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2009 DIGILAW 5 (BOM)

State of Maharashtra, through Police Station v. Ramanath s/o Gangadhar Pawar

2009-01-05

V.R.KINGAONKAR

body2009
Judgment: Oral Judgement: 1. Aggrieved by acquittal of the respondent for offence punishable under section 145 (2) (b) of the Bombay Police Act, in a criminal case (SCC No. 293/1993), the State has come up in appeal. 2. According to the prosecution, the respondent was attached to Pathardi Police Station as a Police Constable. He remained absent from duty from 08-12-1991 uptill 18-06-1993. He had not obtained prior permission of the superior police officer. His continuous absentia from the duty was unauthorized. Therefore, a report was filed against him for offence punishable under section 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act, by the Police Sub Inspector, Pathardi. The respondent was tried for said offence. The prosecution examined in all seven (7) witnesses in support of its case. The learned Judicial Magistrate (F.C.) held that the absence of the respondent was known to the police officers because the roll call was taken by the witnesses. The absence of the respondent was marked at the roll call. Still, however, it could not be said that the respondent withdrew himself from the assigned duty. Therefore, the learned Magistrate came to conclusion that the offence is not brought home to the respondent. Hence, learned Judicial Magistrate acquitted the respondent. 3. Heard learned APP for the appellant/State and learned advocate for the respondent. 4. Before I proceed to consider evidence of the prosecution, let it be noted that section 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act provides for punishment in following cases : (a) Where the police officer is guilty of cowardice; (b) Where he resigns the office or withdraws (3) himself from duties thereof in contravention of section 29; (c) Where he is guilty of any willful breach or neglect of any provision of law or of any rule or order which as such Police Officer, it is his duty to observe or obey; and (d) Where he is guilty of any violation of duty for which no punishment is expressly provided by any other law in force. 5. For the present purpose, only violation which falls within category "contravention of section 29" is required to be seen. Section 29 mandates that no police officer shall resign his office or withdraw himself from the duties thereof except with the written permission of the competent authority. 5. For the present purpose, only violation which falls within category "contravention of section 29" is required to be seen. Section 29 mandates that no police officer shall resign his office or withdraw himself from the duties thereof except with the written permission of the competent authority. It is important to note that main thrust of section 29 is to prevent sudden exodus of police officers from the onerous duty when there is urgent requirement of the services so as to maintain the law and order situation. 6. The expression "withdraw himself from the duties thereof" does imply intentional avoidance of the duty assigned in a particular manner. In the context of present case, on perusal of the evidence tendered by the prosecution, what appears is that the respondent absented himself from the duty for 557 days. His defence was that he had strained relationship with the P.S.O. and, therefore, was falsely implicated in a criminal case. 7. So far as continuous absence from duty is concerned, there is no difficulty in holding that absenteeism may be the ground for proceeding against the respondent for misconduct or dereliction in duty. The departmental action could be taken against him if his habit was found to be derogatory to the discipline expected in the constabulary. For, the culpable act of the respondent, mens rea is required to be proved. There is hardly any material on record to show that the respondent was assigned any particular duty. I mean to say, the absence from duty ought to have been proved to be for the purpose of avoiding any particular work. The withdrawal from duty is quite different concept from mere absenteeism. For, category (b) as shown under sub-clause (2) of section 145 deals with the cases in which resignation is tendered to avoid the nature of work or after assigning of work and duty, the police officer withdraws from the same with intention to avoid the work. For example, if police officers are deputed to work as members of anti-terrorist squad and would later-on resign the post or would withdraw from such (5) duty in contravention of section 29, then it can be said that offence under sub-clause (2) of Section 145 of the Bombay Police Act is made out. The evidence on record only shows that the respondent remained absent from the duty. The evidence on record only shows that the respondent remained absent from the duty. Section 145 contemplates withdrawal from duties in contravention of section 29 of the Act. The expression "withdrawal from duty" does imply intentional refusal to do any particular work or cessation to perform the assigned duty. Therefore, mere absence from duty by the officers is not sufficient to attract section 29 (2) of the Bombay Police Act. Considering these aspects, the impugned acquittal does not call for any interference. The impugned judgment cannot be said to be perverse. 8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.