ORAL JUDGMENT RULE. Mr. Jignesh H. Kapadia, for Mr. Harin P. Raval, learned Counsel waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent No.1. Though served, none appears on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 and 3. 1.0 The challenge in this petition is to the order dated 22.10.2008, passed by the trial Court in application at Exhibit-45, in Civil Suit No. 215 of 2006, whereby the above-mentioned application of the petitioner for permission to file a written statement, has been dismissed. 2.0 The brief facts of the case, as emerging from the material on record are that the petitioner is the original defendant No.3 in the above-mentioned Civil Suit which has been filed by respondent No.1-(Original Plaintiff). The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are the original defendants Nos.1 and 2, who are being proceeded ex parte, in the Civil Suit. The Suit was filed on 20th December, 1999. Upon issuance of summons, defendant No.3 entered appearance on 04.02.2000. 2.1 It appears that, at the behest of defendant No.3, the Suit was adjourned for about nine months. Thereafter, an earthquake struck the State of Gujarat on 26.01.2001, and the file of the case remained closed for some time. Pursuant thereto, it appears that the right to file a written statement of the petitioner was closed, on 03.11.2001. The file of the case remained closed for another three years. On 16.08.2007, along with the application, certain documents were sought to be submitted by the petitioner. The trial Court permitted the petitioner to produce the documents, as there was no serious objection from respondent No.1(Original Plaintiff). However, the application for filing a written statement has been dismissed by the impugned order, hence the present petition. 3.0 Mr. B.B. Gogia with Mr. Anand B. Gogia, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted as under: (i) That, the impugned order is illegal and perverse as the Court has not exercised jurisdiction vested in it, in a proper manner. (ii) That, the documents sought to be produced by the petitioner have been permitted to be produced, whereas the application for permission to file a written statement has been rejected, and in the absence of the written statement, the said documents are of no use. (ii) That, the documents sought to be produced by the petitioner have been permitted to be produced, whereas the application for permission to file a written statement has been rejected, and in the absence of the written statement, the said documents are of no use. (iii) That, the Court below has come to the conclusion that there is a delay of about seven years in filing the written statement but, it ought to have seen that the said delay is not attributable to the petitioner, as the earthquake took place in the year 2001, which circumstance was not in the control of the petitioner and in view of the said natural calamity, the file of the case remained closed. (iv) That, the petitioner has been diligent in pursuing the case and his learned Advocate was remaining present throughout therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has been negligent or careless. (v) That, the file of the case again came on the Board of the trial Court in the year 2007, and no notice has been given to the petitioner regarding this, therefore, the delay in filing the written statement cannot be attributed to the petitioner and his application, has been wrongly rejected. 3.1 In support of the above submissions, reliance is placed on following decisions: • N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy , AIR 1998 SC 3222 , • Chhabi Kulavi and Anr. Vs. Ganesh Chandra Mandal , (2001) 9 SCC 294 , • Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab Vs. Kumar and Ors. , (2006)1 SCC 46 , • Sumtibhai and Ors. Vs. Paras Finance Co. Rg. Partnership Firm Beawer(Raj.) through Smt. Mankanwar W/o. Parasmal Chordia(Dead) and Ors. , 2007(3) GLH 644. 3.2 It is prayed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order be set aside, and the petition be allowed. 4.0 Mr. Jignesh H. Kapadia, learned Counsel for Mr. Harin P. Raval, learned Counsel for respondent No.1 has strongly opposed the grant of the prayers made in the petition, and has submitted as below: (1) That, there is no doubt that the Court has ample powers to condone the delay in filing the written statement and permit the same to be brought on record, but, the said powers should only be exercised when exceptional and compelling circumstances have been shown for non-filing of the written statement. Even though the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 are directory in nature, the time for filing a written statement, as stipulated therein, cannot be extended indefinitely, without any cause, or in a casual or routine manner. (2) That, the petitioner had ample opportunity to file the written statement, as the Civil Suit has been filed on 20th December, 1999, and he has put in appearance through an Advocate on 04.02.2000. Moreover, the petitioner himself has taken adjournments for nine months, thereafter. (3) The earthquake took place in the year 2001, however, the issues have been framed on 11.06.2003, which was in the knowledge of the petitioner, as the learned Counsel for the petitioner had been attending the Court. (4) The case was listed in the Court on 16.08.2007 and the respondent No.1 has filed an affidavit on 14.09.2007. Even at that point of time, the petitioner did not make the application for filing a written statement and the application has been filed only on 03.01.2008. There is no convincing explanation, whatsoever for the delay and the only reason advanced is that the written statement could not be filed as some papers in respect of the Suit premises were lost, and some other papers were to be obtained. (5) That, the trial has already commenced and the examination-in-chief of respondent No.1 (Original Plaintiff) has already taken place, and the case is at the stage of cross-examination. If the written statement is permitted to be filed at this stage, it will amount to almost a fresh trial as issues have already been framed, as far back as 11.06.2003. (6) The order of the trial Court does not deserve interference as the Court below has taken into consideration all the relevant aspects, and the application has rightly been dismissed. 5.0 I have heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties at length, perused the averments made in the petition, contents of the impugned order and other documents on record. A perusal of the impugned order clearly reveals that the Suit was filed on 20.12.1999. The petitioner put in appearance through his advocate on 04.02.2000. It is clear from the impugned order, and is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, thereafter, the Suit was adjourned for a period of about nine months, at the behest of the petitioner. The petitioner put in appearance through his advocate on 04.02.2000. It is clear from the impugned order, and is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, thereafter, the Suit was adjourned for a period of about nine months, at the behest of the petitioner. The earthquake took place in January, 2001, after which the petitioner's right to file written-statement has been closed on 03.11.2001 and issues were framed on 11.06.2003. There is no material on record to show that the petitioner was not aware of the proceedings of the Court. It appears that the file remained dormant for about three years and the case came up on Board on 16.08.2007. Respondent No.1-(Original Plaintiff) deposed by way of an affidavit, on 14.09.2007. Even at that stage, the petitioner did not prefer an application, seeking permission to file written statement. The said application has been filed only on 03.01.2008. 5.1 A perusal of the contents of the said application reveals that the only reason advanced for late filing of written statement is that some papers in respect of the Suit premises were lost, and some papers were to be obtained, therefore, written statement could not be filed within the stipulated period. The trial Court has considered all relevant aspects of the matter before coming to the conclusion that as there is a delay of seven years in filing the written statement, the petitioner cannot be granted permission to file the same. It has also been considered that no plausible reasons have been advanced to explain the delay or sufficient cause shown and it cannot be believed that the petitioner could not collect the requisite papers, for a period of about seven years. The documents sought to be produced along with the application have been taken on record by the Court below, as no serious objection was raised by respondent No.1. Merely because certain documents are taken on record, it does not mean that permission to file a written statement ought to have been accorded automatically or in a mechanical manner, by ignoring the aspect that only vague and unconvincing reasons have been given to explain the delay. As per the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1, the time to file a written statement can be extended up to 90 days. The earthquake took place in January, 2001 whereas the petitioner put in appearance on 04.02.2000. As per the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1, the time to file a written statement can be extended up to 90 days. The earthquake took place in January, 2001 whereas the petitioner put in appearance on 04.02.2000. The extended period of 90 days had long elapsed, by then. 5.2 As stated in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. Vs. Union of India , (2005) 6 SCC 344 and in Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab (Supra), the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 are directory in nature and the Court has ample powers to extend the time for filing a written statement after expiry of 90 days, when it deems fit. However, the discretion vested in the Court should not be exercised in a manner which renders the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 nugatory. The relevant extracts of the judgment in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. (Supra)are pertinent and are reproduced below: 15. The question is whether the court has any power or jurisdiction to extend the period beyond 90 days. The maximum period of 90 days to file written statement has been provided but the consequences on failure to file written statement within the said period have not been provided for in Order 8 Rule 1. the point for consideration is whether the provision providing for maximum period of ninety days is mandatory and, therefore, the court is altogether powerless to extend the time even in and exceptionally hard case. 21. In construing this provision, support can also be had from Order 8 Rule 10 which provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the court shall pronounce judgment against to file him, or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this provision, the court has been given the discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this provision, the court has been given the discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. In the context of the provision, despite use of the word shall , the court has been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if the written statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious construction is required to be applied. The effect would be that under Rule 10 Order 8, the Court in its discretion would have the power to allow the defendant to file written statement even after expiry of the period of 90 days provided in Order 8 Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order 8 Rule 10 that after expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. The Court has wide power to make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. clearly, therefore, the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time-limit of 90 days. The discretion of the court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order 8 Rule 1. [Emphasis Supplied] 5.3 The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon certain judgments, in support of his case. 5.4 N. Balakrishnan (Supra), is a case under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Chhabi Kulavi and Anr. (Supra), is also a judgment on Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5.5 As the said two judgments are not relevant to the factual and legal issues involved in the present case, they are of no help in advancing the case of the petitioner. 5.6 In Sumtibhai and Ors. Chhabi Kulavi and Anr. (Supra), is also a judgment on Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5.5 As the said two judgments are not relevant to the factual and legal issues involved in the present case, they are of no help in advancing the case of the petitioner. 5.6 In Sumtibhai and Ors. (Supra), was a case for specific performance wherein the defendant expired during the pendency of the Suit. The heirs and legal representatives of the said defendants were brought on record. They sought permission to file a written statement. The trial Court had refused to grant such permission, which order was set aside on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. 5.7 The factual matrix of that case is totally different from that obtaining in the present case. The proposition of law enunciated in the quoted judgment, though not disputed, will not be applicable to the present case, as here, there is a delay of more than seven years in filing the written statement, and the trial has already begun. In addition thereto there are no convincing reasons for the delay caused. Only a vague and casual explanation has been advanced which is not sufficient or satisfactory. The power to extend the time for filing a written statement cannot be exercised in a casual or routine manner, as will render the relevant provisions of law ineffective or nugatory. The impugned order is well considered and has taken note of the above aspects. The interference of this Court is, therefore, not warranted. 5.8 Considering the above-mentioned aspects and the legal position as enunciated in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. (Supra), there is no infirmity, perversity or manifest error in the impugned error so as to warrant interference. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court does not sit as an appellate Court or re-evaluate the evidence on record. In B.K. Muniraju Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2008)4 SCC 451 , the Apex Court observed as under, 24. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court does not sit as an appellate Court or re-evaluate the evidence on record. In B.K. Muniraju Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2008)4 SCC 451 , the Apex Court observed as under, 24. It is clear that whether it is a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. It is also clear that the High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. 6.0 Seen in the light of the abovestated principles of law, there is no infirmity or manifest error apparent in the order under challenge so as to warrant interference. 6.1 For the aforestated reasons, the petition fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged.