JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows:- The subject-matter of challenge in this writ application is the order dated February 24, 2006 passed by the respondent No. 3 terminating the dispensing pump and selling licence (DPSL) agreement dated April 20, 1997. 2. The petitioners were running a retail dispensing pump under the name and style "Kamala Auto Stores" at G.T. Road, Nurkona, District Burdwan on the strength of dispensing pump and selling licence dated April 20, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the said agreement) for sale of petroleum products namely, Motor Spirit, Hi-Speed Diesel etc., produced by the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 3. The respondent No. 3 issued a show-cause notice dated August 8, 2005 to the petitioners to show-cause as to why the retail outlet of the petitioners had been found dry of HSD during inspection on August 7, 2005. In reply the petitioners informed the respondent No. 3 on August 13, 2005 that the cause of drying out of HSD on August 7, 2005 was delay in receiving the supply of the product. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3 issued a show-cause notice dated August 23, 2005 to the effect as to why the respondent authority would not take action against the petitioners' dealership for violation of Clause 13a of the said agreement. The above show-cause notice further contended that indent for supplying HSD had been placed by the petitioners on August 8, 2005 and the same was supplied on the same day. On January 30, 2006 the petitioners received another communication from the Assistant Manager, Sales and Engineer, Durgapur of the respondent No. 3 to the effect that during his visit to the retail outlet of the petitioner on January 27, 2006, the above outlet was found dry of Hi-Speed Diesel. Subsequently, the petitioners received a show-cause notice dated February 6, 2006 from the respondent No. 3 to show-cause as to why action should not be taken against the petitioners for violation of Clause Nos. 10(b)(j), 13a(ii)(v)(vii)(viii) of the said agreement dated April 20, 1997 on the basis of facts and circumstances mentioned in the above notice. The petitioner No. 1 as per his communication dated February 14, 2006 informed the respondent authority, of the following ground as the cause of his temporary reduction in placing orders for petroleum products:- (i) The petitioner No. 1 faced a car accident two months ago. The petitioner No. 1 as per his communication dated February 14, 2006 informed the respondent authority, of the following ground as the cause of his temporary reduction in placing orders for petroleum products:- (i) The petitioner No. 1 faced a car accident two months ago. (ii) Fifteen days ago fire broke out at his residence due to electric short-circuit and valuable goods were destroyed. 4. Thereafter, by the impugned order dated February 24, 2006 the said agreement dated April 20, 1997 was cancelled by the respondent No. 3. 5. At the very out set, a preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the respondents with regard to the maintainability of this writ application. 6. It is submitted on behalf of toe respondents that no public law element is involved in this writ application. The subject matter involved in this writ application relates to only private law element. 7. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that in the contractual field the state or its instrumentality acts purely in its executive capacity and the relationship in between the parties are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. 8. It is also submitted that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a qua-contract. Private law may involve a state, a subordinate body or a public body in contractual or tortuous but they cannot be siphoned off in to writ jurisdiction. 9. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that in the field of contract the Court must bear in mind that the State or its agent may suffer financial loss. According to the respondents, in any case, if the dispute cannot be resolved without any external aid then an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. 10. Relying upon the decision of Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2216 it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a qua contract. 10. Relying upon the decision of Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2216 it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a qua contract. Relying upon the decision of Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1496 it is submitted that after the state or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legal valid contract which determines the rights and obligations if the parties inter se. No question arises with regard to the violation of Article 14 or any other constitutional provision with the State or its agents purporting to act within this field, performed any act. Relying upon the decision of Div. Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1981 SC 1368 it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that a right to relief flowing from a contract has to be claimed in a Civil Court where a suit for a specific performance of contract or damages could be filed. Relying upon the decision of Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1076 it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of that contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. Reliance is placed by the respondents on the decisions of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd., reported in 1986 (1) SCC 264 , Assistant Excise Commissioner & Ors. etc. etc., reported in JT 1994 (2) SC 140, State of Gujarat etc. v. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust & Ors. etc., reported in JT 1994(3) SC 96, Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, reported in 2000 (6) SCC 293 , Sri Anupam Ghosh v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1991 (2) CHN 451 and Coal India Ltd. v. Indian Explosive Ltd., reported in 2006 (3) CHN 433 in support of the above submissions. 11. etc., reported in JT 1994(3) SC 96, Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, reported in 2000 (6) SCC 293 , Sri Anupam Ghosh v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1991 (2) CHN 451 and Coal India Ltd. v. Indian Explosive Ltd., reported in 2006 (3) CHN 433 in support of the above submissions. 11. On the other hand it is submitted on behalf of the writ petitioners that in an appropriate case, a writ petition against the State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of the a contractual obligation is maintainable. Merely because some disputed question of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to reject a writ petitioner in all case as a matter of rule. A writ petition involving a consequential relief of mandatory claim is also maintainable. 12. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that a Court sitting in writ jurisdiction can always interfere in the contractual field where the state on its instrumentality acts arbitrarily. 13. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioners that if a contract or a clause in a contract is found unreasonable or unfair or irrational one must look to the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties in dotted lines contracts there would not be no occasion for a weaker party to bargain or to assume to have equal bargaining power. He is to acceptor to leave the services or goods in terms of the dotted line contract. Therefore, the dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies, though may not be separated by any strait-jacket formula, it would depend upon the factual matrix. 14. It is also submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the distinction between public law remedy and private law filed cannot be demarcated with precision and the distinction in between public law and private law remedy has now become too thin and practically obliterated. 15. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that its sphere of contractual relations the State, or its instrumentality, public authority or those whose acts bear insignia of public element or public character are amenable to judicial review and the validity of such action would be tested on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 16. 15. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that its sphere of contractual relations the State, or its instrumentality, public authority or those whose acts bear insignia of public element or public character are amenable to judicial review and the validity of such action would be tested on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 16. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that in an appropriate case, the writ Court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed question of fact when the dispute can be decided on the basis of the materials available on record and without any extraordinary aid. 17. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioners that no decision lays down an absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed question of facts the party should be relegated to a Civil Court. According to the petitioners the opportunity of judicial review cannot be denied even in contractual matters or matters in which the Government exercises its contractual power. The judicial review is intended to prevent arbitrariness and it must be exercised in large public interest. 18. According to the petitioners it is the settled of law that in the field of contracts the State and its instrumentalities ought to so design their activities as would ensure fair competition and non-discrimination. It is now, no longer res integra that the contractual disputes involving public law element are only amicable to writ jurisdiction. 19. Reliance is placed on the decisions of Dr. Rashlal Yadav v. State of Bihar, reported in 1994 (5) SCC 267 to submit that the third element of the rules of principles of natural justice is procedural reasonableness. Relying upon the decision of LIC of India & Anr. v. Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors., reported in 1995 (5) SCC 482 it is submitted that the distinction between public law and private law remedy in the field of contract has now become too thin and practically obliterated. Relying upon the decision of ABL International Ltd. & Anr. Relying upon the decision of LIC of India & Anr. v. Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors., reported in 1995 (5) SCC 482 it is submitted that the distinction between public law and private law remedy in the field of contract has now become too thin and practically obliterated. Relying upon the decision of ABL International Ltd. & Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2004(3) SCC 553 it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that in an appropriate case, a writ petition against a state or its instrumentality arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable and merely because some disputed question of fact arise for consideration, the same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. Reliance is also placed on the decision of Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai & Anr., reported in 2004(3) SCC 214 to submit on behalf of the petitioners that in the field of contracts the State and its instrumentality ought to so design their activities as would ensure fair competition and non-discrimination. According to the petitioners a writ petition would be maintainable even it involves some disputed question of fact and no decision lays down absolute rule that in all cases involving undisputed question of facts a party should be relegated to a Civil Court. Reliance is placed on the decisions of Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa, reported in 2006 (10) 236, Reliance Energy Ltd. & Anr. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corpn. Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2007 (8) SCC 1 to submit that in matters of judicial review the basic test is to see there is any irregularity in the decision making process and not the decision itself and that principal of judicial review cannot be denied even in contractual matters. Relying upon the decision of Food Corpn. of India & Anr. v. M/s. SEII Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2008 AIR SCW 932, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that Article 14 of the Constitution of India has received a liberal interpretation over the years and its scope has also been expanded by creative interpretation of the Court. The law has developed in this field to a great extent. v. M/s. SEII Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2008 AIR SCW 932, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that Article 14 of the Constitution of India has received a liberal interpretation over the years and its scope has also been expanded by creative interpretation of the Court. The law has developed in this field to a great extent. And a Court sitting in writ jurisdiction may grant such relief to which the writ petitioner would be entitled to in law as well as in equity in an appropriate case. 20. After an in-depth study on the question of maintainability of a writ petition in the contractual field where the State or its instrumentality is a party as also taking into consideration the submissions made by the learned Counsels appearing for the respective parties, I find that when India gained independence, administrative law was in an incipient state. 21. The Constitution of India lays emphasis or the State working for ensuring social-economic conditions of the people. The Constitution ensures that an administrative action is subject to judicial review under a comprehensive scheme of judicial review. It is now a basic feature of the Constitution of India as a settled principles of law which has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125 . Till today the Parliament has not been able to legislate a law for ascertaining the ambit of tortuous liability of the State and its instrumentalities for the torts committed by its administrative wing. And it is evident from the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that from the middle of the 20th Century, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has been using the powers under the Constitution of India for developing norms for granting appropriate relief to the people who may have suffered from tortuous actions of the administrative wing of the State or its instrumentalities taking into consideration the fact and circumstances in a given case and keeping in mind the self imposed restrictions under the scheme of the Constitutions of India. 22. 22. From a perusal of the decision of K.N. Gurswamy v. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1954 SC 592 it is evident that a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court examined the scope of entertaining a complaint by way of a writ petition in the matter of granting liquor licence. Though the case was dismissed considering the time which the matter had taken to reach the Apex Court it was, held that in such a case ordinarily the appellant could have complained by way of a writ. 23. In the matter of Sagir Ahmed v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1954 SC 728 , another Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court took up the issue of entertaining a writ petition where the State ventured in the transport business curtailing the right of any member of public any more than was permissible under Clause (b) of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The answer was in favour of maintaining a writ petition. 24. In mid-seventy of 20th Century, this approach became for predominant. In the matter Erucian Equipment & Chemicals v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1975 (1) SCC 70 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that equality of opportunity applied to matters of public contract and the Government could not choose to exclude by discrimination and doctrine of legitimate expectation operates in the field of sales and purchase of materials where a person had been dealing with the Government. 25. However while dealing with a case of enforcement of qua-contract in the matter of Kulchhinder Singh (supra), decided in the context of the facts and circumstances of that case that remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution of India was unavailable for enforcement of qua-contract. A distinction is made between public law domain and private law field in that case. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "11. There is no doubt that some of the legal problems argued by Sri Ramamurthy deserve in an appropriate case jurisprudential study in depth although much of it is covered by authority. But assuming, for argument's sake that what he urges has validity, the present case meets with its instant funeral from one fatal circumstance. There is no doubt that some of the legal problems argued by Sri Ramamurthy deserve in an appropriate case jurisprudential study in depth although much of it is covered by authority. But assuming, for argument's sake that what he urges has validity, the present case meets with its instant funeral from one fatal circumstance. The writ petition, stripped of embroidery and legalistic, stands naked as a simple contract between the staff and the Society, agreeing upon a certain percentage of promotions to various posts or an omnibus, all embracing promise to give a quota to the existing employees. At its best, the writ petition seeks enforcement of a binding contract but the neat and necessary repellent is that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. We fail to see how a supplier of chalk to a Government school or cheese to a Government hospital can ask for a constitutional remedy under Article 226 in the event of a breach of a contract, by-passing the normal channels of civil litigation. We are not convinced that a mere contract agreeing to a quota of promotions can be exalted into a service rule or statutory duty. What is immediately relevant is not whether the respondent is State or public authority but whether what is enforced is a statutory duty or sovereign obligation or public function of a public authority. Private law may involve a State, a statutory body, or a public body in contractual or tortuous actions. But they cannot be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplies) 26. During the period in the matter of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) it was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that even if by some stretch of imagination some case of unequal or discriminatory treatment by the officers of the state of persons governed by similar contracts was sought to be made out, a satisfactory adjudication upon the usual facts of such case would necessitate proper pleadings supported by acceptable evidence. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "25. The limitations imposed by rules of natural justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of an agreement exclusively. The only question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action complained of is or is not in consonance with the terms of the agreement. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "25. The limitations imposed by rules of natural justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of an agreement exclusively. The only question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action complained of is or is not in consonance with the terms of the agreement. As already pointed out by us, even if by some stretch of imagination some case of unequal or discriminatory treatment by the officers of the State of persons governed by similar contracts is sought to be made out, a satisfactory adjudication upon the unusual facts of such a case would necesiate proper pleadings supported by acceptable evidence. In that case, the interim stay order or injunction could not be justified at all because so long as a Presidential Order, under Article 359 of the Constitution is operative, the enforcement of fundamental rights falling under Article 14 is suspended. In such cases even if a petition or suit is entertained and kept pending no stay order could be passed because that would amount to indirectly enforcing the fundamental rights conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution. It is only where a prima facie case for an injunction or stay can be made out, quite apart from a right covered by Article 14 of the Constitution or by any other fundamental right whose enforcement may have been suspended, that an injunction or stay could be granted all on suitable terms. As we have already said it was on such an assumption that this Court had, apparently; granted the interim stay which must now be discharged." (Emphasis supplied) 27. In late-seventy of 20th Century the Apex Court held in the matter of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority, reported in 1979(3) SCC 489 , that the Government was still Government when it acted in the matter of largesse and it could not act arbitrarily. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it did so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. 28. In the matter of Divl. Forest Officer (supra) relating to the right to remove timber without liability to pay royalty not under the concerned rule, but on the basis of specific terms of the lease agreed between the parties, the Apex Court held that remedy under Article 226 was not unavailable. 28. In the matter of Divl. Forest Officer (supra) relating to the right to remove timber without liability to pay royalty not under the concerned rule, but on the basis of specific terms of the lease agreed between the parties, the Apex Court held that remedy under Article 226 was not unavailable. The relevant portion of the above decision are quoted below:- "6. Shorn of all embellishment the relief claimed by the respondent was referable to nothing else but the term of lease viz. Clause 2 Part-IV. May be, that this term is a mere reproduction of proviso to Rule 37 of Assam Land and Revenue and Local Rates Regulations, but that by itself is not sufficient to contend that what the respondent was doing was enforcing a statutory provision. Proviso to Rule 37 is enabling provision. The relevant portion of the proviso reads as under: "Provided that if any person taking up land for special cultivation is unwilling to pay the full royalty valuation of the timber as estimated, he shall have the option of paying a reduced valuation representing only the profit which is likely to deprive from the use of the timber for the purposes connected with the exploitation of the grant. If he exercises such option, he shall be liable to pay royalty at full rates on all timber sold, bartered, mortgaged, given or otherwise, transferred or removed for transfer and on all timber removed for use unconnected with the exploitation of the grant during the period of his lease or renewed lease." A bare perusal of Clause 2 of Part-IV of the indenture of lease extracted hereinbefore and the proviso to Rule 37 would at a glance show that the proviso enables a grantee to take benefit of it by fulfilling certain conditions namely by paying a reduced valuation representing only the profit which it is likely to derive from the use of timber for purposes connected with the exploitation of the grant. It is thus, an enabling provision and the grantor of the lease may permit this option to be enjoyed by the grantee. But whether that has been done or not is always a question of fact. If the pre-condition is satisfied, the benefit can be taken. That again is a matter to be worked out by the parties to the indenture of lease. But whether that has been done or not is always a question of fact. If the pre-condition is satisfied, the benefit can be taken. That again is a matter to be worked out by the parties to the indenture of lease. In fact, Clause 2 of the indenture of lease would show that the respondent grantee paid Rs. 12472/7/- being timber valuation at reduced rates. The respondent having made the payment, whereupon the grantor of the lease agreed that the grantee will have to pay timber valuation at full rates on all timber sold or removed for sale and on all timber removed for use unconnected with exploitation of the grant during the period of his lease or renewed lease but the grantee will not have to pay royalty for timber felled and removed for purpose connected with the grant. It thus can be demonstrably established that the respondent was trying to enforce through the writ petition the right to remove timber without the liability to pay royalty not under the proviso to Rule 37 which was merely an enabling provision, but the specific term of lease agreed to between the parties. Proviso to Rule 37 may not be incorporated in an indenture of lease. If incorporated after fulfilling pre-condition it becomes a term of lease. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, was in error in posting a question to itself as to whether the applicant (respondent herein) was entitled to the enforcement of legal right under the proviso to Rule 37 of the Settlement Rules. The camouflage successfully worked, but once this cloak is removed, it unmistakably transpires that the respondent was trying to claim benefit of Clause 2 of the lease having fulfilled its pre-condition and obtaining the inclusion of its latter part in the contract of lease. The question, therefore, really is whether such contractual obligation can be enforced by the writ jurisdiction? How dangerous it is, can be demonstrably established in this case." (Emphasis supplied) 29. The question, therefore, really is whether such contractual obligation can be enforced by the writ jurisdiction? How dangerous it is, can be demonstrably established in this case." (Emphasis supplied) 29. Subsequently, in the matter of Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the question availability of remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution in a matter relation actions of the State where an instrumentality of the state ventures into the corporate world and purchases shares of company and held to the context of the facts and circumstances of that case that the state or an instrumentality of the State assume to itself the ordinary role of shareholder in such a case and dons the robs of a shareholder, with the rights available to such a shareholder. As a result it was decided that in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not available a distinction was made between public law domain and a private law field in entertaining a writ petition. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "102. For example, if the action of the State is political or sovereign in character, the Court will keep away from it. The Court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with the intricacies of trade and commerce. If the action of the State is related to contractual obligations or obligations arising out of the tort, the Court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the Court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the-private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. There is no reason why the State as a shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management by a resolution of the company, like any other shareholder." (Emphasis supplied) 30. In mid-eighty of 20th Century, the approach of entertaining a writ petition became more predominant while deciding the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguli, reported in 1986 (3) SCC 156 . It was held that the appellant-corporation was the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the Court must necessarily see through the corporate veil to ascertain whether behind that veil was the face of an instrumentality or agency of the State. If the answer was affirmative, presumption was in favour of high officers that they would not act arbitrarily or capriciously would not prevail if provisions did not enjoin them to observe principles of natural justice while taking adverse action. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "67. What is the position before us? It is only one case decided on a concession and another based upon an assumption that a Government company is "the State" under Article 12? That is the position in fact but not in substance. As we have seen, authorities constituted under, and corporations established by, statutes have been held to be instrumentalities and agencies of the Government in a long catena of decisions of this Court. The observations in several of these decisions, which have been emphasised by us in the passage extracted from the judgments in those cases, are general in their nature and take in their seek all instrumentalities and agencies of the State, whatever be the form which such instrumentality or agency may have assumed. The observations in several of these decisions, which have been emphasised by us in the passage extracted from the judgments in those cases, are general in their nature and take in their seek all instrumentalities and agencies of the State, whatever be the form which such instrumentality or agency may have assumed. Particularly relevant in this connection are the observations of Mathew, J., in Sukhdev v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi of Bhagwati, J. (as he then was), in the International Airport Authority case and Ajay Hasia case and of Chinnappa Reddy, J., in U.P. Warehousing Corpn. case. If there is an instrumentality or agency of the State which has assumed the garb of a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, it does not follow that it thereby ceased to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. For the purposes of Article 12 one must necessarily see through the corporate veil to ascertain whether behind that veil is the face of an instrumentality or agency of the State. The Corporation, which is the appellant in these two appeals before us, squarely falls within these observations and it also satisfied the various tests which have been laid down. Merely because it has so far not the monopoly of inland water transportation is not sufficient to divest it of lis character of an instrumentality or agency of the State. It is nothing but the Government operating behind a corporate veil, carrying out a governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance. There can thus be no doubt that the Corporation is "the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution." 31. In late eighty of 20th Century, in the matter of Bareilly Development Authority (supra), while the Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining the issue of maintainability of writ application in the matter of contract of a lease and held that no writ or order could be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of non-statutory contract pure and simple. In this regard the relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "21. In this regard the relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "21. There is a line of decisions where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple; Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, 1977 (3) SCR 249 : AIR 1977 SC 1496 , Premji Bhai Parma v. Delhi Development Authority, 1980 (2) SCR 704 : AIR 1980 SC 738 and D.F.O. v. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd., 1981 (3) SCR 662 : AIR 1981 SC 1368 ." 32. In mid-ninety of 20th Century in the matter of Assistant Excise Commissioner (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, to the context of that case, that the remedy provided by Article 226 of the Constitution of India, or for that matter, suits cannot be resorted to wriggle out of the contractual obligations entered into by the licensees. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "23. May be these are cases where the licences took a calculated risk. May be they were not wise in offering their basis. But in law there is no basis upon which they can be relieved of the obligations undertaken by them under the contract. It is well known that in such contracts - which may be called executory contracts there is always an element of risk. Many an expected development may occur which may either cause loss to the contractor or result in large profit. Take the very case of arrack contractors. In one year, there may be abundance of supplies accompanied by good crops induced by favourable weather conditions; the contractor will make substantial profits during the year. In another year, the conditions may be unfavourable and supplies scarce. He may incur loss. Such contracts do not imply a warranty - or a guarantee - of profit to the contractor. It is a business for him - profit and loss being normal incidents of a business. There is no room for invoking the doctrine of unjust enrichment in such a situation. The said doctrine has never been invoked in such business transactions. Such contracts do not imply a warranty - or a guarantee - of profit to the contractor. It is a business for him - profit and loss being normal incidents of a business. There is no room for invoking the doctrine of unjust enrichment in such a situation. The said doctrine has never been invoked in such business transactions. The remedy provided by Article 226, or for that matter, suits, cannot be resorted to wriggle out of the contractual obligations entered into by the licences." (Emphasis supplied) 33. In the matter Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, on facts, that the termination of an agreement to nominate students by a donor trust for admission in Medical Collage to the extent of 10 per cent was not a quasi judicial Act. Hence, it was not necessary to observe the principles of natural justice by the State or its instrumentality to pass an order. In this regard the relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "23. We are unable to see any substance in the argument that the termination of arrangement without observing the principle of natural Justice (audi alteram partem) is void. The termination is not a quasi-judicial act by any stretch of imagination; hence it was not necessary to observe the principles of natural justice. It is not also an executive or administrative act to attract the duty to act fairly. It was as has been repeatedly urged by Sri Ramaswamy - a matter governed by a contract/agreement between the parties. If the matter is governed by a contract, the writ petition is no maintainable since it is a public law remedy and is not available in private law field, e.g., where the matter is governed by a non-statutory contract. Be that as it may, in view of our opinion on the main question, it is not necessary to pursue this reasoning further." 34. In the year 1994, in the matter of Dr. Rashlal Yadav v. State of Bihar, reported in 1994 (5) SCC 267 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting the concept of natural Justice, introduced the element of "procedural reasonableness" as third element to the above concept. In the year 1994, in the matter of Dr. Rashlal Yadav v. State of Bihar, reported in 1994 (5) SCC 267 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting the concept of natural Justice, introduced the element of "procedural reasonableness" as third element to the above concept. The Apex Court held that it would be open for a Court sitting in the writ jurisdiction to examine the allegation of deviation from procedural reasonableness if such examination was permitted on the basis of factual matrix of a case the relevant portions of the above decision is quoted below:- "5.The concept of natural Justice is not a static one but is an ever expanding concept. In the initial stages it was thought that it had only two elements, namely, (i) no one shall be a Judge in his own cause and (ii) no one shall be condemned unheard. With the passage of time a third element was introduced, namely, of procedural reasonableness because the main objective of the requirement of rule of natural Justice is to promote justice and prevent its miscarriage. Therefore, when the legislature confers power in the State Government to be exercised in certain circumstances or eventualities, it would be right to presume that the legislature intends that the said power be exercised in the manner envisaged by the statute. If the statute confers drastic powers it goes without saying that such powers must be exercised in a proper and fair manner. Drastic substantive laws can be suffered only if they are fairly and reasonably applied. In order to ensure fair and reasonable application of such laws Courts have over a period of time, devised rules of fair procedure to avoid arbitrary exercise of such powers. True it is, the rules of natural Justice operate as checks on the freedom of administrative action and often prove time consuming but that is the price one has to pay to ensure fairness in administrative action. And this fairness can be ensured by adherence to the expanded notion of rule of natural justice. Therefore, where a statute confers wide powers on an administrative authority coupled with wide discretion, the possibility of its arbitrary use can be controlled or checked by insisting on their being exercised in a manner which can be said to be procedurally fair. Rules of natural Justice are, therefore, devised for ensuring fairness and promoting satisfactory decision-making. Therefore, where a statute confers wide powers on an administrative authority coupled with wide discretion, the possibility of its arbitrary use can be controlled or checked by insisting on their being exercised in a manner which can be said to be procedurally fair. Rules of natural Justice are, therefore, devised for ensuring fairness and promoting satisfactory decision-making. Where the statute is silent and a contrary intention cannot be implied the requirement of the applicability of the rule of natural Justice is read into it to ensure fairness and to protect the action from the charge of arbitrariness. Natural Justice has thus secured a foothold to supplement enacted law by operating as an implied mandatory requirement thereby protecting it from the vice of arbitrariness. Courts presume this requirement in all its width as implied unless the enactment supplies indications to be contrary as in the resent case. This Court in A.K, Kraipak v. Union of India, after referring to the observations in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss.) Binapani Dei, observed as under (SCC p. 272, para 20). 'The aim of the rules of natural Justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it.' These observations make it clear that if the statute, expressly or by necessary implication omits the application of the rule of natural justice, the statute will not be invalidated for this omission on the ground of arbitrariness." (Emphasis supplied) 35. In mid-ninety of 20th Century, there was further development of norms for compensating the people were might have suffered from tortuous actions of Government Employees in the matter of LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a case of assailing the incorporation of a condition and denial to accept policies to cover uninsured household by the LIC, held that the distinction between the public law and arbitrary law remedy was narrowed down each case had to examine on its own facts and circumstances to find out the nature of activity or scope and nature of controversy. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "29. In Food Corpn. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "29. In Food Corpn. of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries (SCC at p. 76 in para 8) this Court held that: "the mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision making process." In Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications Ltd. (SCC at p. 464, para 28) it was held that even in commercial contracts where there is a public element, it is necessary that relevant considerations are taken into account and the irrelevant consideration discarded. In Union of India v. Graphic Industries Co. this Court held that even in contractual mattes public authorities have to act fairly; and if they fail to do so approach under Article 226 would always be permissible because that would amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The ratio in General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandumul Jain relied on by the appellant that tests laid therein to construe the terms of insurance contracts bears no relevance to determine the constitutional conscience of the appellant in fixing the terms and conditions in Table 58 and of their justness and fairness on the touchstone of public element. The arms of the High Court are not shackled with technical rules or procedure. The actions of the State, its instrumentality, any public authority or person whose actions bear insignia of public law element or public character are amenable to judicial review and the validity of such an action would be tested on the anvil of Article 14. While exercising the power under Article 226 the Court would be circumspect to adjudicate the disputes arising out of the contract depending on the facts and circumstances in a given case. "The distinction between the public law remedy and private law field cannot be demarcated with precision. Each case has to be examined on its own facts and circumstances to find out the nature of the activity or scope and nature of the controversy. "The distinction between the public law remedy and private law field cannot be demarcated with precision. Each case has to be examined on its own facts and circumstances to find out the nature of the activity or scope and nature of the controversy. The distinction between public law and private law remedy is now narrowed down. The actions of the appellants bear public character with an imprint of public interest element in their offers regarding terms and conditions mentioned in the appropriate table inviting the public to enter into contract of life insurance. It is not a pure and simple private law dispute without any insignia of public element. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the writ petition is maintainable to test the validity of the conditions laid in Table 58 terms policy and the party need not be relegated to a civil action." (Emphasis supplied) 36. In the period it was held by the Apex Court in the matter of Tata Cellular v. Union of India, reported in 1994 (6) SCC 651 , that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness and favouritism. 37. Again in the matter of Starling Computer v. M.N. Publication Ltd., reported in AIR 1996 SC 51 , the Supreme Court was examining the action of an instrumentality of the State in the contractual field. While holding that if the decision was taken by the State or its instrumentality in bona fide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the Courts, such decisions were upheld on the principle laid down by justice Holmes, that the Courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decision must grant such measure of freedom of "play in the joins" to the executive. But in normal course some rules exist to regulate the selection of persons for awarding contracts. In such matters always a defence cannot be entertained that contract has been awarded without observing the well settled norms and rules prescribed, on the basis of the doctrine of "executive necessity". The norms and customs prescribed by Government and indicated by Courts have to be more strictly followed while awarding contract which have alone with a commercial element a public purpose. The norms and customs prescribed by Government and indicated by Courts have to be more strictly followed while awarding contract which have alone with a commercial element a public purpose. As a result, the Hon'ble Supreme Court accepted the principles of law of entertaining writ petition in the contractual field taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the cases as also the nature of controversy involved therein. 38. In a matter of Kerala State Electricity Board (supra), in a matter relating to a claim for recovery of money from the Kerala State Electricity Board by a contractor on account of the payment made to his workers on the basis of the State Government notification, the Apex Court held that the dispute relating interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract should not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "11. A statute may expressly or impliedly confer on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not by itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a convent in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principle of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a Civil Court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a Civil Court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition. The contractor should have relegated to other remedies." (Emphasis supplied) 39. In this Century, the scope of judicial review in contractual field where the State or its instrumentality was a party, was made more liberal in respect of tortuous actions of the Government employees. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining the maintainability of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of ABL International Ltd., (supra) held that in connection with a prayer for a direction upon the authority to adhere to the contract of insurance, the dispute could be settled by looking upon the terms of the contract of insurance as well as the export contract and thus did not require consideration of any oral evidence other then what was already on record. Hence the writ application was maintainable. 40. It is necessary to mention here that while laying down the above ratio, the Apex Court considered the decision of a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of L.I.C. v. Escort Ltd., (supra). The relevant portions of the decisions of ABL International Ltd., (supra) are quoted below:- "37. In our opinion, this limited areas of dispute can be settled by looking into the terms of the contract of insurance as well as the export contract, and the, same does not require consideration of any oral evidence or any other documentary evidence other than what is already on record. The claim of the contesting parties will stand or fall on the terms of the contracts, interpretation of which, as stated above, does not require any external aid." 41. The claim of the contesting parties will stand or fall on the terms of the contracts, interpretation of which, as stated above, does not require any external aid." 41. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining the scope of entertaining a writ application in the matter of Nobel Resource Ltd., (supra) in a case, of breach of contract and held that the Court might not ordinarily exercises its discriminatory power of judicial review unless it was found to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But it would not be correct to opine that under no circumstances a writ would lie only because it involves a contractual matter. It is pertinent to mention here that while deciding the above case, the Apex Court distinguished the ratio laid down in this regard in the matters of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) and Bareilly Development Authority (supra). The relevant portions of the above decision the Noble Resource Ltd., (supra) are quoted below:- "15. It is trite that if an action on the part of the State is violative the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India, a writ petition would be maintainable even in the contractual field. A distinction indisputably must be made between a matter which is at the threshold of a contract and a breach of contract; whereas in the former the Court's scrutiny would be more intrusive, in the latter Court may not ordinarily exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review, unless it is found to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. While exercising contractual powers also, the Government bodies may be subjected to judicial review in order to prevent arbitrariness or favoritism on its part. Indisputably, inherent limitations exist, but it would not be correct to opine that under no circumstances a writ will lie only because it involves a contractual matter." (Emphasis supplied) 42. In the matter of Reliance Energy Ltd., (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in the matter challenging administrative action of the State to declare a party disqualified to take part in the tender process, was subjected to control by judicial review and were classifiable broadly under three heads, namely illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. In this regard the relevant portion of the above decision area quoted below:- "39. In this regard the relevant portion of the above decision area quoted below:- "39. In Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India the Division Bench of this Court has held that in matter of judicial review the basis test is to see whether there is any infirmity in the decision making process and not in the decision itself. This means that the decision making must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and he must give effect to it otherwise it may result it illegality. The principle of "judicial review" cannot be denied even in contractual matters or matters in which the Government exercises its contractual powers, but judicial review is intended to prevent arbitrariness and it must be exercised in larger public interest. Expression of different views and opinions in exercise of contractual powers may be there, however, such difference of opinion must be based on specified norms. Those norms may be legal norms or accounting norms. As long as the norms are clear and properly understood by the decision-maker and the bidders and other stakeholders, uncertainty and thereby breach of the rule of law will not arise. The grounds upon which administrative action is subjected to control by judicial review are classifiable broadly under three heads, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. In the said judgment it has been held that all errors of law are jurisdictional errors. One of the important principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment is that whenever a norm/benchmark is prescribed in the tender process in order to provide certainty that norm/standard should be clear. As stated above "certainty" is an important aspect of the rule of law. In Reliance Airport Developers the scoring system formed part of the evaluation process. The object of that system was to provide identification of factors, allocation of marks of each of the said factors and giving of marks at different stages. Objectivity was thus provided." 43. Further, in the matter of Food Corporation of India (supra), the subject-matter involved was recovery of a claim from an instrumentality of the State for supply of levy sugar. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Article 14 of the Constitution of India had received a liberal interpretation over the years and its scope had been expanded by creative interpretation of the Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Article 14 of the Constitution of India had received a liberal interpretation over the years and its scope had been expanded by creative interpretation of the Court. If there was no disputed question of fact in a given case, the High Court sitting in writ jurisdiction might grant such relief to which the writ petitioner would be entitled in accordance with law. "17. Article 14 of the Constitution of India has received a liberal interpretation over the years. Its scope has also been expanded by creative interpretation of the Court. The law has developed in this field to a great extent. In this case, no disputed question of fact is involved." 44. The attention of this Court was also drawn towards a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Shri Anupam Ghosh (supra) where the question of maintainability of a writ application in the matter of an order of termination from services was under challenge. A Division Bench of this Court held, on the facts of that cases that the right of the concerned employee was flowing from the private contract and was not controlled by any statutory provision and as such the writ application was not maintainable. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "9. Even if it is assumed that the company is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12, in our view, no writ should lie against the order of termination passed against the writ petitioner. The nature of the State action impugned in the writ proceeding is required to be considered carefully for deciding as to whether or not the same can be held to be a subject-matter of public law remedy of writ. It is not the mere fact of employment by a public authority or instrumentality per se which makes an action of such instrumentality touching the question of employment of its employee a subject-matter for interference under the constitutional writ jurisdiction. It is not the mere fact of employment by a public authority or instrumentality per se which makes an action of such instrumentality touching the question of employment of its employee a subject-matter for interference under the constitutional writ jurisdiction. In our view, if the right of the employee of an instrumentality or agency of the State flows from private contract between the parties and conditions of service are not governed or controlled by an statutory provision and the impugned action of the instrumentality or agency in the matter of employment of its employee has no public law character, there will be no occasion for interference in the writ jurisdiction. In the absence of other consideration namely existence of statutory provisions, the breach of which is complained in a state action relating to the employment of the concerned employee seeking for a remedy relating to the employment of the concerned employee seeking for a remedy in writ jurisdiction, state action relating to contractual obligations will not be examined unless the action has some public law character for exercising constitutional writ jurisdiction. In such a case, the employee of the agency or instrumentality may avail other alternative remedies in a different forum. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision in Praga Tool's case. It has been held in the said decision that it is well understood that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty. It is not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body. If company is a non-statutory body but incorporated under the Companies Act, there is neither a statutory not a public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of a mandamus nor is there in its workmen any corresponding legal right for enforcement of any such statutory or public duty. Similar view has also been taken in H.E.M. Union's case. The decision in Praga Tool's and H.E.M. Union's case have been approved by the Constitution Bench in Sabhajit Tiwari's case. The decisions in the said two cases have also been approved in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Tekraj's case. Similar view has also been taken in H.E.M. Union's case. The decision in Praga Tool's and H.E.M. Union's case have been approved by the Constitution Bench in Sabhajit Tiwari's case. The decisions in the said two cases have also been approved in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Tekraj's case. Although the said two judgments have not been referred to in the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia's case, but in this case, the decision of the Sabhajit Tiwari's case has been followed and it has been held that the decision in Sabhajit's case is binding on the Constitution Bench. The distinction about private and public law character or field in the matter of intervention by a writ has been highlighted in the decision of Master of Rolls in the case Ex parte Walsh, reported in 1984(3) All England Reporter page 425." (Emphasis supplied) 45. The attention of this Court was further drawn towards another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Coal India Ltd. (supra) where it was decided by a Division Bench of this Court, on facts of that case, that a writ application was not maintainable since the controversy in that case emanates from a non-statutory contract purely of private nature which could be decided after correct interpretation of the conditions of that contract depending upon evidence. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "30. To sum up, we are of the clear opinion that- (1) The controversy in this case emanates from a non-statutory contract purely of private nature in between Coal India and the explosive companies. (2) There is no public law element involved in the matter and the controversy is purely between the two parties to the contract. (3) The unilateral "introduction of a clause which is claimed to be of a clarificatory nature and not a variation in the contract cannot be itself become an unreasonable, unfair and arbitrary exercise of power or Coal India at all. It is purely done in pursuance of the contractual rights of the Coal India. Hence, there will be no question of Article 14 being attracted in any manner. (4) The question as to whether the Coal India could introduced a supplementary clause would depend upon the correct interpretation of Clause-XV and the supplementary clause sought to be added. It is purely done in pursuance of the contractual rights of the Coal India. Hence, there will be no question of Article 14 being attracted in any manner. (4) The question as to whether the Coal India could introduced a supplementary clause would depend upon the correct interpretation of Clause-XV and the supplementary clause sought to be added. Such interpretation would have to necessarily depend upon the evidence to be led by the parties and, therefore, it cannot be attempted in a writ petition being a disputed question of fact. (5) In the light of the above conclusions, the writ petitions could not have been entertained and the injunction could not have been granted by way of interim orders. The interim orders are, therefore, liable to be set aside and the writ petitions are, therefore, liable to be dismissed." 46. The action of the State, its instrumentality, any public authority or person whose actions bear insignia of public law element or public character are amenable to judicial review and the validity of such an action would be tested on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution of India has received a liberal interpretation over years and its scope had also expanded by creative interpretation of the Court. The law has developed in this field to a great extent. In a given case, if no disputed question of fact is involved, the High Court sitting in writ jurisdiction may grant such relief which the writ petitioner would be entitled to in law as well in equity. The Court is to take into account that the distinction between the public law and private law remedy is now, narrowed down, if not obliterated. The Court is to bear in mind its inherent limitations, but at the same time it would not be correct to say that under no circumstances a writ will lie only because it involves a contractual matter. With regard to the interference of a Court sitting in writ jurisdiction in the matter administrative action, the grounds upon which such action is subjected to control by judicial review are classifiable broadly under three heads, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. 47. With regard to the interference of a Court sitting in writ jurisdiction in the matter administrative action, the grounds upon which such action is subjected to control by judicial review are classifiable broadly under three heads, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. 47. From the above observations and discussions, this Court is now in a position to draw an inference in the matter entertaining an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the contractual field. In doing so this Court is to bar in mind that this Court would be circumspect to adjudicate the dispute arising out of the contract depending on the facts and circumstances in the instant case. 48. The essential principles which are to be ventured for entertaining or an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in contractual field are as follows:- (a) Remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution are available:- (i) In a case where the Government exercises its contractual powers, but judicial review is intended to prevent illegality, irrationality, arbitrariness, discrimination or procedural impropriety, subject to satisfactory adjudication upon facts of that case necessitating proper pleading supported by acceptable evidence without requiring further oral evidence or any external aid. (ii) In a case where a direction upon the State or its instrumentality to adhere to the contract is prayed for, provided dispute can be settled by looking upon the terms of the contract and without requiring consideration of any other evidence and/or external aid other than what are already on record. (iii) In a case relating to contractual matter where the administrative action of the State or its instrumentality is violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India provided there is no disputed question of fact. (iv) In a case of commercial contract where the action of the State, its instrumentality, any public authority or person whose actions bear insignia of public law element. (v) In case where State and its instrumentalities are exempted from operation of rent control legislation provided the State or its instrumentality violates the mandates of Article 14 of the Constitution. (iv) In a case of commercial contract where the action of the State, its instrumentality, any public authority or person whose actions bear insignia of public law element. (v) In case where State and its instrumentalities are exempted from operation of rent control legislation provided the State or its instrumentality violates the mandates of Article 14 of the Constitution. (b) Remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution of India are unavailable: (i) In a case to enforce a qua contract in connection with a contract between the staff and the State or its instrumentality on a quota of promotion which cannot be exalted into a service rule except in extreme cases which shocks the conscience of the Court or other extra ordinary situation. (ii) In a case involving disputed question of unequal or discriminatory treatment by the officers of the State of persons governed by similar contracts without proper pleading and in absence of acceptable evidence-on-record. (iii) Ordinarily, in a case where a breach of contract is complained of and the party complaining of such breach can sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed or the party can sue for damages. 49. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent-company terminated the said agreement on extraneous consideration which were not mentioned in the show-cause notices. As a result the petitioners were deprived of the reasonable opportunity for dealing with those considerations. Therefore, according to the petitioners the impugned order was passed arbitrarily without adhering to the principles of natural justice and at the cost of suffering from judicial impropriety. The aforesaid grievances of the petitioner be properly and completely adjudicated by this Court in course of judicial review by ascertaining as to whether the above pleadings were supported by acceptable evidences from the materials available on record, namely the show-cause notices dated August 8, 2005, August 23, 2005, January 30, 2006, February 6, 2005 respectively, the replies of the petitioners dated August 13, 2005, February 14, 2006 thereto and the impugned order of termination dated February 24, 2006. 50. Therefore, this writ application is maintainable for adjudication of the grievances of the petitioners. 51. The decision of Kulchhinder Singh (supra) has no manner of application in this case because of the distinguishable facts and circumstances of that case. 50. Therefore, this writ application is maintainable for adjudication of the grievances of the petitioners. 51. The decision of Kulchhinder Singh (supra) has no manner of application in this case because of the distinguishable facts and circumstances of that case. There specific grievance of the petitioner was that promotions to three categories of higher posts were made by direct recruitment contrary to what he contended were service rules but, in substance, were the result of collective bargaining with the management. CORRIGENDUM In the Head Note of the judgment titled as "Ms. Maheshwari Kumari v. The State" reported in 2009 (1) CLJ (Cal) at page 318, there is an unintentional printing mistake as Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 439 which has to be read as Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 438. We are very sorry for such unintentional mistake. The decision of Radha Krishna Agarwal (supra) has no manner of application in the instant case for the same reasons. The case of the petitioners in the above case was that of a breach of contract for which the State would be liable to pay damages if it had broken it. In the decision of Divisional Forest Officer (supra), the respondent was trying to enforce through the writ petition the right to remove timber without the liability to pay royalty not under any Rule but on the basis of a merely enabling provision. So, the above decision is not applicable in this case. In the decision of Life Insurance Corporation v. Escorts Ltd. (supra), it was decided that frontier between the public law domain and private law field must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or its instrumentality was engaged while performing the action. This Court has come to the conclusion in favour of maintainability of this writ petition keeping in mind the particular action, the capacity of the respondent-company. It is necessary to mention here that after taking into consideration the above decision, it was decided in the matter of ABL International Ltd. (supra) that a writ petition in the contractual field was maintainable when the issues could be decided on the basis of the materials-on-record and without adducing oral evidence or without any external aid. It is necessary to mention here that after taking into consideration the above decision, it was decided in the matter of ABL International Ltd. (supra) that a writ petition in the contractual field was maintainable when the issues could be decided on the basis of the materials-on-record and without adducing oral evidence or without any external aid. In the case of Barelly Development Authority (supra), the subject-matter was alleged arbitrary and discriminatory increase in cost of houses built by the development authority. In view of the facts of that cases, that decision has no manner of application in the instant case. It is also pertinent to mention...here that in the matter of Noble Resources (supra), after taking into consideration the above decision, the Apex Court held that a writ petition is maintainable in the contractual field where violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India was under scrutiny of the Court. The decision of Assistant Excise Commissioner (supra) is not applicable in this case because the subject-matter of challenge in that case was non-supply of additional quantities of arrack and demanding of instalments due. In the matter of State of Gujarat v. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust (supra), the termination of arrangement of nominating students to the extent of 10% by the trust was under challenge. In view of the distinguishable facts and circumstances of that case, the same has no manner of application in this case. In the matter of Kerala State Electricity Board, the alleged violation of the terms of contract was under challenge. So, that decision is not applicable in this case. In the decision of Sri Anupam Ghosh (supra), the termination of service of an employee of an instrumentality of the State was under challenge. I do not agree with the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-company that the above decision is applicable in this case though the facts and circumstances bf those cases are not identical. In the matter of Coal India Ltd. (supra), the writ petitioner was not entertained the interpretation of contract in that case was depending on adducing evidence. 52. In the matter of Coal India Ltd. (supra), the writ petitioner was not entertained the interpretation of contract in that case was depending on adducing evidence. 52. With regard to the merits of this case, it is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that in the show-cause notices dated August 8,2005, August 23, 2005 and January 30, 2006 the respondent company asked the petitioner to show-cause on the grounds mentioned therein. But from the impugned order of termination of the said agreement it appeared that the decision had been taken by the respondent-company on extraneous considerations, namely suffering from immense loss due to continued closure of the retail outlet of the petitioners, huge loss of sale, nil return of the capital investment at the site under reference and complete loss of faith on the petitioners. According to the petitioners, the impugned order dated February 24, 2006 suffers from violation of procedural impropriety as also non-adherence to the principles of natural justice. 53. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the decisions of Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2006 (4) SCC 713 , Harbanslal Sahubu v. Indian Oil Corporation, reported in 2003 (2) SCC 107 and Central Bank of India v. P.C. Jain, reported in AIR 1969 SC 983 in support of his above submissions. The learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the decision of Indian Bank v. A.B.S. Marine Products, reported in 2006 (5) SCC 72 to submit that the impugned order was passed on the basis of no evidence. 54. On the other hand it is submitted on behalf of the respondent company without prejudice to his objection with regard to the maintainability of this writ petition even some extraneous grounds are taken into consideration for passing the impugned order, in the event of reasonable opportunity had been given to the petitioner to deal with the rest of the grounds, the impugned order is sustainable in law. It is further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of this case the disputed facts involved in the impugned order cannot be ascertained without further evidence or without external aid and as such the matter should be relegated to a suit. 55. It is further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of this case the disputed facts involved in the impugned order cannot be ascertained without further evidence or without external aid and as such the matter should be relegated to a suit. 55. Having heard the learned Counsels appearing for both the parties and after considering the facts and circumstances of this case I find that the grievance of the petitioners and taking into account the extraneous considerations without giving reasonable opportunity to them, can be ascertained from the materials-on-record, namely, the show-cause notices, the replies thereto and the grounds taken into consideration in passing the impugned order. It is an admitted position that no further evidence or no external aid is required to arrive at a conclusion with regard to violation of the principles of natural justice thereby. It is not in dispute that in the show-cause notice dated August 8, 2005 (Annexure p-3 at page 50) the allegation was of violation of Clause 13a (ii) (v) of the said agreement. In order to ascertain the nature of allegations above clauses are quoted below:- "13.a Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained the Company shall be at liberty to terminate this agreement forthwith upon or at any time on the happening of any of the events following. (ii) The licensees, being a firm, if any member of the Licensees is adjudged an insolvent or a compromise is entered into by the firm or any member of the firm with their creditors, or a distress, execution or other process is levied upon or if an incumbrancer takes possession of or a receiver is appointed of any part of the assets or property of the firm or any member of the firm. (v) If the Licensees, for any reason other than due to the Company's default, fail to maintain supply to the public through the said facilities for any period exceeding 24 hors." 56. It is not in dispute that the contains of the notice dated August 23, 2005 were repetitions and reiterations of the above allegations. It further appears from the notice dated January 30, 2006 that the allegation of non-maintaining the stock of Hi-Speed Diesel. It is an admitted position that the notice dated February 6, 2006 contended same allegations and a reference of Clauses 10(b)(j), 13.a (ii) (v) (vii) and (viii). It further appears from the notice dated January 30, 2006 that the allegation of non-maintaining the stock of Hi-Speed Diesel. It is an admitted position that the notice dated February 6, 2006 contended same allegations and a reference of Clauses 10(b)(j), 13.a (ii) (v) (vii) and (viii). In order to ascertain the nature of allegations the above clauses are quoted below:- "Clause 10. The Licensees hereby covenant and agree with the Company as follows: (a)................................................................................................. (b) To promote the sales of the Company's products to the satisfactions of the Company and achieve sales target as may be set by the Company from time to time. (d)............................................................................................... . (j) Not to do or permit to be done on the said premises any act or thing which may (i) endanger the grant or continuance of the Government Licence under the authority of which Motor Spirit or H.S.D. may be stored, or sold, upon the said premises, of (ii) be contrary to the terms and conditions on which the said premises are held by the company." Clause 13. (a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained the Company shall be at liberty to terminate this agreement forthwith upon or at any time on the happening of any of the events following: (ii) The Licensees being a firm, if any member of the Licensees is adjudged an insolvent or a compromise is entered into by the firm or any member of the firm with their creditors, or a distress, execution or other process is levied upon or if an encumbrancer takes possession of or a receiver is appointed of any part of the assets or property of the firm or any member of the firm. (v) If the Licensees for any reason other than due to the Company's default fail to maintain Supply to the public through the said facilities for any period exceeding 24 hours; (vii) If the Licensees shall be guilty of a breach of any of the covenants and stipulations on their part contained in this agreement. (viii) If the Licensees shall commit or suffer to be committed any act which in the opinion of the Marketing Director of the Company for the time being a Bombay or any other person nominated for this purpose by the Company is prejudicial to the interest or good name of the Company or its products. (viii) If the Licensees shall commit or suffer to be committed any act which in the opinion of the Marketing Director of the Company for the time being a Bombay or any other person nominated for this purpose by the Company is prejudicial to the interest or good name of the Company or its products. The decision of such officer or person shall be final and binding on the Licensees. 57. It is undisputed fact that the grounds shown in the impugned order dated February 24, 2006, amongst others were failure to take steps to strengthen the retail outlet under reference, failure to enhance the sales performance ought to maintain existing sales of the above location reduction in sales of the above outlet from February 2005 series set back in the business of the retail outlet under reference besides damaging goodwill and jeopardise the brand image and market potential of products of the respondent-company continued closure of the retail outset under reference, flowing from immense loss on account of loss of sale as well as on account of nil return on capital investment at the site under reference, stock variation beyond permissible limit on close. 58. A finger nail sketch of the facts is enough to bring out the crucial issues and the broad point of denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioners before passing the impugned order dated February 24, 2006 on the ground as mentioned hereinabove. Admittedly, the grounds contended in the impugned order stated herein above were absent in the show-cause notices. Therefore, the impugned order dated February 24, 2006 suffered from arbitrariness and procedural impropriety violating the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 59. In view of the above discussions and observations the impugned order dated February 24, 2006 passed by the respondent No. 3 terminating the Dispensing Pump and selling licence (DPSL) agreement dated April 20, 1997 (Annexure P-9 at page 59 of the writ application) is quashed and set aside. 60. There will be, however, nor order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance with the necessary formalities in this regard.