JUDGMENT DIPANKAR DATTA. J. 1. THE petitioner employed the fifth respondent as Gatekeeper and Usher of "Metro", one of the oldest cinema halls of the State. He was accused of stealing belongings left behind by the audience through oversight, which affected the goodwill of the petitioner. A domestic enquiry was conducted in which the charge of committing misconduct levelled against the fifth respondent was found proved, leading to termination of his service. 2. AN industrial dispute was raised and in terms of an order dated October 12,1993 issued by the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department, a reference was made to the 7th Industrial Tribunal. It was called upon to decide whether the termination of service of the fifth respondent with effect from September 18, 1992 is justified and to what relief he is entitled in law. The order of reference records that an industrial dispute existed between the petitioner and its workman, the fifth respondent, represented by Motion Picture (Distribution, Projection) Employees' Union (hereafter the Union) of 182, Lenin Sarani, Kolkata - 700 013. 3. THE petitioner in its written statement filed before the Tribunal contended that the order of reference is not maintainable in law. What had been referred was not an industrial dispute but an individual dispute. THE Union that has attempted to represent the workman, the fifth respondent, is not a representative union' and is not constitutionally capable to raise any dispute of a workman of a cinema hall. Since it is purely an individual dispute between the petitioner and the fifth respondent, the Union had no locus standi to file written statement on behalf of the latter. 4. CONSIDERING such objection of the petitioner, the Judge, 7th Industrial Tribunal, passed an award on July 18, 1996. Since it is purely an individual dispute between the petitioner and the fifth respondent, the Union had no locus standi to file written statement on behalf of the latter. 4. CONSIDERING such objection of the petitioner, the Judge, 7th Industrial Tribunal, passed an award on July 18, 1996. The operative part of the said award reads as follows: "Thus on carefully going through the case record and the case laws cited by the parties I am of the opinion that the Motion Picture (Distribution, Projection) Employees' Union has no power to represent the case of the workman concerned and accordingly the Order of Reference is bad and not maintanable in law, when the Order of Reference is not maintainable in law there is no need to discuss on the interim relief matter." By an order dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department, the said award was published. 5. THE fifth respondent challenged the award dated July 18, 1996 by filing a writ petition before this Court. A learned Judge of this Court by order dated July 23, 1997 allowed the writ petition by holding as follows: "THE instant writ application is directed against an award dated July 18, 1996 passed. by the 7th Industrial Tribunal in Reference No. VIII-305/93 whereupon the concerned Tribunal has been pleased to reject the reference as bad in law and not maintainable. In the penultimate paragraph preceding the conclusion of the disposal resulting in the award being passed it has been illegible that distinction is there between an individual dispute and a representative dispute. It has been found that the said Union has no representative capacity as such it had no; power of representation and thereby the applicant has no locus standi and as such the reference is vitiated. THE said observation of the Tribunal appears to be a patent misreading of non obstante clause of Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act,' 1947 where it has been held that dismissal of an individual workman is to be deemed an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workman is a party to the dispute. As such the distinction' sought to be made is an ingeneous distinction and by way of misplaced emphasis. As such the distinction' sought to be made is an ingeneous distinction and by way of misplaced emphasis. THE entire approach of the concerned Tribunal suffers from misdirection in exercise of jurisdiction on gross misreading of Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. THE said view has also been supported by Mr. Manick Das in tune of the submission of Mr. Sengupta appearing on behalf of the State in his usual; fairness. This Court in view of the reason as aforesaid feels that the concerned Tribunal has gone wrong in rejecting the reference by holding it as non-maintainable. Therefore, the reference will be required to be adjudicated upon by the concerned Tribunal on reception of evidence and other materials on record during the period of subsistence adjudicatioin. Any interlocutory application made by any of the party can be entertained and can be dealt with in accordance with law." 6. THE Tribunal, after the aforesaid order of this Court, proceeded to decide the reference on merits. THE petitioner had again raised the point of maintainability of the reference. THE Tribunal overruled the objection in view of the order of this Court referred to above. Since the petitioner had not been paid interim relief in terms of an earlier order of the Tribunal, it had been debarred from participating in the proceedings. However, it was given further opportunity to make payment but even then it refused to comply with the order. THE Tribunal had no other alternative but to proceed to pass an award on the basis of the evidence adduced by the fifth respondent. It agreed with the contention of the fifth respondent that the petitioner while terminating his service fragrantly violated principles of natural justice. THE Tribunal, accordingly, by its award dated April 28, 1999, held that the termination of service of the fifth respondent was unjustified. A direction followed for reinstatement in service with full back wages and other consequential benefits. The said award of the Tribunal was published by an order dated June 3,1999 issued by the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department. 7. QUESTIONING the propriety of the said award, the petitioner had approached this Court by filing a writ petition. The said award of the Tribunal was published by an order dated June 3,1999 issued by the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department. 7. QUESTIONING the propriety of the said award, the petitioner had approached this Court by filing a writ petition. By an order dated August 7, 2000, a learned Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition holding that there was no illegality in the award justifying interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. FEELING aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner had approached the Division Bench. The appeal was disposed of by an order dated September 22, 2000. The petitioner was directed to pay to the fifth respondent all the arrears payable in terms of the order of the Tribunal under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter the I.D. Act) within a period of three weeks. It was also directed to continue payment of current subsistence allowance till disposal of the reference before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was directed to dispose of the reference as early as possible, preferably within a period of three months from date of communication of the order. The order, however, contained the following observations : "Subject to the directions made hereinbefore, the appellant shall be entitled to raise all contentions including the question as to whether the proceedings have become infructuous before the Labour Tribunal." The petitioner on April 26, 2002 had filed an application before the Tribunal contending, inter alia, that by operation of law the proceedings had concluded and that the Tribunal had become functus officio. This application was filed apparently in view of the observation of the Division Bench extracted supra. The application was considered by the Judge of the Tribunal who, by order July 12, 2002, held as follows : "In such circumstances, this Tribunal has all jurisdiction to answer the reference and the objection of the Company to the effect that the proceeding is infructuous is wholly misconceived in view of the fact that the Hon'ble Division Bench approved the present proceeding while directing the Company to comply with the Order No. 42 dated January 21, 1998 which was passed after setting aside the Award dated July 18, 1996 and reviving the order of Reference. In the premises I have no hesitation to hold that the Application dated April 26,2002 filed by the Company is totally misconceived and frivolous and. the same is not maintainable in law. I, therefore, reject the Company's application dated April 26,2002 on contest. To August 8,2002 for hearing of case on the point of validity of domestic enquiry." 9. THE petitioner then filed an application dated August 8, 2002 for recalling the order dated July 12, 2002 which again was rejected by the Tribunal {vide order no.127 dated September 6, 2002). THE petitioner filed another application dated September 27, 2002 for recalling order no.127 dated September 6, 2002. Such application was also rejected by the Tribunal {vide order no. 141 dated August 14, 2003). 10. THEREAFTER, despite several adjournments granted by the Tribunal, the petitioner did not participate in the proceedings. Time and again it prayed for adjournment for moving the High Court. However, the petitioner did not approach this Court against the aforesaid orders. In such circumstances, the fifth respondent filed an application dated December 15, 2004. He prayed for early disposal of the reference. Noting the conduct of the petitioner, the Tribunal allowed the application ex parte and fixed March 21, 2005 to enable the petitioner file certified copy of the order of the High Court staying proceedings before it, failing which it was directed that the case would be heard on the point of validity of domestic enquiry. 11. THE petitioner could not produce any order of stay. THE Tribunal then considered the issue of validity of domestic enquiry conducted by the petitioner against the fifth respondent. THE parties were heard. For reasons recorded in order no. 165 dated June 30, 2005, the Judge held that enquiry was conducted against the petitioner illegally and that it was not valid and proper. Accordingly, July 19,2005 was fixed as the date of hearing of the reference on merit. 12. THE petitioner had thereafter filed an application on April 18, 2006 praying for recalling of order no. 165 dated June 30, 2005. THE said application is not on record. However, from order no. Accordingly, July 19,2005 was fixed as the date of hearing of the reference on merit. 12. THE petitioner had thereafter filed an application on April 18, 2006 praying for recalling of order no. 165 dated June 30, 2005. THE said application is not on record. However, from order no. 181 dated May 5,2006 whereby it was rejected, it appears that the Tribunal noted as follows : "........In the petition dated April 13, 2006 it has been stated by the Company that by the Judgment and Order dated September 22, 2000 the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court has been pleased to set aside the Award passed by this Tribunal and directed for hearing the enquiry in question. It has also been stated by the Company in the said Petitioner that Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Division Bench were also pleased to direct further that such question shall be decided after giving an opportunity of hearing. In the said petition it has also been stated that my predecessor-in-office was pleased to pass the Order regarding enquiry but the Petitioner was not favoured with the opportunity to make submissions. It has next been stated by the Company that by Order No. 174 dated January 16, 2006 though the learned Tribunal was pleased to give opportunity to the employer to contest the case and the Company is ready for hearing of the case but it cannot proceed if the Order no. 165 dated June 30, 2006 is not recalled. I have gone through the petition filed by the Company. It also appears from the records that the statements made in the said petition dated April 18, 2006 are not correct. In the petition it has been stated that the Company was not favoured with the opportunity to make submissions as directed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court. In the Order dated February 18, 2005 this Tribunal disposed of all the points which have again been reiterated by the Company in this present application. It has been held in the said Order that the Company took several adjournments on various pleas without participating in the enquiry. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances I have no hesitation to hold that the points as raised in the petition dated April 18, 2006 have already been decided by this Tribunal in its previous orders. It has been held in the said Order that the Company took several adjournments on various pleas without participating in the enquiry. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances I have no hesitation to hold that the points as raised in the petition dated April 18, 2006 have already been decided by this Tribunal in its previous orders. That apart it is well settled that the Tribunal has no power to recall its own order. It, therefore, appears that the Company has not come forward with clean hands and to make out a so called case for recalling the Order it has made some false averments in the Petition. I, therefore the reject the application of the Company as no sufficient ground has been made by the Company for recalling the Order No. 165 dated June 30, 2005." It is at this stage that the petitioner presented this writ petition dated May 11,2006 before this Court challenging the validity, legality and/or propriety of order nos. 165 and 181 dated June 30, 2005 and May 6, 2006 respectively. 13. I have heard Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the petitioner at length on diverse dates. Since his arguments seemed to be unending, he was called upon to file written notes of argument. The same has since been filed and considered. 14. ACCORDING to the petitioner, the following grounds (at pg. 2 of the written notes) are most vital for the purpose of a decision of this case. The same read as follows : "(i) The impugned order of Reference is ultra vires the I.D. Act. and no Industrial Dispute existed. No demand was raised with the employer in spite of the fact that the dismissal of the individual on the ground of theft was not raised nor challenged with the employer. (ii) The Trade Union which espoused the cause of the individual workman being considered as a party to the Industrial Dispute was and is not a registered Trade Union under the Trade Union's Act. (iii) The proceeding became infractuous as recorded in the submission by the Hon'ble Division Bench in the previous Appeal. (ii) The Trade Union which espoused the cause of the individual workman being considered as a party to the Industrial Dispute was and is not a registered Trade Union under the Trade Union's Act. (iii) The proceeding became infractuous as recorded in the submission by the Hon'ble Division Bench in the previous Appeal. (iv) The action of the employer against the dismissal of the delinquent workman indulging in theft during the course of work cannot be a subject matter of judicial interference when on materials on record produced before the Tribunal it is evident that before passing the order of dismissal the employer issued charge sheet held domestic enquiry and acted in full compliance of the principles of natural justice. (v) The objection raised by the employer regarding filing of written statement by the unregistered Trade Union even though recorded but not decided by the Tribunal. (vi) The Tribunal's order rejecting Domestice enquiry is perverse, bias and malafide when admittedly the workman was allowed to be represented by lawyer in the Enquiry and finding is based on evidence on record. The Tribunal's order regarding enquiry is liable to be quashed. Ref : Banaras Electric Light Power Co. v. Labour Court II, Lucknow AIR 1972 SC Page 2182 : 1972-II-LLJ-328. (vii) The order passed by Justice Mitra on workman's application alone is void and not enforceable in law as the workman did not add the Trade Union as party to the proceeding. Ref: 1985 (AIR-SC-189.)" In pages 3 to 5 of the written notes of argument, Mr. Chatterjee has endeavoured to project how the order dated September 15,1997 passed by the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition of the fifth respondent is void and not enforceable in law. It is contended that the fifth respondent had moved the writ petition suppressing material facts and the trade Union was also not a party. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court Prabodh verma v. State of U.P. AIR 1985 SC 167 : (1984) 4 SCC 251 , to contend that the judgment dated September 15, 1997 became infructuous by reason thereof. It is also contended therein that the fifth respondent without having the reference amended got the industrial dispute converted into an individual one and such a course of action is not permissible in law. It is also contended therein that the fifth respondent without having the reference amended got the industrial dispute converted into an individual one and such a course of action is not permissible in law. Reference was made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Deepak Industries Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 1975-I-LLJ-293 (Cal). 15. IN page 6 of the written notes it has been contended that the reference is liable to be held illegal since the fifth respondent raised no dispute with the petitioner. Hence there was no industrial dispute worthy of being referred for adjudication by the Tribunal having regard to the decision Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited v. INdustrial Tribunal of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 529 : 1968-I-LLJ-834. 16. PAGES 7 to 10 of the written notes have been devoted to points as to how the order passed by the Tribunal on the application for interim relief under Section 15(2)(b) of the Act is bad and why the Tribunal erred in ruling against the petitioner on the issue of validity of domestic enquiry. It has also been contended that since the Division Bench by its order dated September 22, 2000 did not set aside the award dated April 28,1999 and publication thereof by order dated June 3, 1999, the Tribunal proceedings by efflux of time and by operation of Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act should be deemed to be concluded by operation of law. Hence all subsequent orders passed by the Tribunal are void in law. The contentions raised by Mr. Chatterjee have exercised due consideration of this Court. However, none of the grounds on which he based his submissions are found to be of any substance. 17. MUCH emphasis has been laid by Mr. Chatterjee on the observation of the Division Bench in its order dated September 22, 2000 quoted above whereby the petitioner was granted leave to raise all contentions before the Tribunal including the question as to whether the proceedings have become infructuous before the Tribunal or not. The Division Bench's order dated September 22, 2000 does not record the submission of Mr. Chatterjee as to how the proceedings before the Tribunal had become infructuous. However, it appears from page 8 of the written notes as follows: "The Divn. Bench order dt. The Division Bench's order dated September 22, 2000 does not record the submission of Mr. Chatterjee as to how the proceedings before the Tribunal had become infructuous. However, it appears from page 8 of the written notes as follows: "The Divn. Bench order dt. September 22, 2000 clearly refers to that legal objections raised by the counsel of the employer and the Hon'ble Court held it as right submission. The Tribunal's ex parte Award recording its high handed action against the employer as 'debarring the employer from participating in the proceeding' thus made the proceeding infractuous as submitted by the Ld. Advocate of the Employer." 18. FROM page 9 of the written notes it is further revealed as follows: "The second point is that the Hon'ble Division Bench upon challenge of the second Award did not pass any order setting aside or quashing the publication order of the said Award including the Award itself when the Writ as well as the Appeal was filed after expiry period after publication U/S. 17A, when the mandatory provision of Section 20 sub-section 3 operated. In view of the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal Proceeding shall be deemed to be concluded by the operation of law. It is respectfully submitted that all subsequent orders passed by the Tribunal including all enquiry etc. are void in law." This Court finds no reason to accept the contention that proceeding before the Tribunal became infructuous for any reason whatsoever. After the Tribunal passed the award dated April 28, 1998 holding the termination to be unjustified and the same was published on June 3, 1999, it was the petitioner which invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court and its writ petition stood dismissed by order dated August 7, 2000. Writ appeal filed thereagainst by the petitioner was disposed of by the order dated September 22, 2000 with directions as noticed above. Merely because the order of the Division Bench did not record that the award and publication thereof, impugned in the writ petition, as well as the order under appeal were being set aside, cannot lead to a conclusion that the same survived even after the Division Bench's order. Merely because the order of the Division Bench did not record that the award and publication thereof, impugned in the writ petition, as well as the order under appeal were being set aside, cannot lead to a conclusion that the same survived even after the Division Bench's order. Everyone including the petitioner understood the terms of the order dated September 22, 2000 whereby the Tribunal was directed to consider the reference in the manner directed and to dispose it of as early as possible and preferably within 3 (three) months from date of communication. The impugned award and the order publishing it as well as the order under appeal dated August 7, 2000 stood set aside by necessary implication. Had it not been so and if the proceeding had in fact become infructuous as argued by Mr. Chatterjee, this Court wonders why the Division Bench would hold that "the question as to whether the appellant being a private employer can hold an enquiry itself or not is a question which would ultimately fall for consideration before the learned Tribunal" and further that since the petitioner was prevented from participating in the hearing, "in respect of such a question the appellant should be given an opportunity of hearing." Also, the direction for payment of arrears and "current subsistence allowance till disposal of the application before the Tribunal" would not have followed in case the Tribunal had become functus officio by operation of law. The learned Judge of the Tribunal correctly held by order dated July 12, 2002 that the application filed by the petitioner was without merit. 19. THIS Court is also unable to uphold the plea that the reference before the Tribunal is incompetent and, therefore, the Tribunal erred in overruling the objection of the petitioner. 20. IT is not in dispute that the petitioner's objection was initially upheld by the Tribunal by its first award dated July 18,1996. However, this Court set aside the said award by order dated July 23, 1997. From a bare reading of the said order, extracted above, it is clear that this Court held the reference to be maintainable and directed the Tribunal to adjudicate it on reception of evidence and other materials on record. Interlocutory application filed by any party was also directed to be entertained and disposed of in accordance with law. From a bare reading of the said order, extracted above, it is clear that this Court held the reference to be maintainable and directed the Tribunal to adjudicate it on reception of evidence and other materials on record. Interlocutory application filed by any party was also directed to be entertained and disposed of in accordance with law. IT is worth noting that the writ petition was filed by the fifth respondent without impleading the Union as a respondent. That the proceeding had partaken the character of an individual dispute between the fifth respondent and the petitioner and could be espoused by the fifth respondent in terms of Section 2-A of the I.D. Act was duly noticed by the Court. All objections raised by the petitioner were overruled. On facts and in the circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the opinion that the decision in Deepak Industries Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (supra) is not apposite. It is also on record that the petitioner, time and again, unsuccessfully attempted to have a termination of the proceedings before the Tribunal. The orders dated July 12, 2002, September 6, 2002 and August 14, 2003 bear ample testimony of the repeated futile attempts of the petitioner in preventing the Tribunal to proceed with the hearing on merits. Not having questioned the said orders, the issue attained finality. Again, with motive to prevent the Tribunal from proceeding further and most certainly for the purpose of wrecking the morale of the fifth respondent, the petitioner approached the Tribunal with similar application which met rejection by the orders dated June 30, 2005 and May 6, 2006. No appeal having been preferred against the order dated July 23, 1997 whereby the reference was held to be maintainable, the contentions urged by the petitioner to the contrary cannot be upheld. The petitioner ought to realize that validity and/or propriety of a decision of a learned single Judge cannot be questioned in subsequent proceedings before a bench of coordinate strength. The Court by its said order having held that the Tribunal misdirected itself in exercise of jurisdiction and not having considered provisions of Section 2-A of the I.D. Act in its proper perspective and the fifth respondent is entitled to have a decision from the Tribunal on the issue of termination of his service, nothing further remains to be done. The Court by its said order having held that the Tribunal misdirected itself in exercise of jurisdiction and not having considered provisions of Section 2-A of the I.D. Act in its proper perspective and the fifth respondent is entitled to have a decision from the Tribunal on the issue of termination of his service, nothing further remains to be done. It is settled law that even if a judgment is erroneous, the same does not mean that the order passed therein is not binding; so long the judgment and order is not set aside by a competent superior Court, the same would bind the parties to the proceeding (see Abdul Rashid v. State of West Bengal and Others, 2009 (1) CLJ (Cal) 117). 21. THE principle of res judicata also bars the petitioner to raise such an issue once again before this Court. THE decision cited by Mr. Dutta, learned counsel for the fifth respondent in Pondicherry K. and V.I. Board v. P. Kulothangan AIR 2003 SC 4701 : (2004) 1 SCC 68 :2003-III-LLJ-1153, is apposite. While considering a civil appeal arising out of a reference made under the I.D. Act, the Supreme Court had observed as follows at p. 1155 of LLJ: "I0. THE principle of res judicata operates on the Court. It is the Courts which are prohibited from trying the issue which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier proceedings between the same parties provided the Court trying the subsequent proceeding is satisfied that the earlier Court was competent to dispose of the earlier proceedings and that the matter had been heard and finally decided by such Court. Here the parties to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the Madras High Court and the industrial dispute were the same. THE cause of action in both was the refusal of the appellant to allow the respondent to rejoin service. THE Madras High Court was competent to decide the issue which it did with a reasoned order on the merits and after a contested hearing. This was not a case where the earlier proceedings had been disposed of on any technical ground as was the case in Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and Another, Smt. Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal (dead) L.Rs. This was not a case where the earlier proceedings had been disposed of on any technical ground as was the case in Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and Another, Smt. Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal (dead) L.Rs. THE "lesser relief of reinstatement which was the subject-matter of the industrial dispute had already been claimed by the respondent in the writ petition. This correctness of the decision in the writ proceedings has not been challenged by the respondent. THE decision was, therefore, final. Having got an adverse order in the writ petition. It was not open to the respondent to re-agitate the issue before the Labour Court and the Labour Court was incompetent to entertain the dispute raised by the respondent and re-decide the matter in the face of the earlier decision of the High Court in the writ proceedings." 22. THE decision in Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. (supra)does not lend any assistance to the petitioner. THE Union, if aggrieved by the order dated September 15, 1997, could be heard to say that an order was passed behind its back to its prejudice and detriment and, thus, cannot bind it. However, the petitioner in whose presence the order was passed cannot question it. The decision in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat (supra) apparently supports the contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee but in Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1979 SC 170 : (1979) 1 SCC 1 : 1979-I-LLJ-1, the Apex Court ruled that "the decision turns purely on the facts of the case." 23. IN Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, Jullundur, AIR 1978 SC 1088 : (1978) 2 SCC 353 : 1978-I-LLJ-484, the Apex Court after considering Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat (supra) ruled that "the question whether an industrial dispute exists at the date of reference is a question of fact to be determined on the material placed before the Tribunal with the cautions enunciated in State of Madras v. CP. Sarathy, AIR 1953 SC 53 : 1953-I-LLJ-174. While interfering with the award of the Tribunal holding the reference to be incompetent, the Apex Court noticed the further fact that when the union had approached the Conciliation Officer, the management had appeared before him and contested the claim for reinstatement. 24. Sarathy, AIR 1953 SC 53 : 1953-I-LLJ-174. While interfering with the award of the Tribunal holding the reference to be incompetent, the Apex Court noticed the further fact that when the union had approached the Conciliation Officer, the management had appeared before him and contested the claim for reinstatement. 24. IT appears from paragraph 16 of the written statement filed before the Tribunal on behalf of the fifth respondent that conciliation proceeding before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (being the Conciliation Officer), which resulted in non-settlement of the dispute and failure report being filed leading to the reference owing to adamant attitude of the petitioner, has been referred to. In paragraph 40 of its written objection, the petitioner did not specifically say that there was no conciliation proceeding preceding the order of reference. The very fact that the workman insisted for reinstatement in service through the Conciliation Officer and the employer did not agree to take him back, in course of conciliation proceeding, is sufficient proof of a demand being raised which resulted in its refusal. The parties were at logger-heads and, therefore, an industrial dispute did exist which could be referred. 25. IN view of the aforesaid decisions and the finding of fact reached by this Court that on the date reference was made an industrial dispute did exist between the petitioner and the fifth respondent, the contention of the petitioner is devoid of merit. 26. SO far as the order of the Tribunal holding the domestic enquiry to be not fair and proper, this Court refrains from deciding the issue in view of the decisions in Cooper Engineering Limited v. P.P. Mundhe AIR 1975 SC 1900 : (1975) 2 SCC 661 : 1975-II-LLJ-379 and in SOnodyne Television Co. Ltd. v. SOnodyne Television Co. Employees' Union and Others, (1997) 1 CHN 218 . If the Tribunal ultimately holds the impugned termination to be unjustified and answers the issues constituting the reference in favour of the fifth respondent, the petitioner would have the liberty to urge the point that the domestic enquiry conducted by it was fair and proper before the appropriate forum in accordance with law, if at all it considers itself to be aggrieved by such award. This Court cannot overlook the fact that by order dated September 22, 2000, the Division Bench had requested the Tribunal to dispose of the matter as early as possible and preferably within three months from date of communication thereof. This Court has noticed the untiring efforts of the petitioner to thwart the Tribunal from giving a decision on merits. Almost 9 years have passed by and disposal of the reference is still awaited. It is clear that the petitioner is instrumental for the delay in disposal of the reference. Accordingly, the Tribunal is encouraged to decide the reference by fixing dates of hearing on day to day basis. It shall not grant adjournment without reasonable cause. In any case, the reference must be decided within six months from date of receipt of a copy of this order. If there is any vacancy in the office of Judge of the 7th Industrial Tribunal, the Judge-in-Charge shall comply with this direction. 27. THE writ petition stands dismissed. Since this Court is convinced that the petitioner has been initiating proceedings only to wreck the morale of the fifth respondent, it shall be liable to pay costs to the fifth respondent assessed at Rs. 10,000/- 28. ALL pending applications stand disposed of in view of dismissal of the writ petition. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order shall be furnished to the applicant as early as possible but positively within four days from putting in requisites therefor.