Judgment D.H. Waghela, J.—This matter comes up before this Court by special order of Hon’ble the Chief Justice. After the first order dated 05.06.2009 issuing notice to the respondents, learned Senior Advocate Mr. K.G. Menon, appearing for Respondent No. 2, objected on the returnable date (16.6.2009) to the grant of long adjournment. However, considering the fact that it was the first returnable date and no interim relief was granted, the matter was ordered to be listed for hearing on 06.07.2009 in the first board with clear order that the Court would proceed with the hearing and no adjournment shall be granted. Thereafter, by an administrative order dated 06.07.2009, the matter is placed before this Court and heard in extenso for final disposal with the consent of learned Counsel appearing for the parties. 2. The petitioner has invoked Articles 215 and 226 of the Constitution as well as the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for restraining the Special Investigation Team (hereinafter referred as “SIT”), constituted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, from investigating any offence alleged in the complaint dated 08.06.2006 of Respondent No. 3, in purported exercise of authority conferred upon the SIT under the order dated 27.4.2009 of the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No. 1088 of 2008 [for short “SLA (Cri.) No. 1088 of 2008”]. The petitioner is one of the 62 persons accused of various offences in the aforesaid complaint dated 08.06.2006. 3. Admittedly, aforesaid complaint dated 08.06.2006 alleging, inter alia, offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of IPC, Section 193 read with Section 114 of IPC, sections 186, 153-A and 187 of IPC, Section 6 of Commission of Inquiry Act and offences punishable under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1991, was addressed to Mr. P.C. Pande, Director General of Police of Gujarat, who is also one of the persons accused of the offences in the complaint. Upon that complaint being not registered as an FIR, the complainant approached this Court by way of Special Criminal Application No. 421 of 2007 and that petition was dismissed, relegating the petitioner (complainant) to file appropriate private complaint under Section 190 read with Section 200 of Cr.P.C. by order dated 02.11.2007 of this Court. Upon that complaint being not registered as an FIR, the complainant approached this Court by way of Special Criminal Application No. 421 of 2007 and that petition was dismissed, relegating the petitioner (complainant) to file appropriate private complaint under Section 190 read with Section 200 of Cr.P.C. by order dated 02.11.2007 of this Court. That judgment and order have been carried in appeal before the Supreme Court and pending that SLA (Cri.) No. 1088 of 2008, on 27.4.2009, the Apex Court made the following order: “ORDER. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, we direct that complaint dated 08.06.2006 which the petitioners herein claim to have sent to the DGP of Gujarat shall be examined by the Special Investigation Team (in short “SIT”) constituted pursuant to the orders of this Court. The SIT shall look into the matter and take steps as required in law and give its report to this Court within three months. Call this matter after three months. This case shall be heard with Writ Petition (Cri.) No. 109 of 2003 and connected cases.” 4. The short issue sought to be raised by the petitioner in the present proceeding is as to whether the SIT is authorized to investigate any offence alleged in the complaint dated 08.06.2006. It is the case of the petitioner that in another related proceeding, being Writ Petition (Cri.) 109 of 2003 filed by National Human Rights Commission against the State of Gujarat and others, the Supreme Court was pleased, by its order dated 26.3.2003, to constitute the SIT and specific directions were issued to it to continue investigation and conduct further investigation into the specific cases described in the order itself. Pursuant to that direction, the SIT has conducted further investigation into the offences alleged in C.R.No.67 of 2002 and has filed its report before the Supreme Court, but the petitioner is unable to get a copy thereof as it is placed in a sealed cover. Therefore, a request is thrice made in the petition to call for and examine that report from the SIT. It is contended that, after filing of the said report, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has issued further directions on 01.05.2009. Therefore, a request is thrice made in the petition to call for and examine that report from the SIT. It is contended that, after filing of the said report, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has issued further directions on 01.05.2009. Thus the very same incident, which is made out to be the basis of the belated complaint dated 08.6.2006, is already investigated by the SIT and any further investigation would be permissible only in accordance with Section 173 (8) of Cr.P.C. Since the prayer for quashing the complaint dated 08.6.2006 is expressly not pressed by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Vakil, the allegations contained in that complaint are not required to be stated and gone into. However, the petitioner has made the grievance that the SIT was proposing to investigate that complaint and would summon all the persons named therein. Relying upon newspaper reports, it is averred that the SIT has already taken a decision to act contrary to and beyond the scope of the provisions of Cr.P.C. 5. Responding to the petition, an affidavit of Smt. Geetha Johri, Respondent No. 9 and Convener and Member of SIT, has been filed to state, inter alia, as under: “3. . . . . This affidavit is restricted to only the question of validity of the preliminary enquiry being carried out by the SIT pursuant to the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. “4. The important question of law raised in the above petition is that when neither an FIR is registered nor any order of either investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code or inquiry under Section 202 of the Code is passed, there is no competence, jurisdiction, authority or power vested in the SIT either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or otherwise to conduct an investigation into the matter referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and hence this respondent restricts her affidavit only in respect of this contention raised in the petition. The respondent says that the SIT or any other investigating agency in a case of this nature which is under the consideration of this Hon’ble Court in the above Criminal Writ Petition is entitled in law to make preliminary enquiry so as to find out the truth or otherwise of statements and allegations made in the complaint as well as in accordance with the direction given by the Apex Court which is being indirectly challenged in the above proceedings. I say that although the officer in charge of the police station is legally bound to register a First Information Report in terms of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same by itself however does not take away the right of the competent officer to make a preliminary inquiry in a case like this in order to find out as to whether the First Information sought to be lodged had any substance or not. I further say that to carry out a preliminary inquiry as stated above, even under the Criminal Procedure Code is permissible and is not unknown. Moreover, in this case there is a clear direction by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the SIT shall look into the matter and take steps as required in law and give its report to the Hon’ble Supreme Court within 3 months and accordingly steps are being taken by the SIT in getting the concerned witnesses questioned and statements recorded so as to find out the truth of the allegations, which is strictly consistent with the provisions of law as contained in Cr.P.C. However, as alleged no statements of witnesses have been recorded so far and no arrests have been made. “5. I say that if the petitioner had felt aggrieved by the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as referred to above, the proper course for him should have been to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself for necessary reliefs rather than challenging the inquiry done by the SIT, thus indirectly challenging the validity of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself in this Court, which is not permissible.” 6. The original complainant and Respondent No. 3 herein has filed affidavit, inter alia, to state that the offence in C.R.-I No. 67 of 2002 was with regard to the offence that occurred in Gulberg Society alone that resulted in the slaughter of 69-70 persons and it did not cover any incident or offence of any other area. However, the complaint dated 08.6.2006 pertains to the offences committed by the persons accused in the complaint and covers their respective roles as conspirators in a mass crime of murder and conspiracy which was of State-wide reach and magnitude. It is further stated that the Apex Court had taken into account the special and peculiar nature of her complaint and directed the SIT also to investigate her complaint dated 08.6.2006. 7. By filing an affidavit-in-rejoinder, the petitioner has, inter alia, conceded that there is scope for preliminary inquiry to verify the existence of a cognizable offence and other details thereof, but it is limited to examination of persons who have knowledge of the affairs and relevant documents but examination or interrogation of persons or witnesses and recording their statements, which may be used as evidence in the trial, is part of investigation and not of preliminary enquiry. It is alleged by him that SIT’s actions of questioning witnesses and recording their statements amount to collection of evidence to prove the offences alleged in the complaint and would amount to investigation. 8. An affidavit of Additional Secretary (Law and Order) is stated to have been filed on behalf of the State of Gujarat, Respondent No. 1, only to controvert some of the unwarranted, unsustainable and vexatious allegations made in the affidavit in reply filed by Respondents No. 4 and 5. 9. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. 8. An affidavit of Additional Secretary (Law and Order) is stated to have been filed on behalf of the State of Gujarat, Respondent No. 1, only to controvert some of the unwarranted, unsustainable and vexatious allegations made in the affidavit in reply filed by Respondents No. 4 and 5. 9. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.B. Vakil, appearing for the petitioner, vehemently argued that this Court was required to properly interpret the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and cannot abdicate its duty to do so and after reading and interpreting the order, it cannot be concluded that the Supreme Court could have directed some proceedings which are inconsistent with established law of the land and express provisions of Cr.P.C. It was pointed out that the proceedings in SLA (Cri.) No. 1088 of 2008 and the orders made therein were distinct and separate from the orders issued by the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Cri.) No. 109 of 2003 and, therefore, the directions issued and powers conferred on the SIT in the latter matter cannot be telescoped into the directions issued in SLA (Cri.) No. 1088 of 2008. He emphasized the fact that even the issue as to whether the complaint dated 08.6.2006 is required to be registered as an FIR or not was at large before the Supreme Court in the pending proceeding and the order dated 27.4.2009 of the Supreme Court must be read in that context. 9.1 Relying upon minority view of Justice J.R. Mudholkar in judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, [ AIR 1964 SC 221 ], it is submitted that investigation, in substance, means collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence. The investigating officer is, for this purpose, entitled to question persons who, in his opinion, are able to throw light on the offence which has been committed. The essential part of the duties of an investigating officer in this connection is, apart from arresting the offender, to collect all material necessary for establishing the accusation against the offender. However, merely making some preliminary enquiries upon receipt of information from an anonymous source or a source of doubtful reliability for checking up the correctness of the information does not amount to collection of evidence and so cannot be regarded as investigation. However, merely making some preliminary enquiries upon receipt of information from an anonymous source or a source of doubtful reliability for checking up the correctness of the information does not amount to collection of evidence and so cannot be regarded as investigation. In absence of any prohibition in the Code, express or implied, it is open to a police officer to make preliminary enquiries before registering an offence and making a full scale investigation into it. It was submitted that the ratio of judgment in State of U.P. vs. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (Supra) is quoted with approval in several subsequent judgments, including in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, [1992 CrLJ527]. It was submitted that the order of the Supreme Court has to be read, interpreted and applied in conformity with established law of the land and the proposed and apprehended action of examining witnesses or accused persons was not falling within the area of preliminary inquiry. Learned Counsel relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in P. Sirajuddin vs. State of Madras, [ AIR 1971 SC 520 ] to submit that, when an enquiry is to be held for the purpose of finding out whether criminal proceedings are to be resorted to, the scope thereof must be limited to the examination of persons who have knowledge of the affairs of the delinquent officer and documents bearing on the same to find out whether there is prima facie evidence of guilt of the officer. Thereafter the ordinary law of the land must take its course and further inquiry be proceeded with in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure by lodging an FIR. Learned Counsel also relied upon Suresh Chand Jain vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2001 Cri.L.J. 954] to submit that, even where the magistrate forwards a complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register an FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter. 10. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. 10. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Menon, appearing for SIT, submitted that the petition clearly appeared to have been filed with an oblique and hidden purpose as, without making it a prayer, the petitioner has sought disclosure of the confidential report of SIT which is submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He further submitted that SIT was duty-bound, under the direction of the Supreme Court, to submit report which could be done only after a preliminary enquiry in which several persons, including the accused persons, may have to be summoned and questioned for eliciting the truth or otherwise in the allegations. He submitted that without such process being undertaken, a proper report, as distinguished from a superficial report, cannot be made. Relying upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajinder Singh Katoch vs. Chandigarh Administration, [ (2007) 10 SCC 69 ], he submitted that, if allegations of an offence, which can be investigated without obtaining any permission from the magistrate, are made, the same by itself does not take away the right of the competent officer to make a preliminary enquiry in order to find out whether the first information sought to be lodged had any substance. It is observed in the said judgment, after reference to decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumari vs. State (NCT of Delhi), [ (2006) 2 SCC 677 ], that, in an appropriate case, police officers also have a duty to make a preliminary enquiry so as to find out whether the allegations made had any substance. Learned Counsel relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Shashikant vs. Central Bureau of Investigationm, [ (2007) 1 SCC 630 ] wherein it is observed that, when a preliminary enquiry was conducted on the basis of an anonymous complaint without registering a first information report, neither it was necessary to comply with the provision of the proviso (b) appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 157 of the Code, nor the question of complying with the said provisions, even if it were applicable, would arise. It was, however, also clarified by Mr. Menon that the SIT was at this stage only holding preliminary enquiries for submitting appropriate report to the Supreme Court. 11. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. It was, however, also clarified by Mr. Menon that the SIT was at this stage only holding preliminary enquiries for submitting appropriate report to the Supreme Court. 11. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Seervai, appearing for Respondents No. 3, 4 and 5, submitted that Article 226 of the Constitution provided for a discretionary remedy for advancing the cause of justice and not for raising academic points of law to camouflage bad facts and dubious motives. He submitted that the present petition by one of the accused persons was a grossly mala fide attempt to scuttle and sabotage the preliminary enquiry and hence the petition was not required to be entertained at all. He submitted that order dated 27.4.2009 of the Supreme Court was specific and clear and any party aggrieved by it must approach the Supreme Court and not seek a stay in the High Court by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. He further submitted that, even if the petition were to be entertained and not summarily dismissed, the contending parties were ad idem inasmuch as the preliminary enquiry was admittedly permissible and being conducted. He pointed out that the SIT was constituted under peculiar circumstances, specifically for investigating serious offences, and Writ Petition (Cri.) No. 109 of 2003 and SLA (Cri.) No. 1088 of 2008 were specifically ordered to be heard together along with other connected cases; and the SIT was the common investigating agency in both the proceedings. 12. It is clear from plain reading of order dated 27.4.2009 of the Apex Court that it contains four directions, viz. (1) complaint dated 08.6.2006 shall be examined by the SIT, (2) SIT shall look into the matter, (3) takes steps as required in law, and (4) give its report to the Supreme Court within three months. There is no controversy about the fact that the SIT is required, authorized and permitted to hold preliminary enquiry so as to submit its report within time. It could not be gainsaid that the SIT is also directed to take steps as required in law. Therefore, there is no question of the SIT being permitted or authorized to take any steps which are not required in law. Conversely, the SIT is under an order to take steps as required in law. It could not be gainsaid that the SIT is also directed to take steps as required in law. Therefore, there is no question of the SIT being permitted or authorized to take any steps which are not required in law. Conversely, the SIT is under an order to take steps as required in law. It cannot also be gainsaid that, under Article 144 of the Constitution, all authorities, civil and judicial in the territory of India, shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. As held by Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ashok Kumar Gupta vs. State of U.P., [1993 LabIC 2653], the scheme of the Constitution makes it abundantly clear that the decrees and orders of the Supreme Court shall have a sanctity of their own and must be given effect as such. In case a person feels that an order passed by the Supreme Court has the effect of taking away or abridging any of the fundamental rights under the Constitution or that it is violative of any other provision of the Constitution or law, it is the duty of that person to approach the Supreme Court itself as advised for redressal of his grievances. As observed in Nair Service Society vs. State of Kerala, [ (2007) 4 SCC 1 ], the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, under Article 144, the State was bound to act strictly in terms of its decisions and even if it has reservation about some of its directions, it could approach that Court and could not act otherwise. Therefore, any attempt at defeating or restricting, directly or indirectly, the scope and width of the order of the Supreme Court cannot be countenanced. However, as observed earlier, the controversy at present is in a very narrow compass and practically about the steps which could be taken by the SIT while it is admittedly conducting only a preliminary enquiry for the purpose of submitting a worthwhile report to the Supreme Court. If in that process the SIT is required to collect information and ask questions of any person having knowledge about the facts leading to the allegations made in the complaint, all civil and judicial authorities are duty bound to act in aid of such exercise undertaken pursuant to the direction of the Apex Court. If in that process the SIT is required to collect information and ask questions of any person having knowledge about the facts leading to the allegations made in the complaint, all civil and judicial authorities are duty bound to act in aid of such exercise undertaken pursuant to the direction of the Apex Court. The apprehensions expressed on behalf of the petitioner that recording of some statements by the SIT may amount to investigation and may be used against accused persons are ill-founded and misconceived in view of the specific statement on behalf of the SIT that it is holding a preliminary enquiry so as to find out the truth or otherwise of the statements and allegations made in the complaint, in accordance with the direction of the Apex Court. While the SIT is acting not only under the direction, but practically under the supervision of the Supreme Court to which it has to submit its report, no relief as prayed in the petition can be granted to the petitioner by the High Court. Therefore, the petition is dismissed and Notice is discharged with no order as to costs. P P P P P