Singh. Appellants are brothers and they were cultivating his land for the last 7-8 years. When the complainant asked them to return his land, they refused to do so. Patta was prepared in his name. Regarding the infliction of injuries, minor contradictions and omissions came out in the cross-examination. In the cross-examination, the witness turned his version about infliction of injuries. by farsa. When the complainant asked them to return his land, they refused to do so. Patta was prepared in his name. Regarding the infliction of injuries, minor contradictions and omissions came out in the cross-examination. In the cross-examination, the witness turned his version about infliction of injuries. by farsa. Smt. Kunwar Bai(P.W.2), who is wife of the complainant, deposed that all the appellants entered into the house of the complainant by damaging khapra and they took the complainant outside the house and beat her husband. Brijbhan (P.W.5), who is an eye-witness of the incident, has not supported the prosecution case. According to the witness, in his presence, no incident has taken place. ( 16. ) He was declared hostile by the prosecution. Similarly, Sukhar (P.W.6) has turned hostile and he has also not supported the prosecution case. Dr.R.P.Sharma (P.W.3) examined the complainant Jujla (P.W.I) on 23.04.96 and found simple injuries which were caused by hard and blunt object. The report is Ex.P.2. L.C.Shriwas (P.W.4) proved the First Information Report which is Ex.P.1. A.S.I. Chandan Singh Parihar (P.W.7) conducted the investigation of the case and also prepared the sop map. All the independent witnesses have not corroborated the version of the complainant Jujla (P.W.I). According to the complainant, appellant Bhagwan Singh entered into his house. Asper Smt. Kunwar Bai (P.W.2), who is wife of the complainant,stated that all the appellants entered the house of the complainant and they broken his Khapra. The prosecution has proved Ex.P.4which is Nuksani Panchanama but the witness Sukhar (P.W.6)supported the Nuksani Panchanama Ex.P.4. However, it was not proved by the complainant himself. The testimony of Investigating Officer Chandan Singh Parihar (P.W.7) shows that he prepared Nuksani Panchanama Ex.P.4. According to this Panchanama, the loss is worth Rs. 500/-.The testimony of Investigating Officer in 16 Cr. A. 110 of 2000this regard remained unchallenged although it is not corroborated by independent witnesses. Looking to the testimony of the complainant and the Investigating Officer, it is not proved that the loss of Khapra caused to the complainant is worth Rs. According to this Panchanama, the loss is worth Rs. 500/-.The testimony of Investigating Officer in 16 Cr. A. 110 of 2000this regard remained unchallenged although it is not corroborated by independent witnesses. Looking to the testimony of the complainant and the Investigating Officer, it is not proved that the loss of Khapra caused to the complainant is worth Rs. 500/-.Regarding the offence under Section 3(1)(xv) of the Act, the essential ingredient of the Section is that- "Whoever not being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; forces or causes a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to leave his house, village or other place of residence, shall be punishable under thisSection."Regarding the objection of non-compliance of Rule 7as decided by the Division Bench of this Court although the Rule 7of the Rules will not vitiate the entire trial but vitiate the trial relating to the offences under the Atrocities Act, unless and untilthe offence under the Indian Penal Code has nexus with the offences under the Atrocities Act. ( 17. ) This objection has been raised the appellants for the first time during the appellate stage but while doing so, the accused will have to satisfy the appellate Court that due to noncompliance of the said provision, grave prejudices caused to him which has resulted into miscarriage of justice and unless the accused satisfies the appellate Court that there was miscarriage of justice, he will not get any benefit of the said provision. In this case also the counsel for the appellants has not satisfied the Court that why this objection was not raised before the trial Court and what prejudice or miscarriage of justice is caused to him due to non-compliance. Therefore, the objection is not sustainable. In this case, the cause of dispute arose due to refusal of the complainant to work as a labourer without charges in the house of the appellant Bhagwan Singh or at his thresher. On this dispute, the appellant Bhagwan Singh entered into the house of the complainant; and caused damage his Khapra; and brought him outside the house and inflicted injuries to him which are simple in nature. From the evidence on record, it does not appear thatl7 Cr. A. 110 of 2000there was any intention of the appellants to dispossess the complainant from his house, being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. From the evidence on record, it does not appear thatl7 Cr. A. 110 of 2000there was any intention of the appellants to dispossess the complainant from his house, being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The backdrop of the case clearly shows that the incident took place due to refusal xf the complainant to work. To take revenge, the appellant Bhagwan Singh went to the house of the complainant, brought him outside the house and inflicted simple injuries to him. Therefore, the essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(xv) are not proved by the prosecution against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the above discussion, it is found that the offence under Section 3(1)(xv) of the Act is not proved against all the appellants. Further, it has also come in the evidence that only the appellant Bhagwan Singh entered into the house of the complainant although version of the wife of the complainant is inconsistent on this point. According to the complainant, only appellant Bhagwan Singh entered into the house of the complainant but his wife stated that all the appellants entered into the house of the complainant which is not proved as per the prosecution story. ( 18. ) Therefore, offence under Section 426 of IPC is only made out against the appellant Bhagwan Singh and it is not established against rest of the appellants. But from the evidence, it is clear that the appellants caused injuries to the complainant and all the injuries are found to be simple in nature. The conviction of all the appellants under Section 3(1)(xv) of the Act and except Bhagwan Singh, conviction against the remaining appellant sunder Section 426 of IPC are hereby, set aside. If the amount of fine is realized, it be returned to them. Appellant Bhagwan Singhis convicted under Sections 451, 323 and 426 of IPC while the remaining appellants are convicted under Section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC. Regarding the sentence, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the incident took place on 22.4.96, since then nearly 12 years have elapsed and the charges which were proved by the prosecution are minor in nature, therefore, looking to the long-pendency of the case, the Court should take lenient view in awarding the sentence. 18 Cr. Regarding the sentence, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the incident took place on 22.4.96, since then nearly 12 years have elapsed and the charges which were proved by the prosecution are minor in nature, therefore, looking to the long-pendency of the case, the Court should take lenient view in awarding the sentence. 18 Cr. A. 110 of 2000Looking to the above facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of the appellant Bhagwan Singh under Sections451, 323 and 426 of IPC is reduced to the period already undergone but the amount of fine to the tune of Rs. 1,000/- is imposed under Section 323 of IPC and amount of fine to the tune of Rs. 500/- is imposed under Section 426 of IPC while the amount of fine as awarded by learned trial Court under Section 451 of IPC is enhanced from Rs. 100/ - to Rs. 500/-. The sentence of the rest of the appellants under section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC is also reduced to the period already undergone but the amount of fine is imposed to the tune of Rs. 1,000/- on each. In default of payment of fine, the appellants have to undergo simple imprisonment for one month on each count. On realization of the fine amount, Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) be given to the complainant as compensation under Section 357 of Cr.P.C Bail bonds of the appellants shall stand discharged. They are directed to deposit the amount of fine before the trial Court within period of 15 days from the receipt of this judgment. Copy of this judgment be sent to the concerning Court for necessary compliance. With the above modification, the appeal stands disposed of.